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# Redefining Community in Intercultural Context



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# Redefining Community in Intercultural Context

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First cover: The Map of Albania from 1445 (author: Bartolomeo Pareto, dedicated to Pope Nicholas V), recently discovered by Artan Shkeli, where the Balkan territory was named Scandirbeco (Skanderbeg). This map suggests the role of Albania in Balkans and in Europe. It also represents a metaphor for the Balkan routes of the waves of history.





## SUMMARY

<b>Summary</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Migration and Intercultural Dialogue</b> .....	<b>9</b>
Intelligence and Migration (Florian Coldea) .....	11
Migratory Waves: Historical and Social Aspects in the Shaping of Intercultural Dialogue (Mariselda Tessarolo)....	19
How to End the Syrian Civil War and its Refugee Crisis – A Possible Scenario (Gabriel Giuvara, Gabriel Răducanu) .....	25
Each Nation’s Ark on the Waves of New “Migration Flood”. Romania’s Institutional and Cultural Preparedness (Adrian Lesenciuc, Ammar El Benni) .....	29
Migration and Citizenship. The Pedagogical Approach for a Cosmopolitan Citizenship (Alberto Fornasari, Mario Conte) .....	41
Adoption of the Global Compact for Migration and the Steps to Follow in the European Regional Context (Eduard Mihai, Ovidiu Moșoiu, Ion Bălăceanu) .....	47
Illegal Migration, the Current Issue of the Security of Nations (Ovidiu Moșoiu, Eduard Mihai, Ion Bălăceanu) .....	53
<b>Culture and Communication</b> .....	<b>61</b>
National Identity, Nourished from the Roots of History (Adrian Lesenciuc, Ioana Miruna Popescu) .....	63
Romania’s Centenary and Young Romanians’ View of their Own Identity (Irina Erhan, Florentina Hăhăianu) ..	69
Cultural Lens of Critical Infrastructure Protection (Ella Magdalena Ciupercă, Victor Adrian Vevera) .....	75
Myopia and Hyperopia in Shaping Cultural Identity (Ioana Leucea, Brândușa Șeican) .....	81
From the Experience Inside Military Multinational Coalition from Afghanistan to a Cultural Educational Model Proposal (Rita Palaghia) .....	88
The <i>Communicative Relationship</i> as a Constitutive Dimension of the “Idea of Community”. The Relevance of the Phenomenological Contribution of Edmund Husserl (Gabriella de Mita) .....	95
Internal Exclusion via Multicultural Policy in South Korea: Beyond the Multiculturalism (Jimhee Kim) ...	103
<b>Linguistics. Discourse Analysis</b> .....	<b>109</b>
Empathy, Sympathy and Demonization of the Other in the Balkan Literature (Mariglena Meminaj) .....	111
Romanian 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Poetry and the Internet: Identity Marketing Policies from “Netpoets” to Virtual Reading Community (Ramona Hărșan) .....	117
Vocabulary: An Epitome of Social Realities (Denisa Drăgușin) .....	125
Pragmatism of Modal Verbs: Case Study of the ICAO Requirements (Daniela Nagy) .....	131
Power Distance in the Korean Culture as it Emerges from a K-Drama (Elena Buja) .....	137
Writing the Difference: The Minoritarian Perspective of Italian Migrants in Quebec (Ylenia De Luca) ..	148
Nationalist Discourse at the European Parliament. The Case of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage (Liliana Alic) ..	153
The Cult of Eagle Metamorphosed – A Semiotic Approach (Eleonora Hodaj) .....	159
Justice, Politics and Intelligence. Quantum Synergies Computed within the Framework Contract of the European Union (EU) Membership (Cristina Gelan) .....	165
The New Museum of Contemporary Art as a Place of Communication for the <i>Second Wave</i> Feminist Art World (Emanuele Stochino) .....	171
The Issues of Latin and Dacian Origin of the Language at the Dawn of Romanian Literature. The Emergent Forms of Romanian Literature (Ionică Cîrciu, Evelina Cîrciu) .....	177
The Pedagogical Communication (Vittoria Bosna) .....	181
Hedging and Boosting Strategies in Albanian Newspaper Opinion Pieces for Dialogical Communicative Purposes (Bledar Toska) .....	185
Intercultural Dialogue for Internationalization at Home: The Case of Albanian Universities (Armela Panajoti)...	191
<b>Security and Intercultural Communication</b> .....	<b>203</b>
The Solidarist Discourse and Humanitarian Intervention. Revisiting Sovereignty, Responsibility and Morality in Global Politics (Laura Herța) .....	205

.....	
<i>CIMIC</i> Tasks During the Romanian Air Policing Mission in the Baltic States. “Baltica 07” (Cosmina-Oana Roman) .....	211
Terrorist Attacks – A Challenge in Crisis Communication (Delia Pop-Flanja) .....	219
The Role of Security Culture in the Fight Against Fake News (Ruxandra Buluc, Ioan Deac, Răzvan Grigoraș, Ciprian Lungu) .....	226
The Concept of National Identity and Its Fall under the School of Constructivist Thinking. Arguments. Identifying the Elements Belonging to the Constructivist Approach (Ioana Miruna Popescu) .....	235
The (Dis-/) Integration of the EU’s Rapid Response Capabilities: The Case of the EU Battlegroups (Adrian-Vasile Popa, Gheorghe Teodoru Ștefan) .....	241
<b>New Technologies, Resources, and Connections .....</b>	<b>253</b>
Marketing Albania through Foreign Social Media (Irena Skendo) .....	255
The Strategic Place and Role of Integrity among Governance Principles and Values of Public Administration (Aura Codreanu) .....	259
Strategic Human Resource Management. A Milestone for Integrity Building in Public Administration (Aura Codreanu) .....	267
The Education of Interpersonal Intelligence in Schools, a Necessity for a Stable Development (Bukuroshe Isufaj) .....	275
Extrinsic Meta-Programs with Influence on Workers Motivation (Bogdan-Alexandru Furdulescu) .....	281
Models Used in NLP for Motivation (Bogdan-Alexandru Furdulescu) .....	285
General Overview of the Project “Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security” (Ecaterina Liliana Miron, Daniela Nagy, Laurian Gherman, Marin Marinov) .....	293

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## INTELLIGENCE AND MIGRATION

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***Abstract:** As an intelligence practitioner, it has been my experience that migration has very different implications for different factors of decision-making factors: it can bring significant advantages from an economic and social point of view, it can be a humanitarian necessity, as well as an obligation to comply with the most basic human rights, but migration on a big scale is also a serious security concern, with potential of generating acute regional instability and insecurity. And those effects have significant impact on both target, and transit countries. Alongside other relevant institutions, intelligence too has a significant role in detecting threats associated with migratory waves, regardless if they consist of refugees or economic migrants. The highest risk is, of course, that of terrorism suspects infiltrating both afore-mentioned legitimate categories, while another hot topic related to this phenomenon is still the foreign fighters/ returnees problem. On one side, there is the thorny question of identifying potential terrorism suspects among millions of people, some fleeing war and inhumane living conditions. And this risk cannot be managed by any single authority alone. It takes close cooperation among local integration authorities, law enforcement and border control representatives, and intelligence agencies. There is also an acute need for further regional cooperation, but also of cooperation with other countries, some adherent to radically different ideologies, which poses several questions, varying from the protection of secrecy, to professional intelligence ethics. Fact is, only a joint effort can generate early warning and the implementation of adequate prevention and countering measures for all kinds of risks and threats related to this complex phenomenon of migration. And, in this regard, one of the most difficult issues we are facing is detecting a person's actual identity, while a fake identity isn't necessarily a signal for a hidden, dangerous agenda. There are also other issues at stake, weighting in on intelligence: the incumbent risks of refugee camps, starting with rioting, altercations with local authorities, and involvement of organized crime networks. Organized crime in Serbia and Macedonia, for example, has been facilitating illegal migrant traffic towards Western Europe for the past four years, becoming a serious concern for European intelligence. Other potential threats stem from the fact that some organizations claiming to help refugees in Greece and Turkey were reported to be actually run by Islamic groups connected to terrorist organizations. And there are also other adverse effects in the host societies which are in intelligence's purview: the reactivation of far right ideas and groups, such as nationalist and supremacist groups with a potentially violent behavior. Intelligence is just a piece of the puzzle in dealing with the phenomenon, but it also has its limitations and needs to enhance its capacity in order to limit risks and threats. Those are some of the premises of a tense relation between migrants and intelligence, which I believe is worth further exploration.*

**Keywords:** migration; intelligence; cooperation

### 1. GENERAL CONTEXT

In Europe, migration only became a troublesome phenomenon in the past few years; it was, after World War II and before the waves of Syrian refugees, a manageable, natural and even necessary process, helping aged Western countries ensure the workforce and population growth much needed for economic purposes. Migrants were needed and generally accepted, with a well established due process allowing them admission, integration and work in the receiving societies, migration a basic human right.

And maybe one of the factors for this tolerance to a lower-scale phenomenon was the very fact that Europe had, for several centuries, been a continent of majoritary indigenous populations, with strong values and a culture of its own, difficult to tip by foreign influences. Migrants were mostly of European descent, but intent on finding better living and working conditions or fleeing conflict elsewhere on the continent. It was rather the foreigners that were assimilated into the mainstream. Until well after the Second World War, Europe had also been the place of origin for migrants going throughout the world, from the Americas to Africa or Australia.

But this would make us expect other nations, providentially formed by immigrants, the most relevant example being the United States of America, to be more welcoming with both economic migrants and war and political refugees, given their former status of “melting pot” accepting of all nationalities and ethnicities, tolerant of all values and cultures and welcoming for all outsiders. On the contrary, the current policy in the US seems to blame migration for all that goes wrong with the American society, from crime rates to lack of jobs, stress on the health and social insurance systems etc. The need for a border wall, intensely advocated by American President Trump, rests on a pretended necessity to limit migration to the US and an underlying association of the migratory phenomenon with terrorism.

What has changed, then? Why have Western democracies become increasingly preoccupied with migration, why does it generate misunderstandings among EU Member States and division in societies, changes of policies, and even social unrest?

a. **Numbers.** On the one side, there is, of course, the sheer number of migrants: the number of asylum seekers in Europe doubled from 2014 to 2015<sup>1</sup>, while most efforts for addressing asylum requests were undertaken by poorer members at the EU borders, since they are the first entry points.

And I think one of the main reason the migratory wave in the last years has put so much pressure on the EU’s cohesion is the very fact that it brought the greatest responsibility to the poorest countries in the Union, which needed to rapidly enhance their processing capabilities for asylum seekers and migrants – but on their own limited resources –, keep them from going further to their destination countries unchecked, while, at the same time, respecting all basic human rights and ensuring optimal living standards for a fair number of people.

The basis for dealing with the phenomenon, the Dublin III Regulation, proved a less than adequate framework for such a crisis, actually putting pressure on the entry-point countries, which are compelled to examine all asylum requests themselves. Moreover, any asylum seeker who filed a request at an entry-point country and was afterwards moved to another one shall, according to the Regulation’s provisions, be returned for processing in the entry country. As a result, Greece

and Italy were heavily affected during the peak of the crisis, while Hungary chose to stop receiving back initial applicants. Some solidarity did show at EU level, when countries such as Germany, Norway or the Czech Republic offered to help processing requests filed elsewhere, particularly for Syrian refugees.

b. **Terrorism anxiety.** On the other side, what is new in the past decade is that, of all asylum seekers coming to the EU, in 2016, for example, 29% were Syrian, 14% – Afghani, and 10% Iraqi, leaving other nationalities in the one-digit percentile. This means completely different values, different lifestyles, but with high expectations from what this area of welfare and peace ought to offer.

This also resulted in some countries of the top 10 being impacted by terrorism worldwide.

It is also not a surprise that, during this violent migratory wave which hit Europe from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015, the majority of asylum seekers were Muslims, and all this in the hectic aftermath of 9/11 and the war on terror, of the decline of Al Qaeda and emergence of DAESH.




Fig. 1. Asylum seekers in the EU, 2015; source: EUROSTAT

And although it is not fair to place an anathema on asylum seekers and migrants, due to the general state of insecurity generated by Islamic terrorism, Western democracies had to implement additional measures and have a more acute sense of responsibility for protecting their citizens. Terrorism brought about a more fragile national and local/regional security, as well as further pressure on authorities to prevent other attacks. And, in terms of national security, keeping the balance between protecting one’s own citizens and those of other states is sometimes – as within this case – difficult to do.

The interests of local citizens tend to take precedence over those of other states’, and reflections

<sup>1</sup> According to Eurostat news release 44/2016, March 4, 2016 – *Asylum in the EU Member States*, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6>, accessed March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

of the past tend to blur the present, particularly when terrorist attacks are what comes to mind.

c. **Organized crime.** The last but not least of the aspects putting pressure on the West is a familiar side-effect of migration: the appearance of organized, transnational crime, criminal networks set up in order to get rich, facilitating the foreigners' transition to their target countries. On the one side, there is no need to further invoke the number of situations in which immigration networks have led people to their death in the attempt to smuggle them towards destination. On the other side, the same transit routes can and are used for further crimes, such as drug or weapons trafficking.

## 2. INTELLIGENCE AS A PIECE OF THE PUZZLE

This being the general picture, it is important to see what are the responsible actors in the process, which can facilitate both observation of basic human rights for migrants and asylum seekers, and security and stability for all other parties involved, from entry-point countries to transit ones, and to destination states.

Intelligence is obviously not the central piece in the mechanism of screening migrants or refugees, since most countries have migration authorities responsible for the phenomenon, but intelligence is, nonetheless, just as relevant as any other authority for the process, because it can provide real-time information about potential threats.

Processing requests, on the one side, and preventing migrant trafficking and illegal migration, on the other, is a matter of a joint effort, on several layers. First, there is the need for domestic cooperation among all pertinent authorities. The entire chain, from well prepared immigration officers, able to act as sensors and first response, to well adjusted law enforcement, with all material means to verify requests and counter trafficking, to pro-active and well-informed intelligence, and a prepared social system, apt to ensure optimal living conditions during requests processing, can have no weak link.

On the other side, local authorities cannot prevent and counter ensuing risks and threats without wider cooperation at regional and global level. There is a need of permanent consultation with other states, transnational organizations, and even with the migrants' countries of origin, for example in order to correctly identify applicants. International data bases, valuable information from other organisms, as well as input from the intelligence are indispensable tools for keeping our

countries and the migrating populations safe. For example, the Passenger Name Record (PNR), a vast data base keeping track of all travel information collected by airlines, is a good tool for detecting foreign fighters and returnees which could be posing as immigrants. This particular system was, nonetheless, subject to misunderstandings between the EU and the US, for example, due to differences in processing and securing personal data.

As mentioned, the operative situation can sometimes refer domestic authorities to those in the migrant's country of origin, which also raises particular ethical questions since, in many cases, those countries are far from being democratic ones, acting upon a completely different set of values than ours. It is, for example, possible to conceive that a foreign intelligence agency in an autocratic country could perceive an opponent of the authorities in power as a terrorist and inform partners in democratic states as such, which only makes the vetting process more difficult.

## 3. COOPERATION FORMATS

a. **Intelligence cooperation.** Extensive cooperation in intelligence has developed largely because of the terrorist phenomena, in the post 9/11 era. It is difficult for any institution working with secret information, as well as with secret means and methods, to agree to divulge some of its trade secrets, sometimes for the exclusive benefit of a partner. And partnerships and interests may still be divergent under some aspects, therefore making cooperation even more difficult.

But, as it is the case, for example, with the INTERPOL SIENA exchange platform at EU level, intelligence worldwide has slowly but surely agreed to cooperate, even with partners in countries which do not share similar values, in order to reduce the terrorist threat.

With regard to intelligence cooperation, a significant component is, obviously, bilateral cooperation, on which most intelligence agencies rely.

But, most importantly, there are several multilateral intelligence cooperation formats. Their role is, on the one side, to enhance information exchange within dedicated platforms, which obviously has high operational value, but also to share expertise and lessons learnt, common training enterprises etc. These "non-transparent formats"<sup>2</sup> at European level are:

<sup>2</sup> Dubbed as such by Matthias Monroy, for an alleged lack of accountability, for example in <https://digit.site36.net/2018/12/04/how-european-secret-services-organise->

- *The Berne Club*, oldest among existing cooperation formats, said to have been established in 1969 by heads of Western European intelligence agencies;

- The *Counter Terrorism Group*, founded by the Berne Club shortly after the 9/11 attacks, aiming at exchanging Intel and discussing incidents and required or implemented measures; it has an operational platform in Hague;

- The *Paris Group*, established in 2016 as a reaction to EU terrorist attacks and including 15 countries;

- *SIGINT Seniors Europe* is a cooperation format for Signals Intelligence agencies, led by US NSA and established, initially, in 1982 with the purpose of exchanging Intel on the Soviet Union; it is particularly useful in exchanging intelligence, because it has its own communication system, called SIGDASYS;

- *INTCEN*, the civilian intelligence analysis center under the European External Action Service, responsible for assessing intelligence submitted by Member States' agencies, and working with *EUROPOL* for joint analysis, conclusions, and orientations;

- *EUMS INT Directorate* – a structure similar to *INTCEN*, but a military structure within the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate.

Regional cooperation formats are also worth mentioning, because they are sometimes more focused on a general picture all participants have a better understanding of and on more acute common problems; regional intelligence initiatives such as the *Middle Europe Conference – MEC* and the *South Eastern Europe Intelligence Conference – SEEIC* have done much in the way of countering common threats.

**b. Inter-agency cooperation.** Intelligence agencies do, however, cooperate in other formats and with other organisms, too, in order to contribute to the most of their capabilities to the vetting process, as well as to the prevention and countering of illegal migration and of various side-effects it can have.

Out of the European cooperation formats, one that raises high hopes in the fight against terrorism is the European Counter Terrorism Center – *ECTC*, an organism of the *EUROPOL* which collaborates with the European Migrant Smuggling Centre, as well as with other institutions such as the *INTERPOL* or *EUROJUST*.

*ECTC* works within the framework of Analysis Projects, in which intelligence is collected and assembled by teams of analysts and experts. The exchange of information among *INTERPOL* and Member States is done through the *SIENA* system (Secure Information Exchange Network Application), accessible on a cooperation-agreement basis for any local CT organism. The system also allows participating authorities to exchange Intel among themselves, with or without involving the *EUROPOL*. It is operational in 95% of EU Member States, including a total of 46 CT authorities.

With *NATO*, CT cooperation is operational through the *Emerging Security Challenge Division – ESCO*, established in 2010 in order to tackle emerging threats such as terrorism and cybercrime, as well as nuclear policy, energy security or non-proliferation.

At EU level, the Justice and Home Affairs includes a working group on terrorism, *The Working Party on Terrorism – TWP*, involved in intelligence exchange, countering radicalization and recruitment, and reviewing EU members' best practices.

The *Security Directorate* of the European Commission is also responsible for countering terrorism, alongside other responsibilities.

The *EURODAC* initiative, supported by law enforcement throughout the EU, is also essential since it provides an extensive fingerprint database, but needs considerable improvement through addition of personal data as well as data about the judicial record of the migrants.

#### 4. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BIG PICTURE FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE

**a. The terrorist threat.** Europe's greatest concern regarding the current migration wave is about the disruptive potential foreign fighter returnees have for their domestic security; in this regard, however, we are mainly speaking of nationals of the respective countries, returning from their host-countries even more radicalized and often as 'sleepers', waiting for the right time to act.

Although the number of EU foreign fighters and returnees is reportedly decreasing<sup>3</sup>, countries with significant numbers of foreign fighters who left to support *DAESH* are expected to return through migration channels in origin countries such as Germany, France, Belgium or even Hungary.

As of 2018, available data from Austria show that several persons seeking migrant or refugee status

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themselves-in-groups-and-clubs/, [accessed March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2019].

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<sup>3</sup> According to the *ECTC's* *TESAT* as of 2018.

raised severe suspicions of being DAESH members and were, therefore, arrested, while countries such as Greece and Italy did not identify such potential threats, but neither can they rule them out. The official numbers are not readily available and don't seem high, but it is obviously not necessary for the migration flows to be used systematically to infiltrate terrorists in order to provoke a great deal of harm. But, even with data on the topic being scarce, the EU undertook several measures to reduce such possibility, among which the most prominent consist of stricter border controls.

FRONTEX has improved its surveillance capabilities and has enhanced data-exchange, particularly with the Libyan coast guard, with discussions ongoing in order to allow Libyan authorities access to the "Seahorse Mediterranean" database. FRONTEX has applied new regulations as of the end of 2014, has instituted the EUROSUR system of monitoring frontiers by means of satellites and drones, and has launched a Multi-purpose Aerial Surveillance/ MAS program.

But despite all the technical advances which can provide better protection, the issue of falsified or stolen travel documents seems to remain the most difficult problem to tackle.

INTERPOL also acted by sending rotating teams of 50 guest officers to Italy and Greece, at entry points of migratory flows, in order to help with security checks and pinpoint terrorism and crime suspects. An extensive recruitment effort is also underway, in order to bring 200 more officers ready for deployment in sensitive migration spots.

Terrorist infiltration amongst legitimate migrants is still a central concern for intelligence, alongside the potential of radicalization and violence in large groups, especially in the context of reduced processing capabilities. Serious threats were uttered by DAESH members in 2014, for example, when they threatened to flood Europe with refugees and send 4 000 jihadists to Turkey.

***Case Study – Paris, November 13, 2015.***

Perhaps the most famous case of terrorist attackers exploiting the weaknesses of an imperfect migration and border control system was that of the November 13, 2015 Stade de France attackers. France is a particularly appealing target for terrorism, because of several reasons:

- i. it is a symbol of Western culture and democracy, point of origin for values such as Revolutionary Liberty, Fraternity, Equality;
- ii. it is involved in Africa with predominantly Muslim countries, where it has economic and military interests;

- iii. it has a secular tradition and has implemented controversial measures forbidding, for example, religious markers in public places, which generates discontent among some traditional Muslims;

- iv. it has an estranged, isolated and poor second or third generation migrants, becoming frustrated, vulnerable and eventually radicalized;

- v. it has the highest number of foreign fighters and returnees of all European fighters, with estimations of approximately 1,700 persons fighting in Syria and Iraq<sup>4</sup>.

At the end of 2015, one of the Paris attackers, an Algerian, was arrested in a refugee camp in Salzburg, after having previously been arrested and released in Greece, for failing to pass a passport check. Two of the perpetrators seem to have entered Europe with false Syrian passports.

There was, obviously, not enough information shared in this case, since he was caught and released, and eventually allowed to participate in a severe attack. He seems to have been part of a group of jihadists that trained with DAESH in Syria.

Although tough measures were taken in France, with an impact on regular citizen's lives, they were barely effective. Only in 2017 have French lawmakers also strengthened counter-terrorist legislation, allowing, among others, for the Office of the Public Prosecutor and particular Judges (of the Counter-Terrorism Section) to communicate to intelligence agencies parts of the terrorism juridical procedures.

On the other side, there is also a probability that terrorist attacks could be perpetrated in order to compromise specific refugees groups, such as those coming from Syria, in order to provoke more radical measures by EU Members States, directed at them<sup>5</sup>.

Radicalization and extremism amongst migrants, in refugee's camps and centers is a serious risk, too. Camps become small-scale societies, with their own mosques and imams, some preaching jihadist concepts and even sending youngsters to fight for DAESH<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Schmidt, A. <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Alex-P.-Schmid-Links-between-Terrorism-and-Migration-1.pdf>, accessed March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2019.

<sup>5</sup> EUROPOL Report *Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Revisited*, at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-revisited>, accessed March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2019.

<sup>6</sup> S. Schmidt quotes an interview with a DAESH defector, stating that the Turkish refugees camp at Akcakale has imams recruiting for ISIS, and that after the Kobani battle, several of the dead fighters had on them IDs from this particular refugee camp.

A 16-years old Syrian boy was arrested, in 2016, in Cologne, for owning materials adequate for the fabrication of an improvised explosive device, with the aim of perpetrating an attack. German authorities discovered his online discussions with DAESH members, as part of his radicalization process.

Lebanon currently has almost a quarter of its population made up by Syrian refugees, while in 2016, its Prime Minister assessed over 20,000 jihadists are in local refugees camps.

There are also situations in which refugee camps became places of violent extremist actions, targets of violent attacks. This is the case with locations such as the Afghan camps in Pakistan, or the Yarmuk camp outside Damascus, whose inhabitants were used as human shields by DAESH, but also the cases of some centers in Germany and Sweden, attacked by arsonists.

Terrorist propaganda can be directed at migrants in refugee centers, since they are a particularly vulnerable category, and, in this regard, the media made various allegations, for example of DAESH trying to recruit in Turkish camps.

UN reports attribute the potential for radicalization in refugee's camps to three factors: lack of education, lack of work, and lack of freedom of movement. And intelligence can do much both in anticipating and preventing such radicalization, and in speeding up the process of vetting, in order to reduce opportunities for such radicalization.

For settled migrants, there are other specific cases of concern, particularly since states like France and Belgium have already experienced the destructive consequences of such actions. Differences on all levels – social, economic, cultural – as well as a traumatic migration process sometimes make settled migrants become unadjusted, self-perceived as second-rate citizens. And migrant communities can also become increasingly radicalized in reaction to unfortunate policies and/ or interventions.

Migrants and refugees themselves can become victims of violent extremism in their host societies. Isolated incidents or even fake news, as the famous allegations about immigrant perpetrated rapes in Germany, on New Year's Eve, 2016, can inform political decision, support populism and increase the level of social anxiety to the point of generating violent extremism or supremacism. Germany had over 900 reports of xenophobic violence in 2015, at the apex of the latest migration wave. Arsons by Molotov cocktails became frequent in many camps in European countries, from Austria and France, to Germany and the UK.

*Case study – Christchurch, Australia.* The Australian citizen who killed 50 Muslims in two New Zealand mosques in Christchurch, in March 2019, although apparently that of a self-radicalized lone wolf, is actually a result of such ideas and a sad example of the extreme effects this type of reactions can have.

An extremist and a xenophobe, connected to and supporting groups and organizations of the same orientation, the attacker tried to legitimate his political position through historical arguments pertaining to the European long-standing battle against the Ottoman Empire. Extremists encourage each other, they become accomplices, while globalization, social media, television, as well as more sophisticated instruments as the Deep/ Dark Web can help spread hatred and toxic ideas, and can lead to further radicalization, making the New Zealand events a franchise spreading through other countries, too.

On the other side, as a reaction to migration policies and in support of the migration agenda, extremists and anarchists also perpetrated other attacks, targeting authorities and infrastructure, in violent acts of vandalism and arsons such as the ones in France, Belgium, Italy or Greece.

Incidents motivated by hatred became, in fact, more and more frequent, and a category of terrorist attacks in themselves. Attacks on mosques in London and Quebec, as well as on Jewish worshippers in Pittsburg, were just as many warning signs.

Right wing terrorism and Islamic terrorism share a considerable number of common traits, such as the mechanisms for radicalization, the belief that “resistance” is a must, that their society is under threat and that they have an obligation to fight it, as well as a deformed vision of the past.

And there is another thing to consider in analyzing the connections among migration and intelligence. NATO official, general Phillip Breedlove, warned, in 2016, that Russia, with Syrian support, is weaponizing refugees in its attempt to destabilize the West. The aim was, in Breedlove's terms, “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”<sup>7</sup>, which seems particularly worrisome, in retrospect, since, should it have been a Russian strategy, the Syrian migratory wave has been able to produce quite a lot

<sup>7</sup> *NATO Commander: Russia uses Syrian refugees as “weapons” against West*, March 2<sup>nd</sup> 2016, URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-commander-russia-uses-syrian-refugees-as-weapon-against-west/a-19086285>, [accessed March 25<sup>th</sup>, 2019].

of dissension among EU member states, starting from immigration quotas and ending with the building of fences.

b. **Organized crime.** Migrant smuggling is already a phenomenon of severe consequences, the most obvious being the further vulnerabilization of an already vulnerable category of people.

Migrants are exposed to abuse, their lives put at risk in small containers or vehicles improper for human transportation, at sea or in the desert. Women and children are potential victims of human trafficking and exploitation. The UN estimates over 6.75 billion USD to be the approximate profit generated by the two main global smuggling routes. The figure tends to equal those representing profits from drugs or weapon trafficking.

At the height of the European migratory wave, in 2015, the chief of EUROPOL stated that the migrant smuggling industry in Europe amounted to over 30,000 people, while the agency was documenting, at the time, 1,400 such cases. Among those, known criminal groups such as the Italian Cosa Nostra were investigated for suspicions of involvement in migrant smuggling.

As with all cases of organized crime, corruption is one of the decisive factors for a successful enterprise in migrant smuggling, with corrupt officials turning a blind eye to the phenomenon. It is, therefore, no surprise that Italy, for example, has arrested, in 2015, several government officials responsible for managing camps and for helping asylum seekers settle in the country, for connections with smugglers.

Such criminal groups tend to merge or form cooperatives, expanding their reach and enlarging the categories of activities they undertake, in order to maximize profits.

False documents, stolen passports or even genuine documents obtained through fraudulent means are impediments for authorities to properly identify and process immigration requests and to keep nations safe.

By its very nature, migrant smuggling is transnational crime, and it involves closer international cooperation, with the main actors being law enforcement and intelligence agencies from origin, transit, and destination countries. And the problems they need to address are numerous, beginning with the shift of scope of other criminal networks, such as drug trafficking ones, to online advertising of such activities.

A Wiki leaks document exposed in 2015 showed concerns from EUROPOL chief that more intelligence was needed about those networks, in

order for European authorities to better counter the phenomenon.

c. **Intelligence limitations.** It would only be fair to say many consider terrorist attacks such as the one in Paris/ November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2005 failures of the intelligence system. In some cases, it indeed has proved unable to determine the exact threat and prevent it. And although I can personally state the phenomenon has been analyzed and anticipated, it is obvious that this was not enough to manage it or to fundament appropriate decision-making.

The cooperation formats mentioned previously are a necessary step, but it is not enough to ensure the security we all desire, and this, for a variety of reasons. First of all, not all involved intelligence services are EU or NATO members, therefore their standards can differ significantly. For EU member states, an impediment to closer intelligence cooperation is the fact that, through Article 4 of the EU Lisbon Treaty, “in particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”<sup>8</sup>.

d. Intelligence agencies underwent unequal reform processed, have unequal capacity and rely on significantly different legislation and attributes to fulfil the same task. Those particularities make consistent and coherent action difficult.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

One of the few good news for Europe is that, after 2017, migration flows declined. Not all underlying motives are positive, as, on one side, some victories were won against DAESH in Syria, while, on the other side, uncertainty for potential migrants that they would have a better life in their host countries increased.

A second piece of good news is that, according to a European Counter Terrorism Center assessment, as of the end of 2017, the European migration routes are not *systematically* used by terrorists trying to infiltrate the continent, but rather sporadic appearances. They nevertheless require vigilance and cooperation with entry-point EU countries, such as Greece and Turkey<sup>9</sup>.

A third piece of good news is that the EU-Turkey refugee agreement is functional and

<sup>8</sup> *The Treaty on the European Union*, URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M004>, [accessed March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2019].

<sup>9</sup> The European Parliament - *Terrorism in the EU – Attacks, Deaths and Arrests*, URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terrorism-in-the-eu-terror-attacks-deaths-and-arrests>, [accessed March 25<sup>th</sup>, 2019].

manages to keep in check over 2.9 million refugees, according to UN reports.

Yet, there is much that still needs to be done in order to preserve this basic human right and to keep safe both migrant communities and entry, transit and host countries. Capacity building is essential. It is not necessarily that migration and border control, for example, are components of the counter-terrorist efforts, but they are a necessary effort, which can be significantly enhanced due to precious information delivered by the intelligence community.

Cooperation at present is much more than it was ten or twenty years ago, but nevertheless, it is far from perfect.

Efforts to prevent and counter trans-national crime preying on migrants should also advance further, in order to reduce the phenomenon to a minimum. Further legal efforts are also necessary in order to prosecute and punish activities such as violent Internet propaganda, which can affect both migrants and host societies.

The role of intelligence in this context needs to be extended, because intelligence agencies are in possession of a significant knowledge base which can be used to ensure security. And security is an essential premise for development.

Those particular needs and others were reunited by the International Migration Organization under the generic name of “system of international migration governance”, involving common rules and regulations, information exchange and joint action. And this could be a good start for a solution.

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<sup>10</sup> *World Migration Report 2018*, URL: <https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/wmr/document/WMR%20IN%20FOSHEET%20No.%205.pdf>, [accessed March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2019].

## MIGRATORY WAVES: HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS IN THE SHAPING OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

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**Abstract:** *Sociology has always been interested in social changes and the way such changes affect society. The latter is not compact and monolithic, but rather malleable and modifiable. The desire for a unitary world where all people acquire the same cultural standard is strong, even though it is impossible to decide what standards all should conform to. A subject willing to migrate performs what Merton calls an “anticipatory socialization”. A migrant person prepares beforehand to be open to language models that are different from those of his/her own native language, as well as different models of belonging, for the present and the future. A migrating world is, in sum, a world dominated by a propensity to intercultural dialogue. In order to investigate this issue, two kinds of migration that took place from Albania to Italy in two historical periods are taken as an example to see how intercultural dialogue took place and how it is currently taking place. The examples we focus on are a succession of eight migrations that occurred between 1399 and 1774, and the two more recent migrations of 1991 and 1997. The Arbëreshë (or Albanians of Italy) primarily fled the Ottoman expansion while it was gaining new territories to the west; they also responded to appeals made by the kings of Naples and the Two Sicilies for soldiers to help ward off a conspiracy by the nobility. The Arbëreshë were granted land in the South of Italy as a reward, and the fact that such lands were mostly isolated made it easier for them to keep their customs and language. In the two latest migration waves that occurred in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Albanians mostly fled their country by sea, facing dramatic situations to cross the Adriatic sea by boat and reach the ports of Apulia. The first migrations, the “historical” ones, led to a deep intercultural dialogue. The Arbëreshë followed the history of Italy and fought in the wars for the independence of the country. When they emigrated to the Americas at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, only half of their population was left in Italy; and in getting to other countries, most of them were considered Italians, since that was actually their nationality. In the 1960s and 1970s there was an ethnic awakening to enhance and preserve the linguistic minority of the Arbëreshë, who were granted the status of protected minority by Unesco in 2017. Finally, we remember an internal migration displacing very large numbers of Italians from the south to the north of the country; many Arbëreshë were assimilated, even if an Arbëreshë community was recreated in Turin that kept the language and religious forms. In 2018, almost 500,000 Albanians from the latest migration applied for Italian citizenship.*

**Keywords:** *Albanian migration in Italy; intercultural dialogue; internal migration; maintenance of language and customs*

### 1. FOREWORD

What I would like to discuss in this article relates to the process of integration that each individual goes through to integrate into society, particularly when the need arises to integrate into a new group or society. Integration is possible through intercultural dialogue. This is useful for establishing and maintaining relations that, in their turn, highlight reciprocal comparison and exchange of knowledge among people who come from different cultures, but also simply from different social layers. Intercultural dialogue always has a reason to exist, but this is especially true when people migrate toward countries that are foreign

lands for them. Mobility is a human right.<sup>1</sup> Everyone has, in fact, the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State, but also the right to leave any country, including his/her own, and to return to his/her country.<sup>2</sup> We have chosen the historical migrations to Italy by Albanians that took place between the 15<sup>th</sup> and the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with a view to

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<sup>1</sup> *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948, articles 13, 14, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, everyone has a right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution and the right to a nationality. Everyone is therefore free to move, and this should be assumed by international regulations.

showing the importance of expulsion factors and reception motivated by humanitarian ends; but also of attraction factors, such as for example the search for employment, the possibility of living a better life and finding greater wellbeing. Preparation for the change involves an encounter that occurs in daily practice: in those who migrate voluntarily, anticipatory socialization is triggered (Merton, 1957), the preparatory stage for socialization that will take place in the future. It consists in learning models of behaviour that lead to avoiding clashes and adjusting more easily to the new society. However, it should be considered that dialogue must take place for both parties involved; and when the resident population is presented with a *fait accompli*, defence mechanisms tend to be enacted. At times of economic crises this has a significant weight, often even greater than that of the humanitarian aspect.

When migrants arrive wherever in the world, a process that was well described by Bauman (2002: 78) is triggered. He describes the *parvenu*<sup>3</sup> as someone who has just arrived and comes from somewhere else. His stay in any place is to be temporary, while that of the other residents will appear to be centuries old and eternal. Since he is a stranger, the “newcomer” raises fears in those who are already labelled as parvenus: a parvenu needs another parvenu in order not to feel a newcomer.

Emigration represents a demographic and economic phenomenon that can be analysed from two different points of view: in the perspective of the country of departure or in that of the country of arrival. Expulsion factors belong to the place of departure (wars, famines, poverty, desire to change); attraction factors, which show (especially on TV) a rosy, happy world where it is desirable to live, belong to the country of arrival.

## 2. CREATION OF CATEGORIES AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

There is nothing natural or eternal behind ethnicity, but just a process of continuous reformulation of identity (Fabiatti, 1998:134). Ethnicity is a constructed category and is never definitively attained. It manifests itself as a constant challenge to the theory of culture: it is essentially a relational category. The notion of culture is something continuously changing, acquiring new practices and discarding others. Culture itself as collective practice becomes the

object of constant renegotiation, because even recognition leads to a new redefinition.

**2.1 Ethnic belonging.** Giddens (2000) takes Hobsbawm’s thesis (1983:56) to the extreme when he observes that we could state that all traditions are invented. No traditional society was ever completely traditional, and traditions and customs are always created for a variety of reasons. It is a myth to think of traditions as something that is difficult to change. Traditions are always the property of groups, communities or collectivities.

This point of view is very contemporary and reflects the flexibility and fragmentation of the current historical period. As compared to the museification of popular culture juxtaposed to dominant culture, the post-modern critique of tradition takes the opposite direction: it is oriented toward a dialectic complexity of relations between hegemonic culture and subordinate culture (Marta, 2005:39, Ragnedda, 2006).

The frameworks within which we organize reality do not depend on the meaning of our experiences. Only by entering other people’s experiences is it possible to understand the meaning they produce. The “finite provinces of meaning” (Schütz, 1974) are the background for the social construction of reality that is only possible with a collective processing of the meaning itself. Such elaboration occurs through interaction, which is an essential pillar of social structure: a group is social in that it expresses and collects meanings and relations established through interactions among its components over time. What varies is the situations in which formal relations are generated. Ethnic belonging is a social category detected in situations of social interaction where subjects decide to which group they belong. Exploration and distinction are no longer possible, in an extremely fragmented scenario that does not provide suitable conditions for comparison and selection that could, in their turn, generate a personal assessment (Tessarolo, 1990).

**2.2 Toward a decentralized society.** The current model for society is decentralisation. Differentiation and pluralism intended as intercultural dialogue are present in all key issues of contemporary sociology (global versus local, universal versus particular, cosmopolitanism versus regionalism etc.): all these forces and notions are presented as modes of antagonism and conflict (Padovani, 1996).

The resurfacing of ethnic belonging responds to a dual issue. On one hand, it compensates for the

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<sup>3</sup> Simmel defines the *parvenu* as the stranger who comes to stay. To see also Sennett (2014).

weakening and fall of other criteria of belonging by displacing identity onto linguistic, cultural and historical planes. On the other, it forces society to disown the social contract upon which complex systems are based, whose existence depends on the ability to negotiate aims and differences. In sum, the rediscovery of ethnic identities brings to the surface the conflictual nature of complex societies and the awareness that such conflicts can not be eliminated.

The category of interculturality intended as a form of dialogue is tainted with difficulties because multiplicity of belonging is not a condition of balance. On the contrary, the individual perceives himself/herself as divided and in conflict. Recent conflicts in which different ethnic entities are on opposing sides are generated precisely in terms of the reaffirmation and recomposition of identities (Schütz, 1974).

Social psychology has significantly contributed to the study of the outcomes of an encounter between different social groups. People belonging to the external group are codified in terms of general categories, while the members of the group to which one belongs are assigned to more specific categories. Greater familiarity with own-group members allows a greater number of behaviours to be observed. Lesser contact with members of the other group could lead instead to a homogeneous and simplified vision of the group as a whole. The perception of social variability is therefore in direct proportion to the amount of knowledge available. When remembering positive or negative items of information, subjects more efficiently remember negative behaviours enacted by the external group. Subjects prefer to remember features that make the groups different, rather than features that make the groups similar.

In these conditions, the individual is reduced to a mosaic of diversified behaviours that cannot produce principles of unity in personality. What is sought is rather the unity of a cultural legacy (language, memory, culture). In our society, precisely when communication and economy are becoming globalised and new technologies gaining speed, a paradox is fulfilled: society stops projecting itself toward the future and relies on the past, or on ahistorical desires. The system and the actor no longer enact a reciprocity of perspectives but rather a direct opposition.

### 3. ALBANIAN MIGRATIONS TO ITALY

The analysis of two different waves of Albanian arrivals in Italy can, in the first case, help

us overcome the complications implied by consistent immigration for the recipient country. The migratory waves we consider differ from one another because they occurred in different historical periods. Eight immigrations took place between the 15th and 19th centuries. The Arbëreshë have been Italo-Albanians for long (over 600 years is a long period!), they have obtained Italian citizenship and their life is in Italy. When Italians migrated to the United States, one or two generations were enough for many of them to no longer feel they could go back to their country of origin.<sup>4</sup>

**3.1 The first wave: Arbëreshë.** We use the term Arbëreshë to refer to all that concerns the diaspora linked to the migratory waves spanning from the 15<sup>th</sup> to the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It must be remembered that all Albanians were called Arbëreshë, but only Albanians born in Italy have continued to use this term to define themselves, while those living in Albania call themselves Shqiptarëve. In order to understand how the Arbëreshë settled in Italy, we need to go back to the reason why they came and whose call they answered. We can identify the beginning of the displacement between 1339 and 1409, when the king of Naples appealed to Albanians to come to Italy and give assistance in the fight against his lords and the Anjou government. Ten years later, Alfonso of Aragon called the Albanian chieftain Demetrio Reres to Italy and, in exchange for the help received, granted the territories that, to this day, are inhabited by the Arbëreshë in the region of Calabria. The settlements in Apulia were created with a similar process, while those in Molise date back to a call to Albanians to repopulate the valleys whose inhabitants had been decimated by the plague in 1600. In the territories of Molise, the latest settlement took place in 1774. On their part, the Arbëreshë were fleeing the war related to the westward expansion of the Ottoman Turks.<sup>5</sup>

The maintenance of their language, religious tradition (the Byzantine rite) and language of primary socialization, together with the geographical location of the settlements in valleys, allowed the preservation of language and customs. The long separation from the mother country led the Arbëreshë to differentiate themselves from

<sup>4</sup> Writing about the “American character”, Margaret Mead notes that Americans purposefully forget their European ancestors and look instead to the more recent steps they have made in America (1946: 39).

<sup>5</sup> The city of Krujë was conquered by the Ottomans in 1478.

their fellow countrymen and cultivate customs of their own. It also made it impossible for them to “update” their language over time, as their fellows countrymen did in Albania. All this helped independently develop their belonging as Arbëreshë.

The language of the Italian Arbëreshë population is the ancient Arbërist in the Tosk (*toskë*) variety of southern Albania, with some inflections of Geg (*gegë*). It was also maintained because the Arbëreshë have two eparchies (bishops).<sup>6</sup> The language was transmitted without territorial proximity and in the oral modality. The Arbëreshë language is not immediately understandable for a native speaker of Albanian. However, there is a reasonable level of intercomprehension between the two languages: 45% of words are common, 15% are neologisms created by Arbëreshë writers and then passed into the language.

It is estimated that the Arbëreshë community in Italy numbers 100,000 people and makes up one of the ethno-linguistic minorities of this country. The Arbëreshë have their home country in Italy, where their roots are by now and where they cultivate their own traditions and diversity. They also participate in the economic and political life of the country. They fought in the Independence Wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, were part of Garibaldi’s *Mille* (“the one thousand”) and landed in Sicily with him; with Francesco Crispi (1887-1893) they had a Prime Minister; they experienced the troubles of the Italian economic crises at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and emigrated to America as Italians, with Italian citizenship.

The preservation of their own traditions does not have a political use of the tradition itself. It comes rather from a perception of the past as being always positive; consequently, each transformation is regarded as a loss and degradation. The decision of being a minority community is, in itself, a declaration of double belonging.

The linguistic history of the Arbëreshë reveals the deep impact of the national language, in its quality of written language, on the linguistic conditions of the local language. The latter is confined to a role of subordinate language, being an oral and non-literary language, thus making bilingualism unstable. Even though it is a “non-covered dialect”, the Albanian spoken in Italy shows a tendency to perform certain functions that in a dialect “covered” by a literary language are

usually performed by the literary language (Altimari, 1983).

Arbëreshë and Albanian are equalised, meaning they are equal within a defined area, subject to the people and the languages spoken by them, but only relatively to the regions where these languages are used. Linguistic minorities are in fact regional linguistic minorities (Salvi, 1975, p. 10).

Italian Law no. 482 of 1999, on the protection of linguistic minorities in the country, acknowledges that linguistic minorities exist; and article 2 guarantees the protection of the languages and cultures of the Albanian, Catalan, German, Greek, Slovene and Croat population, and the protection of the language spoken by French, Franco-provençal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan and Sardinian populations.

From some demographic considerations dated between 1951 and 2001, we note that the overall number of inhabitants of the single communities is decreasing, if we limit ourselves to the adoption of the socio-linguistic status of each community as the parameter with which to measure the transmission of the Albanian language from generation to generation. This parameter shows the speed and intensity of the linguistic change. Data reported by Giacomarra (2003) seem to confirm that mothers teach their children Arbëreshë as the primary language: 94.5% speak Arbëreshë and, among them, 90% say they learnt it as their first language. Only 2.3% of children whose parents are both Arbëreshë say they have learnt the language at a later date. However, Ruffino (2006) had found that 60% of 11-15 year old children knew Arbëreshë and, among these, 28% spoke the language fluently and frequently. The young people living in cities continue to speak Arbëreshë, possibly partly because of linguistic valves that obey communication strategies of an unconscious form of resistance. The presence of the Arbëreshë in Italy is an exceptional case in the history of peoples. In 2017 an official application was submitted to UNESCO for the inclusion of the Arbëreshë population as immaterial and social living world heritage. The representatives of small linguistic groups must be capable of thinking and feeling in one or more of the languages with greater diffusion, to which minority languages can contribute in form and thinking since all languages have something to learn from one another (Ong, 1989).

### 3.2 The second wave: Albanians 1991-1997.

In 1990 the fall of communism led to a second

<sup>6</sup> There was also a pope of Arbëreshë origin: Clement XI (1700-1721).

migratory wave of Albanians toward Italy, with tragic moments and numerous deaths. Many Albanian migrants were hosted by the Italian Arbëreshë communities, especially in Sicily. The new Albanians are well integrated into the social fabric of Piana degli Albanesi by now, where an Arbëreshë community was created that contains a well established core of Shqiptarë.

Almost 500,000 people arrived in Italy between 1991 and 1997. Now they live and work here and belong to the Italian society, just a short distance from their home country, Albania, where a recovery is currently under way. On 1 January 2018, there were 440,465 Albanian residents in Italy. The second migratory wave has not formed – and maybe never will – a community, in contrast with the community of the Arbëreshë, although the latter was such in the diaspora. Furthermore, these Albanians will never be Arbëreshë, but Italo-Albanians. In the year 2000, Albanians were at the top of Italian statistics concerning foreigners reported for crimes and illegal migrants (72%). These figures have been constantly decreasing. As many as 189,000 Albanians applied for Italian citizenship between 2006 and 2017. The younger ones are going back to Albania, where the economic situation has improved significantly.

In order to see how their integration in Italy developed, we can use the data reported by the Italian Institute of Social Security, INPS. In Italy there are 250,000 Albanians working legally; the owners of individual businesses are 31,358, meaning 8.6% of non-EU entrepreneurs present in Italy. Among foreign communities present in Italy, Albanians represent the group with the highest economic contribution to the hosting country.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The right of human groups to identity and diversity should become an accepted fact. Argumentation techniques in favour of such acceptance may only develop where discussion is free. Only in a free society rational choices become possible. The argumentation process is an antidote to the opposing temptations of fanaticism and scepticism: both the fanatic and the sceptic fall victim to the mirage of ultimate truth. The difference between them is that the fanatic is convinced he possesses that truth, the sceptic is certain that such possession is an illusion (Bobbio: XIX).

The theory of argumentation rejects antitheses that are too stark and shows that, between absolute truth and non-truth, there is room for truths that

have to be subjected to continuous review thanks to the technique of presenting reasons for and against. It is known that when men stop believing in good reasons, violence begins (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1976:538).

It is because of the possibility of argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling reasons, that it is possible to escape the dilemma: adherence to an objectively and universally valid truth, or recourse to suggestion and violence to secure acceptance for our opinions and decisions.

Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be exercised. (Perelman 1969:514).

Intercultural dialogue requires education in this from an early age, when it is easier to see the other not inevitably as an enemy, but as someone who belongs to another group, which should not necessarily be overpowered. It is important to recognize others and ourselves as real human beings, and not as cultural models (Tessarolo, 2018). The two migratory waves from Albania to Italy show how we can recognize others as real human beings and also how unexpected turns can surprise us. These Albanian migrations to Italy highlight that many reasonable choices have been possible, both for integration and specific identity.

I would like to conclude by quoting Sennet, with a change. He observes that “unexpected turns”, although caused by uprooting (the immigration of the Arbëreshë and later Albanians), are what makes it possible for a stranger to become a citizen of the same home country, even outside its borders.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> I would like to name the students from the University of Padua who presented a dissertation on the language of the Arbëreshë: Santina Palummo and Ginevra Delfino on Calabria; Paola Orlando on Molise; Biagio Nigro on Apulia. Furthermore, Albanian students Mejsila Resjaku and Blerina Lika, whose dissertations focus on the attitude toward Gheg and Tosk, the language varieties respectively of the North and South of Albania.

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## HOW TO END THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS REFUGEE CRISIS - A POSSIBLE SCENARIO

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**Abstract:** *The Syrian Arab Republic was established after the World War I; administrated initially by the French, the country became independent in 1946 (CIA, 2019). Hafiz al-Assad, member of the Baath Arab Socialist Party took power through a military coup in 1963 (CIA, 2019); his government headed by a single Party declared the state of emergency that would last for 48 years. When Hafiz al-Assad died, by 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad became president by popular referendum. Maintaining the state of emergency allowed al-Assad to retain strict control of security forces and all social and political sectors. The late 2010-early 2011 civil unrest, known as the Arab Spring, spread like wildfire and blew its 'wind of change' across Northern Africa and the Middle East. But in Syria, the protests did not echo nationwide; the security forces suppressed them quickly. In March 2011 however, following the arrest and torture of a couple of students who had written anti-Assad messages on a wall, the situation escalated and protests broke out again. In an attempt to defuse the situation, the security forces opened fire and killed four people. It was the beginning of Syrian civil war, which "has produced over 140,000 dead, hundreds of thousands wounded, and almost half of Syria's population displaced, either internally or in refugee camps on Syria's border" (Amos, 2014). This article focuses on describing the existing situation and a desired end state, defining the problem and developing a possible approach to end the Syrian civil war and its refugee crisis.*

**Keywords:** *Syria; civil war; refugee crisis*

### 1. THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

The situation in Syria remains critical as long as fighting continues across the country between government forces and anti-Assad regime insurgents -- some of whom are fighting amongst themselves. It looks like

more than 75% of the armed opposition may seek to replace the Assad government with a state ruled according to Sunni Islamic law (Blanchard *et al.*, 2014).

The Kurds have broad control of northeastern Syria and may seek autonomy/independence in the future.

Neither pro-Assad forces nor their opponents appear capable of consolidating their battlefield gains or achieving outright victory in the short term (Blanchard *et al.*, 2014).

Despite the fact that the government forces have lost control of large areas of the country, "the regime's crackdown on dissent has shown little to no sign of abating" (Nerguizian, 2011). The country's Alawite-led praetorian security forces remain devoted

to President Bashar al-Assad and "attempt to restore order and quash unrest"<sup>1</sup>. As clashes continue, Syrian populations continue to suffer. They are the subject either of inhumane and degrading treatments by government forces or of recruitment by almost all the factions fighting in Syria:

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<sup>1</sup>"Syria's Alawite community has a history of persecution, but dominate the ruling family's security forces [...] In the Arab world, the Sunnis exercise a hegemony that has often made minority sects feel insecure. Shia and heterodox sects - such as the Alawites - have been persecuted. Alawites saw the ruling Baath party as a way to transcend narrow sectarian identities, while state employment and the military offered opportunities for social advancement and an escape from poverty. Despite defections and desertions, Syria's praetorian military units may have little choice but to rally around the Assad regime. Given their limited prospects in a post-Assad Syria, heavily Alawite elite units with sizeable numbers of loyal Sunnis will likely perceive no alternatives to defending the regime in the event of wider intervention." Nir Rosen, "Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne," (Aljazeera, October 10, 2011), available from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/20111010122434671982.html> (accessed on April 5, 2014).

More than 13 million people need humanitarian assistance inside Syria, another 5.6 million have

fled the country as refugees, and 6.2 million people are displaced within Syria (World vision, 2019).



Fig.1. Syrian Refugee crisis in numbers (Source: Al Jazeera, UNHCR)

As depicted in Figure 1, Turkey and Lebanon have represented together ‘temporary destinations’ of more than 3 million Syrian refugees, from where most of them migrated into Europe. Iraq hosts around 250,000 refugees while Jordan, with its three large camps, is “home” of more than 600,000. The Jordanian authorities and charities have done their best to provide supplies and care but the refugee flows push the situation beyond the limits of both the host country and the international community. Armed gangs, prostitution rings, factions and the mental condition of most refugees contribute to the chaos. The al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist groups such as ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and Jabhat al-Nusra Front have taken advantage of this situation, instigating the refugees to attack Jordanian cities and villages thus creating disorder in the host country. In country, opposition forces continue fighting on multiple fronts as they face pressure from both the government forces and the extremist groups. They lack both unity of purpose and unity of command as well as unified international support. There is a continuous divergence among the opposing elements over the questions of whether and under what conditions to participate in negotiations with Bashar al-Assad regime. While some political wings, like National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (or Syrian Opposition Coalition, SOC), want negotiations for a secular Syrian state, others reject secular democracy, the political authority of

the National Coalition, and negotiations with the Assad government and appears committed to continuing their military operations. SOC has expressed several times its request that President Assad and his acolytes will not be members of any transitional governing body. At the international level, divergent perspectives among Syrian parties to the conflict (which in fact reflect their respective international backers) question the prospects for negotiations to end the conflict in the near future. While the member countries of the “Friends of Syria Group”<sup>2</sup> seek to a transitional process without Bashar al-Assad (as agreed to in Geneva in June 2012), Russia and Iran continue to support the current Syrian regime, which -- contrary to some observers’ predictions -- has shown no indication of an imminent collapse. Furthermore, Syria has not complied with the deadline established by United Nation Security Council Resolution 2118 for removal of chemical agents from its territory, which means that only 70 percent of chemical weapons have been removed. Ultimately, as part of refugees had fled into neighbouring Turkey,

<sup>2</sup>“The group consists of: Albania, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States”. Congressional Research Service, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response,” (Washington DC, March 25, 2019), available online at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf>

Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, the war in Syria is also exacerbating local sectarian and political conflicts within these countries, where violence may escalate and threaten national stability.

### 2. A POSSIBLE SCENARIO

The envisaged scenario which may change the future situation in Syria and its surrounding areas has to reflect the conditions that must exist to achieve the desired end state and how the relationships have to change among the 'actors.' In such an environment, Syria shall pass a peaceful transitional process toward its future status under an established Transitional Governing Body (TGB) as outlined in the June 2012 Geneva principles. To this end, the different factions of insurgents have to reach an agreement on the conditions to participate in negotiations as well as on the tactics, strategy, and their long-term political goals for Syria. Furthermore, they must reach an agreement on a potential future candidacy of Bashar al-Assad for presidential election and involvement of his devotees in the TGB or future Syrian politics. The country's Alawite-led praetorian security forces as well as state security services shall fall under full control of TGB and stop mass killings, arrests, detention and torture as well as inhumane and degrading treatment against population. The international community as well as the international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) shall assist the authorities and charities in the neighbouring countries to deal with the situation involving the Syrian refugees and provide the required funding to respond to the crisis. Nevertheless, Syria has to comply with the deadline established by United Nations Security Council for the complete removal of chemical weapons from its territory. Divergent perspectives among international backers to the Syrian parties must be attenuated and directed to prospecting of an acceptable path to end the conflict. Finally, under no circumstances, the war in Syria shall exacerbate local sectarian and political conflicts within neighbouring countries.

Bashar al-Assad and his devoted forces' actions, the dissensions among the insurgent groups and the continuous pressure exercised by the extremist groups on refugees represent the primary impediments for the achievement of the envisaged state of the situation in Syria and its surrounding areas. The Syrian president's tendency is to continue military and security operations against insurgents while pursuing political agreements that he likely judges could bolster

international support for his government. Then, there is permanent tension between Bashar al-Assad and insurgents regarding the current president's involvement in the future Syrian politics. While Assad's willingness is to participate in discussions but to reject calls for his resignation, some factions demand that President Assad and his acolytes will not be members of any TGB. There is also tension among different factions of insurgents on proposals for negotiation as well as on their long-term political goals for Syria. Explicitly, some tendencies are to continue rejecting secular democracy and negotiations with the Assad government, which is in fact what the other 'actors' have proposed. Increased dialogue of international community under UN aegis may attenuate divergent perspectives on Syria and help the country to remove all chemical weapons from its territory. Amplified assistance by international community, IOs and NGOs will support Damascus to stabilize the crisis of refugees.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

There is potential to solve the civil war in Syria as well as the Syrian refugee crisis and transform such a scenario into reality. To this end, there must exist concessions among all involved actors, which in fact does not happen in real life. With many armed opposition groups weakened, defeated, or geographically isolated, military pressure on the Syrian government to make concessions to the opposition has been reduced. As stated by the intelligence community's in 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment, "the conflict has decisively shifted in the Syrian regime's favour, enabling Russia and Iran to further entrench themselves inside the country" (WTA, 2018). The United Nations Organisation has supported peace talks in Geneva since 2012, but it is yet unclear when or whether the parties might reach a political settlement that could result in a transition away from Bashar al-Assad regime.

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## EACH NATION'S ARK ON THE WAVES OF NEW "MIGRATION FLOOD". ROMANIA'S INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL PREPAREDNESS

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**Abstract:** *The current paper approaches a topic of maximum relevance for regional and national security: the effects of migratory waves from the conflict zones of the Middle East on Romania's capacity to adapt to the dynamics of illegal cross-border flows. It has been revealed as a particular reflection of the subject of a broad research on the Islamic State (Daesh) and the impact of its actions on global/regional/national security. Under these circumstances, the present paper approaches aspects related to one of the major effects of the actions performed by the Islamic State: the displacement of migratory waves from the Middle East conflict zones and their absorption in Europe. At the same time, the paper focuses on Romania's role in the migration crisis, as a disjunctive element in rapport with the topic of the broad research, analyzing the cultural impact of the immigration phenomenon. Despite a rich and diverse specialized literature, from the perspective of its approach to the effects that immigration produces in Europe (focusing on political, cultural, religious and economic aspects), especially numerous articles expressing mainly the European version of the matter, the researchers belonging to the transit or target-countries, the immigration phenomenon is not the subject of a thorough cultural and security analysis in the Romanian academic environment. Starting from this premise and from the original purpose of the research - the analysis of the effects of the Islamic State actions - we opted for a thorough research, involving the use of qualitative research methods: the semi-structured interview with specialists and the participatory observation, engaging equally political decision-makers, diplomats, religious leaders, academics (national security specialists), intelligence analysts, opinion makers. The deep-dive interview, conducted in Romanian, Arabic or English, with 31 subjects covering the above mentioned areas of expertise, with experience in national security, over 50 years of age, coming from Europe and the Middle East but also from the United States of America or Africa (Romanian, Turkish, Dutch, Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, American), Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim or Mosaic Christians provide a comprehensive reading that is appropriate to the need for a deep knowledge of a phenomenon holding great implications for global, regional and national security. Through this article, which involves a multifaceted and complex approach to the immigration phenomenon as a Euro-Atlantic security dimension, as defined by the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 (2015: 13), we intend to offer a complex framework of analysis consistent with the promotion of legal migration, while reducing the security risks involved.*

**Keywords:** *The Islamic State (Daesh); Middle East; European crisis of migration; national security.*

### 1. PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS FOR AN UNWELCOME METAPHOR OR THE ACTUAL INTRODUCTION INTO THE MATTER

Prior to designing the study on the preparedness of European nations to face migratory waves and their effects, I reread David Shariatmadari's simple and conclusive text about "toxic metaphors" describing the migration generated by the recent Middle East conflicts, published in *The Guardian*, in 2015. We agree with the author of this text from many points of view, starting with the analysis of how language changes the way of thinking - with a personal interpretation nuanced in relation to that of

Shariatmadari's, with regard to the Shapir-Whorf hypothesis or the linguistic relativism. The shocking and unexpected phenomenon of contemporary migration, generated by profound causes, requires a humanitarian approach to what is happening with the waves of displaced people from their own countries, leaving to seek a safer future, risking their and their family members' lives in order to provide them with chances of decent living.

The debate on migration has given rise to many "toxic, inhuman, cynical" metaphors. Shariatmadari reminds us of some of the most prominent until the publication of the article in the British public space: "swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean" (Prime Minister David Cameron),

“marauding” (Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) “flood” (Daily Express, BBC), “stream” (BBC), etc.

So what are the ones [A/N - metaphors] we’ve picked to represent the movement of people to and around Europe? MIGRANTS ARE INSECTS is the metaphor favored by Cameron. It’s a subset of MIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS, and basis of Gillian Duffy’s famous ‘flocking’ comment. Hammond employs MIGRANTS ARE AN INVADING ARMY, the BBC and the Express, MIGRATION IS INUNDATION. When set out so starkly it’s clear that these metaphors are way over the top. Not to mention dehumanizing, ridiculously, simplistic, pitched at around the intellectual level of a dark-ages Anglo Saxon covering in a thatched hut. (Shariatmadari, 2015).

This perspective - toxic at the level of language - has the role of changing perceptions, raising fears, cultivating fear, creating certain expectations. Then, where does this projection by the title of this article on the “flood” of migration come from? The answer is simple: the subject under discussion is not “the flood of migration”, but the preparation of the ‘ark’ “of every people to oppose the ‘flood’ of political discourse” of each state that opposes the most significant social, political and cultural change in recent years. The “migration flood” is a reported discursive element; it is the fundamental metaphor, toxic in its core, which is part of the current political discourse, especially of the European countries characterized by illiberal regimes. The object of our analysis is the “preparation of the ark” of each European nation and its construction for “salvation”. The design of the “Romanian ark” is no exception - the public debate on security policy proposals and projections in the context of the current immigration phenomenon - and the understanding of this approach requires employment both from a cultural perspective and from the perspective of security studies. Therefore, this analysis will focus on two fundamental aspects: the immigration phenomenon as such and its effects on Romania, not before a proper methodology of study is discussed.

## 2. MERE “INUNDATION” OR THE SIGNS OF “FLOOD”? WORKING METHODOLOGY

In order to analyze the contemporary migration phenomenon generated by conflicts in the Middle East, we chose to start from the causes and to inquire in depth how migration - one of the effects of the unsettled crises in the area - has become a major subject of debate on European security. The

widespread migration problem of the Middle East conflict has been long studied over the last three years (2015-2018).

The specialized literature is very broad and diverse in its approach, with a deeper analytical focus from an economic perspective, without losing political, cultural, religious engagements. Most published articles express the European perspective: Sirkeci *et al.* (2015), Haller & Verwiehe (2016), Geddes & Scholten (2016), Bourbeau (2017), Ritzen & Kahanec (2017), Freedman *et al.* (2017), Perocco & Fratesi (2018), King & Okolski (2018), Karim & Al-Rawi (2018), etc. as a projection of authors from transit countries or from target countries. There are coordinated studies of specialists from outside countries that include migration routes: Dragostinova (2016), Niu & Fan (2016), Samaddar (2016), Salazar (2017), Al-Masri & Curran (2017), but these are exceptions to those made *in situ*. Concerning the perspective of the Romanian school, the studies reveal important economic aspects: Zaharia *et al.* (2017), Dumitru (2017), Androniceanu & Vasile (2018), or reflecting a political position through new media or classical media: Momoc (2016), Otovescu & Otovescu (2017), Kantor & Cepoi (2018) but they focus less on national security: Iov & Micaș (2017), Răducanu (2018) and cultural issues are almost unnoticed.

Against this background, based on a broader research - the analysis of the effects produced by the actions of the Islamic State (Daesh) - we opted for a digression in relation to the central theme, consisting of a deep analysis of one of the effects of Daesh actions: illegal migration from the Middle East caused by conflicts in the area. In this sense, we designed a qualitative depth research, achieved by a semi-structured interview with specialists (duplicating the participatory observation of one of the authors, Ammar El Benni, originating in the Middle East, in the Lebanese city of Tripoli). The interviewees (31) are politicians/parliamentarians, diplomats, religious leaders, academics (national security specialists), intelligence officers, security staff, opinion makers. These specialists are of Romanian, Turkish, Dutch, Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and U.S nationalities, more precisely, they come from Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the United States of America, have experience in national security, are over 50 and are, from a confessional point of view, Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim or Mosaic Christians. The

purpose of this projection was to cover, in terms of knowledge needs in depth and from different perspectives, all possible perspectives of interest, in order to provide a complex reading necessary for understanding the immigration phenomenon and its security and cultural effects on Europe. Interviews were conducted, as appropriate, in Romanian, Arabic or English.

For an easier interpretation of the research results, I numbered the interviewed specialists in relation to the alphabetical order of their names and pre-codified the genre variables: male (M) and feminine (F); religion: Christian Orthodox (CO), Catholic (CC), Islamic (IS), Mosaic (MO); profession: parliamentary (PA), diplomat (Di), university professor (PU), intelligence analyst (AI), religious leader (LR), military (Of), journalist (Ju); age: 30-40 years (3+), 40-50 years (4+), 50-60 years (5+), 60-70 years (6+); Country of origin: Romania (RO), Israel (IL), Syria (SY), Egypt (ET), Turkey (TR), U.S.A. (US), Palestinian territory (PS). For example, topic 1 will be coded as follows: 01 MCOPa4+RO.

### 3. "MIGRATION FLOOD"

**3.1 Waves generated by the "Arab Spring" and their effects.** The "Migration Flood" came to the public's attention in the spring of 2015, when more than 1,200 immigrants on five ships drowned in the Mediterranean, near the Italian coastline. Public attention has focused on the three "gates" of entry into Europe: Greece, Italy and Spain, and the European Union has established mandatory refugee quota for its member countries, in a wider set of measures to prevent illegal immigration, "responsibility-sharing among EU countries", adopted by the European Parliament on 29 April 2015.

Europe, which had been the territory to which huge waves of migration headed, especially from the East, had been used to the intensification of intra-European migration in the years after the collapse of the Communist bloc, until the conflicts in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (the so-called Arab Spring debut in 2010). Migration in Europe mainly stood for four major migration channels, as they were called by King & Okolski (2018:14)

In synthesis, in the geographical domain under consideration, we distinguish four main migration channels:

(i) intra-EU, from East to West, or more precisely from the 'new' EU countries (EU+10+2+1) to the 'old' EU countries (EU 15) plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland;

(ii) intra-EU but limited migration between adjacent countries (e.g. Ireland – the UK, Germany – Switzerland, Austria – Germany, etc.);

(iii) migration from non-EU European countries; this covers two subtypes: migration to 'old' EU countries (e.g. Albanians to Italy and Greece) and migration to 'new' EU countries (e.g. Ukrainians to Poland and Slovakia); and

(iv) migration from outside Europe.

After 2015, in this picture of migration, in most Western European and Scandinavian countries, the Syrians are the first in terms of immigration: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, etc. (apud King & Okolski, 2018:16, *Top five sending countries in selected European Economic Area countries*, an analysis based on OECD indicators included in the International Migration Outlook in various years). Until 2014, and including it, only Sweden had a consistent number of Syrian, Iraqi, Somali, and Poles refugees. But, after 2015, apart from refugees from the above-mentioned states also appeared those from Iraq or Afghanistan. The effect of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa has begun to be felt throughout Europe and to fuel the fear of the "migration flood".

On the verge of our analysis, in 2019, the gates to Europe remained the same: Greece, Italy and Spain, noting that Italian policies have consistently reduced the number of arrivals in Europe (fig. 1).

In this context, of maintaining an immigration influx from the Middle East through Turkey - Greek islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos) - Mainland Greece - Northern Macedonia (alternative routes through Bulgaria and Albania) - Serbia - Central and Western Europe, doubled by the waves of immigrants from Italy and Spain (many immigrants from the Middle East choosing to enter Europe on the other two gates after crossing North Africa), preparing response measures, the "ark" of each state aboard which states can navigate during the "flood migration", turned into a test on their own security strategy and their own commitment to their peoples.

These waves of migration have created what constitutes one of Europe's greatest post-colonial crises, with major effects on the security of European states and on liberalism: "Migration has emerged through recent events in Europe as the unconscious tool of history to end the last liberal empire in the modern age" (Samaddar, 2016:88), producing effects on the core of the European project, "core of unification project" (Samaddar, 2016:89), generating mistrust and aggressive political positions.




Fig.1 Refugees/Immigrants influx of 2019 (apud European Commission, Emergency Response Coordination Centre/ ERCC, <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Maps/Daily-maps#>)

The positions of the interviewed specialists do not differ from those of the analysts of the phenomenon. Their perspective highlights, in nuance, overlooked or superficially treated issues in the specialized papers dedicated to the phenomenon of migration, which has fundamentally changed Europe. In the interviews, questions about the economic aspects of migration are highlighted - both specialists from Arab and Christian countries - European and national policies are being discussed and debated (with the nuance of lack of coherence and predictability in this sense), social aspects are reflected, with emphasis on issues regarding the safety of individuals, as well as those of cultural aspect, especially reflecting religion. For a systematization of the responses and their analysis, we have chosen to stress the aspects reflected in relation to the four major types of migration effects identified: economic, political, social and cultural, to which we add the effects on security.

**3.2 The economic and social effects** highlighted by the specialized literature relate mainly to the labor market and public finances. If the main economic effects of migration concern the

growth of the labor force - the migrant mass being predominantly composed of the working age population - and implicitly the labor productivity, with positive effects on GDP, especially in the important economies, the security specialists interviewed highlighted other aspects, less emphasized. One of these is the use of a public discourse (scientifically based on the argument of increasing labor productivity through cheaper labor provided by immigrants), especially in Germany (07MCOpa4+RO).

But this discourse, exploiting the poverty and the needs of immigrants, turns the poor masses of their own countries into masses of people capable of accepting working conditions and wages far below the requirements (08 FCOPa4+RO). In addition, European countries benefit from immigrants – they even need them - because they have an aging population “and need new blood, to have someone to work so as they can be supported with their pensions” (opinion expressed by a Syrian expert, 25 MIsJu4 + SY). Some countries, exemplified by Germany, Norway or France, have been pursuing attraction, selection and recruitment of *head hunting* type. “France, claims the same

subject, 25 MIsJu4 + SY, took all actors, painters, musicians, all Syrian culture. All Syrian artists are in France now, where they were well received."

Another nuanced aspect refers to illegal work in transit countries, encouraged by the citizens of these countries, fueling the underground economy:

transit countries are affected by the length of immigrants' stay on their territory during their traveling to their destination countries, as they are waiting for the right moment to enter the target area or destination (which can last from a few weeks to a few years), try to find a temporary job on the "black" labor market - thus fueling the underground economy - to make the living gains needed to live and continue their journey (02 MCOPU5+RO).

The warning against unrelated migration costs, does not miss either from the analysis of the interviewed specialists, or the particular economic efforts these costs include and for which some EU member states (and not only) are not prepared (31 COPa4+RO). From a slightly nuanced perspective, one of the interviewed specialists also substantiated political rejection (and social propaganda) on the grounds of economic fears (08 MCOPa4+RO). In the profound analytical debate, the emphasis is placed on two countries, from the economy point of view: Germany, as the emblem of the target countries for refugees, and Turkey, as the emblem of the transit countries. In the latter case, the economic efforts of the Turkish state with more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees that crossed its territory, to which they provided education and health care services worth about \$ 30 billion, respectively, the aid channeled to Syria, in the border area, of about \$630 million, are data provided by one of the subjects (14 MIsDi3+TR). These efforts are seen from a Syrian perspective as the cost of political negotiations with the European Union:

The Turks have about 3 million [A/N of refugees] they blackmail Europe with the turning on the tap. From time to time they let them go and renegotiate, then, they turn off the tap, it is a political and economic strategy, they use the refugees to reach their interests. Refugees are helped by the Turks to leave ... sometimes the Turks just close their eyes (25 MIsJu4+SY).

Refugees (especially Syrians) crossing Turkey: 2.5 million by 2016, nearly 3 million in total by 2017, 3.5 million in 2018 at the time of the interview, and nearly 4 million by the time of this analysis (more precisely , 3,644,342 on February 7, 2019, the latest data being updated by the UN

Refugee Agency up to the moment of analysis, v. UNCHR, 2019) benefited from the funds mentioned by the interviewed expert, plus a number of other funds earmarked for helping refugees, such as, over 3 billion Euros provided through the European Refugee Facility in Turkey. Overall, the European Union grants a number of trade / trade aid to the countries that temporarily or permanently host immigrants, and this reality has not gone unnoticed (for example, 22 MCOPA4+RO). The financial aspect of the refugee crisis is considered to be fundamental by many respondents - the US should consider funding sources as a priority, one of the surveyed specialists argues, 23 MCCA15+US.

**3.3 The political effects** highlighted by specialized studies mainly concern the European public agenda and the political agendas of the European states. The very definition of immigration and immigrants are political issues (Geddes & Sholten, 2016), the very name of "refugee crisis" is a symbolic product of political origin: "The use of term 'crisis' may seem banal, but (...) this label serves a powerful political and symbolic purpose "(Freedman *et al.*, 2017:7).

With regard to Turkey's policy of using refugees, which the Syrian expert MIsJu4+SY insisted on, it follows directly from the contradictory statements of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who made it clear that there was a conditional shift between the position of the state accession negotiations and the number of refugees. But this unfair bargaining has produced effects primarily on the Turkish state through a series of Daesh terrorist attacks, which has led to further measures and the repositioning of the foreign policy of the state. The direct result of rigorous border control with Syria is the lack of any terrorist attack on Turkey's territory since January 2017. Turkey's repositioning in the migratory mass equation was also mentioned in the European documents: "Turkey continues to make commendable efforts to receive, support and host a large numbers of refugees and migrants "(COM (2018) 91 final, 2018:3).

Other political effects observed in a nuanced and profound manner by the interviewed specialists concern the growing disparity between the national policy of some EU Member States and European policies regarding Middle East immigration (26 MIsDi5+ET). The imagological reading of the phenomenon of migration, the transformation of the mass of immigrants into potential terrorists, causes fears and repulsion in some countries (especially in the members of the Visegrad Group), without taking

into account the lives and future of millions of civilians seeking their more secure place in Europe, regardless of the gateway to the mainland. Recently, this radicalization of positioning tends to become increasingly evident and was observed and exposed by the interviewed specialists:

(...) the issue of migration is “enjoying” a unilateral treatment, still acting emotionally and by chance through random measures or improvisations of the “sanitary cordons” kind, without trying to stabilize it through long-term programs meant to lead to eradication or at least to diminish the real causes of migration (excessive pauperization and radicalization of ethnic, religious, cultural, social-political disputes) (02 MCOPU5+RO).

The correct positioning of the population in relation to the phenomenon of migration is the cause of the political positioning of each of the states concerned, it is related to "the policy of each government to manage this phenomenon" (07 MCOPa4+RO). The cases of Germany and Greece, on the one hand, compared to those of Hungary and Austria, on the other, are illustrative and were also provided as examples by the interviewees. However, in order to overcome national discrepancies - especially in the case of states governed by political parties or political alliances - a long-term, consistent and constructive vision is needed, capable of leading to integration rather than forced surveillance (exemplified by the position a left-wing Romanian parliamentarian, 08 FCOPa4+RO):

The European Union must apply long-term solutions to diminish the global number of migrants on the one hand and change attitudes towards those entering Europe, on the other. Confusion between migrants and terrorists is unacceptable. Romania itself has about three million citizens who work and live in other countries, permanently or temporarily. Extreme right-winged and populist speech assimilates these migrants, even if people from the European Union are, technically, only European citizens in mobility. Neoliberal policies must be combated by reducing inequalities in the Union, adopting policies to prevent social exclusion of certain categories (especially young people), to foster access to education and life-giving activities, and prevent them from becoming vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Transforming the Union into a fortress, with completely installed surveillance, is not effective. People's thoughts are hard to watch.

The most important aspect of political nature has not gone unnoticed by the interviewed experts: in order to find a solution to the immigrants crisis, which is but an effect, it is necessary for politicians to solve the crisis in itself (08 FCOPa4+RO), which is also an aspect of the political will: “to achieve a lasting peace in Syria there is need for a political solution” (14 MIsDi3+TR).

**3.4 The cultural effects** taken into account by specialty studies concern the major religious difference between migrant people - Muslim majority - and most of the continent inhabitants, predominantly Christians. These cultural differences have been extensively exploited politically and included in the control information package, which has created fear among the local population. Certainly, the cultural differences and the natural desire of immigrants to preserve their own culture and religion are realities of the phenomenon that began in 2011 and accelerated in 2015, but all the same, in cultural terms (on the symbolic market, more precisely), these realities are exploited unidirectionally and many times incorrectly:

Many immigrants from Arab Spring countries try to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This is evident in their dress, eating, customs, traditions, practices, and other cultural and social activities. Political systems in the European Union countries in many European cities have many features of Arabic cities in terms of markets, shops, restaurants, places of worship and others, which impede at the same time promoting racist discourse towards them, especially linking migration to extremism and terrorism. This is common in many European media and literature, especially after the involvement of Muslim immigrants in a series of bloody events in Europe (Bani Salameh, 2017:251).

The clash between Christian and Muslim civilizations imagined and projected through the media into the collective mentality of people has already produced effects - reticence in the political dialogue with Turkey and rigidizing the country's access conditions to the European Union - and continues to produce, fueling the rupture, distance, even hatred and hostile actions. Other cultural effects reflected in the specialized works refer to the deterritorialization of communities and cultures, which presuppose the maintenance of problems and the creation of a local cultural atmosphere, which makes the local win in the dialogue with the national. Within the boundaries of the local, new layers of identity, cultural and linguistic communities are created, which are rather open to

the intraconfessional but trans-institutional dialogue, in a different, unknown process of acculturation, which creates fear through the novelty of these developments in both directions, including the immigrant population, as well:

Immigrants find themselves in the cultural spaces between societies and norms; this hybridity affects how they structure their everyday lives and distinguishes them from long-time residents of the country (Timmermans, 2018:54).

In the responses of the interviewed specialists, these cultural effects received deep, nuanced interpretations as a result of direct experience with migrant culture representatives or political decision-makers in the European states that had hostile attitudes. Even if most of the interviewed specialists just preferred to remind cultural effects, some have highlighted cultural differences, habits, education or, more precisely, the lack of education or its inadequacy to the European educational system (02 MCOPU5+RO). From the perspective of Islamic states specialists, specifically from a Syrian perspective, the Syrian refugees' choice for Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and North Africa is natural and directly understandable: knowledge of the language and a set of common cultural values (25 MIsJu4+SY), and this justifies the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data from the end of 2018 early 2019: nearly 5.7 million Syrians have requested political asylum in these countries, of which more than 3.6 million in Turkey and almost one million in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2019). Unlike this huge number in Europe, the total number of Syrian immigrants does not reach 2 million. The explanation is just as simple and signaled by the interviewed experts: cultural differences determine the choice of Muslim countries, despite the higher standard of living in Europe.

It is very important to note the remark of another Syrian, religious leader, who believes that Europe is a cultural bazaar, which adopts and admits, to a certain extent, the preponderantly Arab population (ethnically speaking), predominantly Muslim (from the religion perspective). But in this cultural mosaic, there are limits to acceptance, easy to invoke by influencing the population through mass media. Unlike Western Europe,

Romanians, even wanting to be racist, cannot, because here tolerance is a value, it is something very old ... The first Jewish refugees from Andalusia came here, from the Balkans they came here, from Crimea they came here ... A Romanian, even if he wants to be racist, he cannot. Tolerance is something natural for him (21 MIsLR5+SY).

This prospect - not supported by figures, since in Romania, on December 31, 2018, the number of Syrians holding the right to reside amounted to 5,282 persons, to which 2,769 Iraqis were added, to debate refugees from the Middle East - will be subjected to cultural analysis, in a later chapter dedicated to the effects of migration on Romania.

Other important aspects mentioned include religious issues, such as the fear of some states such as France, which already has a high Muslim population, to become Muslim majority over several generations (20 MCOPa4+RO).

**3.5 Security-related effects** concern a more consistent analysis, replacing a not very consistent specialized literature. In general, the specialized literature reduces security issues to individual (human) and national security issues, but their politicization, in relation with interests, preferences, or even in relation to values, sends the interpretation away from the desired epistemic neutrality. The analysis of the security issues generated by the migration crisis in Europe also raises important ethical issues (whose security is most important?, which of the security aspects must prevail?, to what extent human values gain grounds against ethnic or religious values? etc.), especially that security itself, as a subject of debate, cannot have a counter-argument: "Security is an alluring and intoxicating concept and often reckoned for as a winning argument" (Browning, 2017:42). Debate on security also involves discussing the latent threats and related risks. As a rule, these aspects are only observed through the glasses of the host culture, of the local communities in which immigrants are trying to integrate. The security problems invoked are related to the threats resulting from the analysis of the economic, social, political and cultural effects previously analyzed.

Our analysis, involving the sharing of views belonging to experts of different nationalities / ethnicities and religions, can provide a broad picture, if not, at least more detailed, of security under the migration conditions of the Middle East. Awareness of the effects of Muslim migration to Europe, after the cruel terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), followed by awareness of the "crisis" (2015), led to the understanding of the complex risks involved, from the perspective of all dimensions (according to the perspective of the Copenhagen School).

Migration poses major security risks to the involved states (of origin, of transit and of destination) through its effects on all dimensions of security:

political, economic, social, cultural and military. Since migration in all its forms is managed, better or worse, by political decisions, it is clear that citizens' perceptions about the efficiency of the governance system are influenced by the implications of the migration phenomenon over the quality and safety of their lives (02 MCOPU5+EN).

In all the years in which the effects of migration on security were made aware, immigrants did not commit more offenses than host state citizens, but nevertheless, some individual insecurity continues to manifest, some fears continue to be amplified by political discourses. Host countries need to "harmonize their informative-preventive efforts" and take a concerted and sustained action (24 MCOPU6+RO), they need joint programs to prevent the radicalization of young Muslims in European countries, as it happened in the Netherlands (17 MCCA15+NL). However, in order for these efforts to lead to results, there is need for a concerted action, coordinated at EU or NATO level, with the main objective of solving the causes (the Middle East crisis) in order to solve the effects (migration) (06 MCOPU4+(09 MCOPa + RO), through inter-state dialogue mediated by supra-state structures, through intense exchange of information between governments (07 MCOPa4+RO), through continuous monitoring, co-operation between destination states and transit states by strengthening the external borders of the EU.

Still at the level of individual security, the prevention of radicalization means authentic education, free access to information and dialogue, doubled by the real will to establish peace (30 MCOPa4+RO). The crisis itself is politically exploited to the detriment of security, and violence in Europe, even if it is not produced by immigrants, occurs with migration (31 MCOPa4+RO) and it is easy to transfer the negative image from terrorist attacks and street violence towards the "migration crisis".

In terms of effects on national security, the deployment of large communities to different areas can lead to effects in time - see, for example, the current effect of large mass dislocations of people in the Eastern Soviet to Siberia - which can lead to intentions of border revision (02 MCOPU5+RO). The fight against terrorism is the great challenge of the European states' security, and in this respect, one of the interviewed specialists summarized the

set of measures to be taken at the supra-state level first, and then, at the state level:


The fight against terrorism within the EU must include rules for the prevention of terrorist acts, with a focus on new forms of terrorism; border security measures to identify / prevent terrorist elements from entering the community space; measures to combat online terrorist propaganda; exchange of information between states; monitoring / taking action against those in attention for activities that may indicate an interest in the terrorist phenomenon; control of armaments, explosives and precursors of improvised explosive ordnance; the control of Islamic radicalism and the extreme right, alike (06 MCOPU4+RO).

Last but not least, adequate migration policies, discouraging of illegal migration, reforming the asylum system and measures for the integration of third-party-country nationals (06 MCOPU4+RO) are necessary for strict control in a period of deep crisis in Europe.

#### **4. "MIGRATION FLOOD" CANNOT BE PREVENTED THROUGH FENCING!**

After the intensification of migration in Europe, a cynical joke was in circulation in Romania: "What are the advantages of migration for the Romanians? 1. The West ceased to accuse the Romanian Roma people of any crime, now accusing Middle Eastern immigrants. 2. Hungary found out its border with Romania." The joke itself brings about some complex information. Regarding the gross ratio of Romanian immigrants in the Western European countries, their number has decreased compared to immigrants from the Middle East. There are yet exceptions, and one of them is Germany, the state that is the most important destination for those coming from the Middle East. In Germany, starting with 2017, Romania is the most important immigrant provider: 73,000, compared to Syrians: 60,000, Poles: 34,000, Croats: 33,000 and Bulgarians: 30,000 (Romanian Insider, 2018 based on DWStatist, Statistisches Bundesamt) maintaining the percentages it has reached for the past three years.

Nevertheless, at the imagological level, the fears of Western Europe continue to be present relation to the waves of immigrants from the Middle East, and not in relation to Romanians.



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Fig.2 Comparative analysis of the number of immigrants in Germany between the years of 2008-2017 originating from Romania, Poland, Croatia and Bulgaria (*apud* Federal Statistische Office, DWStatis Statistisches Bundesamt)

On the other hand, Romania is not a destination for immigrants. The image of the two Afghan immigrants who, having learned that they had mistakenly crossed the border with Romania, not Hungary, began to cry, asking to enter the readmission procedure, is very broadly mediatized (Gândul, September 15, 2015). From the official data obtained from the General Inspectorate for Immigration, at our request, the total number of foreign immigrants in Romania at 31 December 2017: 67,135, was lower than the total number of Romanian immigrants in Germany in the same year. Most foreigners with the right of residence come from the Moldovan Republic, while the Middle East countries supplying the large mass of European immigrants occupy the 4th place, through Syria and 6, respectively, through Iraq, to which countries affected by the effects of the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, is added, on the 10th place. Put in a table, this data is as follows:

Syria	5.282
Israel	3.196
Irak	2.769
USA	2.193
Serbia	1.970
Ukraine	1.909
Tunisia	1.724
Other countries	20.568
<b>Total</b>	<b>67.135</b>

Of these, only 6,778 (about 10%) foreign citizens chose Romania for employment, for economic reasons. This data unequivocally places Romania outside the destinations sought by immigrants from the Middle East.

All interviewed experts highlighted this data: Romania is, to a very small extent, a transit country, Romania is unattractive for immigrants; Romania has obligations to accommodate a number of immigrants, established at the level of the European Union. Coming back to the point of view of the Syrian expert, according to whom Romanians are tolerant (21 MIsLR5+SY), respectively, to the view point of a Romanian expert, former presidential consultant on security issues: "Romania has experience from the communist period and some tools for the management of possible waves" (06 MCOPU4+RO), we find that there is a level of

Table1. Number of foreign citizens with right of residence at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2017, in accordance with their country of origin, *apud* IGM Address no. 2751578/DMS/SAR

Citizenship	Total number
Moldova	10.313
Turkey	9.317
China	7.894

institutional training and a high tolerance of the population for the migration phenomenon and that extreme right-wing speeches are missing. However, some experts say, there is a public discourse in which rejecting from a fear of knowledge is cultivated - and this rejection can take on proportions as long as “in Romania people live in euphoria” (13 MMoLR6+IL) - doubled by the lack of long-term integration policies, by the lack of budgetary allocation of funds for this purpose, by budget allocations for institution training, provided there is only a crisis preparedness (07 MCOPA4+RO). The existence of a National Migration Strategy (2015-2018), of some studies (Zaharia *et al.*, 2017) and relevant debates, such as, for example, *Impact of migration on the labor market at European level. How Does Romania Face New Challenges?*, are arguments in favor of asserting that there is a high degree above institutional average in this area (16 MCOPa4+RO). Romania, however, having institutions and bodies prepared to face the border challenge - given its experience as a state situated at the eastern border of the European Union and NATO - and at the same time being a safe and, predictable state, lacking extremist ideologies in its Parliament, leading a balanced policy that promotes dialogue, is bypassed by immigrants.

Some experts consider that Romania is not interesting because the standard of living is not high enough (12 MCOPa4+RO) and many immigrants do not know our country (20 MCOPa4+RO). Other experts point out that immigrants are not interested in Romania because the country is not an important player in the matters of immigration: Middle East conflicts (31 MCOPa4+RO). In conclusion,

I do not believe there is any reason why the immigrants should not choose Romania, but the reality of the last years showed that Romania was not a destination for immigrants (09 MCOPa4+RO)

If the economic migrants do not yet have sufficient reasons to choose Romania, especially the unskilled and vulnerable, who are very poorly paid for such work, as some of the experts observe (08 FCOPa4+RO, 16 MCOPa4+RO), refugees can choose Romania because it is “a peaceful society in which life is not endangered”, and because it is regarded as a “relatively democratic society in which they will not be politically persecuted” (08 FCOPa4+RO).

The most consistent explanations assume cultural foundations. Linguistic and especially religious homogeneity, the practice of Orthodox

Christianity transform Romania into a homogeneous, absorbent bloc, capable of dissolving small communities of Muslims who would opt for this state as their final destination. From the perspective of personal security, these very characteristics could turn Romania into a desirable destination:

Romania is not an attractive country for migrants because of its economic beckgorund and its relative cultural homogeneity. Yet, it is these very reasons why Romania could integrate migrants and provide them with jobs in economic sectors with a shortage of human capital. (15 MCOPa4+RO).

Adaptation to Romanian values and traditions (22 MCOPa4+RO) is, in fact, the great challenge of immigrants to Romania. Religious conservatism: “the action of Romanian Orthodoxy has an important impact” (10 MCOPa5+RO) it does not turn Romania into a destination for immigrants. Unlike the Orthodox space - another example, apart from Romania, is that of Greece, a transit country, humanitarially involved in the crisis of refugees, but which is not a final destination for them – ‘Western Europe is strongly secularized. The great cathedrals of Europe do not serve the purposes for which they were built. A sort of religious depression attracts the masses of immigrants toward this area. It is not only the economic rationale that determines the migration routes, but also the possibility of immigrant communities to express themselves, according to their cultural norms.

From this point of view, Romania (1) is not unattractive because there is no economic attractiveness: neither Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt nor the countries of North Africa are economically attractive, but the number of emigrants is higher in these countries than in Europe; (2) it is not unattractive because it is insecure: Romania is a security provider in the area; (3) it is not unattractive because of a popular rejection, as in the case of the Visegrad Group countries: Romanians are tolerant, yet, the unattractiveness comes from the fact that Romania is a homogeneous from the cultural, linguistic and religious perspectives.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

A country without walls can avoid problems generated by the crises of history. China did not resist the invasion waves in the north based on its Great Wall. Nor will the “Trump Wall” stop migration from the South, from Latin American countries. Walls,

fences, curtains or dams do not stop the phenomena from their long-lasting development. They can be solutions for a short period of time, only. The waves of migration melt any barriers. "Noah's Ark", flood resistant, is eminently cultural – culture, open to the dialogue, equally characterized by the "strength of existence" (Mircea Vulcănescu) and by the power of assimilation, resists the challenges. Is this a Romanian lesson in the "crisis of migration"? Possibly yes, but it is equally Greek or Serbian lesson.

The true preparation of the "ark" for the challenges of history equals the attention paid to the security culture, with rigorous and authentic cultural foundations. Otherwise, the religious and, implicitly, cultural depression is established. In the symbolically vacated place - in the absence of identity, of the connection with the roots - there will always be someone to settle down. And that one will always be stronger, faster, more timely-adapted, capable of leading to the fall of Rome and all empires and caliphates built by conquest or seduction.

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## **MIGRATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP. THE PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH FOR A COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP**

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**Abstract:** *Being interested in intercultural issues is a necessity for pedagogical and educational research. The priority task becomes to draw a model of citizenship, which in recent years has greatly expanded, taking into account a real interaction between the different groups. In order to create an intercultural society, it is necessary to ensure the possibility of recognizing and sharing a minimum core of principles and rules that constitute the basis of a common coexistence. This article reports the most recent reflections in the pedagogical field on the concept of citizenship, within the global society, which can be harmonious and pluralistic, as desired by E. Mounier, only if education will appreciate the multiculturalism and multi-religiousness already present in our societies.*

**Keywords:** *intercultural society; citizenship; cosmopolitanism; global education*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

In the current scientific literature, it emerges that education is undoubtedly a concept of relevance of pedagogy, but it is also considered a social phenomenon, since the human being is formed and grows in a certain environment, of which it gradually absorbs, and later internalizes, the culture (Annino, 2012). Contextually to the whirlwind of changes that have taken place lately, it's necessary to reflect on educational phenomena in relation to individuals and their social and cultural peculiarities, that is, on the subjects participating in the interaction process that involves the need to rethink some very important issues such as globalization, complexity and plural identity from the perspective of otherness. Therefore, among many problems to this level, one particularly representative regards the meanings that today are attributed to the dimension of citizenship and to the educational choices that should be made in relation to the new scenarios. The phenomenon of globalization, international migration indeed set new challenges and call for new reflections on the very concept of citizenship. The article, after examining the different meanings of the concept of citizenship evolved over the centuries, tries to reconstruct the ways in which man has inhabited the earth by interacting with his fellows starting from the concept of civis up to that of cosmopolites, illustrating the new prospects of global education.

### **2. REASONING ON THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP**

The concept of citizenship is complex and changeable, whether it is considered in its transformation over time, or whether it is analyzed in contemporary times from points of view that offer different interpretations and realizations. The different meanings of citizenship recognizable over time have in common the participation in public life (Santelli, 2010). But new meanings are emerging: migration processes, the communications system, globalization dynamics that question the traditional meanings of citizenship. No longer belonging to a nation-state, a juridical dimension, but cultural and ethical reasons extend the concept of citizenship to the sphere of universal human rights (Tarozzi, 2005:21). The formative approach focuses not so much on the first juridical-political meaning (what is indicated on passport and identity documents, and which is regulated by the laws on naturalization), but on the awareness of the social connection that this state entails (Santerini, 2010:6). In recent years, many expressions have been introduced: social citizenship, active, plural, differentiated, new citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, flexible citizenship, democratic citizenship. They are declinations of citizenship that summarize and enclose the meaning of these new perspectives, managing to combine the level of territorial citizenship with the national and

international level and emphasizing the "multiple loyalties" to which each of us is called (Prodi, 2003:165). In current debates, these issues are basically faced through two approaches: one universalist in favor of opening borders; the other institutional-civic in compliance with the rigorous conceptions of citizenship. About this issue, it is appropriate to question whether the territory within which one is born and the documents to which one is entitled are less arbitrary, from an ethical point of view, than other characteristics about which much has been discussed in recent years such as skin color, sex or other peculiarities of the individual. Following this reasoning, hardly disputable according to Santelli (2010), the democratic states, that are such indeed, are called to pursue more compatible politics with the vision of a world without frontiers. The aim is to have an overview as clear as possible so that it becomes truly broad, that it aspires to wider horizons, in order not to overlook any fundamental factor that could make participation in social and cultural life in the community effective and consequently progress civil law in the country. The history, the various norms, and all the institutions allude in different ways to the dimension of the nation-state, but the phenomena of change generated by globalization have inevitably undermined the very concepts of national identity, influenced by the phenomenon of 'immigration; for this reason, the need for a new form of citizenship that knows how to manage the pluralism connected to the presence of linguistic-cultural minorities arises directly. The question in this regard is whether the collective identity of the nation-state must always remain identical to itself, or should it not rather transform itself, enrich itself, and in a certain sense 'evolve', gradually including new elements, brought by the different groups that arrive (Annino, 2012). Citizenship is therefore a *being* even before a knowledge or know-how. In this direction, international studies and researches have developed a comprehensive and holistic model of citizenship, broader and deeper than those of the past, in which there are assumption of responsibility, critical thinking, availability to the non-violent solution of conflicts and sensitivity towards the defense of human rights (Cogan-Derricott 1998:116). According to these researchers, the educational project designed to enhance these attitudes must develop on four levels: *personal*, modifying the behavior of individual life; *social*, about the commitment in public life; *spatial*, considering the dimension of interdependence even with distant realities;

*temporal*, which includes projects for the future (Cogan-Derricott 1998:118-137). This view, as underlined by other authors (Osler-Rathenow-Starkey 1995), is inclusive, it goes beyond the local dimension to embrace the international one. But given the overabundance of constituent elements of citizenship, it is necessary to understand how to organize them in an educational project. In this regard, the framework elaborated by Gagnon and Pagé can be useful to analyze and describe what is inside the "black box" of citizenship and identify the different ways in which societies face social pluralism. In this context, citizenship is presented on two axes: on the vertical side of identity, at the two poles there are the macro-concepts of national identity and of social, cultural and supranational belonging; on the horizontal side of equality we find the poles of the effective regime of rights and political and civil participation. The individual elements cannot be considered in isolation, but in close connection with each other. Each country will choose how to configure identity, how to manage memberships, which rights regime to affirm or which rules of participation to establish (Gagnon-Pagé 1999). Through this image-picture it emerges that the city is made of civic culture, as expressed in the Constitution, and of that complex balance that regulates the integration of differences, the system of effective rights, their degree of participation and so on, and that these processes on the social, civil, political and historical-cultural level must be used in their becoming (Santerini, 2010) as tools to analyze the civic framework, but also as guidelines for training. Identity and belonging, relationship and otherness, dignity / rights and participation are also proposed as learning objectives for the school (MIUR 2009). Therefore, starting from this assumption, citizenship cannot be limited today to the civic values of the Risorgimento of the family, of religion and of the homeland or of cultural belonging, but must be relocated in the global dimension, in that world context in which every individual finds himself by now living, now disoriented, now looking for landmarks, now as a member of social networks or as a traveler. We are in a *world-culture* about which we try to discover connections and interdependencies (Lipovetsky-Serroy, 2008).

### 3. EDUCATING IN POLITICS IN GLOBAL SOCIETIES

In this context, what Prof. Santelli (2010) defines as "*education to the politics*" differs from

political education not about content but about its purposes. In fact, both deal with topics such as power, state, government, but the purpose of political education is not to mobilize consent towards their particular configuration, but rather to help understand what this configuration is and to assent / allow or disagree with it considering the own personal interpretative criteria, in view of a possible improvement of social coexistence (Santelli, 2010). The clear goals of political education are: promoting responsible knowledge of political dynamics, questioning political choices to support or regain trust, participation but above all acquiring skills to evaluate all the results of action politic. The challenge is to pursue in the institutions that deal with education and care, an education in politics that is free from politicization, to promote and encourage a lifestyle as much as possible characterized by a cooperative behavior, able to overcome separation and conflicts (Ravasi, 2006). Engaging in the development of an education in politics means interpreting the continuous innovations of the present while maintaining its basic principles firmly and clearly. Today we are realizing with increasing awareness that the reference to the other does not concern only the neighbor, the similar, but also involves those who are far away, those who are not there yet, the different so as not to make the mistake of believing that there is nothing beyond one's time and the desert beyond one's boundaries or, if something is there, it is only charged with negativity and danger. A realization that is difficult to achieve, full of obstacles not only on the cognitive level due to the complexity of recognizing what is specific to different realities and what is configured as recurrent and permanent, but also on an emotional level because of the effort we must make to overcome the sense of insecurity triggered by what we do not know (Santerini, 2008, 147). This commitment helps to support what Piussi calls "politics first", a non-competitive and non-instrumental way of living and relating to others, aimed at making "civilization and civilization human" (Piussi, 2001, 9). The current complexity must therefore make us reflect on the path that man carries out in trying to become an 'active citizen', and education must provide a real paradigm for active citizenship since

[for the single subject] it is the practice of *care about* that must be placed at the center of the training processes and rendered as a constant orientation of these processes. And *care about* means the ability to read oneself, to give oneself an

orientation, to rework the image of oneself and to make it always open with respect to one's future (Cambi, 2010, 138).

This imposes, especially in a context of an intercultural nature, that in a confrontation, even a tight one between members of different cultures there be no prevarication of one over the other, but rather a continuous confrontation, an openminded approach, a closeness, and, so that this encounter is fruitful and effective, it must absolutely be based on a profound and above all 'reciprocal' dialogue (Buber, 2009, 68).

#### 4. GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF COSMOPOLITANISM: FROM THE CONCEPT OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP TO THE ADVENT OF GLOBAL EDUCATION

The adjective "cosmopolitan" and the noun "cosmopolitanism" as claimed by Pierluigi Valenza in his essay (From Athens to Seattle. An Historical look and current considerations on cosmopolitanism, 2004:95-116) "both intend, in the most common acceptance of current language, the idea that the world can be traced back to a single unity, from which thence there is only one citizenship: cosmopolitan man is, precisely, citizen of the world, the one who is at home and can be at home everywhere. Cosmopolitanism therefore would be that philosophical-political theory that supports this possibility: that the world is a single city, that is, it is governed by a single system of rules in which man, every man, can be a citizen. In this way, then, the world-city combination unravels, always in language and current use, in a quantity of shades: the cosmopolitan man is not really the man as such, nor is he made such by the fact that the world is effectively brought back under a single system of rules. If this were the case, it could also be argued that having human rights as sanctioned in the 1948 UN Charter would therefore constitute a single system of rules, a kind of city, a world republic, of which men, for the sole fact of being men, would be a part, and then we would all be cosmopolitans. It is sufficient to call to mind the meaning of that adjective applied to man in ordinary language to realize that the sense is also something else, that we use that word equally to mean a person who has lived in many countries, who knows the languages, customs and traditions, and therefore is at home in different parts of the world because he has adapted to different contexts and knows how to fit in (Ulivieri, 2017). Still different then the use when

we refer to the city: when we talk about a cosmopolitan city we mean that the city became a world, that is, it is inhabited by a number of people of different cultures, customs, races, who live side by side without particular problems (Santerini, 2008). It is therefore, important to reflect on how the word "cosmopolitan" and the theory related to it "cosmopolitanism", take on actuality in the period in history in which we are living, in which imposing phenomena, such as mass migration or instant communication between the different parts of the world (through the internet), seem to realize that idea expressed in common language, that the world is reduced to a city, that men become citizens of the world, that the city itself becomes a world because it is inhabited by men very different from each other .

Valenza underlines how focusing on some significant moments in the history of the term can help to better enter the problems mentioned above and see them inserted into the cultural tradition to which we belong: the different layers of meaning show how the idea of cosmopolitanism has accompanied the transformations in cohabitation between men. It may be useful to start, for example, from the meaning of the single words that form the roots of the compound terms discussed here: polis and cosmos according to Greek culture. Polis is an ambiguous term, as recalled by Aristotle in the *Politico*: ambiguous in that it names, as indeed does our "city", both the geographical place, that is the place as inhabited by men, and the social place, or the State which the men who live there organize by creating a constitution for themselves. This ambiguity tends to move to the *polites*, because similarly the citizen can simply be the man who lives in a place, or the man as endowed with rights, a participant in the political life of the place in which he lives. In the discussion that Aristotle, again in the *Political*, makes of the notion of citizen the first case, however, is certainly excluded, and it can be said in this sense that that same first case does not belong to the line of thought of the Greek man of the pre Hellenistic age: "the citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place"; rather a citizen in the strict sense, or, as Aristotle says, "in an absolute sense", it is the one who has the right to participate in public life, more precisely "those who have the right to participate in the office of councilor and judge this we say without doubt citizen of the state in which he has this right ". The terms polis and *polites* define an area that is human and conventional, that of the inhabited place founded or governed by a small or large number of

people, who have given themselves an order, which varies greatly from place to place in the Greece of then. Even the term cosmos means an order, but this is an order independent of the will of man, it is a natural order. The two words then, associated with each other, continues Valenza, would seem to generate a sort of short circuit: the word *polites* referring to the cosmos would be improper because being a citizen has sense only within man made realities, of institutions that have conventional value. The birth of the term "cosmopolitan", however, intends precisely to achieve this, the rupture of the obvious organized political order of classical Greece into a multiplicity of polis. The first uses of the term and above all the political conception that assumes its nucleus are found in the time in which the world of the free Greek cities declines with the Macedonian predominance. It is the idea of a citizen remembered that no longer is: "Man as a political being, an element of the polis or responsible for the government of the city-state, had died with Aristotle; with Alexander the Great man is conceived as an individual. After the polis, you become a citizen so what? As will be most clearly expressed by the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor Philosopher, the reference to the "cosmos" can represent a sort of superior citizenship, belonging to humanity, which can coexist in a non-conflictual way with the belonging to a State, as expressed in the fragment: "My city and my homeland is Rome because I am Antonino. As a man, it is the universe". The compatibility of universal citizenship and local identity, (we are in the time before the meaning attributed to the term *glocal*) (Robertson, 1995) because of the particularly interesting premises posed by the contemporary situation, is announced. In *Zum ewigen Frieden*, outlining fundamental principles and articles for perpetual peace, Kant distinguishes three levels of law: public law, international law and finally the "cosmo-political right", the right according to which "men and states in external relationship mutual with each other are to be considered as citizens of a universal state of men". Some of the problems that the term cosmopolitanism evokes have led philosophers, sociologists, scholars of politics, to take sides, more or less openly, on the right of the term to subsist and to represent a possible perspective of coexistence among men. Cosmopolitanism, understood in this sense, could designate the possible identity in the age of globalization, an identity that, without erasing the cultural and linguistic identities of a majority, takes as a basis for integration a core that

does not look upon these as a point of departure but more, if anything, as a point of arrival, in the awareness, however, that in individuals, families, communities with another story behind them, they will no longer be those, but others. But what is the relationship between intercultural pedagogy, the only way, in an era of migration and globalization processes of being pedagogy today, and global education? Starting with the “Global Education Charter” developed by the European Council, Global Education (P. Panarello, 2016) can be defined as the ability to educate people during their life to actively and responsibly participate in the construction of a planetary future in the search of peace, of intercultural dialogue, to the education off the appreciation of beauty, of the protection an of the safeguarding of the environment and all living species. From this point of view, it is necessary to develop a sensitivity and consciousness towards planetary issues - migration, war, hunger, poverty, structural violence, environmental disasters, climate change, human rights, democracy - using an interdisciplinary perspective, capable of highlighting crucial factors in the theory of pedagogy: anthropological-formative, socio-political, epistemological-cultural. In the “Global Education Charter” four specific fields of research and action are identified: 1) interdependence in a global horizon; 2) sustainable development; 3) awareness of the environment and concern for its protection; 4) human rights (including anti-racism), democracy, social justice and peace (North-South Center of the Council of Europe: 75). Therefore, working on global education paths in this way intended represents the true challenge of the new millennium.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The new horizon awaiting pedagogy today is represented by a profound 'critical responsibility' towards the new generations, that is to say to grasp the true value of social life, of the common good, which concerns everyone indistinctly, to promote it relentlessly, fighting apathy and disinterest, in short, to try to fill the current sense of void. The challenge that pedagogy faces today is that of the analysis of an education towards citizenship, inclusive of the intercultural dimension, aimed at the acceptance of others, equality and social cohesion, achieving the necessary balance between the peculiarities of intercultural education, which specifically is the ability to know and appreciate differences as well as the ability to direct them not

to defend localisms and different cultural needs, but to develop serene 'civil coexistence' (Annino, 2012, 227). The wealth of meanings proposed by the intercultural perspective is articulated in the overcoming of solitude and inequalities, in the pursuit of peace, in the construction of a society that E. Mounier defines as “harmonious and pluralist” (Mounier, 1935). It is inevitable, today, that these issues be addressed with the awareness of their inescapability, since the presence of 'the other, the different', in our midst, will always be greater, and the inclusive process, both in school and in society, need to be the most natural and 'civil' the social fabric can offer: Pedagogy, operating in this light, therefore has the delicate task of critically analyzing society, and trying to hand over, mainly, but not only, to the younger generations the responsibility of the choices: “the value of values, that is the discussion of values because values are valid, are fundamental both for social life and for the affirmation of personal qualities” (Baldacci, 2010).

## 6. ACNOWLEDGMENT

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## ADOPTION OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR MIGRATION AND THE STEPS TO FOLLOW IN THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL CONTEXT

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**Abstract:** *The adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly through the Intergovernmental Conference that took place in Marrakech, Morocco on the 10th and 11th of December, 2018 opens a new perspective to the states governance and the international cooperation on how to tackle the challenges of managing the migration at national, regional and worldwide level. In the same time, it is an opportunity for the Member States to be involved in both long and short-term actions that will strengthen the measures intended to answer to better managing international migration. In the light of this context and despite the lack of consensus on several migration issues, the Europe Union member states should take further steps in finding the best approach and solutions that fit every state's specific situation regarding migration. Accordingly, the aim of this article consists of a qualitative analysis meant to prove the necessity of these steps.*

**Keywords:** *migration; intergovernmental; regional context*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Migration as a global phenomenon has a strong local and regional impact that requires global solutions and a multi-level response. Adopted by the UN General Assembly through the Intergovernmental Conference that took place in Marrakech, Morocco on the 10th and 11th of December, 2018 the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) opened perspectives to the states governance and the international cooperation on how to tackle the challenges of managing the migration at national, regional and worldwide level. Along with the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), GCM are meant to become a non-legally binding international cooperation framework and promote a global approach to migration.

The process of adopting this international document was started in 2016, when for the first-time Heads of State and Government met at the global level within the UN General Assembly to discuss matters related to migration. This sent a world-wide political message that migration and refugee issues had become major concerns in the international agenda. As a result, adopting at that moment the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the UN Member States underlined the

urge for a comprehensive approach to migration and enhanced cooperation at the global level.

Also, in the same time, Annex II of the New York Declaration opened a transparent and inclusive process of intergovernmental consultations and negotiations towards the development of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. These actions concluded with the adoption of the Global Compact by the majority of UN Member States in Marrakesh, Morocco, followed closely by formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly on 19 December. The Modalities Resolution for the intergovernmental negotiations of the Global Compact outlined the key elements and timeline of the process. The Global Compact was developed through an open, transparent and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations and the effective participation of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, academic institutions, parliaments, diaspora communities, and migrant organizations in both the intergovernmental conference and its preparatory process.

### 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR MIGRATION

The Global Compact is a negotiated agreement at inter-governmental level, meant to cover all

dimensions of international migration in a comprehensive and holistic manner. It respects states' sovereign right to determine who enters and stays in their territory and demonstrates commitment to international cooperation on migration. It presents a significant opportunity to improve the governance of migration, to address the challenges associated with today's migration, and to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development.

The Global Compact is framed in a way consistent with target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in which Member States committed to cooperate internationally to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration. The Global Compact is based on principles that member states prior agreed as course of actions regarding migration issues, such as:

- support countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of migrants;
- protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status;
- integrate migrants – addressing their needs and capacities as well as those of receiving communities – in humanitarian and development assistance frameworks and planning;
- develop, through a state-led process, principles and voluntary guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations;
- combat xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards all migrants;
- strengthen global governance of migration.

As an international framework document the Global Compact intended to:

- address all aspects of international migration, including the humanitarian, developmental, human rights-related and other aspects;
- make an important contribution to global governance and enhance coordination on international migration;
- present a framework for comprehensive international cooperation on migrants and human mobility;
- set out a range of actionable commitments, means of implementation and a framework for follow-up and review among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions;
- be guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; and
- be informed by the Declaration of the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.

One of the purposes of GCM is to address the migration issues with actions on multiple levels, from global to regional and local contexts. In this matter, the international global cooperation can help at regional and state level the developing of coherent policies that fight against the threats related to a safe migration, like illegal migration or human trafficking for example. The cooperation at bilateral and regional level contributes to a better understanding of the migration phenomenon, offering different perspectives regarding the ways that stakeholders can approach the illegal migration.

In that light, one of the great values of the GCM resides in recognition of the fact that the local authorities and other stakeholders at the local and regional level play a key role in governance of migration and forced displacement. While the main responsibilities for defining policies and rules to manage migration lie with national authorities, cities and other local and regional authorities are at the forefront of managing their impact on the ground and of promoting inclusive and cohesive societies.

Local authorities play an increasing role in providing support and services to migrants and promoting their successful social and economic inclusion. They act not only as implementing bodies but often also as agents of innovation. At the local level is also where the role of the civil society, private sector and other stakeholders becomes apparent in addressing migration. The Global Compact emphasis on a wide-range of support instruments aimed at local communities to assist in migration situations.

Given the multilevel nature of the governance of migration, a structured dialogue between local, national and international actors is crucial, from the design to the implementation and evaluation of both migration and integration policies. To reaffirm the role of cities as key players in the governance of migration, mayors and city leaders from across the globe adopted the declaration *Cities working together for migrants and refugees*, presented also at the Intergovernmental Conference that adopted the GCM. The declaration highlighted that cities are important players in connecting the global debates on migration with the policies on the ground.

The text of the GCM also creates a mechanism to supervise the follow-up measures and actions taken at international level, called *International Migration Review Forum*, meant to be the most important inter-governmental platform that will discuss the issues related to migration from a

global perspective. According with the provisions of the document, beginning with 2022 every four years this forum will evaluate the progress in implementing the GCM.

For this body to be fully functional, in February 2019 it started the negotiations for the UN resolution regarding the way this forum will be organized, planned to be adopted by General Assembly until the end of July this year.

### 3. EUROPEAN CONTEXT


The process of adoption of the GCM found the European states, members or not of the European Union, on different positions regarding the utility, the opportunity and the follow-up actions of the international document. Although one of the European Union member states was pointed to represent the Union in some phases of negotiations, there was a lack of consensus among the European Union member states also on the main parts of the document and the adoption itself, due to the different situation, issues and approaches on migration.

The regional context of the European countries has particular importance as this part of the world confronted a migration crisis in the last years, with effects that are continuing to raise problems in managing and finding the best solutions to respond the migration related issues. But balancing solidarity and responsibility proves to be a very tough challenge for some Member States especially for those with more conservative governments in power and facing strong public opposition to migrants.

For example, some countries did not attend an international conference in the Marrakesh to adopt the agreement, while Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic voted against the adoption of GCM. The position of European countries is illustrated in figure below.

Since 1999, the European Union has developed a common legal migration policy, mainly by introducing a set of rules regulating the conditions and procedures under which non-EU nationals are admitted to the EU, as well as their rights to reside, work, study, being joined by family members.

Fig. 1 The position of the European countries at the conference in Morocco (*apud* UN, 2018)



This policy development happened throughout a rapidly evolving geo-political context, in which migration has become one of the central topics on the political agenda in Europe and globally. The European Commission has completed an overall

evaluation of the EU legal migration framework, whose main aim was to assess whether the current policy is still “fit for purpose”, in order to identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, and look for possible ways of streamlining and simplifying the

rules currently in place. The study concluded that the current EU framework on legal migration can be considered largely 'fit for purpose'.

Several positive effects of the EU legislation on legal migration have been identified (e. g. in terms of rights and equal treatment of non-EU nationals), proving the continued relevance and added value of having an EU framework regulating this field. At the same time, a number of critical issues have also emerged from the study, as regards the coherence, effectiveness, relevance and efficiency of the current rules. If the EU wants to fully achieve the objective of developing a common legal migration policy as part of a comprehensive approach for an orderly management of migratory flows, these issues will need to be addressed in the next steps through a wider range of actions of different nature.

The EU has so far addressed legal migration following a sectoral approach, regulating different categories of migration with different Directives, instead of using a horizontal legislative instrument. This approach has allowed developing a common EU rules covering admission and stay of non-EU nationals for different purposes (e.g. work, study and research, family reunification, long term residence). However, some important categories of migrants remain not covered at EU level, and there are a number of coherence issues between the different Directives.

Possible solutions should be identified in the GCM framework for developing EU rules covering more additional categories of migrants and horizontal legislative instruments for these categories. Also, regarding labour migration issues in the EU economic and social agenda it will need more flexible tools to address skills and labour shortages of the European markets, to attract highly skilled workers and to make the EU more attractive for talented professionals who are looking for job opportunities worldwide.

The strengthening of legal migration pathways to the EU (for studies, research, work etc.) can play an important role in overall migration management and is part of a more comprehensive strategy to promote more orderly migration flows. Host societies, countries of origin and the migrants themselves stand to benefit from increased share of legal migration in overall flows at the expense of irregular migration. Better managed legal migration, be it temporary/circular or long-term, can also help address labour and skills shortages across the labour markets of EU Member States.

Therefore, the European Commission has started to support Member States as well as non-

public actors in developing legal migration pilot projects, including through specific funding opportunities. The main objective of the pilot projects was to promote the role that legal migration can play in the overall management of migratory flows, by encouraging and supporting the development of concrete projects by EU countries in the area of legal migration, with a particular focus on labour migration (including opportunities for training and internships).

Pilot projects can address all phases/issues linked to legal migration – be it capacity-building in partner countries, pre-departure measures, support for actual mobility and integration in the host country, as well as reintegration into the country of origin. A wide variety of stakeholders can play a role in a pilot project, both public and non-public: ministries, public employment services, employers and business associations/chambers of commerce, trade unions, education and training institutions, including universities, and networks delivering work-related training.

For example, in direct relation with labour migration, the concept of circular migration needs to be adjusted to respond the situation both in destination country (a EU member state) and in country of origin of the migrants. At this moment, it is not functional that a non-EU national will return in his/her country of origin after obtains a good proficiency or specialisation in a domain or work branch that has no or little representation in home country. Also, several factors need to be taken into account on making this concept more adapted, the wages differences and the overall different living standards between home and destination country being just some of them.

On this matter, as the objective is to have a better integration system for the non-EU nationals' migrants, it will need new mechanisms to be developed, especially involving non-public actors, civil society and local communities, for improving comprehensive management of migration and overall relations with partner countries.

Although, as a common practice, the migration of non-EU nationals is normally managed by the central state authorities, migrants are integral part of the local communities where they live and work. Local authorities are often first responders to refugees' and migrants' situations, this being the main reason why is important to build partnerships with local communities and provide support to strengthen institutional local level capacities and infrastructure. For the governance of migration where local authorities can play a decisive role, the

EU member states should have flexible and practical strategies to address in real time the challenges of the migration, starting from the point of one individual, a family or a group of families and having solutions for large groups of migrants.

Through the activation of the local population and more cohesive communities, it can be found good opportunities for the reception of newly arrived migrants and the provision of inclusive services for those migrants. Civil society organisations should have a more important role in guiding and complementing the efforts of local authorities in integrating the migrants, because sometimes the communities have their own problems to cover and the migration related issues must be addressed in full compliance with the regional and local situation.

They can also have the role to identify the type of migrants that are most needed or fit in their local communities, based on the knowledge about cultural, social and economic particularities.

The involving of the migrants in policy formulation is generally limited, yet essential to develop effective policies and services such as language courses, skills assessment and recognition services, training or orientation support. Migrants and refugees have the experience and expertise to inform policy-making and to contribute to improve policies and programmes. When migrants are included, the quality and effectiveness of integration policies and services can be improved. Supporting their participation and engaging host community and migrant groups, can also facilitate living together and promote cohesive societies.

The Common Basic Principles for Immigration Integration Policy in the EU lay down the common principles for integration policy in the EU and one of them is that

the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.

These principles were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November in 2004, and reaffirmed in Council conclusions in June 2014.

Being aware of those above, it is desirable to find possible ways to support the participation of migrants, and learn from these experiences how to improve integration policies. Good practices supporting the meaningful participation of all migrants, both women and men should be shared

among the stakeholders in European Union member states. It is to take into account supporting the integration of migrant and refugee women, in view of the wide gender gaps in employment and the diversity of individual profiles, such as the main reason for migration or the level of educational attainment.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Given the ongoing issues raised by migration and the international discussions on a global governance of this phenomenon, for the European countries it is necessary to look for solutions in order to move from a crisis management approach to a medium and long-term perspective.

Due to its geographical position and its reputation an example of stability and openness against the background of growing international and internal conflicts, climate change and global poverty Europe will no doubt continue to be attractive for migrants. The EU must therefore combine a range of internal and external migration policy tools.

The good opportunity of implementing the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees should also focus on the role that the civil society organisations and other local actors can play in this interaction between the international and the local dimension.

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## ILLEGAL MIGRATION, THE CURRENT ISSUE OF THE SECURITY OF NATIONS

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**Abstract:** *Given the current international context, the security of the state cannot be realized independently, but only by developing and enhancing international cooperation. Furthermore, being a member of an international security organization comes with certain risks, considering the current escalation of international tensions and threats. Because of the complexity of the different activity fields, organized crime represents a transnational risk, which must be fought against by all of the states, given the social impact of it. Illegal migration, studied as a component of organized crime, creates a series of social and cultural issues, starting from the entities that support it during the migration process, up to the integration of the migrants in the hosting society. The individuals' behavior is unpredictable because it is mainly the result of the cultural and religious aspects of their homeland, which are significantly different from the ones of the hosting state. The religious tolerance and the solution to social integration problems can be achieved by intercultural communication. The integration of the migrants brings the hosting state the responsibility of providing a set of rights and obligations, in order to allow the migrants to be engaged in the social, economic and cultural life of the hosting community.*

**Keywords:** *illegal migration; organized crime; security; culture; integration*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The European security background evolved during the last years and, despite the different types of threats and challenges towards its stability, the variation course is a positive one. (Iliescu, 2003:22). The emphasized economic development differences, in behalf of unprecedented technological progress and discriminatory access to vital life resources, health defense, education, information and knowledge, causes deep social crises, stirs discontent and raises frustration. Most of the times, the new circumstances of economic globalization and the deep social crises were followed by identity crises that led to unexpected violence acts. Given this situation, it became obvious the fact that the security objectives and interests of the most of the states can be reached only by an efficient international cooperation system, that can act not only in narrow situations, but also in different contexts that consist of financial, social and economic problems of the contemporary world. This type of renewed solidarity of world countries can be expressed in multiple domains by the preoccupation of different conjugated forms of action by all the states that share the same social

values and interests. The plain disjunction of the international background evolutions with the ones of the internal environment is getting harder and harder to accomplish, considering the conjugated actions context and conflict processes crossings that are able to generate facile conditions for the unpredictable or predictable occurrence of new types of risks towards states security (Bălăceanu & Moșoiu, 2018:10).

The security objectives and interests of the European nations are not the source of generating major conflict situations, contemporary security background being positively influenced by the Euro-Atlantic and European integration activities, by the spreading of country's communities that promote and share market economics and democratic values and by the development of zonal collaboration. The facilities of integration in the European Union show effects among the whole national territory, boost the economic development, enhance and consolidate democracy, intensify the communication and tolerance, consolidate the expression of fundamental rights, ensures the minorities protection and their cultural and ethnic identity, stimulate the act of solving the communitarian problems by collective actions and communication, etc.

At this moment, considering the constant affirmation of democratic, state of law and citizens' rights principles, a real increase of population's trust in democratic states institutions has been ensured. Romania, 12 years after its adherence in European Union, takes on the rotary presidency of the European Union Council in the first semester of 2019. This event is highly important considering the fact that the European Union Council, in co-decision with the European Parliament, passes bills and negotiates the European legislation, representing the governments of the member states. By continuous communication with European Parliament and European Commission, European Council coordinates the politics of the member states, develops EFSP, seals international deals and sets the European Union budget.



Fig.1 The logo of Romania's Presidency of the Council of the European Union

Even if we witness political disputes in the internal politics environment during this election year, Romania must show maturity and rise to the expectations and to the level of trust that has been put in the European political background. This aspect demonstrates the level of consolidation of the national democracy in a rather complex regional context.

The Romanian system, which is based on pluralism and political stability, ethnic diversity, ideological, political and cultural differences, respecting the human rights and citizens' freedoms, the alternatively governing experience of the political/ democratic regimes, currently represents a model for the European democratic society. Concurrently, these important democratic resources are actively involved in solving the problems regarding the risk factors and the unconventional threats of the territorial security environment. (Bălăceanu & Moșoiu, 2018).

## 2. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE ACCENTUATION OF THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS AND THE GROWTH OF THE STATES INTERDEPENDENCY

Nowadays, the states and the societies are facing a globalization of risks phenomenon. The main risks regarding the state security and democratic states

communities find their origin within three factors: terrorism, mass destruction weapons proliferation, undemocratic or unstable regimes. The risk factors shows elements, conditions, internal or external situations that are able, considering their nature, to damage the country's security and stability by generating contrary effects or interfering with the fundamental national interests<sup>1</sup>.

The consequences of globalization are, among others, two simultaneous aspects: the first one is the dissipation of the limits regarding the concepts of regional, national and international, the world being very close to becoming one single state; the second one is crossing the political, economic and social issues up to the point where they are impossible to be separated. Following this trend, the globalization also developed in the criminal domain. (Miclea 2004)

Romania is, among other states, member of NATO, integrant party of Euro-atlantic security sphere. Furthermore, the risks, vulnerabilities and dangers that the Euro-atlantic security sphere is exposed to and that are being identified by the democratic states communities are also the risks, vulnerabilities and dangers that the Romania's territory and its citizens have to face.

The characteristics of European Union adherence road, the geostrategic position and the experience gained by multiple states among which is Romania, whose territory is trafficked with many Euro-asian commercial routes, classic smuggling lines and illegal traffic, determines considering certain risk factors, such as: transnational and regional risks.

The transnational risks go past the states' borders, demanding collective countermeasures effort. The up-mentioned risks can be generated by separatists and extremist organizations, ethnic disputes and religious rivalries, and also by the violation of the human rights by certain politic regimes. The transnational organized crime, that can also be present in trans-regional forms, represents a risk factor towards every state's security because of the activity domains complexity (illegal drugs, weapons and strategic materials traffic, human trafficking, *illegal migration*, money laundry, etc.) and because of the social impact that is capable of.

Alongside the transnational risks, the regional risks can develop and embrace different forms. Some of them have been identified in literature of

<sup>1</sup> According to Presidential Administration. (2015). Strategia națională de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015-2019. *O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume*, chapter 3 – Threats, risks and vulnerabilities.

specialty, such as: imbalances regarding the military potentials of the geostrategic interest area of the state; the presence of military conflicts and tensions which can develop in the nearby territory; the prolongation of economic and social difficulties that can alter the military potential and undermine the governing institutions' authority of the country; the possibility of encountering several malfunctions in financial, energetic, informatics, communications and telecommunications systems of the country; the political military rivalries between the countries; the degradation of the surrounding environment by carrying out different activities with a negative ecological impact. (Bălăceanu & Moșoiu, 2018:23).

Other risks that can provide effects regarding societies, men and European Union states are: *asymmetric non-classical risks* (unarmed and armed actions, done on purpose, with the aim of damaging the stability and the security of the nation, by causing direct or indirect consequences towards the economic and social activities); *economics related risks* (the control of the market, disloyal competition, corruption, bribery); *ecology related risks*<sup>2</sup> (depositing unsealed barrels that contain radioactive substances, the leaking of industrial residues nearby cities, export network organization of toxic substances); *risks regarding faulty functioning of the banking financial system* (money laundry, turning the illegally gained goods into apparently legal profits).

Risks with regard to the society generate as many threats as vulnerabilities. Organized crime is, by the opinion of some authors, a residual phenomenon of globalization that manifests in this way the negative effects it generates within states. According to other authors, cross-border organized crime is based on the inefficiency of governments to act with legal leverage against its manifestations, generating vulnerabilities that induce instability in the proper functioning of institutions and guarantee the security of those states.

Organized crime and human trafficking are becoming more and more complex and difficult to detect and control. Organized crime networks benefit from global communications and transport networks as well as global banking systems to mask operations. The way in which cross-border criminal networks are organized on a cross-border basis has enabled the criminal power centers to hold data and information in a timely manner, efficiently plan

their operations, anticipate responses to the protection systems and police actions, national governments, as well as international organizations. The crossing of borders between states, a rather difficult issue in the past decades, has become quite insignificant in the new context of European integration. The European continent has gone beyond the militarized border of internal borders and the securing of external borders will be based on the principles of good neighborly relations, partnership and trust. Under these circumstances, stopping traffickers to the limit of European borders will become a particularly difficult problem. (Bălăceanu & Mosoiu, 2018).

The securing of borders has become one of the most pressing problems of Romania as the phenomenon of globalization implies an expansion of the boundaries between the states of the world with the related risks and consequences. (Moșoiu & Din, 2012). Given the causes, forms and the way of manifestation, the phenomenon of organized crime can be defined as the totality of offenses planned, executed and coordinated in a unitary system by a group of people reunified on the basis of common concerns on the territory of a group of states more or less corrupt, over a period of time, in order to obtain illicit revenue.

*The main components of organized cross-border crime are the following*<sup>3</sup>: illegal trafficking and drug use; qualified smuggling; the legal regime of raw materials used in the manufacture of drugs; *human trafficking and illegal migration*; illicit electronic commerce; counterfeiting of values or currencies; money laundering; cybercrime; traffic with cars that had been stolen before; nuclear material trafficking, weapons, explosives, ammunition, toxic waste, and radioactive substances. Under the current conditions of increased convergence of national interests with those accepted and promoted by Western democracies, opportunities are created for the development and enhancement of international cooperation in order to strengthen security both at the global level and especially at the regional and sub-regional level. *All society must adapt to the new conditions.* (Gherman *et al.*, 2016).

In conclusion, organized crime, according to the specific objectives, can have an unpredictable evolution that, through dynamics, scale and consequences, exceeds the odds of a serious crime, becoming an asymmetric threat with potential for generating tensions or social crises which,

<sup>2</sup> According to the Romanian parliament's Bill no. 6/1991, *pentru aderarea României la Convenția de la Basel privind controlul transportului peste frontiere al deșeurilor periculoase și al eliminării acestora.*

<sup>3</sup> According to the Romanian parliament's Bill no.39/2003, *privind prevenirea și combaterea criminalității organizate*, art. 2

amplified and diversified, can create vulnerabilities in the national security environment.

Asymmetric threats of organized crime are no longer confined by national borders, they are increasingly cross-border, crisis-generating and conflicting in different environments and their settlement is based on the concerted action of states. The diminishing of the negative influences of this asymmetric risk that induces multiple vulnerabilities to state security can only be achieved through multidimensional and multinational actions based on the defense of democratic values and fundamental human rights.

Illegal migration as part of organized crime generates a series of problems for migrants and target states with an effect on the culture of people and states involved, while at the same time becoming a source of illegal income for human traffickers.

### 3. THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF THE ILLEGAL MIGRATION

The phenomenon of migration can only be fully understood if the concept itself gets a logical dimension based on real facts and realities whose proofs become palpable and understandable if they are properly explained and sequentially. The question which is rightfully asked is: Does the migration, as a continuous and sequent aspect, consist of a repeating sequentially aspect or how does it behave? It is a sure thing that the migration did, still does and will be strongly expressed, considering the fact that the evolution of human societies is based on mobility.

Men had been migrating from the oldest periods of time in search for food for themselves or their animals, better jobs and a better lifestyle. The migration is indispensably tied with human existence (IOM, 2018). Wars, natural or human calamities, and existence needs determined and will determine further on the movement of population from one place to another, either on regional small surfaces, great distances between countries or from one continent to another, from east to west and also from south to north. (Bălăceanu, Moșoiu, 2018:94)

The main aspects that determine the population to migrate from one place to another depend on time, countries and regions and can be: demographic, economic, political, socio-cultural, religious and *natural (climatic reasons)*. The causes, however, generate the different types of migration.

Migration is a complex process and, depending on the territorial area which is in question, there can be two types of migration: internal migration and external or international migration. The national

security attention tends more towards international migration (Dascălu, 2018:14). Migration can be legal and illegal, as well. The terms that can be used to explain the phenomenon of migration are immigration and emigration, the first one referring to the persons who enter a state or a territorial area and the second one referring to the persons who leave the up-mentioned structures. (National Geographic society).

The illegal arrival of refugees in Europe is not a new occurrence. European Union was not sufficiently prepared for the refugees mass migration that took place in 2015 and in the following years. Given the current context of refugees crisis, the most of the migrants come from the Middle East and the northern part of Africa. The increase can be considered to be a result of a sum of „push and pull” factors that stacked up during the last years, examples of factors that determined the people to leave their home country are the development of the riots, protests, bloodied conflicts known as Arab Spring, that took place at the end of 2010 and continued in the following years, the Siria, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, poverty and famine. The reasons because of which the immigrants chose Europe are the peace, the prosperity, better job conditions and the education. The main migratory routes to Europe that have been identified on the migration map by the Border Police and Coast Guard European Agency are (Frontex, 2019): the West Africa route, the West Mediterranean Sea route, the Middle Mediterranean Sea route, the east Mediterranean sea route, the Western Balkans route, the Eastern Europe borders route, the circular route from Albania to Greece. The details regarding the routes that have been followed by the migrants flow in Europe, the number of arrivals, the actions and the infrastructure of the organized crime network involved in illegal migration, as well as the accessed funds, are being highlighted in the Europol-Interpol reports (Europol, 2016).

The perception regarding migration is generally associated firstly with a negative fact, but, facing such a millennial phenomenon, the society raises *a series of justified questions* such as: what contribution can the immigration bring to the host society, can it influence in any way the host society, does it represent a threat to national and social security of any state, is the behavior of the migrants influenced by the cultural differences that are particular to their original background, does the mass emigration of our own citizens affect the social, economic and even cultural life, what would be the advantages and disadvantages of the both events that happen intensely nowadays?

Many more millions of people that are caught in *the migration flow* used illegal sea navigating means, traveling from Turkey to Greece, from the northern part of Africa to Italy or Spain, being helped by the members of organized crime groups. It is estimated that, since 2015, thousands of people lost their lives in the effort of reaching Europe.

The Western world has responded to the phenomenon of migration and a series of restrictions have been set over time at the borders of the EU Member States, which made it difficult for migrants to reach their destination. In this context, migrants have used various methods and travel routes both on sea and on land, sometimes putting their lives at risk. Forced by circumstances, most of the time, refugees have accepted to be led and accompanied by *various guides, members of organized crime exploiting their situation*, providing them with inappropriate means to cross the water or to be transported on the road. Risks are enormous for people who want to reach Europe due to the inaccessibility of safe routes and routes used by citizens with legal documents. (Europol, 2016).

Statistically speaking, the most dangerous things that can happen and which have generated the most deaths are drowning and asphyxia due to the transport of people under inhumane, overpopulated conditions. Many boats have sunk in the Mediterranean Sea or the Aegean Sea, but there were also many cases of asphyxiators in cargo cars carrying airless people. At the same time, refugees risk being held prisoners, abducted or even killed due to additional charges imposed by traffickers and which ordinary people are unable to pay or because of illegal crossings across borders. Between them there are multiple sexual and physical abuses, even tortures, amplified phenomena and guides at various points along the travels.

Once they arrive in the destination countries, administrative, logistical, spiritual, cultural issues also arise for all states that have received migrants. In Europe, the refugee crisis seems to be more a matter of culture and attitude than a problem of overcrowding. Cultural conflicts are more difficult to address, especially since immigrants leave the asylum districts. Some European governments that have received migrants have not taken cultural differences seriously on issues such as minority rights, women's rights, family honor, and individual freedoms among asylum seekers, especially from the Middle East and Africa, have omitted the issue of the religion of migrants who, many situations are not Christians and try to impose the places where the religion and customs of the country of origin come.

The conditions in some refugee camps and *Hotspots* are extremely difficult. Refugee accommodation centers are often located in remote or isolated localities, migrants are confronted with space and insufficient food problems, expired food, lack of privacy or family, lack of space and equipment necessary for children's recreation. In some accommodation establishments, refugees are not allowed to prepare their own meals or there are no spaces where they can cook (UNHCR, 2018).

On the other hand, more and more analyzes confirm that refugees do not adapt to the European environment of living and security, and that more and more crimes are caused by them. As a measure, the political class approved harsher sanctions for convicted crimes and more restrictive asylum laws (UNHCR-Europe, 2019).

The security/safety of European people and societies is being raised more and more frequently. In host countries, especially in Germany, many citizens are concerned about how the presence of refugees will affect the local community, thus promoting racial prejudices among some segments of the population. Many specialists believe that with the intensification of migratory flows, the number of people who can participate in terrorist acts in Europe has increased. Increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks, crime rates, increasing competition on the labor market and possible changes in their lifestyle create a negative attitude towards refugees from citizens. Many people surveyed in the locations where migrant camps are organized fear the attitudes and behavior of immigrants (UNHCR-Europe, 2019). But, on the other hand, some malicious locals benefit from the presence of refugees, forcing them to commit robbery, distribute drugs, including forcing some women to prostitute.

Contrary to what has been said, other people offer volunteers and help refugees find a home and transition to the society that adopted them (German, French, Italian, etc.). They collect donations, offer language lessons, and accompany them to local governments. Some have sponsored directly the refugees or received them in their homes. *The main integration efforts* are directed towards the labor force and higher education. Integration efforts have had a positive economic impact in the short term. Integrating immigrant populations into the EU is generally problematic due to language barriers, hostility to host societies and other factors. Immigrants are less successful in school compared to target country students, resulting in a low hiring rate, and when they find a job they will earn much less. (Dascălu, 2018).

#### 4. EUROPEAN INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR THE LEGAL SOLVING OF THE PROBLEMS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE PHENOMEN OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

The problems are complex and concern both the newcomers and the citizens of the target countries. It can be said that we face progressive western culture and conservative oriental or North African culture. The EU needs to deepen the integration of the Member States and one way is to maintain the values of the millennial and majority Christian culture, specific to Orthodox, Catholics or Protestants. This must not exclude acceptance of minority religions on the continent.

Religious values have coincided with and coincide with the fundamental cultural values of a community or another, which contributes decisively to preserving the identity of the respective community. Sometimes religious values have been transformed into defense weapons against external or internal aggression, and are even explicitly embedded in specific defensive strategies. This situation has radically shifted the ideological element and altered the socio-political environment. Instead, intercultural dialogue favors the phenomenon of religious tolerance and solving social integration problems.

Integration of immigrants involves the responsibility of the host state to provide a legal framework of obligations and rights for immigrants to actively participate in social, economic, civil and cultural life. Social policies on integration must be tailored to the specifics of the population concerned, local and national conditions, and be viewed from a global point of view, analyzing not only the social and economic aspects of integration, but also those on religious diversity, cultural, political rights and citizenship.

EU measures to prevent illegal migration and cross-border crime must take into account the improvement of asylum and migration policies, the integrated management of the external border security, continuing within the Community space by improving intelligence-driven search, control and surveillance, and in accordance with national law where possible on the basis of police cooperation agreements. (Moșoiu & Din, 2012).

The European Commission, *through the new European Migration Agenda* adopted in 2015, proposes immediate measures to address the challenges of migration. The agenda recommends the following four issues: reducing the causes of illegal migration; saving lives and securing external borders by better managing them and improving

border procedures; rethinking and properly applying the European migration and asylum policy, stepping up efforts to eliminate abuses and identifying potential people questioned by the law; addressing a new legal migration policy, taking into account the demographic challenges that the EU countries will face.

Based on the lessons learned, on June 28, 2018 at the *European Council meeting*, EU leaders came to an agreement on migration in Europe following intense negotiations through consensus. The *establishment of regional landing platforms and the transfer of migrants to controlled centers established in the Member States* are the newest negotiated things that come to resolve the bottlenecks existing in the first-line Member States of migration and to strengthen cooperation in the EU.

In this context, *the European Commission* is promoting the idea of stepping up refugee redeployment efforts by correctly applying the *distribution key* and saying that social policies on migrant integration should be based on the following: respect for the core values on which a democratic society is based; immigrants have the right to retain their own identity; immigrants have adequate rights and obligations, as well as the rights and obligations of EU citizens; as well as EU citizens, immigrants to participate actively in all aspects of the life of European society (cultural, social, political, economic, civil).

The motto of unity in diversity must be well understood and applied within the framework of the European Union project, within the existing cultural diversity, especially in the context of the days we live in.

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

Considering the globalization context, the main global security threats are still the transnational risks: global terrorism, drug traffic and organized crime. Their present forms are radically influenced by the globalization characteristics: opening and fluidization of the borders, the free trafficking of merchandise and services, communication networks. Europe is in the middle of a legislative and social transformation process due to the great number of migrants that keep on arriving and the problems caused by them. The intercultural communication is still the foundation of solving the most of the problems regarding the refugees integration in the hosting nation societies.

The international community finds itself only at the beginning of understanding the social effects of

the migration in the hosting country. Nowadays, international assistance that is capable to solve the problems and the causes of migration is required. (The European Institute of Romania, 2004). The uncontrolled migration flow among the currently developing and already developed countries can hamper the success of local and national development politics.

The immigrant's attitude will determine his condition in the hosting nation and, furthermore, the impact of the social structure of the state. It is well known the fact that, during some situations, the migrants continue to keep their moral values, traditions and the lifestyle that they embraced in their home country (Bălăceanu & Moșoiu, 2018).

Because of the economic offer that Romania currently provides, it is still not a target country for the migration flow, but, for the most part of it, a transit or waiting territory regarding the route to European western and northern countries.

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# Culture & Communication



## NATIONAL IDENTITY, NOURISHED FROM THE ROOTS OF HISTORY

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**Abstract:** *Perhaps the most concrete perspective of national identity is the historical one, because this perspective departs from real events spent in the past to bring their echo to date. For the formation of the Romanian nation and the Romanian State the reference moments are marked by large-scale national speeches, that make the transfer of the identity concepts from the elite to the masses. To capture the way in which the national feeling in Romania was propagated vertically (from intellectuals to peasants), the way in which he transformed from ethnic identity into national identity, is the quintessential way in which the national identity was born. Strengthening a relationship with the past, gradually led to the genesis of Romanian ethnic consciousness, which materialized in the unification programs of the Romanian nation. The analysis of messages transmitted by the elite in the past, who had succeeded to anime the entire Romanian population and led to the unification of all Romanian historical provinces, is important because this is the way we can have the image for what represents the contemporary speech regarding National Identity.*

**Keywords:** *national identity; national speeches; national cohesion; union; state nucleus*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Romania has been set up as a state in the year 1859, when the union of the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, was done by choosing a common ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza. The establishment of the first Romanian state nucleus was possible in the context of the international events of the time, and the consolidation of the Romanian state was also based on the enthronement of the United Principalities of a foreign prince, on the promulgation on July 1st 1866 of the first Constitution of Romania, on the War of Independence and the proclamation in 1881 of the Kingdom of Romania. The affirmation of the principle of nationalism at international level, that occurred mid-19th century, was a favorable context for establishing the nation-state, and the identity elements - developed above - found a good background to fall into place. The 1866 constitution, which was one of the fundamental elements of state support, was shaped on the Belgian Constitution of 1830 and was based on the idea of an ethno-cultural nation, being a modern constitution that promoted the principle of the separation of powers within the state. Subsequent to the Small Union of 1859 and the constitution of

the state nucleus, the Great Union of 1918 represented the completion of a historic process that resulted in the union of all the Romanian provinces in one national state, Romania.

In the work *Memoria națională românească*, Mihai Rusu (2015:24) has identified an active pattern regarding the movement of national emancipation from the "small" countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Romania, in agreement with the three phases designed by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch, namely:

- a) Phase A, of scholastic interest, in which the scholars "discover" the nation and by which they trigger the nation-state building movement;
- b) Phase B, of "patriotic agitation", in which the literacy people who discovered the nation start actions of ideological proselytism for the development of national consciousness;
- c) Phase C, the institutionalization of nationalism as a mass movement".

A brief presentation of the way in which the national feeling in Romania has propagated vertically (from intellectuals to peasants), the way in which ethnic identity has turned gradually in the national identity, is at least as important as the chronological presentation of historical events'

development. But the two levels: the ideological one, of provision of ethnic and linguistic arguments for the achievement of the union and the factual one, of the conduct of major political affairs, are intimately linked, even if there is a slight temporal gap.

Through this article we aim to investigate the hidden ideological dimension of the first two phases of the Hroch-Rusu model, which underpinned the institutionalization of Romanian nationalism.

## 2. THE PHASE OF SCHOLASTIC INTEREST. THE LATINIST FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

**2.1 Historical approaches.** The idea of the Romanians' Latinity was the one that represented the kernel of Romanian ethnic identity, being common to Moldavians, Vlachs and Transylvanians. The first known author who supported the idea of the Latin origin of the Romanians was the Transylvanian humanist Nicolaus Olahus, in his work *Hungaria* (1536). This was followed by the writings of the Moldavian scholars who preached in the 17th and 18th centuries the common Latin origin of the Romanian people, among them Grigore Ureche – *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei* (1642-1647), Miron Costin - *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei de la Aron Vodă încoace, de unde este părăsit de Ureche* (1675) and *De neamul moldovenilor, din ce țară au ieșit strămoșii lor* (1686-1691), Dimitrie Cantemir – *Hronicul vechimei a romano-moldo-vlahilor* (1719-1722) and Ion Neculce - *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei de la Dabija Vodă până la a doua domnie a lui Constantin Mavrocordat* (1732-1744), but also the Wallachian humanist Constantin Cantacuzino - *Istoria Țării Rumânești dintru început* (1716). If in Wallachia and Moldavia, progress has been easier to be obtained, in view of the fact that the Romanian Principalities were autonomous as regards the internal politics, but had some limitations with regard to foreign policy, being vassal to the Ottoman Empire, Transylvania was in a very different situation, entering the Austrian Empire at the end of the 17th century as autonomous principality, and thereafter being included in the Habsburg Empire. The representatives of the Romanians in Transylvania have made sustained efforts to emancipate the community of Romanians, which, although they represent the majority population, have the status of tolerated nation. Numerous petitions have been addressed by those who today are known as part of the Transylvanian School, through which they

claimed rights for the Romanian population. The arguments of those petitions have become the guiding ideas of the Romanian population, in its fight for the recognition and the acquisition of independence, through the creation of the red wire of the national identity. The most important Latinologic ideological wave, drawing its roots in the chronicles of Grigore Ureche, grew at the end of the eighteenth century - the beginning of the nineteenth century, through the representatives of the Transylvanian School. Through the treatises of history and philology, of which we mention: - Samuil Micu *Elementa linguae daco-romanae sive valachicae* (1780, in collaboration with Gheorghe Șincai), *Istoria și lucrurile și întâmplările românilor* (1805), Gheorghe Șincai – *Hronica românilor și a mai multor neamuri...* (1811), Petru Maior – *Istoria pentru începutul românilor în Dachia* (1812) and the joint work *Lesicon românescu-latinescu-ungurescu-nemțescu or Lexiconul de la Buda* (1825) recourse is made to the *strictly* Roman origin of the Romanian people.

Seemingly simple works of history (and philology), those listed above have designed ideologically - especially in Transylvania, at the beginning of the 19th century - the concept of nation (at the phase A of the Hroch-Rusu perspective The Transylvanian School, for example, appealed to the Roman origin of the Romanian people as a reparatory gesture towards the exclusion of Romanians from social-political life through the *Unio Trium Nationum* (1437). The Latin hypothesis was launched with no declared scientific purposes, but with the political purpose (ideologically fueled) to put Romanians in equal rights with the other nations of Transylvania. The works of the Transylvanian Enlighteners aimed to prove by historical facts and especially by language the noble origin and continuity of Romanity on the left of the Danube, responding to a wave of works by the revisionists Fr. Joseph Sulzer, I.C.Eder, Bella Marton or I. Chr. Engel, who had fed the idea of the uninhabited space of the Carpathian arch at the arrival of the Hungarians, the *terra deserta* theory. In the absence of substantiation with incontestable scientific arguments, the works of the Transylvanian School were ideologically used by the new wave of revisionists (among them the German philologist Robert Rösler) against the very idea of continuity and Romanian national identity with Roman roots. The Rösler turn was made possible by feeding the two antagonistic theoretical approaches with ideas from common studies, also devoid of scientific consistency:

One of these studies, known probably not in its depth by all the representatives of the Transylvanian School, given the takeover “in waves” of the ideas proliferated, is *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae of Ioan Lucius (Lučić)* (1604-1679).<sup>1</sup> Lucius believes that the name *vlah* is an appellate first used by Bulgarians to determine a people formed south of the Danube from the mixture of Roman captives with “other ethnic remnants” in the Empire, left after the Aurelian withdrawal or displaced by other peoples before the invasion of the Bulgars. The Revisionists, headed by Engel, take over the idea of the formation / displacement of Romanians south of the Danube, given the lack of “ideological resistance”. As a matter of fact, the representatives of the Transylvanian School, starting with Maior, overlook the interpretations related to the subject of the Aurelian withdrawal. Perhaps Lucius's theory, for example, would not have been so important as a landmark if it did not constitute a reference in consolidating the Latinist theory. The Latin-Romanian comparisons of Ioan Lucius's work<sup>2</sup> are resumed by Șincai and Maior (and used, by reference to other studies by the other representatives of the Transylvanian ideological movement). Obviously, neither Șincai nor Maior could mistakenly regard the intention prefigured in the source of *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae* source as long as they fed their ideology from Lucius's Latinist hypothesis, and neither could they combat the revisionist ideology. Historical truth could not be made up of half-truths, “convenient” to the proposed goal (Lesenciuc, 2016: 106-107).

But the Röslerian works are also devoid of scientific arguments and they are full of contradictions, and in this phase of scholastic interest, confrontation could only be carried out at the ideological level. The Enlightenment exaggerations of the Transylvanian School are rooted in the reality of the epoch, the first half of the nineteenth century, sometimes bypassing historical truth from political reasons, but this perspective led to parallel developments: a later recourse to the scientific instrumentation of many historiographers, respectively a retention within the projection of the ideologically based path, pursuing political goals, in the case of some of the foreign historiographers:

<sup>1</sup> “Lucius's theory has been widely known to Romanian historiography starting with Petru Maior and his descendants up to the present day” (Armbruster, 1993: 180).

<sup>2</sup> Ioan Lucius notes, among others: “Valachi autem hodierni quicunque lingua Valacha loquuntur seipsos non dicunt Vlachos aut Valachos sed Rumenos et a Romanis ortos gloriantur, Romanaque lingua loqui profitentur (...)” (Armbruster, 1993:180).

(...) to a large number of modern historiographers of Slav, German and Hungarian nationality, the political character seems to form today as in the past the environment of scientific investigations, the background of the historical study, when it comes to the origin of our ancestry (Pop, 1999: 194) .

Under these conditions, “the need for a correct understanding of the context of the Transylvanian School emergence is fundamental” (Lesenciuc, 2016:114) and therefore a balanced situation away from any ideological deformation produced by certain exaggerations is necessary in the study with the scientific tools at its disposal of the relationships between the ideological and factual levels of propagating the idea of national identity.

**2.2 Linguistic approaches.** Along with the expression of the historical arguments for the Latinist foundation of national identity, a remarkable activity of promoting it was achieved by printing books and publications in Romanian. In the vicinity of Orthodox churches and schools in Romanian - as is the case with the first Romanian school near the Church of St. Nicolae from Șcheii Brașov - printers were set up. The whole affirmation of national identity by linguistic arguments is based on the founding work of Coresi, who saw in the Romanian prints not only a way of destroying the Slavic “darkness”, destroying the Slavonic barriers that comprised the Romanian language and writing, but also a way of approaching the Romanians through the liturgical practice to a sort of community identity, which underpinned the ethnic and then national identity. The edifier is Coresi's continuous reference to the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Corinthians: “In the holy church better to speak 5 words with meaning than 10 thousand words misunderstood in the foreign language” (*Preface to Întrebare creștinească*, 1560, v. and *Epilogue to the Tetraevanghelul* of 1561, and *Preface / Polojenie at the Molitvenicul rumânesc* (1567) and *Epilogue to the Psaltirea românească* of 1570, etc.), which transforms from the coresian typographical approach into a substantive approach in terms of national identity through language. Coresi's action in the second half of the sixteenth century was one that “polarized the unity of speech, thought and feeling of a nation” (Oltean, 2009: 20), a concerted action of drawing attention to the role of language in the formation of cultural consciousness:

And if I read and learned that all are interpreted and testified and strengthened with the Holy Scriptures, and I was very fond of writing and I printed for you

my Romanian brothers, to teach you, and I pray that you my brothers will be honest and honorable, that you will see yourself the way the pearl is and the hidden treasure you will learn / reveal ... (Coresi, 1998: 187)

Having the intuition of the literary language, Coresi laid the foundations for the subsequent settlements, most of them in the same cultural centre of Brasov, which also benefited from the freedom of expression and the printing infrastructure needed to promote cultural unity through language. Extending from religious writings to secular ones - see the work of priest Petcu Șoanul from Șcheii Brașovului, which printed in 1733 the first almanac in Romanian - was the natural step before the rigorous grammar foundation, starting with the first *Gramatică românească* (1755-1757), of Dimitrie Eustatievici, the Brașovian, which was the basis of the Romanian grammar of the enlightener Radu Tempea, but also of the one written in Latin by the Transylvanian Schoolmen, Gh. Sincai and S. Micu, *Elementa linguae daco-romanae sive valachicae*. Remaining in this area of language-based foundations, the work of 1780 produces important graphical mutations and the removal of Slavonic writing, for the purposes of later influencing and phonetics, for example: replacing the semivowel *î* with *i* in the beginning of the word (eg. *imperat*), i.e. with the *e* and *a* inside of the word: (E.g. *Fen, camp*), replacing the velars *k* and *g* in the current graphics *ch* and *gh* with *cl* and *gl* (e.g. *clau, glație*), of the sound *c* followed by a vowel with the latin *qv* (e.g. *qvand*), the doubling of the liquids (e.g. *terra*), noting the wheezing *ș* with *s* (e.g. *resina*), of the hissing *ț* with *ç* or *ti* (e.g. *fație, tiene*), the replacement of *z* with *d* (e.g. *dieu*), of the group *pt* with *ct* (e.g. *lacte*), of the group *șt* with *sc* or *st* (e.g. *crescere, esti*), but also the call to the initial prosthetic *h* (e.g. *hom*) (Rosetti *et al.*, 1971:452-453).

The most important steps in expressing the national identity through the written word were the printing of the first Romanian publications in the first half of the nineteenth century: *Chrestomaticul românesc* of Theodor Racocce from Cernăuți (1820), *Foaia duminicii* of Ioan Barac of Brașov (1837), which started the extensive translation program from Shakespeare, Marmontel, Gessner, Schiemann, Kotzbue, etc., including from *Halima* or *1001 nights* and from the *Odyssey*, but especially through *Gazeta de Transilvania* - the first Romanian political publication - and by *Foaie pentru minte, inimă și literatură* of George Barițiu

(1838). The publications of Brașov do not help by chance to develop the national identity, but are part of a program undertaken to continue the founding work of Coresi, as evidenced by George Barițiu's essay from the 25th number of 1840 of *Foaie pentru minte, inimă și literatură*:

However, the language is more pronounced on which nationality is founded. And let's not forget that speaking a language one way or another does not depend only on the outside elements, but more due to some inward features that all of you have and one who lives in closer relationship with each other. Therefore nationality, after my own account, is a natural need, and the language is the fortune, the holy property of a nation. (Barițiu, 1840, *apud* Hangiu, 1968:76-79).

The assertion of identity through language and literature led, with the emergence of the first Romanian publications, to Phase B of the Hroch-Rusu model, that of the ideological proselytism through "patriotic agitation", through programs of development of national consciousness.

### 3. THE "PATRIOTIC AGITATION" PHASE THE THEORY OF FORMS WITHOUT THE SUBSTANCE

The design of national consciousness, reached in the second phase, was realized on a discursive level through partisan substantiation, through aspects related to the projection of the present critical discourse. In order to define the national identity, it was necessary to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' - a discursive element specific to the nineteenth Romanian century, culminating in an active level with the Revolution of 1848 (as a reverberation of phase A, previously analyzed) and ideologically with the Maiorescian program of *Convorbiri literare*, based on Mihail Kogălniceanu's *Dacia literară* program. But the phase of "patriotic agitation" was not characterized by action against the other, but by amending the allogeneic element in relation to its own direction, with the national path, with the natural course of modernization with internal resources. Even though the "imitation" has been amended by previous studies, including those of George Barițiu, or by the cultural program of *Dacia literară*: "The desire for imitation has become a dangerous mania for us, because it kills in us the national spirit ..." (Kogălniceanu, 1840/1967:127), the true expression of the protection of national identity through an "inward" journey has been produced by the Maiorescian theory of forms

without substance: "The form without substance not only does not make any use, but it is quite ruinous, because it destroys a powerful means of culture" (Maioreescu, 1868/1989: 129). The greatest danger, from this perspective, is the loss of identity through cultural dilution, by deviating from the natural course of culture:

For without culture a nation can still live in the hope that at the natural moment of their development this beneficial form of human life will emerge; but with a false culture a nation cannot live, and if it persists in it, then it gives an example more to the old law of history: that in the struggle between true civilization and a resilient nation the nation is destroyed, but never the truth (Maioreescu, 1868/1989: 130).

Basically, we are in the pre-institutional foundation of nationalism, in a phase of cultural nationalism that sometimes overlooks or develops in parallel with political nationalism, aiming, in summary, to "achieve or maintain the autonomy and political individuality of a group that considers itself - in a larger or smaller proportion - a potential or actual nation" (Dungaciu, 2018:105), serving the national state/ the future unitary national state. Unfortunately, this nationalism, that can be analyzed in the context of the era, is decontextualized and interpreted, in one direction or another, in the light of various current interpretative interests. And if Maioreescu's theory of forms without substance is not directly amended, Mihai Eminescu's theory of superposed layer, derived from the Maioreescian one is the subject of many contemporary commentaries, most of which decontextualizing the projection. For Eminescu, the theory of forms without substance is not a theoretical framework usable in explaining some aspects of the society, but rather an explanatory principle of the society affected by the presence of a "superposed layer" that takes advantage of the transformations of society, allowing non-critical copying of western institutional forms. "The national character is not founded by public morality" (Eminescu, 1989:110), and imitate leads to weakening of the substance. A weak substance means, in fact, the weakening of national consciousness, because empty forms cannot serve to the cultural regeneration and the strengthening of the nation.

The theory of forms without substance, applicable to "all "peripheral delayed" societies, in the condition of "dependent development", societies in transition to a model already developed in developed societies" (Georgiu, 2000: 154) is the

one serving as a catalyst in the development of national consciousness, pervading and fueling nationalist political traits, such as the narrative one, developed under the sign of the national project. Without these projects, without these polarizations, the nationalist discourse would not have probably been possible. The phase of "patriotic agitation" in the ideological substratum corresponds to the foundation of "national consciousness", which according to Ernest Renan's meaning actually represents the nation. The ideological foundations of the two incipient phases are those that have, in fact, allowed the establishment and foundation of the concept of national identity. The simple popular actions of 1859 and 1918 could not have taken place without such a rigorous foundation, deeply rooted in national history, and leading to the crystallization of national consciousness.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Ideologically, the first phase of the Hroch-Rusu model begins in the second half of the 16th century and continues until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The second phase extends during the nineteenth century and during the first two decades of the 20th century. There is no clear demarcation between them, but only a form of organic continuity. The factual expression of these two phases, continuing with the third, that of the institutionalization of nationalism through the political programs in the Kingdom and Transylvania, occurred on a scale that allows historical analysis and chronological rendering. From this point of view, according to Otto Bauer's view, of the nation seen as a "community of destiny" (more precisely with the Romanian expression of the "community of destiny" in the meaning of Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, 1942/1998:569-582) without a solid ideological projection, without the appropriate steps in the ideological underground of phases A and B of the Hroch-Rusu model, we could not have talked today about Romanian national identity in the same terms. In other words, without the Romanian nation in the pre-politic sense (projected in the phases of scholastic interest and ideological proselytism), the nation in political sense would have been an inoperative concept.

Summing up the ideological path of the evolution of the national idea, the consolidation of a relationship with the past gradually led to the genesis of the Romanian ethnic consciousness, which materialized in the unification programs of the Romanian nation.

There were also voices who argued that the history was artificially invented and rewritten to give meaning and content to collective memory in support of the creation of states. The conspiratorial and destabilizing theories of this kind, which had the purpose of defeating the common effort, did not have the power to counter the collective effort of unification and the national spirit.

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## ROMANIA'S CENTENARY AND YOUNG ROMANIANS' VIEW OF THEIR OWN IDENTITY

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**Abstract:** Starting from Erikson's idea that identity is a coherent self image made up of the goals, values and beliefs that a person is firmly committed to, our article aims to analyze how Romania's Centenary celebrations have succeeded in fostering in young people the belief in the grandeur of Romania's national values or annihilating the feeling of pride in belonging to a big nation. The main objective of our paper revolves around the way in which this anniversary event has succeeded or failed to strengthen the Romanian nation. We will equally address the hypothesis that the Centenary could represent that country project that is currently lacking in Romania. We will also employ the theory of the form without substance in our analysis, given the fact that the Centenary and the Romanian hospitality give a formal boost to Romania's image. In our approach we will equally resort to the methodological instruments delivered by anthropology, since seen as a ritual the Centenary gave voice to two contradictory opinions, one attacking the national spirit and disavowing the symbols, rituals and national myths, the other defending them, but in a tedious and redundant rhetoric. For an interdisciplinary approach, the anthropological perspective will outline the premises for a qualitative psychological analysis. In an experiment, we need to make it clear that shaping a national identity among young Romanians is a process that can happen due to all the efforts put in celebrating the Centenary.

**Keywords:** identity; national identity; Centenary; country project

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Any cultural system gives the individual a predetermined structure of values and meanings, which creates an internal, coherent unity and continuity. These values are transmitted through exposure to customs, traditions, laws and rules. Each individual forms their own values as a result of the product of the cultural values learned in the socialization process, as well as of the unique personal experience. One of the unique experiences of 2018 is the celebration of the Centenary of the Great Union of Romania.

The dissolution of communism and the accession of Romania to the Euro-Atlantic values created the favorable context for anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists to focus more closely on the symbolism of national anniversaries and the manner in which both the political class and the civil society offer new interpretations of national moments and national rituals.

In this context, the centenary of a nation is a precious tool for analysis through the lenses of a multidisciplinary approach, all the more so as it reflects equally the attributes of that society, how it has been related to the Centenary and its own

identity, but and its ability to make correlations between the national anniversary event and the contemporary global and regional crises.

Celebrating one hundred years since the Great Union of Alba Iulia in 1918, in which the Romanian historical provinces unite and form Great Romania, the Centenary meant the remembrance of the moment of perfection of the Romanian unitary national state, as well as the awareness of the repositioning of Romania on the map the history of the XXth century, dominated by new original models of negotiation of global positions and interests.

### 2. NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN ADOLESCENCE

To understand how the youngsters reported themselves to the Centenary, we need to understand how they relate to their own identity. Therefore, we will take into account the age of adolescence, because it is the age that has as a purpose the quest for identity. Erikson (1950, *apud* Papalia *et al.*, 2010) defines this search for identity as the coherent consequence of itself, made of goals, values and convictions that the person has a

firm commitment to. It is the age at which there is the effort to understand oneself. This crisis is the main task of adolescence to define the individual with a coherent sense of self and a valuable role in society. This individual identity suggests an identity of self, a rather subjective structure, assumed by the person, according to particular and unique provisions.

One of the major issues to be solved to help shape the identity of young people is the adoption of the values they will guide (Erikson, 1968, *apud* Papalia *et al.*, 2010). To analyze the theme of this paper, we will focus our attention on forming a set of values. The period of adolescence allows young people to seek commitments that can remain faithful to them. It is a necessary period for building a stable self-esteem, a set of values to identify with. Therefore, adolescents who satisfactorily solve the identity crisis develop their virtue of fidelity. By referring to values and their hierarchy, this identity of the individual is built in relation to them. This is negotiated and is based on the context with which we are in permanent contact.

Moreover, the community environment equips the individual with a social identity, implicitly with a national identity, in which the personal identity profile is reconfigured in relation to the exigencies of the social roles in the socio-historical contexts in which the individual is integrated (Gavreliuc, 2011). Substantialist theories emphasize biological, social or historical features (Gavreliuc, 2011). Therefore, the national identity becomes a historical data that anticipates the person's belonging to a certain national community. Instead, interacting theories emphasize building self-image in relation to other social actors in a particular society (Gavreliuc, 2011). National identity in this case becomes not so much an inheritance but a permanent crystallization and cultural and social negotiation.

“The process of forming values proceeds concurrently with the process of defining the identity of the individual.” (Gavreliuc 2002a:324). Throughout this process, the individual is continually interacting with the environment and those he / she comes into contact with, his / her perceptions being always validated or denied. As it reflects and clarifies its identity dilemmas, the person gets more clarity about who he/she is, both individually and socially.

### 3. DESIGN OF RESEARCH

**3.1 The motivation of research.** The present scientific approach is based on the premise that a ritual is an instrument of social order (Leach,

1968:520-536) or a formal act with a symbolic component through which a person manifests his respect for an object or action of absolute value, Erving Goffman quoted by Catherine Bell (1997:141) subtly perceiving the idea that organizing social gatherings into various formal events trains people who live after a set of moral and social rules specific to a particular culture to be self-regulating participants (1967:19, 22-23, 31-33, 42-45; 1971:62-74), although the ritual does not have the same connotations and stakes for all human beings. Claiming that the rituals tend to be governed by formalism and traditionalism, because it obliges the participants to turn to formal rhetoric (Bell, 1997:139), Catherine Bell, quoting Bloch, asserts that

highly formalized discursive ways of speaking and communicating tend to be closely connected with traditional forms of social hierarchy and authority (1997:140).

In this context, the rituals contribute to the

recreation of a society in which its members worship the same objects and share experiences that help form and sustain deep emotional bonds among the members (ed. Etzioni & Bloom, 2004: 7).

Aspiring to be a source of data about a particular society, about the beliefs and attributes of a people (Etzioni & Bloom, 2004:9-10), while the same ritual may have different roles within society, meaning that for a part of a society may have the function of renewal or what the authors call it “recommitment holidays”, while for another segment of the population it may have the role of releasing of tensions or “the tension management holidays” (Etzioni & Bloom, 2004:11). Hence, the holidays can contribute to changing social relations, in this sense we can identify group celebrations does not undermine commitment to the whole (Etzioni & Bloom, 2004:17), but there are also group ceremonies that are clear expressions of separation from the entire society or from another group (Etzioni & Bloom, 2004:19).

The rituals contribute to the building of identity, Ioana Leucea noting that identity can provide a frame “to think about the links between the person and society” (2012: 59), “integrates individuals into the community through ethnicity, nationalism, race, gender and other social categories” (Leucea, 2012:65) and, at the same time, definitively establishes the dichotomy – “we”-“others” (Leucea, 2012:63).

**3.2 The objective of research.** In the present scientific approach, research strategy and methods are based on a qualitative approach. The main objective of this research is to identify whether the Centenary celebration is a reflection of the articulation of one's own identity, especially among the teenagers.

**3.3 Research hypotheses.** Starting from the above objective, the following hypotheses were formulated:

Ip.1: Centenary is a ritual loaded with uncontroversial symbols and a substitute for a denser country project.

Ip.2: Centenary is a moment of reflection on the articulation of one's own identity.

Ip.3: The Centenary Celebration activities determine among those who are at the end of adolescence a process of shaping national identity.

**3.4 Sample and methods.** The group involved in this research comprises 40 students in the social sciences program, aged 19-20.

To demonstrate the hypothesis we will use as investigation methods: case study and experiment.

The case study thoroughly examined the celebration and symbolism of the Centenary. This was done through an interdisciplinary approach, using additional information from anthropology, political science and psychology, in order to know as many aspects of this phenomenon as possible.

The experiment was based on the idea that persuasive communication will succeed in helping to shape a national identity among young people. The experiment had two stages: in the first, under the pretext of an exhibition to be held on the occasion of the Centenary, the subjects reflected and answered two questions (What is the Centenary for Romania? What is the Centenary for you?). Two months after completing the two questions, the subjects took part in the Centenary Celebration Exhibition and had a meeting with a teacher who presented them historical data and meanings of this celebration. The persuasive message was set up to shape a national identity that begins at the age of the beginning of the youth. In the second stage, one month after reflecting on the speech, they again answered the two questions (What is the Centenary for Romania, What is the Centenary for You?). The purpose of including the experiment in this research was to help increase its overall value.

**3.5 Results in empirical research. Centenary as a ritual and a substitute for a country project.** In this sense, the centenary as a ritual has given rise

to two types of narratives, on the one hand part of the political elite promoting a discourse focused on the idea of a prosperous and powerful Romania only by suspending conflicts "between Romanians", disseminated in the public space through mobilizing words like "ending the Romanians' war against the Romanians" (Lupitu, 2018)<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the celebration of the centenary organized by the state authorities seemed to focus on the past and less on the future of Romania, being perceived as a tribute to the simultaneous efforts of our ancestors in the service of the national desideratum. This kind of celebration of the past, which involves the spending of public money, reminds us of the Iranian shah regime and the exacerbated exaltation (October 1971) of the 2500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great.<sup>2</sup> In this key of interpretation, the Centenary seems to have served the Romanians' need to recover the period when communism did not allow them to be present on the global stage, regardless of the economic costs of these rituals.

Also, the Centenary as any event celebrated lavishly and even ostentatiously traces the past and the future of that nation, in the public space, it seemed to be a substitute for a consistent country project that is lacking in Romania for the next hundred years. (<http://centenar.gov.ro/web/>)

So can we conclude that the hypothesis *Centenary is a ritual loaded with uncontroversial symbols and a substitute for a denser country project* is being verified.

At the discursive level, the Centenary offered the opportunity for political and intellectual elites to focus on the fight against corruption, although this issue has also led to more types of reading, because it is not clear what is meant by anti-corruption notion. (<https://inpolitics.ro>; <https://www.turdanews.net>)

**Centenary as a step of reflection on the articulation of national identity.** In spite of a

<sup>1</sup> See also Gabriel Valentin. 28.11.2018. Evenimentul zilei. „Dragnea: „Trebuie să încetăm acest război între români și români”. <https://evz.ro/dragnea-razboi-romani.html>

<sup>2</sup> Thus, if the declared primary objective of the Iranian holiday lies in grouping the nation around its regained identity, allowing all Iranian citizens to overcome any personal frustration and “to see where they come from and where they go” (Pahlavi, 2003: 87), later, it received the connotations of a festivity whose purpose was to legitimize the regime of Iranian shah, which had lost its popular support.

logo, the Centenary was treated as an event dominated by populist speeches, centered around the idea of preserving what the Romanian people have and less on the idea of building and prospering, especially in the conditions of Romania's demographic decline and exodus labor and talents to the Western states, given that, according to UN reports Romania occupies the second place in a global migration top, after Syria. (Alexe, 2018). Therefore, the hypothesis *Centenary is a moment of reflection on the articulation of one's own identity, which is partially verified*, as the moment of reflection should have centered on the idea of prosperity.

Or, in this sense, the Romanian nation seems to forget to reinvent, and these rituals failed to propel the feeling of belonging to the whole, just as only the Israeli nation successfully managed to preserve its faith in the singularity and greatness of its national values, and articulates their own identity by promoting the consciousness of belonging to the group, whether it is a linguistic, religious or ethnic group<sup>3</sup>. The Israeli leadership, more than ever, bet on the idea that the nation is perpetuated by organizing symbols, rituals and customs, and that Jewish identity continues to be a distinct reality because every Jewish native is aware of the problem of identifying with a group.

According to Eugen Simion, the theme of Romanian identity was born two types of attitudes that reside in either aggressive (...) nationalism, which mocks "national myths" or in a "dramatization" in the style of the heroes of I.L. Caragiale, which "defends tradition, language, national myths "through a content-free rhetoric". (2015: 20)

Understanding "to voice attitudes, mentalities and collective behaviors resulting from the belonging of individuals" to a group (Schifirneț, 2009: 464), national identity can be correlated with history, place of birth, rituals and language, the latter being the most convincing argument the identity of the nation. The answer to the legitimate

question "who are we?" captures the essence of national identity, and Romanianness, in its capacity as an identity category, deserves to be analyzed in the full equation with the presence of an ethnic conscience in all those who consider Romanian language as their mother tongue. On the other hand, the religious identity element has the role of "preserving the Romanian culture and spirituality" (Schifirneț, 2009:471), as Islam contributes decisively to the creation of arabness (Sitaru, 2009: 111-113) in this case, Orthodoxy occupying, a special place into the identity thesaurus, by deepening the opposition "us" – "the others". (Chiorean, Sigmirean, 2012)

**Centenary, a process of shaping the national identity among those who are at the end of adolescence.** In the first stage of the experiment, the answers to the question "What is the Centenary for Romania?" focused on describing the Centenary as a unique moment that celebrates 100 years since the achievement of the Great Union and reflection on the past, as well as the joy of excitement involves such an event. On the opposite side, there were 3 responses that ranked in the state reconstruction area, being considered a moment of opportunity to affirm at international level. There were also no answers that had a negative connotation in the sense that the centenary feast is a pretext for corrupt personalities to build a better image but also to waste money.

As far as the answers to the question "What is the Centenary for me?", 9 of them were circumscribed to feelings of pride and joy. 5 responses were placed in the insignificant area, the feast not giving rise to any feeling. More than half of the answers were official, presenting the Centenary as a historic day, a celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Union of 1918.

In the second stage of the experiment, following the intervention of the teacher by presenting data on the importance of the Centenary celebration, the answers to the question "What is the Centenary for Romania?" have been placed in the area of describing the Centenary as a unique moment that celebrates 100 years since the achievement of the Great Union, but grew the number of responses to 6, the ones that focus on the area of change, the reconstruction of Romania, an opportunity for affirmation, a greater power in decision-making and action have grown. 3 responses with negative connotations have placed this time in the area of a too publicized celebration, in order to gain profit from the marketing of some products.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the discussion of Jewishness, it should be noted that hebrew was reinvented as a national language, although most of the Jewish immigrants were Yiddish speakers, precisely to enshrine the nation. On the other hand, the adoption of a religious identity by the majority of Jews in Israel and the awareness that they belong to a distinct ethnic group that built the state of Israel ("Israel was, is and will be a state of the Jews") (Friedman, 2018) represent political acts of reinventing the new Jew and establishing a "link between this Israeli national identity and the Jewish character of the State of Israel." (Greilsammer, 2007)

As for the answers to the question “What is the Centenary for me?”, 15 of them have circumscribed their feelings of pride. The 5 answers remained constant and placed in the insignificant area, the feast not giving rise to any feeling. Less than half of the responses were official but various in content, presenting the Centenary as a historic day, a unique celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Union of 1918, the recognition of the initiative for a united Romania, etc. Moreover, there have been answers that have been placed in the area of reflection to the present and the future, defining the Centenary as a hope for a better Romania.

Analyzing the two stages of the experiment, we can see that, as it reflects and clarifies its identity dilemmas, student responses gain greater clarity of who they are, relative to the national identity level. Let us not forget that these students are in the process of finalizing their own identity. From this analysis we can conclude that the message of the teacher was a persuasive one that encouraged reflection on national identity. Therefore, the hypothesis that *the Centenary celebration activities determine among those who are at the end of adolescence a process of shaping the national identity* is verified.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The Centenary also represented an opportunity for reflection on the future of Romania in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as the files in progress such as the Brexit and the robustness of the European Union, Russia's revanchist reactions, the crisis of migration and terrorism, the reserved position of the United States over the retention post-war alliances coupled with multidimensional internal actions and crises, obliges Romania not to assist passively, but to adopt positions, mobilize resources and facilitate coherent responses to known and unpredictable crises in the context of holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019.

In this era of globalization and of European integration, of a changing world and volatile borders, the discussion must be waged around the feeling of being Romanian and the need to preserve the advantages of one's own identity, especially given the phenomenon of the Romanians' exodus in the West for a better living leads us to talk of a new Romania beyond its traditional borders, in which two kinds of narratives can be identified, namely one of preserving, by any means, the cultural and spiritual

identity<sup>4</sup> and another of the unconditional abolition of identity, on the background of the the fastest and better integration into the communities in which they live and work. (Olaru Naneti, 2007: 823)

Therefore, this will lead to the formation of a national identity, not just inherited, but also permanently crystallized, culturally and socially negotiated. We can have generations involved, generations that convey the desire for a better Romania if we adopt positions in this respect.

Both the Romanians inside the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic arc and those who go to work in the West have the noble mission of thinking about a viable country project built around "we", more determined to renounce to a certain type of autism to the real problems of society, and the obsessive return to the past has the role not to appeal against the present, but to be a mobilizing pattern of the masses for a better future.

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<sup>4</sup> The existence of Romanian teaching schools, music and theater festivals, cultural journals published in Romanian or Romanian parishes has a very important role in the Romanian identity inventory of the Romanian diaspora. (Olaru Nenati, 2007:823-836).

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## CULTURAL LENS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

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**Abstract:** *The modern diversification of nowadays risks and threats has led to an expansion of the significance of the concept of national security which is including today elements from the economic, social, technological fields. The importance of critical infrastructure issues was originally discussed by the United States that included it among national security issues as early as the '90s. This good practice was soon generalized worldwide, with each state being concerned about developing its own strategy to protect critical national infrastructures and about participating in the optimal operation of transnational ones. However, the mere reading of the legislative texts devoted to critical infrastructures reveals some significant differences between states in the way of approaching this issue. In this study, we propose to conduct a comparative analysis of the critical infrastructure protection strategies of the United States, Germany, Australia, Japan and Romania, having as a filter the model of cultural dimensions proposed by Geert Hofstede (1981). From this perspective, we will try to highlight how the dimensions of cultural software has shaped the way this issue is addressed. We will also analyze the extent to which these differences are elements that facilitate or endanger the protection of critical infrastructure at national and international level.*

**Keywords:** *critical infrastructure; intercultural context; cultural legislation*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of critical infrastructure has become a hot topic of security-related discussions over the last decades. Initiated in the United States as a field of study, critical infrastructure issues have been analyzed from different angles and perspectives. Gradually, the subject was populated by concept such as resilience, criticality, national infrastructure, European infrastructure, deterrence, partnership. Defined as

built-in systems that work interdependently for the production and distribution of essential goods (such as energy, water and information) and services (such as transport, banking and healthcare). An infrastructure is marked as critical if its incapacity or destruction has a significant impact on health, safety, security, economy and well-being of people (Zio, 2016:3).

Critical infrastructures have crossed national boundaries in the same way globalization did. Each country has built its own protection strategies and has also established frameworks for international cooperation.

Our objective is to analyze throughout this paper strategies aiming at protecting critical

infrastructures from the point of view of cultural studies, in the sense that we will try to identify the national cultural footprint in critical infrastructure protection strategies.

The existence of such a fingerprint is welcomed in the case of national strategies, because respecting the values of national culture increases the chances for a strategy to be accepted and respected by the average population. On the other hand, cultural lens can be a serious impediment if we are talking about a strategy that targets joint interstate effort. Understanding the cultural footprint has become one of the stakes in the studies.

### 2. CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF HOFSTEDE'S THEORY

Each historical age and each ethnicity presents certain specific features that become the particular soul of that community. Of course, the issue of culture has concerned many scholars who have tried to understand how culture works and influences community life. In *The Decline of the West*, Oswald Spengler takes over Goethe's morphological method to identify and characterize different cultures and, at the same time, to identify the main traits of the Western culture of the time. Its opinion is that any

culture has a phase of civilization, which is in fact its decadence phase, characterized by an intellectual, utilitarian, opportunistic and pragmatic spirit; the soul-related explanations was replaced by those based on intellect. The history of Chinese, Indian, Arab, Egyptian, or other Ancient culture supports this thesis, because these civilizations have shown an increasing interest in science and rational knowledge only towards their sunset.

But the various attempts to understand the culture have struck the difficulty of systematizing in a rational manner the complexity of the elements included in a cultural ensemble and processing them algorithmically.

From this point of view, a turning point in the understanding of the cultural specificity was marked by the appearance in 1980 of the book *Management of Multicultural Structure. Software of the mind* belonging to the Dutch scientist Geert Hofstede. The stake of this book was the description and differentiation between systems of values, beliefs and behavioral patterns of people who represent different cultures, according to certain classes of values brought together in five bipolar scales. Subsequently, dimensions that allow culture evaluation were complemented by additional analysis plans.

Investigating the organizational culture of several IBM affiliates, Hofstede made a major observation: organizational culture was enormously imprinted by national culture. Using a comprehensive questionnaire he identified these differences and grouped them into a few pairs of antagonists categories, which in fact represented the axes where each culture could be located: high power distance – low power distance, individualism - collectivism, masculinity - femininity, great avoidance of uncertainty – little avoidance of uncertainty, long term orientation – short term orientation, to which was added later the degree of indulgence in socializing children.

1. Power Distance Scale is the extent to which people expect power to be unevenly distributed. In countries with a high power distance, people find it natural for the power to be held by a small number of people and to be a significant difference between them and the average citizen. The power distance is also dependent on the social class, the level of education and the occupation of individuals.

The power distance influences the behavior of people on different levels. Thus, in India it is expected that friendship and romantic relations will take place within the class of membership, while in Sweden such a criterion is non-existent. Also in countries characterized by high power distance,

power symbols such as academic titles, uniforms are intensively used.

2. Masculinity – Femininity Scale: in masculine cultures, people are assertive, ambitious, competitive, strong, accepting direct conflicts and have well-defined gender roles (Japan, Austria, Venezuela, Italy, Switzerland, Mexico, Ireland, Jamaica, United Kingdom, Germany). In the feminine cultures, people are encouraged to be fashionable, oriented to the quality of life, to value interpersonal relationships, tenderness, to negotiate and even compromise, overlap sex roles, have good relationships with superiors and, in general, to choose win-win solutions (Sweden, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Costa Rica, Yugoslavia, Finland, Chile, Portugal, Thailand).

Organizations can be also evaluated in terms of masculinity and femininity. Thus, in male organizations, competition is encouraged, and workers are rewarded according to their contribution to the development of organizations, while feminist organizations distribute resources according to worker satisfaction and needs.

Hofstede believes that over time, all countries will embrace feminine values which are more suited to the new type of world-wide jobs with a high percentage of human factor focused service.

3. Individualism – Collectivism Scale: in individualistic cultures, the person is oriented towards individual success and independence from others, relies on himself and emphasizes privileges rather than duties. Individualistic values are power, personal achievement, hedonism and stimulation. On the contrary, the collectivist societies are characterized by a strong sense of solidarity with those belonging to the same group, respect for tradition and goodwill towards others. The individual is perceived as part of a larger whole and feels the need to obey the group's norms.

Collectivist mentality is specific to agricultural societies, where land is a limited resource that cannot be multiplied by each individual. Survival is thus ensured by the existence of extended families and joint work. An interesting observation, in support of the previous one, is that in collectives closer to the Equator, social values are predominantly collectivist due to the preponderance of agriculture in the respective regions.

4. The Uncertainty Avoidance Scale refers to the extent to which members of society feel threatened by ambiguous, uncertain, unknown and new situations and also how much they try to avoid these situations by ensuring greater stability of the career, adopting more formal rules, rejecting ideas

that deviate from standards and accepting absolute truths.

5. The long term orientation scale was later added by Hofstede and Bond (1988) and refers to people's preference to focus their efforts on the present or on the future. Communities that shape their future in the long run are geared towards future rewards and they value ambition, savings, and increased adaptability to changing circumstances. Communities characterized by a short-term approach are proud of their past and present, have strong national pride and respect for social traditions and rules.

For our paper, we will apply this theory to understanding how the cultural specificity has imprinted legislation on the protection of critical infrastructures. For this purpose, we chose to compare the strategies regarding critical infrastructure in some of the most representative countries around the world including Romanian legislation in the field.

### 3. PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES – CULTURAL SPECIFIC DYAD AROUND THE WORLD

**3.1 United States Of America** illustrated an unusual combination of low power distance (40) and high individualism (91). Therefore, Americans are very eager to reach high performance and recognition while hierarchy is in most of the cases a convenience, as managers are very accessible and they rely on their team for better results. Also people do not rely too much on authorities for support.

For our paper we analyzed *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7* (2003), which is one of the major American legislative texts regarding critical infrastructure protection. With respect the cultural specific, Americans precisely expressed in the acknowledgement of the strategy that

Individual efforts to manage risk are enhanced by a collaborative public-private partnership that operates as a unified national effort, as opposed to a hierarchical, command-and-control structure.

and

Voluntary collaboration between private sector owners and operators (including their partner associations, vendors, and others) and their government counterparts has been and will remain the primary mechanism for advancing collective action toward national critical infrastructure security

and resilience. (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003, 10).

The legislation nominees also a responsible person for critical infrastructure protection, but he

...shall serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, art.12).

All over the strategy, the Secretary is referred in relation with maintaining a partnership framework for achieving security.

According to Hofstede's theory, the score of the US on Masculinity is 62, and this also must be interpreted in connection with the highest individualistic drive of the world. Americans consider that people have to work hard to be the best they can be. They are fairly open to new ideas and experiments, as uncertainty avoidance shows 46, but the moment 9/11 provoked a lot of fear for Americans – they were culturally switched from a fairly naïve culture to the tendency to monitor everything.

Their drive to get results is clear expressed in the executive summary of *NIPP 2013 Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience*:

The heart of the National Plan is the Call to Action, which guides the collaborative efforts of the critical infrastructure community to advance security and resilience under three broad activity categories: building upon partnership efforts; innovating in managing risk; and focusing on outcomes. (...) To achieve this end, critical infrastructure partners must collectively identify national priorities; articulate clear goals; mitigate risk; measure progress; and adapt based on feedback and the changing environment. Success in this complex endeavor leverages the full spectrum of capabilities, expertise, and experience from across a robust partnership.

As for the long term orientation, Americans are measuring their performance on a short time basis, while they are striving for best results. This drive them to choose behavioral path that bring them quick results.

**3.2 Germany.** Highly performant, German cultural style is a low power distance one. Performance is achieved because of a leadership is challenged to show its expertise within a participative communication framework. While the power distance is very low, people see themselves

in terms of I, as the society is highly individualistic (67). An important feature of the relation manager-employee is responsibility and trust.

In line with their law power distance in the German *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection* (2009:3) it is underlined that

Critical infrastructure protection is a task of society as a whole, which calls for coordinated action supported by all players – government, business and industry, and the general public.

According to Hofstede, the German society is driven by competition, performance and achievement. Performance is encouraged and valued and people rather live in order to work. But they like to work in a secure environment as their need for uncertainty avoidance is really high (65).

This urge to avoid uncertainty is clear in their *CIP Strategy*:

the functions incumbent on the state and/or public authorities are primarily directed at making provisions for, or - at the most - safeguarding and controlling, the supply of goods and services in times of crisis when regular market mechanisms no longer function. Therefore, as a precaution against, and in view of coping with, serious disruptions and severe disasters/emergencies, the requirement is for institutionalized, organized co-operation of the state and business and industry within the frame-work of established security partnerships. (National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2009, 8).

It is obvious that the German legislative was aware of the country cultural specific and included recommendations for mentality changing in order to better suit the present-day challenges as

The present security mentality must be converted into a new "risk culture" (National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2009, 11)

that should encourage open risk communication, cooperation, commitment for incident prevention and management.

Their long term orientation (83) make German society a very flexible one, opened to new ideas and to innovation, coming from academic community and industry including through their national programme "Research for Civil Security" supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Their findings are encouraged to be implemented by critical infrastructure operators (*National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection*, 2009, 14-15).

**3.3 Canada.** Having a 39 score on power distance Canadian culture place a big emphasis on egalitarianism. Hierarchy is a convenience and managers are accessible and informal. They have informal interpersonal relationship and use a straightforward exchange of information.

This is the spirit of Canadian National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure (2009, 2) that assumes that

The National Strategy establishes a framework for cooperation in which governments and owners and operators can work together to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptions of critical infrastructure and thereby safeguard the foundations of our country and way of life

and highlights that

Responsibilities for critical infrastructure in Canada are shared by federal, provincial and territorial governments, local authorities and critical infrastructure owners and operators – who bear the primary responsibility for protecting their assets and services. (Canadian National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, 2009, 2).

Canadian are individualist (80) and they are self-reliant looking after themselves and their families. This is why

Canadians also have a responsibility to be prepared for a disruption and to ensure that they and their families are ready to cope for at least the first 72 hours of an emergency" (Canadian National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, 2009, 2).

Canadians are an intermediate uncertainty accepting society (48) which suggest relatively easy acceptance of new ideas and products. They are not rule oriented although they are a short term orientation society, that is a normative culture having little concern for future.

**3.4 Australia.** In Australia the power distance is low (36) as the bosses are accessible and relying on their team to perform while the communication between them is direct and informal.

Their *Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy* (2010, 4) states that

The Australian Government recognises that the best way to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure is to partner with owners and operators to share information, raise the awareness of dependencies and vulnerabilities, and facilitate collaboration to address any impediments. The Australian Government has established the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) as

its primary mechanism to build a partnership approach between business and government for CIR.

The society is highly individualistic taking care of their nuclear family but being especially self-reliant. Also they are a masculine society (61) the main value being that people should strive for the best. Australians are very determined to have success and are very proud of it:

The Australian Government has the unique ability to bring critical infrastructure sectors together in a non-competitive environment to discuss and address vulnerabilities within sectors on a national or cross-jurisdictional basis as well as enabling the identification of cross-sector dependencies. (Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, 2010, 4).

While uncertainty avoidance is very intermediate (51) Australians have a long term orientation:

All decision makers, however, need to see all hazard risk mitigation and response as part of their role, and be empowered to carry it out. Tools and techniques that are part of normal business will be more successful than those that are only used when a specific plan is activated" (Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, 2010:13).

They need to establish which is the absolute truth and have a great respect for traditions and norms, but a little interest to save for the future.

**3.5 Romania.** To highlight how the Romanian legislation carries the footprint of the cultural specificity, we will analyze the Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy approved by GD 718/2011. Romania scores very high on the power distance dimension (score of 90), therefore people accept the hierarchical order without further justification. It is accepted that people are not equal and they expect to be told what to do.

This is how protection of critical infrastructure is approached by the Strategy which refers to the responsibilities of the Inter-institutional Working Group on Critical Infrastructure Protection, established by GD 1110/2010. In the same time, all over the Strategy there are many very reverent references to European authorities, being somewhat transparent the idea that they are considered to be the higher authority (Romanian Official Journal, Part I, No. 555 / 4.VIII.2011:11).

Through the theory of multicultural structures lens Romania is evaluated as a collectivistic society. The Romanians are deeply attached to family, relatives and friends. Responsibility is shared

among group members, and management has to consider the group, not the individuals.

Thus, the Strategy emphasizes the role of cooperation in a very substantial way. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Working Group has the task of providing the institutional framework for critical infrastructure protection cooperation:

there is a need to step up critical infrastructure protection measures, namely: a. Increasing the level of communication and cooperation between state authorities and the Union Economic operators and the population, taking into account the sensitivity of certain categories of information; b. Optimizing cooperation between crisis management crisis prevention and management; c. Operating the public-private partnership in the field of critical infrastructure protection; d. Increasing the potential of self-protection, self-guarantee of individual or institutional capacities affected by dysfunctions or that may compromise the operation of critical infrastructures e. prioritization of the accepted risk level according to the cost-benefit determined by the probability of occurrence and its impact." (Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No. 555 / 4.VIII.2011:12).

The assumption of the principle of cooperation between the responsible social actors can be identified on several dimensions: e.g. according to the law it is important to create a national network of critical infrastructure liaison officers, an effective communication mechanism between them and the responsible national authorities (Monitorul Official Journal of Romania, Part I, No 555 / 4.VIII.2011:13-14). Therefore, solutions are considered possible with the help of experts working groups that should include not only Romanians but also international experts.

In terms of society values, Romania scored 42 on the masculinity - femininity dimension, being rather a Feminine society. Therefore, Romanian works as much as they need to live and they value equality, solidarity and quality at jobs, but also free time and flexibility.

The extent to which Romanian feel threaten by ambiguous or unknown situations is very high (90), therefore it is very important for them to avoid uncertainty. This is why unorthodox ideas are rejected and people need rules, rigid codes of belief and behaviors and security is an important element in individual motivation.

Also Romania score average on long term orientation showing that it maintains some links with the past but also having a half pragmatic approach to the present and the future. The strategy

is in agreement with this dimension of cultural characteristics deemed important

the development of adequate capacity response to all structures that could be affected by the design of intervention measures in emergency situations (including physical protection) and management crisis (Official Gazette of Romania, part I, no. 555 / 4.VIII.2011, 14).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The study of legislation on the protection of critical infrastructures in parallel with the theory of multicultural structures throughout this paper allowed us to observe that, almost without exception, legislation is created independently of the understanding of the cultural specificity of the countries in which they are to be applied.

Generally, the legislative texts follow a common line, which implies observance of some guiding principles: cooperation, private-public duality, efficient communication. As we have shown, these principles may or may not coincide with cultural specificity and we have highlighted the situations in which the legislation conforms to the cultural specifics. In only one case we could notice that the legislature was aware of the cultural element and recommended its conscious change in order to succeed in protecting high-level critical infrastructure (Germany).

Our proposal is to further review the legislation to be in line with the cultural specifics of the reference communities, while maintaining the fund of common elements that will allow the protection of critical European and international infrastructures.

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## MYOPIA AND HYPEROPIA IN SHAPING CULTURAL IDENTITY

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**Abstract:** *In this article our aim is to discuss the importance of cultural identity shaping and to raise the flag with regard to perceptive dystopias deliberately maintained by various actors through a colonization of the imaginary aiming to trigger the creation of certain cultural identities, more often than not in the logic of cultivating inferiority. We understand myopia and hyperopia in a metaphorical sense – as maladies that are perceptive towards a healthy perception we consider a road to success. From our point of view, cultural identity represents the critical emotional infrastructure for the development and survival of a nation who, if altered, can easily play the game of other actors and serve other interests.*

**Keywords:** *cultural identity; national identity; imagined geographical space; self national image*

### 1. INTRODUCTION: EMANCIPATION OF THE MIND AND DEVELOPMENT

Talking about the measures the Chinese strategists had in mind in order to develop China, Andrei Marga writes that “the Chinese refer to their type of reform as a model of emancipating the mind. China adopted the method of changing people’s minds” (Marga 2015:62). Backwardness of a society is perceived as being linked to a prevalent mentality. Chu Yu (2009) is an author who explores the shortcomings of the Chinese traditional models of thinking. Chu Yu minutely analyses the mindset that is susceptible to correction (Marga 2015:65). His recommendations include the idea of cultivating a feeling of satisfaction. Changing the prevalent mentality, which was understood as a prop for failure, became a strategic objective of utmost importance. A recent cunning explanation given by Wu Xiaobo says that the beginning was based on other premises: it was a beginning whose momentum was a new perception of reality, it was a beginning triggered by ordinary people. Extreme leftist theory was replaced by a new concept of truth, supported by a new perception of reality (Marga 2015:163-164).

Understanding this essential facet of development that mindset and national culture represent the secret ingredient of rebirth and success of a nation, is not a new endeavor. Max Weber placed the protestant ethics within the development equation thus highlighting the

cultural values that represented the “invisible” infrastructure that paved the way to success in Western cultures.

In a reversed approach, recent postcolonial studies in international relations focus on identity constructions that rendered domination and imperialism possible (Smith & Owens 2008, 187). A plethora of researchers analyzed the relation between the new forms of power and systemic inequalities, i.e. the continuous domination of “subalterns” in Gramscian terms. An important claim in postcolonial studies is that global hierarchies that render subordination and control possible are facilitated via certain social and identity constructs. Representations of cultural and identity differences, especially formulated in terms of inferiority or superiority, are not innocently wrought, but carefully cultivated. It is absolutely crucial to understand, Smith and Owens insist (2008:189) that the forms of power and imperialism act at the crossroads between gender, race and class. Western nations see themselves as civilized, while the enemies/ the others are seen as barbarians. As a means to justify British Empire’s ruling over India racist and sexist claims were used in “describing” the uncivilized manner in which Indian women were treated by men. The strategy aimed at putting Indian behavior on an inferior position and British behavior on a superior one, and considering the latter a civilizational standard, a benchmark of civilization. The objective here was to create a network of inferiorising significations. At a discourse level it was not relevant whether this was

appropriate or inappropriate relative to reality; it was enough to merely utter them and present them in pejorative terms, as well as to increase the topics or criteria presented as “underdevelopment”, “inferiority”, “abnormality”, “powerlessness”, “inability”, “lacking”, “savage”, etc. We are witnessing the construction of an exogenous identity of an actor, circumscribed to the logic of inferiorisation towards a self-assumed superiority of the “colonizing” actor. Postcolonial researchers resort to the phrase “colonizing ideologies” in order to describe the type of discourse instrumented to reach their objectives, but at the same time they are also interested in discovering the forms of resistance to the colonizing ideologies and illustrating the response strategies to this offensive (Smith & Owens, 2008:189).

## 2. MYOPIA ȘI HYPEROPIA OF IDEOLOGIES

From our point of view, colonizing ideologies could be understood as discourses that target the creation of hierarchies, more precisely the cultivation of a feeling of “inferiority” through finding and disseminating certain negative narratives. An eloquent example could be the reinterpretation of historical events from a positive key to a chiaroscuro light, or even a negative key, in other words a mythicized one. If a people is proud of their history or it has certain heroes, these narratives need to be changed and “spiced up” with uncertain aspects. As historian Ioan Aurel Pop said (2014:VII),

mister Lucian Boia brings an opinion that cuts through flesh: past is dead, it cannot be known and becomes in historians’ writings a narrative full of myths, biases, lies.

After all, the author wonders,

why do Romanian personalities, presented in a positive light before 1989, suddenly become condemnable, insignificant, enshrined in mythologies and ancestral, especially nationalist, flaws? (Pop 2014:10).

We do not speak of appropriating facts to realities, but of the way facts need to be interpreted. And the key to understanding this is ideology, negativity or positivity register. Following the red line of postcolonial studies, discourse cultivating “inferiority” and approaching various topics are reaching a certain target: the “small” powers to remain “small” and the “strong”

powers to remain “strong” through destroying the winner mentality, through cultivating feelings of powerlessness, of belief in a destiny of failure.

We understand myopia and hyperopia in shaping cultural identity as distortions of a healthy view, of a resilient identity and cultural self-perception. When we see reality through the lens of hyperbole or litotes, thus straying from the “*aurea mediocritas*”, “the royal path”, we may adopt extreme views, the all-or-nothing kind, and miss the opportunity for a normal view of reality. When we discuss the necessity of “demythization of history”, for instance, the stake is not necessarily linked to the possibility of settling the historical truth but to the “severing” of national pride or self-confidence. Not feeling self-confident translates into a paralysis of the decision-making ability

## 3. CULTIVATING IDENTITY INFERIORITY

Cultivating identity “inferiority” is done via selecting those criteria that pave the way to the image of absolute failure. For instance, Ioan Aurel Pop writes:

we have the feeling that mister Lucian Boia makes a 180 degree change in the glorious nationalism that some of us may have experienced, turning it still into a kind of nationalism, but reversed, a nationalism of hate, of darkness, of hopelessness (2014:XVII)

and we may add that this discursive retroversion has its own stakes! What if these stakes depend on the cultivation of an imaginary of the grotesque and implicitly of a solution to save ourselves by leaving the country because here we are damned, here we can do nothing because the past and present reality is “black”, the country is “black”? We no longer lend an “ear” to slogans such as the Romanian proverb “bread may taste bad but still it’s better in my country”, since they are assimilated to a communist slogan, therefore implicitly rejected.

Resorting to history, in the logic of postcolonial studies, there is no innocent but only canonical interpretation of titles such as: *Is There True History? On the “General Relativity” of History* (Djuvara, 2008), *Two Centuries of National Mythology* (Boia, 2012), *Why Is Romania Different?* (Boia, 2012), *A Game without Rules: On the Unpredictability of History* (2016). If in the communist era there was a “saint factory” and an ever-growing number of Boverist readers, hungry for the literature of escape of any kind, where Romanian literature was a fragile national product,

where “masterpieces” and “classics”, directors of conscience, brilliant princes, clan leaders and protectors, deception and seduction techniques, protochronist temptations were published (Negrici, 2017), in the same logic, can we ask ourselves what is the purpose of today’s negative cultural activism? Shall we no longer love our country? There is no surprise, given the historical circumstances mentioned above, that it is people over 60 that project a positive light on the cultural identity of Romanians (David, 2015:284).

Could we identify an involution from grandeur to the grotesque, from a “petrification in respect” to a dissolution of respectability, from an Eminescu emerging from a profane time to lusty poets, from the “rain of superlatives” (Negrici, 2017:73) to “Hotel Transylvania” and Dracula cartoons? Was the unpaired poet, the national poet replaced with a “post-revolutionary asphalt tango<sup>1</sup>”?

What we can barely see nowadays is the moderate discourse. Vladimir Tismăneanu, writing about *The Devil in History* (2013), places Romania in an implicit extreme space of unfortunate Soviet influence whose effects still linger in the Romanian psyche. Romania’s lack of reaction to this replacement is the embodiment of the other extreme compared to, for instance, the Muslim world that violently reacted to Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*, the author being accused of blasphemy (Erhan, 2018, 227).

In *Psychology of the Romanian People*, Daniel David reached the conclusion that when we compare ourselves to other ethnics living in Romania, we consider ourselves “civilized”, but when we compare ourselves to other peoples of the world, we consider ourselves as “uncivilized” (David, 2015, 283). The results might be due to a carefully wrought postcolonial discourse that caught on precisely due to certain traits that turned into fertile soil for a certain cultural identity mindset. There is no clear, focused, well-defined opinion on national traits referring to behaviour, character or attitude. Probably it is a lack of gauging standards that cultural myopia and hyperopia manifest that obviously in the mindset of Romanians. Maybe a deeply-rooted inferiority complex that triggers a distorted view on our closer or distant neighbours is actually part of our nation’s

DNA – is Dan Alexe’s main thesis on Romanian identity (Alexe 2015, 283). Hedonophobia, another characteristic typical of Romanians, according to the author, might explain the permeability of our cultural identity.

#### 4. CULTIVATING THE BALCANIZATION OF THE BALKANS

In the perspective of symbolic geographies, our positioning in the Balkans might provide us with an a priori inferior identity. In Maria Todorova’s semi-Orientalist interpretation, the Balkans represent “a bridge between various development stages, echoing labels such as *semi-developed*, *semi-colonial*, *semi-civilized*, *semi-oriental*.” (Todorova, 2000:34). During the Cold War, the tone used to denominate the Balkans softened, making way for choices such as East Europe, but in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the term Balkans was reinforced and its discredited meaning was kept (Andraş, 2008:37).

The phrase “the imperialism of the imagination” found in Vesna Goldsworthy’s title (1998) expands the semantic field of the concepts imperialism and colonialism. While conventional colonists are interested in natural resources and their exploitation (1998), neo-colonization is soft nowadays (discursive, metaphorical, cultural). Balkanization of the Balkans means attributing characteristics to this space, creating symbolic geographies, creating an imaginary correlated to this geography, more often than not by using litotes in contrast to the civilizational space.

Similar to Larry Wolff’s ideas, i.e. inventing East Europe and investing the space with attributes of submission – dominated, effeminate, passive, inferior, falling out of history space – is the result of an intellectual action, attributing identity traits to people living there (Wolff 2000). The colonization mentioned by Larry Wolff is an imaginary one, a symbolic one. A divided Europe is an intellectual project, an imagined and invented reality.

Placed in the logic of social constructivism, imaginative colonization is opposed to essentialism, as Benedict Anderson (2003) also said: the nation is first imagined (by others included) and then promoted until it is internalized.

#### 5. CULTIVATING SEPARATION AND DIVISION

An example of identity construction can be seen in Herta Muller’s literature, where divisions are reiterated. Being a minute radiography of the

<sup>1</sup> *Asfalt Tango* is a 1995 Romanian road movie, which pokes bitter fun at the disastrous situation of post-revolutionary economic and cultural transitional state of the country, including an extremely poor road infrastructure, hence the title of the movie. *Asfalt Tango* was directed by Nae Caramfil.

subtle effects of the Iron Curtain, even if concentrated on presenting the political totalitarian experiment in Romania, her books can be read as well as a translation of the barbed wire into the intimate universe of the Self. The author suggests that the Berlin Wall is living inside us producing a lot more than separation, “the green plums” or *Herztier* in German language, but the “the animal of the heart” in the Romanian translation.

Her writings reflect the profound influences of the divided world on every aspect of personal life leading to an inner universe made up of paradoxical inclusions and exclusions, it could be characterized as well as a personal confession about living in a concentration camp and expressing the confrontation between intimate personal identities and prefabricated political identities organizing the world. The idea of the divided Self and the schizoid personalities is writ large in the Herta’s Müller prose, there are many issues and characters related to the idea of separation: the razor blade, the seamstress, the hairdresser, the barber, the scissor, the hack, the incision. For instance, the title of a short story in the volume *The Fox was Ever the Hunter*, “The razor blade”, awakes the idea of division, and the main character takes care of the razor blade more than anything else. Similar to that, another short story from the same volume has as title “The nails grow” and a pair of scissors is the instrument observed and put next to the teeth brush. The scissors are very important within a universe in which you listen out of breath (in the Romanian language a verbatim translation for *out of breath* would be *to listen with the breath cut*). The events of a day are correlated with the noise made by the scissors or there are descriptions of a nail falling after being cut. Another example, in the novel *The Green Plums*, one character is the seamstress, a woman renowned more for telling somebody’s fortunes from cards than for sewing dresses. The seamstress used to say that, even if the people pay a lot of money to find out their destiny, she is not able to change it.

Herta Müller writes that everybody lived with a mind to emigrate. They wanted to swim across the Danube until the water transforms itself into the foreign. In her Nobel awards speech, the artist speaks about split words, double-edged meanings, as “every word knows something of a vicious circle”. The world is cut into pieces and even gestures deceive.

In the first novel written after escaping from the Dictator’s country, *Traveling on One Leg*, Irene is not truly able to escape as the Other

Country is still present, as the Other Irene is still present. The duality of her personality is reflected in many images encountered in the new country. In this book, the Berlin Wall is presented as the space where dead people are still living but metamorphosed into dark-brown rabbits, who live in holes next to the Wall. Those are scarier than guns (Müller, 2010:188).

The Berlin Wall condensates multiple divisions. It may be perceived as the global segregationist nucleus, specific for the Cold War era, since it was separating the world in two ideological blocks: the European continent into Western and Eastern Europe, a country into West Germany and East Germany, a city into West Berlin and East Berlin and continuing separating families, human beings or words. The prose metaphorically reveals the impact of the political culture of segregating identities upon an artist’s consciousness, one who hallucinates as a consequence of a world that is deconstructed and organized in squares, a world imagined as white and black territories separated by concrete walls. The implicit artificial inner personal identities, enshrined by global structures of interests and identities are perceived as fake and unnatural, the artist has the feeling that the whole world was upside-down and perverted: an incoherent labyrinth and a prison in which the inquisitor was asking despitely “Who do you think you are?” and she used to reply that she was a human being as any other (Müller, 2005:59).

## 6. SHAPING MULTIPLE PERSONAL IDENTITIES

Being illustrative of the unsettled equation regarding the relation between personal identity and collective/national identity, her literature reiterates the question Maria Todorova (2000:25) evokes: can we carve up humans and endure beyond the consequences of that cleavage on cultures, histories, traditions, societies or races? Just like in the Heisenberg effect, people’s inner Self is modified dramatically following the organizing political principle of separation based on certain identity features, Müller’s writing is the radiography of that effects, the implications for an individual of the world built on the assumption of separation and differentiation.

The paradoxical aspect of our multiple social identities is reflected in our deeper self and conscience and needs an integrating principle, a coherent meaning. Natural identity categories, such as mother, father, brother, sister, friend are at the

intersection with political and ideological identity categories, such as killer, Nazi, enemy, bourgeoisie, proletarian, inmate, fanatic, etc. In her Nobel Lecture (Stockholm, 07.12.2009), Müller perceives those multiple and overlapping identity categories coexisting within one person's mind as a paradoxical situation, a combination understood only by God:

For my grandmother this photo was a combination, too: on the white handkerchief was a dead Nazi, in her memory was a living son. My grandmother kept this double picture inside her prayer book for all her years. She prayed every day, and her prayers almost certainly had double meanings as well. Acknowledging the break from beloved son to fanatic Nazi, they probably beseeched God to perform the balancing act of loving and forgiving the Nazi.

## 7. SHAPING IDENTITY CONFUSION

The artist cries for coherence in a world made up by double pictures and displaced meanings, where there is no normalcy and the natural roles are changed. The replacement and confusion of natural roles are expressed in many ways: the fox is the hunter, the car is looking for the pits in the street, this too is a contradiction, and contradictions connect themselves, white-black sky, we should bite, chew, swallow and close the eyes until the quince moves from hand into stomach...to be somebody who never eats a quince.

The absurdity of life is portrayed in images such as: "The seamstress spoke the whole summer about the legless hen. She was saying, I had to cut it, it was like a child." (Müller, 2009:138). In searching for a subjective coherence, she discusses the issue of a senseless world revealed by contradictions and tries to delineate an idea of normalcy or the natural. The state of a deeply unnatural world is revealed by insisting on the fact that the very natural things are incriminated: there is a forbidden way to breathe or a crime for *abat-jour* (lampshade).

The theme of the fundamental contradiction – the state who was supposed to protect its citizens had become the main perpetrator of violence – is addressed in many of her writings, including the consequences of her refusal to cooperate with the communist oppressive apparatus. The moral purpose of the state to protect its citizens is perverted and the state produces the main aggressive tools against its citizens who have but a *handkerchief* to fulfill a lot of duties. The totalitarian political universe produces

contradictions as well: the scrub has the biggest truncheon and the fox was ever the hunter. The walls are full with bugs but the windows have nothing to say about it.

The artist's literature is asking loudly and clearly: Who am I? Who are the others? Herta Müller answers:

I do not understand the world. That is why I write, because I do not understand the world... literature too is a way of searching... we are all a mystery, even in our body... Alongside all these existential problems, which automatically concern us all, the dictatorship introduced political surveillance that you have to fight against... all I have understood is that freedom is important. Literature is paradoxically born out of your belief that there is a disconnection between thoughts and words. You start writing precisely at the moment when you believe that words have lost their power. I am a writer only when I am alone with myself. Writing is not a pleasure for me, I only write reluctantly and after much hesitation. I do not understand the world. That's why I write, because I do not understand the world.

## 8. DISSOLVING COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

In an interview with G. Liiceanu (2011), expressing the idea that each person is unique and has a unique relation with the world, the writer believes that who we are is not determined by the language we speak but by what we say. Our actions are determined and understood in certain words, but "silence lies and lies within ourselves and smells like home." There is no such thing as language, there is no language something that accompanies what we do, or what we think or what we don't do. It happens but what was experienced doesn't want to be written down – what was experienced has nothing to do with language. When discussing identity, she finds that silence is also relevant for who we are. *Silence smells like home*. Even though the artist has no intention to create a comprehensive theory of identity, she mentions:

Homeland is a word that has been overused for ideological purposes. Whether in German history, National Socialism, the Stalinism of East Germany, or in the other socialist countries, this word has *been used very often. Home means a lot less but also a lot more: if you feel at home I think that is enough.*

The Romanian language has a twofold relevance for Herta. Firstly, it allows the revelation

of a linguistic universe different from the native and when exposed to a new language, one realizes that the world looks different in another language than it does in one's own: "In every language there are other eyes." (Müller, 2005:5). Prior to learning another language, Müller says, one's native tongue appears as something natural. She mentions that Romanian words were migrating into German words and that another language gives you another dimension of the self. The images from Romanian language are accompanying the images from the other language.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

The principal aim of our article concerning myopia and hyperopia in shaping cultural identity was to reveal the very importance of building perceptive biases. Frequently deliberately orchestrated by various actors, through a colonization of the imaginary, aiming to trigger the creation of certain cultural identities, more often than not in the logic of cultivating inferiority, identity biases should be a major concern and food for thought in Romanian scape and in the Balkans as well. We should learn to see myopia and hyperopia in a metaphorical sense as maladies that are part of a *guerre cognitive*, a *guerre du sens* against a healthy perception that is a prerequisite for victory. We highlighted that cultural identity represents the critical inner infrastructure for the development and survival of a nation. The narratives recreate symbolic geographies, be they utopian or dystopian, and may spread confusion and cultivate absurdities by presenting people as being psychotic, dehumanized.

Romania is again portrayed in the same negative light even in the writings of our only Nobel Prize Winner for Literature, Herta Müller. The dictator's country breeds a suffocating atmosphere, sinister characters, metamorphosed dead, like Dracula. Even if Romania is not an insane asylum, by promoting such images and stereotypes the result might be a self-fulfilling prophecy, a distorted and perverted cultural identity.

Yet, in the light of conceptualizing human beings (Parekh 2006, 114), the separation between West and East, sane and insane, myopia and hyperopia, exceeds the symbolism of the Berlin Wall: it was more than an architectonic monstrosity made of concrete or wire fence, 2-3 meters high, signaling system in the floor, contact wire fence with barbed wire fence, kennels for dogs, equipment and trenches to stop vehicles and

tanks, watchtowers and searchlights, metallic fence, the death strip, strips of sand where footprints could be detected... surrounded by a system of guns that people had risked their lives to climb over.

Myopia and hyperopia, like the Berlin Wall, are in fact prefabricated identities in political laboratories whose core idea was a principle of exclusion through an inferiorisation that generates multiple side effects, such as alienation or nuttiness. The Berlin Wall is less than the very monument of the limits of the political imagination relying too much on principles of interdiction and segregation, and more the barricade between the victorious and the losers.

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## FROM THE EXPERIENCE INSIDE MILITARY MULTINATIONAL COALITION FROM AFGHANISTAN TO A CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL MODEL PROPOSAL

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**Abstract:** *Cultural differences in military multinational coalitions are generating frictions of certain degrees among their members that are affecting the efficiency of the collaboration. The topic of cultural differences is not new, the understanding of the importance of knowledge and cultural harmonization has generated the creation of certain cultural training programs. The focus is on the pre-mission training, including that of the leaders and less the systematic inclusion of this type of training at pre-university, university and post-university levels. Even they are existing they are not adjusted to the requirements of the Theatre of Operations, to the Peace Support Operations, or to Peace Operations. The knowledge, understanding and cultural harmonization are processes that are allowing the perception of the certain events through 'cultural lenses' and are facilitating an adequate interpretation of behaviors, actions and decisions of the Coalition Partners. Those three steps are 'built' in time, over years of study, based on general and specific military knowledge.*

**Keywords:** *cultural differences; multinational coalition; Power Distance; military educational system*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is aiming at presenting briefly the results of an experience of being seven years inside the Theatre of Operations in Afghanistan, the period in which I had analyzed the topic of cultural differences and their generated effects and is suggesting, in the same time, a simplified model of cultural training for the entire military educational system. Even the globalization and scientific progress, especially the cybernetic one, are bringing us the idea to the necessity of inter-relate with others only through the technology, I consider that that stage is too far in order to work efficient inside coalitions. The transformation of European Armies or multinational military alliances will need decades of training, linguistic and cultural harmonization in order to facilitate interoperability.

The elements that can determine cultural differences are interacting and are producing effects of a variable intensity in close connection with the level of knowledge and cultural competence, stress level, the leader's ability to manage those elements and to integrate them efficiently into multicultural military collaboration.

The aim of this paper is to move from the stage of the identification of causes and effects of cultural differences from multinational coalitions

to the proposal of an integrated harmonized cultural knowledge educational model.

For researchers such as: Edward T. Hall (1966, 1976), Geert Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1991, 2001, 2005), S. H. Schwartz and Peter B. Smith (1992, 1994, 2002), Hampden-Turner and Fons Trompenaars (1993, 1997), the cultural theme has presented a great interest especially from the perspective of cultural standards and values. The results and the conclusions of the research performed by them, on which we add those of the studies elaborated by Moelker René, Soeters Joseph, Von Hagen Ulrich in Peacetime and Wartime, have been landmarks and starting points in the scientific attempt to determine the impact of different cultural variables over the interoperability, a research that I performed inside the Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan from October 2012 to May 2017.

World Armies are having different pre-mission training programs, but only few of them have integrated fluently in their pre-university, university and post university educational curricula the operational culture. This kind of training is performed very often in a form of short courses that are not enough for the reality of the multiculturalism of the theatre of operations. Therefore, starting with the pre-university level the

introduction of a discipline related to cultural elements there would be a need.

In Romanian military Educational System, there are disciplines such as culture, interculturality, but elements that are presented does not reflect the specific needs of the theatre of operations and are not correlated in a logical flow with aspects that are influencing interoperability (language, standardization, NATO procedures, personnel policies, etc).

## 2. THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES OVER MILITARY MISSIONS IN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN

What is new in this scientific attempt performed in the Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan is represented by the fact that is offering a document for a wide cultural knowledge of the contributing nations to the Coalition, is presenting the elements that based on their differences are generating cultural effects and are influencing interoperability and is proposing a 'Linear model for cultural knowledge and harmonization' useful in the training process of our national troops that are to be deployed and is presenting the results of two studies elaborated in the Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan.

The fundamental thesis of the research was: *In military multinational operations, the efficiency of the mission is growing proportional with the level of linguistic knowledge, of the level of professional and cultural knowledge, of the harmonization of the cultural differences and of the strengthening of the common cultural aspects of the military sub-cultures.* All these elements mentioned above have been analyzed in detail and have been supported by the results of the case studies. *The initial questions* of the research have been the following:

- Which are the elements of national cultures and the factors of the organizational culture that are having the potential to influence the efficiency of the collaboration inside multinational military coalitions?

- Is the subject 'cultural differences' a priority one for the leaders of the mission or become a subject of interest only when major frictions are appearing among the coalition members?

- Can we consider that cultural differences are representing the essential factor that is acting over the efficiency of the military operations?

After we asked the questions we established the *initial objectives* of the research:

1. A comprehensive knowledge of what does it means culture, multiculturality, dimensions,

values, the status of the research concerning multicultural interaction in military life in peacetime and wartime, the identification of cultural theories, providing a theoretical framework and of the results of previous research and finally the provision of some explanations for the "cultural differences" phenomenon.

All of these have been detailed in the first part of the research conducted in the Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan. Resuming the benefits of a comprehensive research, they are representing the framework in which it has been carried out. Of course, the limits in between they are interacting in multinational missions are very vague. Some of them belong to general culture, the others to national cultures or organizational cultures, military sub-culture, cultural psychology, sociology, anthropology etc. Clear limits are not existing and the dispute on the subject it will never be finalized. What we can say is that the same issue is very often presented differently, but it is important that the analysis process to be conducted only by comparing the same items;

2. Identification and observation of the variables of the national and organizational cultures that are generating cultural differences and frictions that are affecting the efficiency of the mission.

Being a subject so broad, the research has been conducted on multiple levels: taking into consideration cultural group of the countries (GLOBE Study), from the perspective of some cultural dimensions (Gert Hofstede's cultural dimensions), from the perspective of organizational factors, of command and control, of the teams' composition that are executing missions in the field, of the cultural and psychological tendencies, of communication, technology and from the perspective of social factors and cultural norms.

The economic, political, technological, legal, ethnic and religious frameworks are decisive factors of a culture of a society. To those elements are added language, customs, personal values, ethics, attitudes, expectations and other elements of the organizational culture are determining the organizational behavior. Then, countries have the tendency to group themselves based on geographical proximity, of the common language, or to the group language or religion. The similarities of the countries that are closer from the geographical point of view have as a result '*the spread*' of some cultural values over their entire geopolitical evolution along the history. The language comprises meanings and values that are

influencing the working process, the behavior at the working place and the leadership style. Some countries have a common religion, like for example Latin countries that are predominantly Catholics. Common religious believes are associated with common values and norms in the Society and at work. All listed elements are interrelated and interact in interrelationship processes of multinational in multinational coalitions generating effects.

3. The accomplishment of the two case studies through the participative and non-participative observation method, whose conclusions were reproduced through narrative method. The case studies have pursued:

a. personnel's interaction of the two Romanian contingents with the civilian and military personnel of Resolute Support Mission HQs - a study conducted over a ten months period

b. the interaction in a multinational structure from Resolute Support Mission HQs - a study conducted over 24 month's period.

4. Issuing recommendations based on the conclusion of the research and lessons learnt. Lessons learnt over the period of research are focused on the role of cultural knowledge in planning and conduct of operations and we can mention the following:

- these are offering a better image of the way the fighting actions are affecting local population and insurgents;

- these are offering a better prediction over the behavior of the population;

- these are highlighting ways to make communication more efficient and can prevent useless tensions in between the personnel of the mission, civilian organizations and local population;

- these are helping the training of the protection force;

- is constituting the data base of the minor cultural mistakes during military operations and are presenting the way in which they can escalate into major issues or incidents.

Starting from the objectives I formulated the following hypothesis that I checked during the research and in the analysis of the case studies:

- The membership to the same cultural group is reducing but not canceling frictions inside Coalition. Soldiers' long term multinational interaction, during peacetime is not generating problems, in comparison with the ad-hoc formations, without common knowledge and cultural training, where cultural differences are amplified and are generating frictions of different

degrees and inefficiency in operations, things identified in the two narrative case studies during peacetime and wartime performed by Moelker *et al.* (2003). Frictions can appear even among soldiers of the same nation, but belonging to different branches, for example in between infantrymen and those from Special Forces.

- Knowing the cultural groups and of the different cultural variables are facilitating the efficiency of the communication in between the leaders and multinational organization they are leading. In each multinational military coalition is simultaneously acting a wide range of variables that we grouped in three large categories: the factors of the organizational culture, of the National Culture and of the individual psychology, etc.

In studying of the documents, I have identified the following dimensions, norms, characteristics, cultural values that, each individual through corroboration are determining effects over collaboration inside coalition.

*Socio-cultural dimensions:* Power Distance, avoiding Uncertainty, Masculinity vs. Feminism, Short Term Orientation, Individualism vs. collectivism, Long Term Orientation, Orientation towards Performance, Collectivism as a Group, Institutional Collectivism, Assertively, Hierarchy and loyal implication in the activity of the organization, Equality and Utility Participation, Equality, Equal Engagement, Conservationism.

*Attitudes and values associated to work:* the importance granted to the accomplishment of the established aim, the need to accomplish the objectives, the satisfaction offered by work, the management style, the organizational climate, the role inside the working process and the interpersonal orientation.

*Dimensions, mechanisms and the factors of change of the organizational structures:* the internal factors are represented by the values of the organization, the leadership style, the structure of the organization, in general terms, everything that is related to the personality of the individuals, policies, procedures and practices, the hierarchy and the decision process. The external organizational factors: those related to legality, economy, society and technology.

Four big groups with significant cultural differences have to be especially mentioned: the Western - European countries group, the Eastern - European one, that of the Muslim countries and that of the English native speaker ones (USA, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain). The communication in between the soldiers of those

groups is difficult from the linguistic and cultural perspective.

- 'The linguistic level' Variable is determined in the communication and interrelationship processes inside the mission.

- 'The Power Distance' and 'Avoiding Uncertainty' Variables have a significant impact in the operational processes inside the Coalition.

- Dividing the Area of Responsibility into contingents, or at least on the contingents belonging to the same cultural group, is a viable solution to avoid frictions in stress conditions, in theatre of operations, besides the uniformity of the technologies used are eliminating the communication deficiencies. The clear example is performed in KAIA, where unique technology and common and well-known procedures are facilitating a better and efficient collaboration.

- Identification of the cultural variables is helping pre-mission cultural training. Multinational interaction of the soldiers, even the long-term one, is not generating problems. In war conditions, inside the ad-hoc established formations, without cultural awareness and pre-mission cultural training, under the influence of extended stress conditions, cultural differences are generating frictions of different degrees and inefficiency of the mission;

- Long-term common training, is generating cultural knowledge, is strengthening the trust in between the soldiers, and together with a 'professional' level of language proficiency, is generating automatically an interrelationship without frictions.

The essential elements of the military culture: ceremonials, labels, discipline, professional ethos, cohesion and esprit de corps, have been identified as existing in all armies of the Coalition. Parts of those elements have been identified as manifesting themselves in different forms of military organizations of the Afghan fighters. Very often, major cultural differences are making extremely difficult collaboration in between the groups, but establishing common procedures are making possible a professional military collaboration.

Besides knowing the cultural competencies, for a multinational military organization to be efficient we consider that the minimal following conditions have to be fulfilled:

- SOPs for the transition period have to be clear and respected by all the nations;

- Creation and development of a knowledge and cooperation system of relationships (meetings organized outside the formal environment, the

creation of opportunities in order the individuals to be able to have informal discussions);

- Understanding by the leaders that their presence inside the Coalition is useful only for the benefit of the mission, not for the interest of their nation he/she is representing;

- The informatics systems and NATO organizations and not doubled by the 'ghost' ones;

- Creation by their leaders of a constructive environment, based on mutual trust among their members, in order to be able to express freely their opinions.

The research has confirmed assumption 1-6. *The assumption no. 7 (Long-term common training is generating cultural knowledge and is strengthening the trust amongst the soldiers. Together with an expert level of training, these are generating automatically an interrelationship without frictions) has been invalidated.*

At the end of the research I concluded that the following factors are effecting to a certain degree, the efficiency of the collaboration in multinational military coalitions: the level of linguistic knowledge, the level of training and military international expertise, cultural identity and the differences in values, the accommodation and feeding facilities, the codes of conduct, the differences in between the leadership systems and the forms to exercise discipline, the differences related to political believes, salaries, and other benefits, the nature of relationship in between officers, NCOs and soldiers, the way in which women are seen in different cultures, the values of the dimensions of the National Cultures, etc.

The conclusions of the research conducted in Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan in between 2012-2017:

- There are both similarities and differences in between Armed Forces participating into Coalition, on which is added the elements of a supra-national military culture. This is a collectivistic one, based on hierarchy and less motivated by the materialism in comparison with civilian cultures.

- The high ranking and orientation towards obeying the rules and military regulations, (a feature of the Latin Group), elitism and special respect paid to the position (a feature of the Anglo-Saxon Group) and excessive orientation towards the accomplishment of the objectives on which is added avoidance of uncertainty and the enhancement of rules (a feature of the Americans) are only few aspects of the military culture that are generating the harmonization and also frictions inside the operational process.

– Different cultural believes related to military conflict resolution methods (fight or humanitarian approach), force protection, payment and accommodation conditions, personnel policies and communications can generate frictions inside coalition. These are representing learning opportunities, that is meaning multiculturalism in military environment and are offering the possibility to study the link in between cultural differences and interoperability efficiency. A clear example is represented by the efficiency they accomplished the objectives using different Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where, despite NATO mandate provided general recommendations, applying different execution styles in accomplishing the objectives, the way they are seeing the share of work in different cultures, had generated different efficiency degrees in finalizing the projects.

– Strategies to achieve an acceptable level of cooperation in Coalition, known in sociology as separation and integration are functioning in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the separation model is the most common that is not specific to the Headquarters of the Mission. The limited space inside, the way the operations are coordinated and the structure of the organization are generating an integrated model. In this approach none of the nations are superior or is having a dominant operational style, combining more styles of work in order to create a supranational one that is more efficient. Inside this integration strategy framework, the adaptability factor is essential, having the commander on the top, acting for a common mission and to activate the ‘excellent level’ attitudes of each nation, creating norms and common experiences and making well known cultural differences and similarities.

– Military organizations that are functioning over extended periods of time are developing together an isomorphism resulted from common experiences (experiential isomorphism), through the standardization of policies, doctrines, resources and training programs, all these generating an increase in military interoperability.

– Leadership is supposing a thorough knowledge and cultural expertise. Starting with the increase of cultural knowledge, the option used in the Past – part-time cultural advice - cannot satisfy the need of continuous advice necessary in stability and security operations. Command of each level is assuming the existence of complex structures, with specialized positions in providing cultural recommendations, part of the integrated planning, decision-making and execution processes. The

ideal personnel for a position of cultural advisers one of a high degree specialization, with anthropology, psychology and sociology studies, having a long term experience gained through direct participative observation.

– The face of the modern war has changed, being transformed into a diplomatic and media war, in which any mistake related to cultural knowledge is sanctioned by international public opinion. Muslim clerics are stigmatizing any mistake of the Coalition (wrong reconstruction projects, accidental killing of innocent persons, burning the Koran, entering of the soldiers shoehorn into the mosque, corporal check and entering into areas specially designated for women, etc.) and are finding answers inside the Islamic-extremist population that are caring rebellion acts against Coalition Forces. All of these only because ignoring cultural differences.

### **3. OPERATIONALIZATION FORMS OF LESSONS LEARNT AND MULTICULTURAL TRAINING**

**3.1 In the Theatre of Operations.** The realities of the Theatre of Operations have generated the establishment of different organizational initiatives aiming the adaptation of the needs to interact with local population.

a. Human Terrain Teams - HTT, comprising 5-6 members, attached to the brigades and consisting of experienced sociologists, whose role is to provide constant information about socio/cultural and ethnographic base of the area of responsibility of the brigade.

b. Semi-formal meetings with important local leaders (Key Leaders Engagement Teams-KLE), have the role to cultivate relationship with important persons from the tribes, government, state apparatus, so that those to support NATO mission.

c. Female Engagement Teams – FET, comprising women, military personnel and civilians that are supporting patrols in their interaction with Afghan women.

Also, depending of the job specific requirement, the soldiers and the civilians that are operating in the theatre can attend the following courses: Counterinsurgency Course, Combat Lifesaver Course and Guardian Angel Course. In all these we can find important cultural elements that can influence both the interaction inside Coalition and that with the local population.

**3.2 Outside Theatre of Operations.** The leadership of Romanian Ministry of Defense understood the need for advanced cultural and linguistic training of the personnel participating into international missions. In order to achieve the interoperability objectives that are linked to different levels of training, Romanian Army has started in 1994 to develop specific training programs. First they established linguistic training centers, followed by the establishment of Distance Learning Department. These are offering some important advantages, in comparison with the classical model of education: they are appreciated by the new generation of military personnel that is having abilities and competencies in using information technology, the costs are reduced and the courses are widely accessible. The third step in the training effort is represented by the establishment of the Simulation Training Centre, with a major role in standardized NATO training.

World's Armies are having different pre-mission training programs, based on short courses. To highlight, US Army is using different operational and cultural training, the most one being VCAT (Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer), an interactive platform for cultural and linguistic practice. This is supported by scenarios in which are presented and exercised reactions in different situations that are closely to reality. The well known is the American pre-mission training called JRTC Operations Group (Joint Readiness Training Centre). These American training models comprise a series of instruments to determine cultural competencies: the inventory for intercultural development, the Scale of Cultural Intelligence and Multicultural Personality Questionnaire. All of these are offering an initial image of training and competencies each soldier is having and on which are applied the communication and intercultural training programs, role playing etc. In general, the programs are generating four levels of cultural competencies, the orientation towards objectives and also are offering information about niche domains in which the soldier can efficiently use those competencies.

NATO - ACT has created an interactive platform - NATO Innovation Hub for learning, presenting scientific researches in different domains and for intercultural communication and development - Extended Hand. This is useful in training but not very often used because there is a need for closer coordination in between the groups that are to make an exchange in military expertise/experience, in audio format at distance.

For European armies but also for NATO ones, joint training based on short courses is organized in NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany) and Joint Training Centre Stavanger (Norway). All are supported by conferences, working groups and international exercises, but the achieved cultural exchanges are not enough as for the realities are faced in a theatre of operations.

#### **4. THE PROPOSAL OF AN EDUCATIONAL MODEL**

In order to a proper functioning of a Coalition to have positive effects over interoperability I consider necessary an increased educational space to be allocated to the current cultural knowledge and harmonization. The specific training should be extended and integrated with the other disciplines (linguistic knowledge, communication, general and specific disciplines, psychology), in educational curricula, starting at the pre-university level and continuing with the university and post-university ones, pre-mission training and at the end the special advice into the theatre of operations.

The extension of the study programs at the mentioned levels related to cultural competence and leadership in multinational environments should become a priority. Only after the establishment of the foundation of cultural knowledge it will be the need to import the cross-cultural knowledge model of the advanced states concerning this domain (for example USA, Great Britain) or they can create exercising models using their own concepts. At pre-university level they should cultivate and develop not only the cultural elements and values, but also those multinational. They should know the organizational values, the differences amongst the cultures and sub-cultures and in between the armies. At university level there should be done the connections in between different cultural variables and also exercised cultural harmonization. The students should actively participate in interactive cultural training programs. Pre-mission courses should represent only a stage in developing the skills and for refreshing the basic existent training.

I consider that is necessary the establishment of a cultural supporting structure, for the theatre of operations based on the model of psychological advisers.

#### **5. CONCLUSIONS**

Understanding the cultural context became almost of a same importance as understanding the

military profession, operational art or military strategy. Looking into the Past to the most successful campaigns or operations from military history, their success was the result of the best military strategy and of the efficient use of resources to put into practice this strategy. In time, misunderstanding of the cultural context has become a barrier, but not that dangerous as having insufficient resources in military profession. The evolution of the Society, the increased influence of mass-media, the increased speed of information and of the sensibility of public opinion of the World have generated a need to analyze again the way in which cultural knowledge and inter-relationship in coalitions with the local population through the effects insufficient cultural knowledge is generating.

Even there are great differences related to National Interests, military resources, the way the violence is used, personnel policies and also cultural aspects that are generating frictions, there is a great dose of optimism that Coalition will work, may be not as wide as it is, but may be will work in an multinational and professional European Army. Those elements should accelerate the preoccupation of the lead of the Europeans armies for the complex cultural side of the problem. The current and future conflicts will be conducted at another level. The armies will face major changes: the number of soldiers will be reduced; there will be an increased role of sophisticated technologies, of the influence of mass-media and of the role of the coalitions. The linguistic knowledge and cultural adaptability are only few of the tools for an increased efficiency of interoperability in multinational military coalitions.

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## **THE COMMUNICATIVE RELATIONSHIP AS A CONSTITUTIVE DIMENSION OF THE “IDEA OF COMMUNITY”. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION OF EDMUND HUSSERL**

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***Abstract:** Is it possible to identify in the communicative relationship the constitutive condition of a renewed “Idea of Community”, aimed at averting the ever more evident risk of conflict between exaggerated ideologies of “belong-to”? In this question can be found both the nucleus of my personal theoretical contribution and the perspectives of deepening that philosophical thinking can offer to the work of the International Conference. In this brief intervention, I propose the phenomenological perspective that Edmund Husserl develops as a method of investigation and reflective attitude able to restore renewed dignity to the communicative-relational phenomenon and to the resulting the “Idea of Community”. The phenomenological approach, in fact, makes it possible to make a theoretical gap with respect to the diffused acritical forms of adjectivity through which the current scientific research landscape reduces the communicative relationship to a simple problem of communication. To confuse the communicative relationship with the consolidated forms of externalized representation of communication and with the innumerable modalities of its symbolization entails the risk of not grasping its original and constitutive essence: the “Relation-With”.*

***Keywords:** idea of community; communicative relationship; relation-with; phenomenological contribution; intercultural philosophy*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The perspective of dialogic interculturalism is today considered inevitable and unavoidable, both as a response to today’s challenge of cultural diversity, and as a dimension closely connected to the anthropological vision that defines the human as relationship, dialogue, sociality available to the contamination of diversity.

The awareness that cultural diversification puts to the test and can lead to inadequate reactions must not make us forget that it is a huge resource, which must be recognized and valued.

Specifically, philosophical research has long felt challenged to offer its critical and constructive contribution to the realization of forms of communication between world cultures. Above all it is a critical contribution, as an investigation into the genesis, methods, ends and limits of intercultural discourse; but also of a constructive contribution, which leads to signal new research horizons. Of course this does not mean that the philosophical approach is exclusive, but only that a critical reflection on intercultural dialogue can validly contribute to better highlight the

complexity, urgency and fruitfulness of an intercultural discourse that at the same time knows how to recognize the own limits.

As stated by Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, Cuban philosopher who is the initiator and supporter of the new paradigm of intercultural philosophy,

interculturality makes of personal biography a constitutive, central point of identity stability. Unlike multiculturalism, interculturality privileges dialogue and goes beyond tolerance. For interculturality tolerance is important but reductive. In fact, we must go beyond tolerance, we must learn to truly share with love and learn to live-with. Tolerance is respect, while interculturality is a quality of human relations, a mutual inter-relationship between cultures and not a cold ‘bearing’ the other (Fonet-Betancourt, 2009:18).

Between multiculturalism and interculturality, the substantial difference lies in the fact that the latter promotes the quality of a dialogical relationship with the other, in which a common transformation takes place without, however, the differences disappearing. The challenge of interculturality lies precisely in the possibility of

not canceling the differences. For example, we continue to be Milanese or Roman, French or German or Albanian, but in the encounter with the other we get rich; we get closer to each other, but at the same time we don't lose our identity point. We can see that we are dealing with a dialectical interaction of approach and departure, for which we are in the presence of a historical process open to intercultural relations. If multiculturalism creates "ghettos" (Italians, Indians, North Africans, Moroccans), interculturality is a participatory dialogue that aims at the common construction of identity. Thinking critically about the common construction of identity inevitably leads to a question of meaning. It leads directly to the constitutive idea of Community.

Then, what contribution Philosophy and in particular the phenomenological attitude, has to offer today to the theoretical investigation and to the possibility of identifying in the communicative relational dimension (interpersonal and intersubjective) the original meaning of a renewed Idea of Community?

I try to move my research into the theoretical reflections that Husserl develops in a series of shorthand notes in a specific historical period that goes from 1922 to 1935. Some notes are still unpublished in Italian language and others are present in works published and become fundamental in the field of philosophical research.

In particular, I refer to the five essays published between 1922 and 1924 in the Japanese Magazine *Kaizo* (Renewal) and published in Italian language in the volume *L'Idea d'Europa*. I also recover the fertility of thought of the 1935 *Dissertations* collected in the book *Crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology* and I try to make them dialogue with the meditating thought of a series of notes written in 1924, collected in the second volume entitled *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* and by myself translated and published in the volume entitled *Fenomenologia della relazione comunicativa*.

## 2. RENEWED IDEA OF COMMUNITY

**2.1 Transformation and renewal of Humanity.** In August 1922, Chugi Tadayoschi Akita - agent of the Japanese general culture magazine *Kaizo* - living in Berlin at that time, asked Professor Edmund Husserl to write and send him an article of no more than 3,000 words to be published in the same magazine. Husserl willingly accepts above all because the Phenomenology, the

philosophical current of which he was the initiator, was spreading in Japan in that period and was getting a brilliant response. Inspired by the profound meaning of the magazine's name (*Kaizo* is a Japanese term that translates to the word Renewal), Husserl goes far beyond writing 3,000 words as commissioned. In the winter of 1922-23, he produced five essays. Only the first three will be published in the magazine due to some misunderstandings with the publishers. The last two essays will remain unpublished until their publication in volume XXVII of the *Husserliana* series entitled *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*.

The general theme that Husserl addresses within the five essays is "The Renewal of Man and Culture". The choice is not accidental. The meaning of the name of the magazine: "Renewal" certainly inspires Husserl not to miss the opportunity to point out that "Philosophy of the Crisis" that was maturing in Europe immediately after the end of the First World War, particularly in Germany. It is no coincidence that, at the end of the First World War, writers, thinkers and illustrious philosophers dedicated entire pages to the problem of the cultural and existential crisis that was raging in the West. I mention only a few: the philosopher Ernst Bloch who in 1918 wrote the essay *Geist der Utopie* and in the same year the writer Thomas Mann who published *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*. In 1919, the French writer, poet and philosopher Paul Valéry wrote his work with the emblematic title: *La crise de l'esprit*. In all the intellectual circles of the period, the urgency of a "transformation of humanity" is evident because through war it was able to show its moral, religious and ☐ Husserl will say ☐ philosophical misery.

In 1920, in a letter addressed to his student and friend William Hocking, the philosopher denounces how the Great War "became a war between peoples in the most terrible and literal sense of the term, has lost its ethical meaning" so that, for the "renewal ethical-political of humanity", it would require "an art, supported by supreme and clearly established ethical ideals", capable of "a universal education of humanity" (Husserl, 1924).

Husserl's message is surprisingly current.

**2.2 Universal education of humanity.** It is also necessary to start today from a universal education of humanity. It is necessary to re-signify the cultural boundaries that differentiate and define a people with respect to another people in order to promote an intellectual and dialogical attitude capable of looking at the difference of language,

religion, tradition, *forma mentis* as a possibility of wealth and of continuous redefinition of an authentic and universal sense of Humanity.

The reflection that Edmund Husserl starts at that particular historical moment is dictated by the personal need to clarify the theoretical assumptions underlying the constitutive problem of the identity of the self. This identity was overshadowed by an unbridled technicality and a weariness of science that made us lose sight of the spiritual sense of man and of his being an active part of a broader social identity as Europe was expected to be at that time.

He himself does not hesitate to reiterate that to characterize the “spiritual form of Europe” can not and must not be a geographical map capable of circumscribing within the borders of nations “men who live in European territory and consider them European humanity” (Husserl, 1923-24/1999: 85).

The “renewed” Idea of Community contains in itself and alludes to the unity of a life, an action, a spiritual work, with all the aims, interests, concerns, efforts, and the organizations that follow it. This unity includes the men who act within multi-faceted societies of different degrees such as the family, the cities, the nations, in an “interior and spiritual communion” of which it is important to recognize its “binding character” (Husserl, 1923-24/1999: 97).

The binding character to which Husserl speaks is that relational condition that allows cultures to enter into dialogue, avoiding the transfer of conflicts not only from a geographical area at war to a safe area but also and above all between different languages, traditions and habits.

What does Husserl mean when he speaks of “inner and spiritual communion”? He refers to a change of essential perspective. The central core of this change of perspective is in the complexity of the perceptual act. He takes up this problem in a more intense way, in 1930 □ a few years after the publication of the essays in the Japanese magazine □ in the Second Volume of his work *Ideas for a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy (Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica)*.

In the moment that one discovers as a subject that performs actions, “subject of a voluntary or involuntary I do” (Husserl, 1930/1965: 705) and as a subject that undergoes them (*Ego patior*), the individual Ego □ according to the phenomenological analysis that Husserl develops in an extremely original and pertinent way □ it is perceived in a dual position and with a double identity:

a) as what is “outside” and “against”, as opposed to the individual Ego, as non-I, as alien to the Ego;

b) as what is “in-front”.

In front of me, opposed to the individual, foreign to the Ego.

**2.3 The perception of the “in front of me” as “opposite” and as a “stranger to the Ego”.** From what conditions does the differentiated perception of the “in front of me” be generated as “opposed to the Ego” and “extraneous to the Ego”? And again, what do I perceive as “in front of me” and what as “opposite” and “foreign to me”? In Appendix VI to the Third Section of Book II of *Ideas*, Husserl asks: “What do I find in front of me under the title of Ego, and what do I find as opposed to the Ego, as not-I, as a stranger to me?” (Husserl, 1930/1965:704).

The level and type of possible answers are closely linked to the attitude that is taken respect to the question: they reflect the perspective, the point of view, the stance. The difference and the difference between what is “in front” and what is “opposite” is first of all influenced by the distance that separates the naturalistic attitude and the personalistic attitude. The difference between what belongs to subjectivity and what belongs to nature is also played in the gap between “in front” and “opposite”. According to the naturalistic perspective it would seem that the individual Ego first comes across, and almost obviously, in the physicality of its own corporeity. He finds himself as part of natural reality, as a thing between things.

The physical body (*Körper*) is the limit of the possibilities of life-giving movement, of kinesthetic perceptual Intentionality. The naturalistic perspective makes us blind and prevents the individual from perceiving himself as living, intentional in a network of interpersonal and worldly relationships.

In § 49 of Chapter I, Section III, of *Ideas II* we read: “(...) man knows about himself, about other men and about a world around them all common” (Husserl, 1930/1965:578). It is a knowledge that precedes any information of a cognitive nature. The limit configured by what in nature is “against” is the boundary of individual egological perception: the boundary established by the interpersonal relationships and the relationship with the “common surrounding world” (*Umwelt*). It is a mobile boundary linked to symbolic and cultural productions within the group to which they belong.

This surrounding world does not contain mere things, but also objects of use (clothes, domestic

utensils, weapons, instruments), works of art, literary products, means of religious action, legal (seals, official badges, gifts, symbols ecclesiastics, etc.) and does not contain only single persons: people are, rather, members of communities, of personal units of a higher order, who live as totality, who maintain themselves and go forward in time regardless of the appearance and disappearance of the individual. They have their own conformation as a community, their ethical and juridical order, their ways of working together with other communities and individuals, their dependence on circumstances, their regulated mutability, their way of developing or to remain temporarily constant in according to the particular circumstances. The members of the community, of marriage and of the family, of the class, of the association, of the municipality, of the state, of the church, etc. they "know" their members, are consciously dependent on them and know, eventually, to act consciously about them (Husserl, 1930/1965: 578-579).

**2.4 Awareness of belonging-to.** The boundary of subjective individuality, established by the natural 'in front', determines, therefore, in the individual Ego, different levels of awareness:

a) the personal awareness of being always in situation and that this situation is at the same time spatio-temporal and symbolic, is connotable in terms of naturalness and is full of culture, is worldly as well as interpersonal;

b) the shared awareness on the experiential level of finding oneself in a situation which, precisely because it is relational and interpersonal, manifests the sense of belonging to a more or less cohesive group of other individual Ego: a group as a community of people and also of values, of meanings that link tradition to the possible production of new values and meanings.

Certainly, even my individual Ego can in front of me as a material thing can be: as a non-I and as a foreign given to the Ego. It happens when my own body "is taken as this somatic body, like this thing here, something that in fact is something like another thing" (Husserl, 1930/1965:705). In this case the individual Ego belongs to the sphere of the non-I, the somatic body, it is a thing among things. And yet, this individual Ego is other than the thing: it is something else at various levels. The first person I of the verb and the somatic body non-I are in a constitutive relationship that makes the body/soma (*Körper*) a living body (*Leib*).

What does Husserl want to introduce when he investigates the traits that separate the Ego from the not-I? What differentiates this individual Ego that belongs to me but which can be 'in front of me' and which is offered to me as a substratum of

theoretical, affective, psychic, etc., acts, from the self that I find 'against' me as a thing and not-thing, like me and not-me, as a stranger to self? On which of these elements does Husserl actually focus attention?

A first hypothesis of response to these questions can be advanced by observing how, through these analyzes, the phenomenological methodology accentuates the relevance that attaches to the situation in which the interpersonal and intersubjective relationship is established: that relationship which, on the border, is configured in the terms of being 'against', opposed-to, extraneous-to.

By shifting attention to the concrete situation in which the interpersonal relationship is constituted, Husserl points out that it is possible to perceive the "in front" of an individual ego only by referring to another individual ego. In the "front" specific intentional acts are manifested which are proper to the individual ego compared to another ego. These acts are based on self-awareness that persists even when there is no reflection and without which it would not be possible "even to reflect" (Husserl, 1930/1965: 706).

### 3. COMMUNICATIVE RELATIONSHIP AND INTERCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

**3.1 From the individual I to the I-You and I-We relationship.** The itinerary that leads to the recognition and realization of the individuality of the self is therefore a long and complex process. The characteristics of individuality are always to be conquered, always to be renegotiated not only with each other but above all with one's own individual ideal self.

The personal need to recognize oneself in one's individuality through a continuous process of differentiation (to look for the individualizing elements that separate the self from the other) is accompanied, and is in a constitutive relation, to the need to identify the other, to grasp the elements that differentiate me. So it is no longer a question, for the theorists, of searching in the place of scientific knowledge, if there is a concept that defines the individual Ego. Rather, it is a matter of grasping the specific relational through which the I expresses itself and in which we recognize the others who pronounce "I".

It is not a question of creating a concept that expresses, in terms of theory or categories, the Ego that acts and works in the relationship: at least it is not a question of doing so with the risk, already denounced by Ortega y Gasset, of leaving behind it

the dynamism of the phenomena involved in relationality.

The condition of being “in front” is the exclusive belonging of the individual Ego, man and person. It is a condition in which the individual Ego places itself when it requires or welcomes that in front there is “an I in the form of the you, that is, a front which in turn is another individual Ego” (Husserl, 1930/1965: 707). I as an individual and you as an individual: it concerns the initial differentiation between I and non-I, between subject, object complement and I naturalized in the somatic body.

We move from a level full of instances of objective constitution to a strongly and deeply dialogical level. We move from a plan characterized by individualistic cognitive expectations to an essentially relational and interpersonal level.

The person □ writes Husserl in Appendix VII of the *Ideas II* □ its essence (*Wesen*: to be) “can be constituted only in a personal association of bonds” (*Verband*: link), it designates a sort of “kind of being relative” (Ibidem).

**3.2 Context phenomenology.** What does Husserl mean when it recalls the centrality of the function that “a possible context” performs both with respect to the definition of the individual ego and of the person and with respect to the definition of the material thing?

The reference to the context indicates the possibility of looking at phenomena from another point of view: no longer or not only from the perspective of the abstract Ego, it is artificially dissolved from the links with the world and with the others with whom it lives daily, but from the perspective of relationships and bonds in which the individual Ego, actor of the overall and variegated ‘I do’, acts in the network of possibilities and limits marked by being in an ‘association of people’. The passage is from the abstract vertex of the individual ego to the plane of situations in which the bonds are welded together, make it possible and at the same time delimit the action of the same Ego: observing each other in relation, the I do is perceived as a nucleus of possibilities (I can) and of impossibility (I *patior*).

The context, the connection, the relationship, can be examined in the interpersonal and relational connotation of ‘context of people’ or in the naturalistic connotation of ‘context of material things’. In the first case, the network is given by the ties that are established between the individual ego and those who put themselves ‘in front’.

“In front” there are and can be found only “the other men, not as objects of nature, but as persons, in front of us, as egological subjects and *as companions* (Ibidem. The italics is ours). In the second case the investigation can continue to focus only on the experience of the Ego, on its way of relating to nature and to its own self that is naturalized or included in the objectified and objectifying dimension of the other, deprived of the possibility of saying ‘I’.

In the network of relationships with the “in front”, the individual Ego grasps and develops its own personal dimension. His individuality is constituted through the experiences that relate him as well as to the natural and cultural world to others in ‘flesh and blood’ towards which he feels emotions.

Only “by way of abstraction” □ observes Husserl □ the person can be thought of in

his singularity, (...) in such a way that it no longer involves a relationship with other people (no relationship that falls within the association of people). In ideal terms, each person has within the surrounding communicative world (...) in which extra-communicative persons can be involved, that is to say, (...) people who are outside the social association of people. The people who are part of the social association are given to each other as ‘companions’, not as objects but as counter-subjects who live together, who are in a mutual trade, who are in a mutual reference, currently or potentially, in the acts of love and reciprocated love, hatred and reciprocal hatred, trust and reciprocated trust, etc. (Husserl, 1930/1965: 589-590).

**3.3 To be in a communicative and interpersonal relational situation.** In the interpersonal relational situation the ego becomes I-person as I-subject:

a) who speaks: subject who asks questions. Person is who expresses himself using the first person of the personal pronoun I;

b) that is in front of another Ego-subject to whom it is addressed and towards which it is intentionally directed;

e) that, with the other, it carries out a symbolic exchange, a personal trade: to be in a mutual relationship. The symbolic exchange therefore presupposes the question and the answer and takes into account that the answer can be negative and therefore negotiated in the *cum mercis* exchange. “People are the men themselves who are with us in a *personal business* (Husserl, 1930/1965:708. Italics are ours);

d) that, with the other, shares a common experience. The etymological root of companion

recalls the experience of *cum-panis*, that is, of consuming together.

Husserl, therefore, investigates the structure of the “possible context” through the precise analysis of the ways in which the interpersonal communicative relationship unfolds.

It is the language of the other that allows the individual ego to speak in first person, to recognize the symbolic boundaries of its existential perceptive space-time, to take on the possibility of giving rules to oneself and to others, to respect the rules of others, renegotiate them continuously by re-inventing them. It is also in the word that the self discovers its own status as a “subject” which is revealed to an “other subject”, not an “object”.

The word requires two interlocutors: one who names the thing and the other who evokes it by hearing the name. The word refers to the centrality of the function of dialogue (*dia-légo*) and, consequently, of relational understanding (*cum = prehendere*). In dialogue, in fact, there is no error but only “truth”. The error is always related to the object. In the dialogue there is only the truth of the subject which, in comparison with the other, emerges from the solipsism of its eventual delirium (Lèvy-Valensi Amado, 1956).

**3.4 Intended and intentional word.** What kind of word does it refer to? To the intentional and intentional word. For Husserl, intentionality is the first access to the recognition of the presence of the other. To be intentionally-addressed constitutes the horizon of meaning in which the other is no longer something between things, but he too is a core of meaning. The same intentional movement constitutes its own identity, that of the other and that of the external world as a horizon of intersubjective meaning. And open to the communicative relationship. The communication (*Mitteilung*) is con-division.

Through the phenomenological analysis of communication, the specific of the human relationship is configured mainly in two ways:

- a. in participation and belonging-to;
- b. in understanding how to take the other with you, take it on.

Understanding communication as the possibility of the subject communicating “to be-part-of” allows Husserl to not homogenize it to the externalizing forms in which it manifests itself in human groups or associations. It refers, rather and very explicitly, to its intentionally to be part of a culture, of a mentality, of an attitude that finds its rooting in to be-with-the-other and is fulfilled in the form of understanding.

The communication thus understood realizes the participation in the common life and the understanding of the other subject in the constitutive modality of to be-with (*Mit-Sein*).

The problem of communication becomes for Husserl all one with that of the constitution as well as a privileged form of intersubjective and interpersonal knowledge of the ego and the Ego-other-me.

Communication, unlike what may appear to the modern consumer of information, is not a problem that is added to interpersonal relationships, but is itself rooted in the Ego that is always and constitutively an I-in-relationship.

Intentionality, as it gives meaning to being, is the constitutive link of all modes of being. The sense of being is in turn rooted in consciousness. Which means that the constitution theory is not reducible to a mere gnoseological problem.

The relationship is not the consequence of the simple act of connecting, as if at first there were real things and then these were related to each other. Instead, it is what Husserl entrusts to the words of the manuscript “I am in relation to an environment” (Husserl, 1924/1973:331-332).

To be in a relationship-with has in itself the implicit recognition, in the sphere of the Ego, of the constitutive link with the ‘you’ and of the apperceptive movement in which the constitutive act of the Ego as self and the other-self becomes possible. In this way the ‘me-us’ emerges on the level of representative possibility. And it is this ‘me-us’ that leads again to a reflection on the ego.

It is a question of a continuous renewal of the theoretical categories with respect to the consolidated pre-judgments that too often pre-judge the possibility of recognizing and recognizing the relationship-with as a communicative relationship.

This is a relationship understood as a fundamental transition from a solipsistic but necessary vision of the world to a recognition as part of a humanity as a unity of sociality.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

### 4.1 The formative plan of the phenomenological reflection and perspective.

At the conclusion of the theoretical reflection that I proposed with respect to the theme of the Conference: *Redefining community in Intercultural Context. Migration and Intercultural dialogue*, I would like to underline the importance of the phenomenological perspective as an attitude of search for meaning about the requests that must be at the basis of the authentic dialogue between

different cultures to which the migration phenomenon, today, takes on.

The phenomenological methodology has the implicative value able to involve not only the activities of rational and symbolic thought but to activate and strengthen the critical and epistemological request as well as the corresponding personal, emotional and affective intention. The phenomenological methodology contributes to launching that “intentional modification” that transforms the modalities of relating-to and interacting-with in the operative framework that Husserl calls phenomenological attitude.

The perspectives □ notes Husserl in the *Crisis of the European Sciences* □ are “infinite” but above all they suggest “guidelines of orientation” that translate into a “*Neuartige Einstellung* (new attitude)” (Husserl, 1935/1961: 334). If we report this Husserlian annotation to the here and now (but also to the *hic et nunc* of each relational situation), we immediately realize that Husserl's phrase reveals at least two key information regarding the operational modalities in which everyone can choose to place himself in the context to which it refers. The perspective not only delimits and circumscribes a “context” as a “field” of observation and action but also indicates the role of a hypothetical external observer. It follows that, from a topological point of view, the perspective has two main poles:

a) the position (to be inside) that the intentional individual occupies or is about to occupy in the relational space of the situation (plane of the emotional-affective implication of knowledge);

b) the point of view (to be outside) that the intentional individual occupies or is about to occupy as an observer (logical-formal and epistemological level of knowledge).

Of a situation or ‘relational space’ it is possible (and no less appropriate) to grasp (to know) both its to be in a network of relationships, meanings and motivations (internal configuration), and the natural structure (external configuration), what it possesses at a given moment and that can be assimilated to the perception of an external hypothetical observer.

#### 4.2 From the individual to the group; from the position of the self to the relational situation.

Specifying one's own perspective therefore requires a fluctuating and intensely mobile attention: it urges us to pass continuously from the observer to the context, from the individual to the group, from the position of the self or of the other

to the network that keeps them united in the relational situation, from the strictly intellectual level to the symbolic, emotional and cultural one.

Etymologically the term ‘perspective’ derives from the Latin *pro-spicere*: *pro-* ‘forward’, *specere* ‘to look’. The action of the *pro-spicere* establishes a connection between two elements: there is a “subject” that performs the action of looking and a *quid*, placed before it, which is “object” of to be looked at. The presence of the subject who performs the action of looking is *conditio sine qua non* of the *pro-spicere* no less than the object (real or imaginary).

Now, to be able to look, the subject must:

1. has performed a preventive distancing action between himself and the object to be looked at (whoever looks [*spicere*], looks “from a distance” and, with respect to the relationship, places himself “outside”);

2. that he looks “before” to himself. (You can only look at what is before us: “against” and / or “in front” and, consequently, only if you are “in” the relationship).

The distancing refers to the set of conceptual and theoretical tools (knowledge) available to the subject. They mediate and maintain the necessary distance for knowledge and observation. How these tools affect the cognitive process and how they condition it is the object of study of epistemology.

What interests us here is that the relationship between the subject and the object, to which the cognitive distancing refers, is not the only one possible. The ‘pro’ evokes a whole range of potential relationships that bind both the subject to the object (being against and being ‘opposed to the self’) and two or more subjects between them: to be in front (Husserl, 1935/1961).

The choice of perspective therefore suggests “guidelines”. It directs our attention, among other things, and implies our to be in relationship. In the specific case, when I claim to be in a phenomenological perspective, I invite you to shift our attention:

a) on the actors and on the role of those who act in a relational space;

b) on the relational space in which these “actors” operate and have their own “role”.

Opposite - observes Husserl - one can only have another person, not the natural objects or the naturalized body of the other. Opposite is the condition of the *vis à vis*, of the gaze that recognizes the other as analogon and at the same time other than itself; on the other hand, it expresses the opposition between objects or

between an individual who makes an “object” or naturalizes the other, making it a thing among things. The others of the frontal position are placed in an interpersonal relationship; they are in relationship with the role of co-actors, with dignity of person and with a common “sense of belonging” which cannot be ignored.

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## INTERNAL EXCLUSION VIA MULTICULTURAL POLICY IN SOUTH KOREA: BEYOND THE MULTICULTURALISM

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**Abstract:** *The concept of homogeneous nation has been for a long time deeply rooted in Korea. With the new current of time, however, Korea has entered into multiethnic society. Multiculturalism has been universalized in Korean society. It is also considered as severely discriminative and includes the concept of internal exclusion. This paper will reflect on the Korean society and seek a direction for improving Korean perceptions by discussing the internal perceptions towards foreign immigrants.*

**Keywords:** *multiculturalism; internal exclusion; discrimination; single ethnic; transformation*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to critically look into the agenda, ‘multicultural society’ that has been used in South Korea since 2000s, as the transformation of neoliberalism. In addition, it raises the question on how the concepts of ‘immigration’, ‘foreigner’ and ‘multicultural family’, as the new phenomena of exploitation in the era of neoliberalism, distinguish aliens from our people and involve psychological, social and collective discrimination.

This paper consists of 4 chapters. The phenomenological meaning of Gap (topdog) - Eul (underdog) relationship that is called “I” or “people” in South Korea is discussed in Chapter 2. Internal exclusion embedded in the Korean multicultural policy is looked into in Chapter 3. Agenda necessary to go beyond multiculturalism is considered as democracy of underdog in Chapter 4.

### 2. HOW TO CHARACTERIZE SOUTH KOREA? UNDERDOGS AS THE SECOND CLASS PEOPLE

Discourse of Gap-Eul relationship widely used in Korean society has been on everyone’s lips as an interesting research topic or phenomenon in recent years. Even several years ago, Gap-Eul relationship was a very common term (Jin, 2017:4). It is not more or less than to refer both faces in contract. However, as suggested by common expressions appeared in the press such as Gapjil (overuse of one’s power) and ‘tears of Eul’, these terms no longer refer to neutral relationship between both

parties but to the relation between domination and obedience, superiority and inferiority, insult and repulsion, and repression and exclusion. In other words, ‘Eul’ refers to people subject to unfair repression-violence, discrimination-bullying and insult-exclusion. Here are some examples: franchise owners suffering from unfair arrogance of the franchise headquarter and their part time workers suffering from arrogance of the franchise owners; non-regular workers suffering from not only repression and violence by capital, but also discrimination and Gapjil by regular workers; subcontractors and their employees as the victim of unfair demand and abused authority by prime contractors; postgraduates required to absolutely obey their professors; women and minors subject to indiscriminate repulsion, and young students suffering from harsh competition. According to Jacques Ranciere, a French philosopher, Eul is not different from a ‘person without head’ (Jin, 2015: 210). As suggested by expressions such as ‘10:90’ and ‘1:99’, the majority of members of Korean society are in the position of Eul as the person without head.

In this sense, the following question might be inevitably raised. Why discourse of Gap-Eul relationship has been widely spread in our society in recent years? A number of economists and sociologists might agree that IMF Financial crisis in 1997 became to be one of the inflection points. The Korean society has been rapidly reorganized in order of neoliberalism since the financial crisis, which caused the deepening of polarization as well as the expansion of Euls as second class people.

In 2014, the rate of non-regular workers was 32% per government statistics or 45% per labor world statistics. The problem was that the salary level of non-regular workers was only half of that of regular workers and the similar trend was found in salary gap between large corporations and small and medium sized businesses. As of 2014, 81% of total labors were hired by small and medium sized businesses and 19% by large corporations. This suggests that the majority of labors, except for the regular workers working in large corporations, face severe income and employment inequality. In fact, the proportion of low-income labors in South Korea is the second highest among the OECD countries; “labors with less than KRW 1,000,000 (approx. 800 euro) monthly salary take 1/3 of 18,740,000 of waged workers” in South Korea (Jang, 2014:310). Eventually, it was demonstrated by a number of statistical figures that increase in low income labors and non-regular workers starting from the financial crisis when neoliberalism reorganization of Korean society was regularized has deepened the income and employment inequality (Kim, 2015:170).

Another instance of ‘Euls as the second class people’ is the ferry Sewolho disaster in 2014. The disaster served as a momentum for the public to be aware of the hierarchical Korean society once again. The public experienced from the disaster that the nation ‘Korea’ was the black hole (Jin, 2017:109). It is because people generally used to consider the nation as the most solid reality. However, the government seen by the public in the disaster was shockingly “vain” and “big blank” (Jin, 2017:110).

The government was not only incompetent to rescue the students stuck in the sinking ferry but also did not seem to have a will to rescue them. People said ‘How does the country do something like this?’ and came to be conscious of the fact that ‘there is no nation for poor us’ and ‘no nation exists for poor me’ (Jin, 2017:110). The question of ‘How would the government respond if the students stuck in the ferry were from the prestigious school located in Gangnam, instead of Danwon high school in Ansan?’ has been raised by the public. The order ‘Stay still’ was considered as a metonymic expression to force obedience, stirring up anger of people. The ‘nation’ was on ‘their side’ (Jin, 2017:110).

South Korea can be characterized as ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism can be characterized as consistency between ethnicity as racial/cultural identity and people as political identity (Shin, 2006:12). Korea is the country where people who can quickly recognize where they come

from are considered citizens and are also considered eligible as citizens.

In countries like Korea, where national identity is equated with ethnic identity and where such identity is highlighted, it is difficult for minorities and individuals to be properly protected or to have their rights respected. This is why the hierarchical order of Gap-Eul relationship and the discriminatory structure highly influence the society. Therefore, discourse of Gap-Eul relation might be considered as one of the critical phenomena in modern Korean history 70 years after liberation. It is related to the question about the national or political community, South Korea.

### 3. INTERNAL EXCULSION EMBODED IN MULTICULTURAL POLICY IN SOUTH KOREA

The Keeping Korea as a single race country with 5000-year history has been highlighted in the educational system of the country. South Korea got over the Japanese colonial rule and made economic progress/ developed economically after the Korean War. As a result, it joined the rank of developed countries in 2000s, showing the international society its social and economic dynamic. With such achievements, it is reaching forward to multicultural society by continuing a number of supportive policies (Ministry of Justice, 2019).

In this circumstance, however, Koreans still have prejudices and negative perceptions towards foreign immigrants and multicultural societies. As such, the Korean society is undergoing a period of transition where the perception does not meet the reality. Before reviewing the Korean policy of foreign immigrants, this paper will discuss three types of negative perception towards multiculturalism (Jang, 2015:8).

**3.1 Double-faced Anti-multiculturalism.** This means showing a double-faced attitude towards multiculturalism. Although Koreans appear to accept and understand the foreign culture, people with this perception feel an antipathy against the government’s support and commitment for multicultural people. This concept is also associated with the *Chemyeon* (social face) culture of Korean society. Koreans who are reluctant to openly show their negative perceptions cannot frankly express their views. Rather, they only express their antipathies to multiculturalism either anonymously or as a form of the majority.

**3.2 Anti-multiculturalism.** Anti-multiculturalism means that people perceive multiculturalism to be a cause of social problems or to go against their interests. People with this perception and attitude actively express their opinions and negative feelings against multiculturalism with their own logical reasons. However, these reasons tend to be self-centric or precausal reasoning, leading to many distorted interpretations of the issue often different from the fact. Nevertheless, people are still fleshing out the distorted interpretation to justify their opinions.

**3.3. Multiculture-phobia (Hatred against Multiculture).** Multiculture-phobia is both a subset of Xenophobia and an umbrella term for Islamophobia and Chao-phobia. In Korea, most multicultural people come from the socially and economically less developed countries. Moreover, the meaning of “multiculture” does not cover all the foreigners and their cultures, but is often limited to the culture of the socially vulnerable community, including foreign workers, marriage migrant women and their children, and others. In other words, it is not discrimination and exclusion against all foreigners, but discrimination and hatred against multicultural people from developing countries occurring based on “superiority” rather than discrimination and exclusion against all foreigners (Min, 2015:31-32).

Establishing various supportive policies and enhancing relative laws, the government has made statistics of the multicultural Korean society since 2000, when the number of multicultural families increased as a result of the increase in/of international marriages in rural local labors. For instance, statistics of in-and-out-bound foreigners per month, multicultural members per nationality, education status of immigrant adolescences per school and adaptation of North Korean defectors are reported on a regular basis, and administrative and financial support are provided (Kim *et al.* 2014). The problem is that adaptation to Korean society is highly influenced by their age, social activities, and their familiarity with the Korean language, culture, food, and custom and etiquette by gender/region. All these are provided as the means of assimilation and regulation. Distinctive competence shown in the provided program is an essential factor for them to be recognized as ‘Korean’. According to the criteria defined by ‘Gap’ to become a Korean citizen, multicultural members are considered as ‘Eul’. In other words, multicultural members are subject to internal exclusion despite that they are living in South Korea.

Etienne Balibar (2010) defines internal exclusion as the following:

Symbolic characteristics of internal exclusion are that the person excluded 1) can be neither truly integrated nor actually removed; 2) cannot be even directly expelled from the community” (La proposition de l'égaliberté, 2010: 212).

In this sense, the people forced to be internally excluded are represented by heretics or religious minorities in the past, women or proletarians in 19th century, black people in early 20th century and immigrants from late 20th century to early 21th century. In this study, internal exclusion is the comprehensive meaning of the concept that includes social exclusion, newly used to supplement the criterion of internal exclusion as poverty as defined by European scholars in the past, as well as symbolic exclusion including discrimination and exclusion by race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual identity.

However, not only people from such particular groups are included in the category of internal exclusion (Jin, 2017: 414). People who are at the bottom of competitive social order, who are forced to be in the position of ‘Eul’, and who inevitably came to be the second class citizens or people, are also subject to internal exclusion. Internal exclusion is the condition away from the proper level of life/living as a decent person, which prevents people from being happy (Jin, 2017:414). The problems of exclusion from happiness and outsider of happiness have not disappeared, but have systemically reproduced and extended.

In addition, one of the main phenomena caused by neoliberal globalization is that minorities/underdogs have become numerous. Neoliberal socialization weakens or disbands social solidarity organizations, including working class groups, and furthermore destabilizes the sense of belonging in individuals (e.g., non-regular work, early retirement, freelance, and self-employment), the outcome being that most of individuals become singularized/lonely? And established. ‘Euls’ become the majority in terms of number; however, they are in fact singularized and destabilized minorities/underdogs who failed to be connected to each other via their own unique organization and network.

Entities grouped by a single name, nation, are not the homogeneous group but the conflicting group represented by the numbers such as ‘1:99’, ‘10:90’ and ‘20:80’, which are in multilayered, hierarchical power relationships, for example, Gap, Eul, Byeong and Jeong. Therefore, what Euls’ democracy questions is how democracy based on

minorities/underdogs/(politically) minors who are at the bottom of national sovereignty would be possible. In other words, it is the question about how the concept of people can be reorganized from the viewpoint of minorities/underdogs/(political) minors who are at the bottom of society, called 'people without head'. It might be necessary to think within the frame of 'Euls' democracy' to solve the problem of multicultural and refugees in Korean society.

#### 4. BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM: GO FORWARD TO EUL'S DEMOCRACY

Multiculturalism has been quite universalized in the Korean society. It is also considered severely discriminative and includes the concept of internal exclusion. Meanwhile, every society that is participating in globalization can be defined as a multicultural society. Foreigners became no longer strangers in the Korean society in past 20 years. There might be two different premises if 'multiculturalism' becomes index of discrimination and exclusion in this situation.

Firstly, multiculturalism implies a very static norm of culture. In other words, culture is the unique lifestyle, convention, thoughts and behaviors of a group; therefore, is not considered to be changed in definition. Korean culture is the expression of the Koreans' (ethnicity) unique lifestyle, conventions, thoughts and behaviors. It assumes invariability of culture; for example, Chinese culture is the Chinese own, Japanese culture is the Japanese own, and etc.

Secondly and accordingly, it rules out internal diversity or hybridity of other culture from the beginning. It is such that the Korean culture is considered to have invariable identity for thousands of years since Dangun Era; Kimchi has been consumed by Korean since Dangun era; memorial service has been continued without change since Joseon era, and Korean language has existed in the current form for about 550 years. However, the history of the Kimchi consumed today is not that long and memorial services practiced nowadays are the hybrid transformed after the liberation from Japan.

According to these two premises, multiculturalism has come to be the means of administration and public order to preserve and enhance Korean culture whose identity is invariable and singularized. Given that the current level of Korean awareness towards multiculturalism, the government should be first deeply concerned about whether to actively accept multicultural policy that ensures coexistence of various cultures. Moreover,

the government should all the more actively take the lead in fostering tolerance of Koreans towards diversity. This is to ensure that Koreans would not resist, but accept the society of various cultures as well as new members joining Korean society. It is because the most important task for Korean government to prepare for the upcoming multiethnic society is to come up with multi-level active policy to create a better understanding of the public of multiculturalism.

Therefore, multiculturalism in the Korean society is a modified form of nationalism. Under this condition, it is not surprising that multiculturalism is used as the means to hierarchically include or exclude heterogeneous things against Korean culture. Accordingly, new ideas, practice and institutionalization about culture itself are required to overcome the logic of nationalism and its involving violence. The two premises that pre-existing multiculturalism (no matter whether it is called interculturalism or poly-culturalism) is based on should be broken up. Interculturalism or poly-culturalism might be impossible if the Korean language could function as the only one universal language in Korean society. It is important to establish the base to learn and use well the Korean language. However, effort to use other languages as the common language is also significant.

Furthermore, it is critical to establish the passage for more citizens and people regardless of their nationality to participate in public discussions. There are a number of TV programs in which foreigners make their appearance, but this is limited to variety shows. People who are not 'special foreigners' exist in the Korean society, living like non-existing ghosts. It is an important issue to make the passage for them to reproduce/represent themselves.

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Linguistics.

Discourse

Analysis



## EMPATHY, SYMPATHY AND DEMONIZATION OF THE OTHER IN THE BALKAN LITERATURES

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**Abstract:** *The profile of the other in the Balkans literatures is as special and complex as its projection onto real life has been through the region's history. Since the Balkans itself has been a bridge between East and West, being 'the other' in relation to Europe and part of it simultaneously, the concepts of self and the other reveal as specific in the Balkans literatures. In these literatures, the other has been the alien, the invader, who came either from a powerful empire or from 'beyond the fence'—the neighbour, the similar but also the different one all at once. In most cases, this 'other' exerted all its influence to spread their culture and, either when being part of an empire or merely a neighbour, cohabited with them for such long periods as to strive to undo the features of their identity. The present paper aims to highlight some features of 'the other' in the Balkans literature that make it essentially unique and (considering the work of albanian and serbian prose writers) which, in relation to self, appears in diverse and often opposite positions: it has been demonized at times, but empathised or even sympathised at others, and, as everything else of the Balkans, is depicted in strong colours and contrasts, yet essentially similar.*

**Keywords:** *Balkan; the other; self; narrative; demonization*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Literature is that space of imagination which is interested in and allows space for the issue of 'the other' more than any other art form. *The other* has at all times been destined to be changed into speech, although this has happened especially in the literature written for and of postcolonial countries, where the confrontation between self and *the other* appeared in clear-cut contrasts. That is why the first studies on this issue are to be met in the 1950s, when the term postcolonial theory<sup>1</sup> is to be traced too.

In most of its part, the postcolonial theory pivots around the concept of *the other*, looking at the world as split into adversary forces: *the self* is ordered, rational, masculine – thus, good, whereas the other is chaotic, irrational, feminine – thus, evil. In the works of that literature (postcolonial), the unequal power relations appear in the form of binary opposites: we – they, white – black, colonizer – colonized, self – other, powerful –

powerless, Master – slave, superior – inferior. ( Al-Saidi, 2014:95-105)

Of course, when we talk of *the other* in the Balkans Peninsula, in the Balkanian culture and literature, an identikit of this *other* cannot be that simple or easily identified. This is due to many reasons, which relate to the history, culture and the geopolitics of the region through the ages, considering them in both contexts, the Balkanian internal relations and the juxtaposition between the Balkans and Europe, particularly, in the way this relationship has been seen through the last century to the present.

A few things are to be resolved before laying out the specific issue of *the other* in the Balkans literatures. First and foremost, are we considering the Balkans as an entity, or rather each of its constituent patches? Is *the other* as different from *the self* as it appears in the European view of the Easterner, or as it reveals in the perception that the colonized peoples have of the European in the literatures of the postcolonial countries? Is this *other* Balkanian, or is it one coming from Europe, from the east, or from a neighbouring land in the Balkans? Does this *other* bear obvious, clear-cut distinctions from the *self* or just minor differences, yet essential in the different cultures of the Balkans? What are its relations with itself?

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<sup>1</sup> The term gained importance in 1970, when Edward Said wrote his book "Orientalism". It was initially used to refer to cultural interactions in colonial societies. The postcolonial theory was created to deal with the literature written in the countries that used to be or that are still colonial.

In Maria Todorova's view, the Balkans issue should be seen as parallel to other similar experiences, such as the relations between Europe and postcolonial countries. "*The Balkans is also a bridge across the stages of growth, which is why it should be classified as half-developed, half-colonial, and half-oriental.*" (Todorova, 2009: 16) Certain scholars in the West are too quick to use the oriental notion—used by some Balkanian researchers too—as a model to incorporate the whole of the Balkans. That is why she also uses the term *Balkanianism* when she refers to the European's discourse of the Balkans and the Balkanians.<sup>2</sup>

For Todorova, the methodologies used in post-colonial studies cannot be applied in the Balkanian ones. The issue that Todorova treats in *Imagining Balkans* relates to the way the Balkans has been seen—as an *other*, different from Europe, a part of which it actually is. Our interest lies in only one approach of this view and not in it as a whole, as the matter in our discussion, while we are arguing on the basis of the Balkans literature, is seen from a different perspective. Todorova's viewpoint is of an interest to us because it helps us position our discussion in a broader context that will lead to certain conclusions.

While discussing *the other* in the perception of the Balkans peoples, we should bear in mind that the very roots of these peoples relate to Europe, a part of which (though in the periphery) the Balkans is. On the other hand, since it used to be part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years, the two cultures were mixed and cohabited side by side, so

<sup>2</sup> "The way to understand this *Balkanianism*," holds Todorova "is by placing it within the theoretical debates being held—above all, in juxtaposition to *orientalism* and *post-colonialism*." In her understanding, the evolution of a general Balkanic discourse is much less than a variant of *orientalism*, since it is a development with quite distinctive features within the 'western' intellectual and academic perception. The Orient of their imagination hardly had any concrete location or boundaries; it used to be considered as 'non-European', closely associated with a colonial and by-gone image, dressed with racial connotations ('non-whites'), and closely associated with Islam, as the religion of 'the rest of the Orientals.' Todorova emphasizes that most of these aspects are not to be found in the Balkanian discourse. The Balkans was precisely located in the geographical context, it was 'European,' it had no real 'colonial' past experience, its population was 'white,' and (around 1900) most of its population were Christian. By early twentieth century, though, a portrait of the Balkans as a cultural '*other*' had become dominant.

that this climate of controversy about identity prevails the discussions about it today, both inside the Balkans countries and outside them.

The discourse on *the other* in the Balkanian culture is highly affected by the history of the region and the age-long clashes for expansion, the developments brought about by the cohabitation under the Ottoman rule, as well as the traces it left on the religion and culture. Consequently, *the other* of these peoples has not only been the one coming from far away, imposing their own language and culture, but also their adjacent neighbor, from whom they differ in certain characteristics as nation, religion and language. Following this line of reasoning, the identity of the other in the Balkanian history, literature and culture is special, quite different from the one held by the post-colonial countries about Europeans, as different as the one held by the Europeans about the peoples of the east. Since the Balkans has been a bridge between east and west, being the other to Europe though part of it, the concept of the other reveals as specific in the Balkanian literatures.

As the peoples of the region have been marked by both a common fate and conflictual relationships lasting for centuries—bound by a neighbourhood they could not escape—it is not easy to define the image of the other as depicted in the Balkans culture and literature. Thus, in Albanian literature, from the folk Epics of the valient warriors to the later cultivated literature, it is hard to find such pairs of binary opposites as the ones in the literatures of the post-colonial countries that we have mentioned above.

A view of the Balkans as something in-between can be noticed in depictions of it. East and west are usually depicted as incompatible entities, as opposing worlds, and the image developed of the Balkans is either of an intersection or of a bridge linking these two opposites.

The bridge is a structure that not only complements the very meaning, the geographic, historical and cultural position of the peninsula, but it has also become a part of its identity, of the way the Balkanian knows himself. Turned to a metaphor, the construction of a bridge, as a thing of vital importance to the community, is a narrative to be found in all of the Balkans languages.

This concept of a bridge or a crossroads is also related to the concept of the Balkanian for *the self* and *the other*. In the Balkans literatures, as in the perception of its peoples, *the other* has been the foreigner or the invador coming from a powerful empire, or from "beyond the fence," or the nieghbour—similar but different all at once. This

*other* has, in most of the cases, exerted all their influence to extend their culture and, either when they were part of an empire or a mere neighbour, cohabited with them for a long time striving to undo parts of their identity.

Owing to specific circumstances of an age-long cohabitation of a common history, and, irrespective of the long-lasting differences and the keen old clashes, the profile of *the other* pictured in the Balkans literatures shares as many features as the respective cultures and identities do.

The aim of this paper is to draw a portrait of this Balkanic *other* (starting from the work of Albanian and Serbian authors), who is, in relation to self, in different and often conflicting positions: it has both been demonized and empathised or even sympathised and, as everything else connected with the Balkans, comes through powerful colours and contrasts, yet essentially similar.

## 2. DEMONIZING THE 'OTHER'

As far as Albanian literature is concerned, it has generally been accepted to have a rather isolationist inclination, particularly after World War 2. Due to numerous historic determinant circumstances, isolation from the world, from the different one—from the *other*—has either been a fatal condition at times or, at other times, a prerequisite to survive in aspects of culture and identity. Nevertheless, even though created in the time-space of communist Albania, the prose of such writers as P. Marko, I. Kadare, D. Agolli and a lot more contains various scales of imaging this *other* in the Albanian letters. That is not a linear image, either within the boundaries of the literature as a whole, or within the work of the same author.

In Ismail Kadare's work, for example, we can find various types of relationships with *the other*, which, no matter how they differ, they all tend to demonize it. *The other* in his novel *The General of the Dead Army* is represented by the general of an enemy country and the priest, who are central figures in the novel. The author considers *the other* from his own perspective. The way this *other self* views Albanians enables us to know *the other* himself, in this case, the General. Picturing him as the general of the dead army, the army that charged in order to invade that land, immediately merges the figure of the general with that of the enemy, who now comes in a more sophisticated form to extract the remains of the once glorious army and "fight", this time without weapons, only to be defeated once again. In his novel *The Wedding Procession Turned to Ice*, Kadare follows another

path in his imagination of *the other*. Here he starts from the self, a Pristina hospital doctor and her husband. She has to go through a process of rendering account for the assistance the doctors of her ward have offered to the Kosovo students wounded in a demonstration. The other in the novel comes as a senior officer of the UDB, Dobrila Guberovic, and two of his ex-colleagues, Vladan and Yovitsa. The latter are painted in dark colours. Feeling excluded because of the new policies, they think that now that the UDB needs them again, the big day has arrived for things to be put to their normal order.

Yovitsa couldn't help sobbing. 'Poor lonely one,' he repeated a few times, while Vladan said, 'Hush, brother; everything will be restored, just need be patient.' But Yovitsa could hardly get hold of himself. 'They've set fire to the Patriarchate of Peja. They are rendering our Serbian girls barren. How could I be patient?' 'What about us?' responded Vladan 'Haven't we done enough to them? On April 1 our tanks rode right upon people's bodies. The blood traces can still be noticed in Germya. Is that not enough to you?' 'Not enough!' responded Yovitsa. 'It is very little to me. Would they but leave us free as in Karageorgevitch's time. To uproot them, stamp 'em out, with their language and all, with their cursed alphabet, which they claim to be more ancient. (Kadare 2000:158)

In the writer's imagination of *the other*, a demonizing inclination is noticeable in treating him as a fanatic and a criminal. There are other Serbian characters in the novel, though, having other features than these, such as another hospital doctor (it is related that the Serbian doctors too have equally assisted the young wounded in the demonstration), or a client in the bar *Old Serbia* who mocks the ex-UDB people.

The very title of the novel, *The Wedding Procession Turned to Ice*, foreshadows such an atmosphere. Unlike in the legend, where the frozen procession participants return to normal again and the marriage between *the self* and *the other* may be accomplished, this is impossible in the novel and the real life.

A demonization of the other, although rather disguised through parody, is also to be found in Ivo Andric's *The Journey of Derzelez Alija*. While the Albanian hero Gergj Elez Alia of the epic *Songs of the Frontier Warriors*, who has been in bed for nine years, rises to defend his sister's honour and life, Andric's character has different features. In the novel, he is not *the other*, but rather *the other's* hero (as the epic depicts Gergj Elez Alia).

However, in Andric's discourse, the relations between the hero and the crowd beholding him are inversed: the crowd knows *Derzelez* from his deeds; it shrinks from him initially, but then, gradually comes to see how ridiculous he is and makes fun of him.

Now that he had dismounted his steed, as if descending from a pedestal, the awe and esteem started to abate, and he kind of equaled with the rest ... In a matter of days the magic circle around *Derzelez* had totally dissolved (Andric, 1976:52).

Feeble in the face of feminine beauty, he becomes ridiculous, especially in their presence. Course and ignorant as he is, he allows the others to ridicule him, lets himself get drunk, crawl in front of the crowd, and not get what he wants.

In addition to being individual, the features he dresses *the other* in are also related with the community he comes from and he represents. That is noticeable in his attitude towards females:

As always when he beheld feminine beauty, he immediately lost all sense of time and real relationships, along with all understanding of reality, which separates people from one another (Andric, 1976:69)

He smoked with hatred. That he cannot reach that Vlach woman; that he never can! A new wave of blood wrapped him ... (Andric, 1976:52)

or his attitude towards the others that are not like him, as in the case of those who do not fast like as he does:

On an afternoon, because of boredom and weariness, they beat a somunji, a Christian, for he had been smoking while passing by (Andric, 1976, 52)

Andric chooses not to talk of *the other* by juxtaposing it with his *self*. He chooses to parody it, by transforming the heroic into ridiculous, bravery into unmanliness, and virtue into vice. He does not call *the other* names but rather builds the scene and the figures so that the reader can gather the meaning themselves. He envisages the hero and *the other* as demoniac and silly all at once, through parodying him. Consequently, if he does that to the hero, it is easy to see what he suggests about *the others*.

Both in the cases of Kadare and Andric, *the other* is seen in a relationship already established. For Kadare, he is the foe coming from a powerful empire or from an age-long conflicting neighbourhood. He is, a priori, the "enemy" that has charged, imposed his values and culture, and despised the values, the culture, and the right of

people to live in freedom. For Andric, *the other* is the one coming from afar, with norms, canons and features different from those of *the self*. He is of an inferior culture and is despised for the fact that he strives to impose that culture upon the others. In both cases the conception of *the other* derives from conflict, from the clashes that their people have had, now with the invador who tried to be imposed upon them, now with the neighbour they have always lived in vicinity, but always in conflict. This other, in the cases of Kadare and Andric, does not go beyond the boundaries of the Balkanian conflictual reality and, through imagination, affirms attitudes already known from reality.

### 3. EMPATHYZING AND SYMPATHYZING THE 'OTHER'

One of the Albanian authors who treated the other atypically is D. Agolli, from whose work we will set aside his novel *The Man with the Gun* and his story *A Small Greek Boy in the Household*. In the novel *The Man with the Gun*, main character, Mato Gruda, an uneducated peasant, takes in an Italian soldier after Italy has capitulated. Even though that was a common experience for many Albanian families during the war, the author pictures this relationship between the self and the other in an original way, showing that no matter how rough and uninformed the peasant is, he opens his home to the alien, accepting him as different, understanding and even sympathizing him for certain traits he appreciates in him:

Meanwhile Zara came in, wearing a head kerchief. She shook the Italian's hand and sat by the aunt on the fireside. Augusto glimpsed at Zyllo, then immediately looked away. Mato Gruda understood from this that the Italian was a behaved man after all and that he had learned some of the peasants' customs. Women should not be stared at, not looked at them in the eye; and he said to himself that the foreigner had to descend from a good house (Agolli, 1975, 67-68)

The correlation between *the self* and *the other* is particular in *A Small Greek Boy in the Household*. *The other*, initially marked as Greek, is a small child, the son of a family friend from a village across the border. In Agolli's work, *the other* is simultaneously a Greek (foreigner and "foe") and guest to the house; it is an alien but *small*, a mere kid, unaware of the differences and problems between the two peoples, innocent of the acts of others. Home is the territory where one feels safe, strong and secure, the place belonging to

them alone and where one is oneself. Consequently, allowing there somebody that could well be considered a foe is an unacceptable and frightening thing. Nevertheless, this fear turns to absurd when ‘the enemy’ comes to be a small kid needing help.

This scene clearly reveals our correlation with the forigner, as conditioned by history, which always placed the Albanians on the position of the invaded rather than the invador. The alien has been the one that tipped the ballance of the community, threatened their culture, and put to doubt their very identity.

In the Balkans context, those who are in a majority “us” in relation to the other always seek to exert their influence and make it similar to them. That is what the grandmother character does to the small Greek, who reminds her of the Greek andartes who had wounded her husband at the mill. She says that after he has come, the house smells of Greek to her and that if she had the boy done *sünnet*, the odour would disappear.

In essence, this endeavour to undo the features of the *other’s* identity and alter them into such traits that resemble our identity, is a refusal of *the other*, under the conviction that the right form of being is the one we belong. This justifies Bauman’s view according to which all societies produce aliens in their own way. “Everyone is dirty to the other, but everyone fights the other’s dirtiness on behalf of their own purity.” (Jenkins, 2008, 33)

This is a mindset the Balkans peoples have suffered and are still suffering from. The present parallel between Agolli’s textual figure and real life goes to show that, despite what we dress upon *the other*, despite the way we identifay our *self* in correlation to it, this *other* is basically so close to us that we weep and laugh with them, fight and rejoice, and we even err almost the same way as them.

Especially in the case of the story *A Small Greek Boy in the Household*, the *other’s* profile is one that fits best a characteristic conception for the Balkans peninsula, where old and keen as the conflicts may have been, there are quite as many shared values in the respective cultures and identities. The matter is that in the Balkans, the differences take such huge proportions, their value is inflated, and they get transformed and played with until they turn to deep irresolvable conflicts.

The correlation between the self and the other is specific in the story *A Small Greek Boy in the Household*. It comprises all the kinds of perceptions of *the other*. The other is demonized there by the character of grandmother, who identifies him with the Greek andartes, or the enemy, empathized by the boy who observes him

and feels his pain, by the father and then grandmother, until later, when he is not only sympathized but also merged with the self.

The perception of another writer, Petro Marko, is of high interest too. His image of the other relates with concrete circumstances and events, such as his volunteering to Spain, along with others from around the world, in order to set resistance to fascism, where he met other Albanians like him, as well as many others from different countries of the world, who shared the same love of liberty and same ideals.

Petro Marko’s novels are creations of a rather ambiguous status, as the reader may read them either as biography or as fiction. Many characters, impressions, and place or space descriptions in them come from living, and they have become a part of fiction. It may be owing to this experience too, why *the other* holds an important position in his novels, to such an extent that this literature was in obvious contrast with the time context when it was written and published, with the method of socialist realism, which encouraged a literature closed in the periphery and isolated from *the other*.

Petro Marko created wonderful characters of others who had ideals, aspirations, and courage the same as himself. His other is not only empathized and sympathized but also loved. The love in the novels *Hasta La Vista*, *The Last City*, or *The Night of Ustika* is an *other* who is called Anita and is Spanish, called Ana Maria and is Italian, and called Sonia, who is Serbian. The way this *other* is imaged in Petro Marko’s prose has a specific that is related to the way Petro Marko narrates.

As the characters of the above novels are not mere fictional creations but a merging of the author’s consciousness, his memory, experience, and his imagination, it is harder for them to escape “the author’s voice,” to such an extent that it seems as if the author speaks through each of them.

Kebede was looking at the Aragona mountains ... Kebede was thinking. He was pondering his country enslaved by the Italian fascism ... From those moments, Enco Ferruci started to think differently! He recalled the mass executions of the Abyssinian population and shook with a feeling of revenge. He recollected the rapes and tortures the Abyssinian women had to undergo by the enraged black-shirts and felt ashamed to call himself Italian (Marko, 2002:29-32)

The author’s voice can hardly skip the other, who is such only because it is Italian, Spanish, or Serbian, and is called Kebede, Anita, or Sonia. There is no otherness in it except for some

characteristics as the liberty of the foreign girls, while the Albanian character is rather shy in relation to them. The others in his novels are people coming from different countries and cultures; yet the writer does not seek in them for what is different or distinctive, but rather for what is similar to him, what has brought all these youths together from all over the world to come and fight in Spain.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

In this article I try to demonstrate that the image of *the other* in Balkans literatures is somewhere between the different one imagined as foe, demonized, or despised, and the similar, who is viewed as connected to self, empathized, sympathized, and unified.

Of course it is hard to speak of the Balkans as different from what it is, being such a heterogeneous territory in culture, religion and language. Nevertheless, fully aware of the conflict within our identity profile between east and west, we are in a position to avoid some *others*, who at times come from afar, at others are inhabitants of the same village, now differing in everything, now being almost like our *self*; it could even be said that, in the Balkans, this conflict between the self and the other is so severe not so much because of

the characteristics that divide than because of those that unite.

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## ROMANIAN 21ST CENTURY POETRY AND THE INTERNET: IDENTITY MARKETING POLICIES FROM “NETPOETS” TO VIRTUAL READING COMMUNITIES

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**Abstract:** *This study is an exploration of the Internet as a new medium for both poetical content and its surrounding paratext, focusing on certain less common, yet rather successful reception politics and (user) profiling strategies used by Romanian contemporary authors and/or publishers of indigenous poetry. Leaving out unspecific, global(ized) book marketing Internet approaches, the present investigation aims to map certain particular, local features and efficient tactics that basically rely on the virtual (i.e., Internet simulated) configuration / re-configuration of personal and / or group identities, as an adaptation to the new global cybernetic medium and an original response to the “worldwide” virtual networking of both books and identities. A few selected case studies, illustrating different identity construction policies – from straightforward fictional identity generation to subtler, covert alternative group identity design – are described and analyzed as a phenomenon ultimately aiming to build what is generally thought to be a somewhat unlikely bridge between highly cultural content (or forms) and digital mass culture marketing techniques.*

**Keywords:** *Romanian poetry; media identity; user profiling; reception politics; book marketing*

### 1. ON THE ‘VIRTUAL GRAPHOSPHERE’ AS A GLOBALIZING PHENOMENON

**1.1 Considerations on a new, global dimension of “book culture(s)”.** From the emergence and proliferation of books as virtual objects (be it in the form of scanned or digitalized paperback formats, free PDF versions or proper e-books), resulting in the expansion of digital libraries and publications, to online bookselling policies and authors’ self-marketing Internet strategies, there is a whole new ‘virtual graphosphere’<sup>1</sup> out there which is apparently bound to complement – if not replace entirely – the traditional culture of writing as we

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<sup>1</sup> I will use the term “graphosphere” in a restricted meaning, similar to the definition assigned to the concept by Simon Franklin (Franklin, 2011:531). Thus, it should be understood as a comprehensive perspective on the “technologies of depicting signs which are perceived to relate to language: that is, with writing and printing”, but in a meaning that is (unlike in Franklin’s definition) meant to “extend in time and media” “from cave daubing to ideograms to alphabetic script to movable type to plasma display screens” (Franklin, 2011:531).

(used to) know it. And, naturally – since the notorious ‘McLuhan Equation’ tells us that “the medium is the message” (McLuhan, 1964:7), i.e., that innovation in the medium/support of the message determines cascades of unanticipated cultural effects and interactions that we aren’t ready to spontaneously acknowledge and classify as direct (and sometimes massive) “personal and social consequences” of a new technological “extension of ourselves” (McLuhan, 1964:7) – the rise of the new, virtually infinite medium which is our contemporary cybernetic reality brings about a particular set (or net?) of specific social and cultural interactions at the level of what could be generally described, via a general concept, as the contemporary ‘book culture’ (or graphosphere). And since the Internet is a ‘worldwide’ medium, the propagation of the said set – or ‘network’ – of cultural effects can only be described, willingly or not, as a global phenomenon.

**1.2 The ‘virtual graphosphere’ as an issue: dilemmas in the field of reception theory.** In the multitude of global “personal and social consequences” (McLuhan, 1964:7) prompted by the new medium, the transformations in book

marketing (including self-marketing) policies are among the most disputed. Problematic questions arise, mostly, in matters related to reception theory, as to the virtual impossibility for the general public to discern between quality writing and quality self-marketing in a ‘space’ (medium) which – in theory, at least – allows uncensored / non-reviewed content to proliferate at the same rate as thoroughly/ traditionally ‘edited’ and/or critically-assessed textual material.

**1.3 The Romanian ‘virtual graphosphere’ as a case.** It is in the context of such arguments, generating underlying tension in today’s book culture in general, that I have chosen to address the issue of the Romanian contemporary virtual graphosphere as a particular (and perhaps, relevant) case study area. More precisely, I mean to look into certain less common, yet rather successful reception politics and (user) profiling strategies used by Romanian contemporary authors and/or publishers of indigenous poetry, and define them as profitable, virtual personal and group identity strategies, which have so far managed to keep an apparently obsolete literary genre into the Romanian public’s focus.

This is why a quick glance at some of the most efficient (i.e., popularity-gaining) publisher or author policies used in recent years (starting with the 2000s) is necessary as a basis for further interpretation.

## 2. AN OVERVIEW OF CERTAIN SUCCESSFUL IDENTITY CONFIGURATION POLICIES IN ROMANIAN POETRY MARKETING

In what follows, I mean to provide an overview of certain successful, if sometimes rather exotic identity policies which could be roughly summarized as (personal or group) identity-formation or virtual identity configuration / reconfiguration strategies. My purpose is not necessarily to cover all actual cases (i.e., to structure an all-comprehensive image of the online occurrence of poetical text), but rather to select some relevant solutions issued by Romanian editorial and/or auctorial practice, ranging from straightforward fictional identity generation to subtler, alternative group identity design.

This is why, out of a concern for conciseness, I will basically refrain to the in-depth analysis of two poetic phenomena I deem evocative – namely, the ‘case’ of Iv cel Naiv [Ives the Naïve] as an example of successful self-marketing and self-

profiling, on the one hand, and the more complex ‘case’ of what I will call ‘the Max Blecher Publishing House phenomenon’, on the other hand – as well as to the related (‘online’ and ‘offline’) interactions they triggered in the book-reading community.

**2.1. Ives the Naïve – “a-guy-who-is-fictive”, or the ‘strange case’ of a popular incognito ‘netpoet’.** Ives the Naïve (in Romanian, Iv cel Naiv), self-described on his ‘personal’ Facebook account as ‘a-guy-who-is-fictive’ (in Romanian, ‘Untipfictiv’)<sup>2</sup>, is a poetic mass-phenomenon of the 2010s. Ives started as a self-published incognito poet, by posting light-hearted, imaginative – if rather unsophisticated – poetic texts on his personal website, ivcelnaiv.ro.

The website design (apparently started in 1999) was simple and attractive: reader feedback in the form of comments and likes was allowed for each poem, and the poet himself took the trouble of providing gentle replies to nearly all reader reactions, while visual support was provided by Vali Petridean – a non-fictional person, this time, and an extremely gifted visual artist and illustrator. The effective layout of the virtual support and the steadiness of Ives’ posting frequency (with a poem per day as an average publishing rate for years in a row), the one-click-away availability of the texts, along with the sheer accessibility of poetic forms and the popular, naïve-romantic content and themes (seasoned with the minimal dose of creativity required by any successful marketable product) contributed to making Ives the Naïve an unexpectedly fruitful project.

However, the key-element in the mix was definitely the wave of public curiosity – and attraction – generated by the author’s fictional / virtual persona, functioning both as a cover for the poet’s true identity (a well-kept secret to the day) and as a way of introducing the essential idea of his entire poetic concept. His general motto, “un om căra în spate / un dram de naivitate” [‘a man once carried in his attaché / a small drop of pure naiveté’ – in an approximate translation] reflects, in fact, the author’s *ars poetica*, which seems to be that of becoming “the first healer-poet / the first nanobot to write poetry as a hobby”<sup>3</sup> (Iv cel Naiv, *I, the nano-*

<sup>2</sup> Written in one word when used as a Facebook surname. See <https://www.facebook.com/ivcelnaiv>.

<sup>3</sup> Original fragment: “vreau să fiu primul poet vindecător / primul nanorobot care are poezia ca hobby”. My translation, R.H. Iv cel Naiv, *I, the nano-robot*, June 2017 (yet unpublished). Available online at

*robot*). In fact, there are frequent such textual references to the said intended combination of accessible, positive, unsophisticated content and the accessibility of virtual / electronic content, e.g. “now I can fit into / much smaller spaces / than before. you can just clasp me in your fist. / or you can swallow me, if you want, as you would do/ with one of those modern-day nano-robots / who enter your body / through your stomach, your intestines, your blood vessels / to make you well again.” (Iv cel Naiv, *I, the nano-robot*)<sup>4</sup>. Accordingly, the netpoet seems to be willing (or even determined) to give up traditional, intricate but cumbersome poetical constructions, in favor of the immediate catharsis the new medium – as well as other technological advances – are able to provide. Hence, anonymity is an identity configuration policy meant to allow the masked author the aesthetic and ethical freedom(s) he desires.

The result: five astounding volumes richly illustrated by Vali Petridean, printed as a borderline product bridging fine art and poetry, published by Vellant Publishing House in Bucharest between 2011 and 2016 (which sums up to almost an album / volume per year)<sup>5</sup>. And to this fine achievement, one could add a few more: posts rarely going down beyond 100 likes per poem (with the most popular reaching ± 2k and the majority ranging between 200 and 800 ‘like’ button hits); the formation of a constant follower community; reaching improbable bookselling records for a poet as one of the few bestselling authors for 2013, in the company of pop-icon Tudor Chirilă and notorious actor Radu Beligan – according to an online news article citing publishing house representatives via Mediafax<sup>6</sup>.

Having reached the peak of success in 2013 and at an apparent loss of inspiration in 2014, he

<https://ivcelnaiv.ro/2017/06/eu-nanorobotul/>. [30.03.2019].

<sup>4</sup> Original fragment: “acum încap/ într-un spațiu mult mai mic/ decât înainte. mă poți strânge în pumn./mă poți ține între degete./ mă poți înghiți, dacă vrei, ca pe un nanorobot/ din ăsta modern/care intră în tine, prin stomac,/ prin intestine, prin vase de sânge/ și te face bine.” My translation, R.H. Ibidem.

<sup>5</sup> Namely: *Versez* [IVerse], 2011; *Uibesc* [IOlve], 2012; *Nesfârșesc* [INeverend], 2013; *16 poezii de iubire pe care mi le-aș fi scris mie dacă aș fi fost tu* [16 love poems I would have written to myself if I had been you], 2015; *Cartea săruturilor* [The Book of Kisses], 2016.

<sup>6</sup> See <https://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Lifestyle/159207/tudor-chirila-iv-cel-naiv-si-radu-beligan-cei-mai-vanduti-autori-in-2013.html#gref>.

slowly faded from the public eye in the following years. Neither his two following books being published in the same format by Vellant in 2015 and 2016, respectively, nor the ingenious marketing concept behind his last published volume, *Cartea săruturilor* [The Book of Kisses] (2016) – seemingly meant as a collection of poems based on reader accounts of significant kisses – were able to restore the project to its former glory.

The real person hiding under Ives’ mask remains incognito to the day, in spite of the many attempts to identify him and the several interviews, including radio interventions, in which he managed to keep his identity a secret. His last posted poem, *Ca-n cer* (word-play between ‘cancer’ – ‘cancer’ and ‘ca-n cer’ – ‘just like heaven’) published on ivcelnaiv.ro dates back to October 2018 and evokes the loss of one’s parents to the terrible disease.

All in all, even if relatively short-lived as a literary phenomenon (like so many other sudden success stories), Ives the Naïve constitutes a case to remember – and worthy of attention as far as the online self-marketing strategies deployed, as well as the implied meta-discourse on virtual fictional identity are concerned.

**2.2 The ‘Blecher phenomenon’ or the ultimate alternative ‘launch ramp’.** The Max Blecher<sup>7</sup> Publishing House and the Blecher Institute (a book discussion club centered upon young poetry), as well as several related online literary projects and platforms gravitate around the charismatic personality of Claudiu Komartin, the self-taught<sup>8</sup> editor-in-chief of the said small but solid publishing business, making him the main *arbiter elegantiae* for young Romanian poetic vibes. A rebellious-romantic personality and a precocious poetic talent himself, having won the most reputable national award for his literary debut at age 19<sup>9</sup> in 2003, and held in high regard afterwards, Komartin is often described as the ‘spearhead’ of the 2000s ‘poetic generation’, for which he had also designed a notable manifesto in 2005, significantly entitled “Performantism”<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Max Blecher (1909-1938) was a Jewish-Romanian writer whose poetic prose writing was deemed emblematic for the aesthetic creed articulating Komartin’s cultural projects.

<sup>8</sup> Claudiu Komartin gave up university studies in languages and literature at the University of Bucharest.

<sup>9</sup> The ‘Mihai Eminescu’ National Prize, for *Păpușarul și alte insomnii* [The Puppeteer and Other Insomnia], Vinea Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Claudiu Komartin, „Performantismul”, in *Caiete critice*, 2-3 / 2005, pp. 144-146.

However, starting with the second decade of the century, Komartin's genuine preoccupation for poetry in general and for the writing of his peers gradually turned him into a remarkably efficient cultural promoter. Equally skilled as a poetry editor, a talent discoverer and a cultural activist, he was able to 'market' both his own poetic products and his preferences as a standard of value for the young generations of Romanian poets.

The beginning of what can be defined today as a complex and authoritative promotion mechanism (a veritable 'launch ramp' for young poets and poetical discourses) was the 'Blecher Institute', currently counting 199 editions. Basically following the structure of the academic year<sup>11</sup>, the weekly meetings of this literary club take place each Sunday evening in a Bucharest café (*Tramvaiul 26* – Tram Route 26). From occasional evenings dedicated to older-generation poetic role-models to the typical events usually moderated by Claudiu Komartin himself, starring two (or sometimes three or four) young, emerging (published or yet unpublished) poets who are required to share some their newest creations with an average audience made out of some tens of their fellow writers, this literary society has become a 'must', a *sine qua non* step in the career of any newcomer who cannot (or would not) access the traditional, state-funded support provided by national cultural institutions.

Of course, the 'Institute' is also a negotiation area, the perfect context for an editor to 'collect' the best (or most promising) authors for his own. Thus, the foundation of the Max Blecher Publishing House one year later (in 2010) naturally followed, aiming at a relatively small number of selected publications per year. The main editorial collection (entitled *Plantații* – 'plantations', or 'cash crops') presently counts about 50 titles and features young previously published authors; it is complemented by the approximately 15-title collection *Opera prima* and three others (*Orfeu*, *Washoe*, *Hors Collection*), plus the now partially crowd-funded collection made out by the 22 current issues of the consistent and widely-appreciated *Poesis Internațional* poetry magazine. Also, Blecher publishing annually houses a well-regarded national poetry competition dedicated to previously unpublished young authors on a lookout for an editor willing to sign for their debut.

All in all, the Max Blecher cultural phenomenon is an auspicious launch mechanism providing the full range of promotion services for poets who practice alternative and experimental writing and aim not as much at commercial mass success, but rather at an alternative, high cultural and exclusive status. In other words, Blecher authors and protégés tend to become the favorites of young(er) elites – and form a 21<sup>st</sup> century self-established alternative to the long-settled elites promoted by the literary establishment.

However, an important feature that quickly lead to the success of this rather small-scaled, but elitist project was the tremendous effort put into the 'socialization' of the House's authors and books, as well as of its 'satellites' (i.e., favorable poetic reading clubs and projects, personalities, bookstores etc.). Quality standards met a clear-cut, attractive aesthetic program and the *spiritus rector's* personal notoriety and theatrical public persona were directly (and effectively) engaged in promotion strategies (from the impeccable editing of the book-as-object and of Blecher-related web pages to well-organized book launches, public readings in all significant book or poetry events, festivals etc.).

But most of the actual notoriety of the 'Blecher phenomenon' is just as much due to successful – if sometimes, rather aggressive – blogging and online social media strategies. First, just like with Ives the Naïve, the due attention is paid to the visual paratext accompanying the books or book-related events – a regrettably underrated preoccupation with most publishers of the same (or even higher) league. All book and magazine cover art, the Institute's posters, and all web design (from websites to Facebook pages or events<sup>12</sup>) are signed by Ana Toma, whose elegantly imaginative creations and style, displayed on unicolor, simple white or black backgrounds have generated an all-comprehensive, consistent and appealing concept, readily recognizable, both offline and online, as one of the (now, already 'classic') Blecher trademarks.

Second, the group's concern for media visibility – i.e., for Internet and social media (Facebook) publicity, mostly – was (and still is) tremendous. But in this case, Internet posts concerning book-promotion activities and Internet profiling go way beyond the utter showcasing of poetic material. Of course, the steady flow of carefully selected poems or fragments posted on

<sup>11</sup> The two annual 'seasons' during which the Blecher Institute is active are September to November and February to June.

<sup>12</sup> See [www.maxblecher.ro](http://www.maxblecher.ro), [www.facebook.com/InstitutulBlecher](http://www.facebook.com/InstitutulBlecher), [www.facebook.com/CdEMaxBlecher/](http://www.facebook.com/CdEMaxBlecher/), [poesisinternational.blogspot.com](http://poesisinternational.blogspot.com).

the Institute's and the House's Facebook pages, on Komartin's personal page, or blogs, the live video footage of public readings or poetry festivals, the rich and thoroughly organized photographic material, the vast paratext<sup>13</sup> on display (e.g. the featuring of positive critical feedback or of musical and visual associations with the work of worldwide contemporary artists etc.), the extensive video coverage of every Blecher Institute edition are not to be underestimated as part of a creative and well-organized attention-getting strategy.

But then, there is mostly the online definition of an alternative, if rather exclusivist group identity, the social marketing of a concept, rather than of the individual economic products it sells (or rather, 'launches'). And this is mainly achieved via the direct involvement of the editor's personal Facebook page and blog<sup>14</sup>, which are still the most 'followed' of all related Internet platforms and highlight the main posts on the House's and the Institute's pages, website contents, as well as selected textual material from *Poesis Internațional*'s blog). Even if the general rhetoric of the paratexts supporting the actual poetic material usually retain a dose of the traditional solemnity of meta-literary discourse (and most of its technical accuracy) with Komartin, there is still a visible, a casual-cool, youthful surface to the discourse and imagery, signaling a visible tendency towards a paradigm change<sup>15</sup>.

In addition, beyond the engaging pro-domo use of a personal tone and the direct, dynamic dialogue with target audiences, there is also a certain anti-establishment, identity-configuration policy involving a definite taste for public scandal. An overt (and sometimes less-than-elegant in terms of its rhetoric) anti-Writers' Union Facebook campaign, started after January 15, 2015, on occasion of the "Mihai Eminescu" National Poetry Award is still ongoing. Claudiu Komartin initiated an online petition on contributors.ro<sup>16</sup>, demanding for the resignation of

the jury having awarded the "Opera Omnia" prize that year to Gabriel Chifu (the vice-president of the Union), against other, much more reputable nominees, such as Mircea Cărtărescu, Aurel Pantea, Marta Petreu, Ioan Moldovan, Liviu Ioan Stoiciu or Lucian Vasiliu. Some tens of writers joined the petition by signing it online. It was the beginning of a long-lasting public media quarrel which resulted (apart from several embarrassingly insulting public exchanges on both sides of the tracks), in several resignations from the Union (not of the jury, but of some tens of other writers who deemed it immoral to cling to their membership against their personal convictions), the challenging of Nicolae Manolescu's right to the Union's presidency (which ended in the court of law), and, on the long term, in a chase for each other's false steps ever since. But perhaps the most prominent outcome was the fact that the waters were parted: since January 2015, authority in the field of literature (and mostly, poetry) has been clearly redistributed between the official / traditional establishment – i.e., mostly state-funded institutions such as the Writer's Union –, and their 'opposition' – i.e., the alternative, progressist, anti-establishment faction, relying on a list of poetic celebrities, among which Claudiu Komartin is probably the most influential to-the-day, via both his editorial prestige and his relentless cultural activism. More than that, if legally there was no real gain in the end for the Union's opponents, their 'move' was a tremendous publicity stunt, achieved mainly due to an efficiently-lead Internet campaign. In other words, if the Union won the legal battle, the 'anti-establishment' mostly won the battle for the online medium – an advantage not to be neglected on the long term, as more and more literary journals, magazines and platforms move 'in the online' in order to reduce costs and gain visibility, while traditional publications sell less and less paperback copies.

In the end, the 'Blecher projects' thus had visibility to win (Claudiu Komartin and his cultural ventures get more and more mainstream media attention as a consequence<sup>17</sup>) and the identity-

<sup>13</sup> The concept of 'paratext' belongs to Gérard Genette. See *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

<sup>14</sup> Namely unanotimpinberceni.blogspot.com.

<sup>15</sup> Literary critic Ovio Olaru also discusses a "mutation in the literary paradigm" occurring with the 21<sup>st</sup> century poets in *Romanian Poetry of the 2000s. The Setting for a Change in Paradigm* (Olaru, 2017: 19).

<sup>16</sup> *O modestă propunere. Apel către Juriul Premiului Mihai Eminescu – Opera Omnia. Actualizat cu reacția lui Nicolae Manolescu*, [http://www.contributors.ro/cultura/o-modesta-propunere-apel-catre-juriul-premiului-mihai-eminescu-opera-](http://www.contributors.ro/cultura/o-modesta-propunere-apel-catre-juriul-premiului-mihai-eminescu-opera-omnia/?fbclid=IwAR1gfYOHXaF5jCVmEkpX8WZW0YMy88GpVU8FXbX1XDEfXg3T_x17_-txPAQ)

[omnia/?fbclid=IwAR1gfYOHXaF5jCVmEkpX8WZW0YMy88GpVU8FXbX1XDEfXg3T\\_x17\\_-txPAQ](http://www.contributors.ro/cultura/o-modesta-propunere-apel-catre-juriul-premiului-mihai-eminescu-opera-omnia/?fbclid=IwAR1gfYOHXaF5jCVmEkpX8WZW0YMy88GpVU8FXbX1XDEfXg3T_x17_-txPAQ).

<sup>17</sup> See Claudiu Komartin's recent interviews on HotNews.ro (March 20, 2019), available at <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-perspektiva-23039099-interviu-claudiu-komartin-scriitor-ideea-este-gasesti-calea-functionezi-firesc-fara-online-faulteze-tot-pasul-intelectual-sau-sensibil-fara-faca-sclav.htm> [30.03.2019], Radio România Cultural (July 18, 2018), available at [https://radioromaniacultural.ro/interviu-cu-poetul-claudiu-komartin/\[30.03.2019\]](https://radioromaniacultural.ro/interviu-cu-poetul-claudiu-komartin/[30.03.2019]), or the Claudiu Komartin portrait dedicated to the poet by the national

definition politics they employed, mostly by using the online environment – notably, popular social media websites (i.e., Facebook) and areas of the blogosphere (i.e., blogspot.com) – eventually earned them an important marketing asset: beyond the aesthetic program they started with, they have also added an attractive, alternative-progressive moral identity to their services package. Thus, the young author who chooses this alterne path to canonization may not expect a traditional, institutionalized reception of their work; but they will be acclaimed by a large part of the online exclusivist reading community as an author who is at the same time ‘trendy’, in tone with the ‘Spirit of the Age’, a progressive thinker (which would also bring him or her closer to the somewhat similar Romantic concept of the visionary poet), and last but not least, a person of strong moral fiber, able to give up or refuse, *a priori*, (sometimes, consistent) financial advantages (such as the ones provided by one’s membership in the Writer’s Union) for the sake of their moral beliefs. On the whole, this may count as a gain in personal prestige not to be taken lightly.

Furthermore, perhaps following the same line of thought, and adding to the ethical group identity designed via the engagement in the said anti-(the literary)establishment scandal, a definite political stand also became explicit in recent years with the ‘Blecher group’, again triggered by public content posted on Claudiu Komartin’s personal page: this time, it was about the poet-editor’s fervent participation in the anti-government civil movements in the last few years, as well as his overt critical take on the government’s policies. Also making a stand as a political commentator – according to a philosophy of the public intellectuals’ necessary engagement in public affairs which seems to be the dominant progressist moral perspective in Romanian society – and, by consequence, attracting, again, the approval of a rather vast majority of the possible younger-generation frequenting the Net for news, Komartin thus secures an online supremacy in the perpetual battle for audience support.

**2.3 Subchapters, follow-ups and further developments.** The poetic online identity *topos* pioneered by the ‘Blecher group’ – i.e., the unconventional, anti-establishment poetic identity understood as significant in the sense that it is

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television (TVR1) on April 3, 2018, currently available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGCqzLk4uHg> [30.03.2019], to provide a few examples.

meant to trigger a mentality shift widely deemed necessary – has rather thrived in the poetic online environment, becoming a recurrent, popular *topos* with the ‘reading elites’ which come to inhabit the virtual spaces dedicated to literature and poetry in the Romanian online medium.

One of the most trendy (if short-lived) such ‘follow-up’ online projects was Laurențiu Ion’s Subcapitol.ro platform, self-described as an online “independent and non-profit magazine dedicated to literature and photography”<sup>18</sup>, an “online contemporary photography and literature magazine meant to promote young artists”<sup>19</sup>. Initially promoted, again, by Komartin and the ‘Blecher group’, the webpage reached the peak of its activity and influence between 2014 and 2017, by mainly featuring ‘Blecher’ authors and their poetic ‘social circle’, accompanied by alluring photographic art authored by Romanian young artists.

Another society of young authors that got intensive (online) media support from the ‘Blecher institution’ was *Zona Nouă*, the literary magazine issued initially on paper, then online (at [zonanoua.com](http://zonanoua.com)) by the students of the creative writing school in Sibiu (mentored by Claudiu Komartin’s close friend and fellow poet Radu Vancu). An interesting and valuable initiative, it slowly began to die out after 2017 (after about 7 years of fruitful existence), as the initial editorial group scattered and mostly left the poetic scene altogether.

Beyond related online platforms, the ‘Blecher Institute’ also set certain standards when it comes to the self-promotion standards of other literary cafés, such as ‘Dactăr Nicu’s Skyzoid Poets’ in Brașov, for instance, a monthly poetry reading club which has currently reached its 39-th edition. Also saluted by the ‘Blecher group’ and lead by the charismatic nationally-acclaimed poet and university professor Robert-Gabriel Elekes, also a dear friend to Claudiu Komartin and the “Blecher circle’ follows the same proven pattern: the attractive and coherent web visual concept (by Roxana Târziu) is accompanied by dynamic online exposure and the correlation of visual, video and text material, all wrapped up in a “cool”, smart-casual intellectual atmosphere.

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<sup>18</sup> Original description: “SUBCAPITOL.RO este o revistă online de literatură și fotografie, independentă și nonprofit”. My translation, R.H. See <http://www.subcapitol.ro/> (the homepage). [30.03.2019].

<sup>19</sup> Original description: “Revistă online de fotografie și literatură contemporană ce promovează tinerii artiști”. See <http://picdeer.com/subcapitol>. [30.03.2019].

However, since 2018, a progressive decrease in aggressive online self-marketing tactics seems to have set in, even if self-promotion is still present under the form of less theatrical, and thus, more discrete individual posts, regarding book events, launches, authors' recent publications or ad-hoc reviews of their favorite recent reading. A syndrome, perhaps, of the new-establishment's comfortable settling in the new medium: it may very well be that the outcome of the battle for the Romanian virtual poetic space is, at least temporarily, decided.

### 3. SUM-UP: CONCLUSIONS ON MORAL IDENTITY AS A RELEVANT MARKETING ASSET

If we were to summarize, at this point, the two online identity-configuration strategies we've looked into as selected case studies, we can surely notice that they have an essential common point to be remembered: both Ives the Naïve and the 'Blecher phenomenon' are ultimately based, in one word, on different types of ethical 'user' profiling, involving, one way or the other, a certain redefinition of traditionally established poetic practices and discourse, with a key or base element in content accessibility (however differently defined). And by 'accessibility', we can understand both the actual ease-of-access – as most content is just a few clicks away and is, just as important, free of charge –, and the preoccupation for a higher degree of openness towards the general (online) consumer public in either the poetic form (as with Ives the Naïve) or the paratextual discourse and material accompanying it (as with the 'Blecher group').

Thus, the new medium imposes a compromise (not necessarily to be understood in a negative moral connotation) between high cultural forms, such as poetry, and mass reception mechanisms, reducing the gap between elitist and popular discourses by enforcing a dialogue which seems to be felt by present-day generations as a rather acute necessity. Both discourse and identity politics are thus transfigured and (re)configured within the new virtual "extension of ourselves" (McLuhan, 1964:7).

A direct consequence of this change is the growth in importance of the ethical message and the moral identity of both its sender and its receiver, as personal content becomes – unavoidably – more prominent. The effective public management and/or manipulation of one's moral identity (as an author or a publisher) as well as the (re)definition of the audience's moral portrait as similar may therefore come down to ingenious user profiling strategies,

for both ends of the communication channel are affected. In the two cases analyzed here, Ives' fictional self-profiling as a naïve dreamer responds to a general necessity for innocence, kindness and for artistic expressions which can function as an escape from everyday hardships with its readers – a definition of art that ultimately fits the *kathartic* 'aest-ethics' of mass-culture itself; whereas the group identity defined by the 'Blecher phenomenon' is, in the end, an updated resuscitation of the 'rebellious', anti-establishment youth culture pioneered by the generation of the Sixties, i.e., a covert reference to an ever-reoccurring cultural phenomenon which characterizes periods of massive cultural mutation.

As a consequence, self-empowerment policies such as self-marketing, but also as (moral) self-(re)definition are of the essence when traditional institutions or authoritative, well-established entities and discourses lose credibility or tend to be dismissed as outdated and conservative. Also, we should note that capitalist ethics basically authorizes personal and group identity-marketing as a perfectly moral and competitive endeavor. Consequently, such strategies are not to be deemed immoral by default – at least, not before severe de-synchronization between one's (or a group's) authentic ethic or aesthetic beliefs and the 'marketed' ones can be proven.

This is why, even if the mere idea of it is often frowned upon by the conservative, the possibility to distinguish between two clear-cut, separate cultural paradigms, i.e., between 'high' culture and 'mass' culture gets thinner and thinner, especially inside – and due to the expansion of – the digital environment. Nonetheless, the ensuing dialogue (or negotiation) mustn't necessarily be understood as a fundamental failure to maintain artistic quality standards, as it may very well prove to be a win-win situation in the years to come – after the natural initial clashes and convulsive mutations come to an end –, by eventually favoring a seemingly improbable 'merger' able to balance quantity and quality requirements in present-day cultural production.

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## VOCABULARY: AN EPITOME OF SOCIAL REALITIES

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**Abstract:** *A society's attitudes are exposed in its vocabulary and speaking practices. So far as linguists know, all languages are mutually translatable. What can be said in one language can be said in any other, somehow. Hence, if a speaker of any language wants to express something, s/he can resort to morphological processes and derive new words or can resort to syntax and make up new sentences in their languages which will express that new thought. All languages are thus constructed that new thoughts can be expressed in them. Undoubtedly, it is easier to convey some ideas in one language rather than another. This is because the vocabulary of each language develops partly according to the priorities of its culture. The objects, relationships, activities, and ideas important to the culture get coded onto single words, which are often highly specialized to express subtle nuances. The present article aims at tackling this issue by analyzing certain lexical choices, euphemisms, metaphors and idioms, gender-specific lexical structures in English (mostly American English) with reference to languages like Russian, German, Yiddish.*

**Keywords:** *euphemism; social reality; gender; metaphor; idiom*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

For human beings, reality is “filtered, apprehended, encoded, codified, and conveyed via some linguistic shape” (Smitherman, 1991:117). It is the words we use for concepts that help us form our ideologies, attitudes, and behaviors. However, this does not mean as Whorf said that we are prisoners of language. It means that language reflects cultural attitudes and that we unconsciously adopt those attitudes as language is acquired; and our consciousness can be trained. We can learn to identify the biases in our language, and we can learn not to use sexist, racist, or otherwise prejudiced speech forms. Sometimes positive attitudes are instilled because of our language. For example, in Yiddish, the word *kvell*, which means “to feel joy in someone else’s good fortune or success”, leads to a positive attitude in its user. In opposition, the German *Schadenfreude*, meaning “to take joy in someone else’s sorrow”, is the expression of a negative attitude which might be undertaken by its users.

Words do not have holistic meaning. Rather, they are composed of features of meaning. For instance, *boy* is composed of features like [+human, +male, -power]. Features of one word can be transferred onto another, which represents an important way to get meaning.

The differences in the way such features are attached to words often reflect the differences in

meaning between two dialects or languages. Even within the same dialect the choice of a word over another can subtly convey an attitude. Thus, words take on the semantic features of [+good] or [+bad] according to how a particular culture feels about the item designated.

The objects, relationships, activities, and ideas important to the culture get coded onto single words, which are often highly specialized to express subtle nuances.

A good example of this cultural influence is the Eskimos, to whom snow is a central feature of life. For this reason, it has been claimed, they have anywhere from eight to hundreds of distinct words for it. However, this seems to be a major myth. Eskimos have four words for snow, *aput*, *qana*, *piasirpaq*, and *qimuqsuq*, meaning respectively ‘snow on the ground’, ‘falling snow’, ‘drifting snow’, and ‘a snow drift’ (Shaul and Furbee, 1998: 29). Eskimos do have grammatical adjustments to their basic vocabulary to express different duration or conditions of snow. African languages, spoken where there is no snow, do not have a word for it. Still, they could describe it, as *white, cold flowers from the sky that turns to water when they are touched*.

Another culturally-grounded concept is friendship which is more important in Russian culture than it is in American, as witnessed by the fact that the Americans have but one word *friend*,

which can be modified by words like *best* (Weirzbicka, 1997: 55-84). In contrast, Russian has six separate words, each designating very different friendly relationships with a person: *drug*, *podruga*, *tovarišč*, *prijatelj*, and *znakomyj*. It is important to mention the fact that these words are not at all interchangeable. One is either a *drug* or is not. One is a *prijatelj* or is not. This is in sharp contrast to American English in which people can have ten best friends, one from college, one from their old neighborhood, and so on. Also, in America a friend can be someone you just met at a party or someone whom you have known for quite a long time. *Friend* in America is a very loose term.

On the other hand, in Russian, a person's *druz'ja* "form this person's life support" (Weirzbicka, 1997: 59). A *drug* is a person you can rely upon for help and support. Seeing one's *druz'ja*, talking with them, confiding to them, and spending time with them is an important part of Russian's life, but this is not true of the other categories. *Tovarišč*, for example, refers just to someone one has gone through an experience with. *Podruga* can be a temporary relationship. *Prijatelj* refers to someone who is friendly but not intimate. This does not mean that such differences cannot be conveyed in English, it means that English does not easily codify them.

Russians have to categorize these distinctions in relationships every time they go to mention another person with whom they have a relationship. There is no cover term like *friend* in Russian. In the United States friends are made, found and lost. They are not permanent features in life, but in Russia they are of vital importance, they are durable and consistent, and this is reflected in the careful terminology for friends in that language.

People make their language say what they want it to by having many vocabulary items referring to different aspects of a concept, or to allow speaking of taboo things by never directly naming them.

If it were possible to say certain things in one language but not another, then we would have the problem that people who speak one language could know things that those in another could not. Bilinguals might have the problem of being able to know something in one language but not another. In fact, although it may be more difficult to express a given idea in one language rather than another, it is not, however, impossible.

Unquestionably, this does not mean that there is a one-to-one correspondence between languages. If there were, it would be possible to translate any language into any other by machine. Computer translations are still limited after three decades or

more of intensive research. They fail on the fact that any word in any language potentially has many meanings, and that the same idea can be expressed by grammatically different sentences. Computers cannot match words to the cultural context or even to the context of utterance the way any human can do.

The major problem is that, although all languages can potentially say the same things, the way they say them is consistently different. Each language builds up the semantic universe (i.e. all things which can be possibly said) in a different way. Even when two words mean the same thing in two different languages, the entire semantic load of those words differs. For example, in English *climb* can be used in:

Mary climbed the tree.  
 Mary climbed out on a branch.  
 Mary climbed out of bed.  
 The airplane climbed 20,000 feet.  
 Mary climbed to the top of her company.  
 What a social climber Mary is!

We may suppose that all of these meanings of *climb* would be combined in one word in any other language, as we may as well assume that there might be separate words, each with its own semantic load.

Prototype theory and modern theories of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; MacLaury, 1989) have shown that cultural models underlie the variable meanings of words such as the English *climb*. For instance, in English, the prototype of *climb* consists of:

- vertical movement
- use of hand in grasping position
- use of legs, bent a knee, in sequence
- purposeful activity

It is not necessary that all of these features be present in all usages of *climb*, but all exploit some combination of them. For instance, "climbing up in a tree" uses all of these features. "Climbing out on a limb" refers to the prototypical hand and legs movements, but to horizontal motion, rather than vertical. Climbing out of bed uses vertical movement and perhaps leg movement, but not the grasping hands. The airplane's climb is vertical motion without hands or feet. The metaphor for climbing up the corporate ladder depends on the entire picture of climbing, including the prototypical motion of hands. This last adds a picture of grasping, of ruthlessness, so that the metaphor "climbing to the top of a corporation" indicates a determined person who grasps at opportunity.

In another language *climb* might be conceived of solely as an animate activity, so the equivalent of the word *float* might be used for the airplane rising. In our society, we often treat social structures metaphorically as if they were objects, so that we see corporations as ladders. Therefore, we go up or down them; hence the metaphor for social or business climbing. In another culture, one which conceives of power as being a hidden entity in the centre of things, instead of a metaphor for climbing up in the business world, the metaphor for success might be based upon an image of burrowing to the centre of something.

Such prototypes help explain why semantic loads of words differ cross-linguistically and why there are often differences in metaphor in different languages.

## 2. EUPHEMISM

When a culture frowns upon an activity or situation, usually it creates euphemisms to refer to it. Euphemisms generally occur in sets of several words, none meaning exactly the thing referred to. When one euphemism becomes too directly associated with the disvalued meaning, it is replaced by other euphemisms.

*Propaganda* is a kind of euphemism, calling unpleasantness by another name. The difference is that propaganda is euphemism used by governments and political organizations. The term *ethnic cleansing* was intended as propaganda. It really meant 'genocide: massacring a group of people with a shared identity'. The seemingly innocuous word *apartheid*, literally 'apart-hood', 'the state of keeping something apart', really meant 'keeping blacks in South Africa in poverty and servitude'. The only 'apart' for them was being herded into special, poverty-ridden townships apart from the white folks.

In the United States, all one need to do to justify almost any action is to speak of "freedom" and "rights." The National Rifle Association has successfully kept gun-control laws to a minimum on the grounds that they would violate "freedom" and "rights", despite the fact that every other free society in the world has strict gun controls, and far fewer murders from shooting. The kicker is that the "rights" are "constitutional", another potent word in American politics. The word itself is used as a justification.

Sometimes propaganda and common euphemisms coincide. An example in this respect is *death*, another phenomenon with which the American culture is uneasy and which governments have to discuss. Again, we can tell

that English speakers are uncomfortable with death by the number of euphemisms for it. People do not die, they "pass away", "pass on", "go to sleep", "go to the other side", "meet their Maker", "go to rest", "go to their final reward", "croak", "kick the bucket", "buy the farm", "buy it", and become "traffic fatalities", not corpses. Also, they "lose" their relatives, as in "I recently lost my favorite aunt". Their pets "are put to sleep", "put away", or "put down", not killed. Gangsters "deep-six", "waste", or "off" their victims rather than "murder" them.

The uneasiness about mentioning death is in conflict with the military's need to talk about it. The military is an extremely difficult position, for if we cannot talk directly of natural death, how can we talk of unnatural death? Yet soldiers must deal with both killing and being killed. Death must be mentioned in their training, but if it were mentioned too straightforwardly, soldiers would be too often reminded of their mortality and of the true awfulness of what they are supposed to do.

Robert Sellman, a ROTC (Reserved Officers' Training Corps) student, examined military euphemisms for death in a field manual, *The Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*. He showed that the manual is written in a highly impersonal, distant style which is "designed to negate the psychological impact of killing and destroying." This style is achieved by the use of the modal auxiliary *may*, as in "A nuclear explosion may cause heavy casualties among your leaders" and "may even completely destroy your unit's chain of command." Nuclear explosions will cause these disasters. There is no "may" about it. By using *may*, the field manual makes it much less certain, much less frightening. Also, referring to "heavy casualties" as a cover term, rather than elucidating with direct words like *the dead*, *the burned*, *the wounded*, or *radiation sickness* belittles the true horror. The stress on the leaders' being destroyed is especially interesting, as nuclear bombs are not selective. Anyone around gets dead. By overtly citing "leaders" and "chain of command" but not actually mentioning enlisted persons or peers, the potential deaths of the ordinary soldiers are backgrounded. It is not so much that the manual lies; it just mentions part of the truth.

Sellman focused on two other terms: *fire for effect* and *engage the enemy*. The first is the command to the artillery to destroy an area with its explosives. Sellman points out that the emptiness of *fire for effect* matches that in the euphemism *do it*. He feels that this emptiness minimizes the personal involvement of the artillery observer who has to

give the command. The second term also does not mean what it says. It means 'fight, shoot, kill.' It says "take part in an activity with the enemy." The soldier has no difficulty extrapolating the meaning, but the meaning is never explicitly given. The reason is simple. If the field manuals were explicit, if they directly reminded soldiers what they were training for, to kill and to be killed, getting soldiers on the battlefield could become more difficult.

Both of these terms illustrate a common factor in euphemism: circumlocution, which means spreading meaning over several words rather than using a single one. This weakens meaning and is one way to avoid confronting an unpleasant issue head-on. *Kill* is not only more semantically direct than *fire for effect*, it is more powerful because meaning is concentrated on one word. In the same way, *engage the enemy* is weaker than *fight*. A beautiful example of the semantic weakening by circumlocuting is the U.S. Army's statement of intent, "the management and application of controlled violence", that is *war*.

Sellman also studies the slang terms used for death by soldiers. He underlines the fact that these allow soldiers to talk about the unpleasant aspects of their job while still maintaining their courage and morale up so that they can function as soldiers. The euphemisms for death are oddly explicit, but they keep soldiers at a distance from the true horror by denying the humanity of the corpse. For instance, *die* is "get iced" or "get waxed." Dead fish are usually put on ice, and mannequins are made of wax. "Dog tags" are really death tags, used to identify dead soldiers, but who would put them on if they were constantly being reminded of that? Sellman suggests that "Making the dead seem inhuman allows the individual to say it can't happen to him. This is the attitude that the soldier must have in order to throw himself in front of bullets."

Euphemism is also accomplished by understatement, using words which have combined semantic features that do not add up to the meaning intended. For instance, saying that children are "nutritionally deficient" when you mean 'starving' is an example. Sellman also gives one from soldier slang: *zap* rather than *kill*. *Zap* can also mean 'strike a blow' that is not fatal.

### 3. METAPHOR AND IDIOM

The previous section argues that things people are uncomfortable with have many euphemistic names and phrases. These all mean roughly the same thing, although typically they do not mean quite what they say. Metaphors and idioms are

very common as euphemisms, perhaps because they are the embodiment of circumlocution, of not calling a spade a spade.

A metaphor is a word used so that its central meaning cannot be taken. Rather, one must extend its meaning. For instance, *that old bag* in the right context means 'the old, unpleasant, unattractive woman.' The extension of *bag* to mean 'woman' is a metaphor.

Idioms are different from metaphors in that a mere extension of meaning of the words used will not give the intended meaning. Frequently, idioms consist of whole parts of sentences, typically a complete predicate. The meaning of the idiom is not given by an examination of its parts. Rather, the entire group of words has a meaning as if it were one word (Chafe, 1968). For instance:

<i>Idiom</i>	<i>Literal Word</i>
put X's foot in X's mouth	blunder
shake a leg	hurry
pull X's leg	deceive
chew the fat	talk
shoot the breeze	talk
kick the bucket	die

Because the actual meaning of idioms is so remote from the meaning of the sum of their parts, idioms are the epitome of skillfully indirect reference. It follows, then, that one way to uncover the attitudes of a culture is to examine its idioms and other euphemisms.

As said in the introduction, a culture has multiple terms designating items or activities that are important to it. There is a difference between these multiple terms and euphemisms. In euphemism, all the terms mean the same thing. In contrast, multiple terms for culturally important referents all refer to slightly different aspects of the same activity, object, or concepts. Consider the synonyms of *talk*:

*chatter, gab, prattle, gossip, jabber, nag, babble, clack, yakkety-yak, yada-yada-yada, jaw, jibber-jabber, B.S., shoot the breeze, shoot the shit*

All of these refer to idle talk or ordinary sociable talking with no intellectual or business purpose. People who talk a lot are:

*talkative, gabby, wordy, glib, bigmouthed, fatmouthed, full of hot air*

or are:

*gossips, nags, shrews, chatterboxes, windbags*

Although there is no noun that specifically means 'a person who does not talk a great deal,' there are many adjectives to depict such a person:

*quiet, laconic, reticent, taciturn, reserved, closemouthed*

Just about all the words used for idle talk have the connotation of 'not desirable' and 'stupid.' Some, like *prattle, babble, and chatter*, also bear the connotation of 'childish' and 'feminine.' Besides the feminine *gossip* and *nag* with their connotations of ' nastiness' and 'triviality,' the only phrases for idle talk that do not bear bad overtones are those that refer to the casual speech of men, *chew the fat* and *shoot the breeze*. In other words, all words for talking which have semantic features of [-good, -important] also have one of [+female]. Likewise, the adjectives listed above denoting people who talk a lot are not only demeaning but feminine. The semantic features of these words allow us to state that the speech of men seems to be more valued in nowadays society than that of women. Notice that there are few common words to describe someone who does not talk very much and those that do are somewhat literary. In contrast with the words for talking too much, none of these is exclusively feminine.

Two things should be especially mentioned. Both *gossip* and *nag* are considered feminine activities. However, men do both things and do them all the time. For example, male "shop talk" is gossip. It involves talking about people who are not present and making judgments of their behavior or business tactics. Men gossip about who has just bought an expensive car which he couldn't possibly afford, who is cheating on his wife, who is gambling, and so on. Men also nag their wives about losing weight, not spending money, their poor cooking, and even their clumsy housecleaning. The point is, if women do it, it is gossiping and nagging. If men do it, it is not.

However, talking per se seems not to be a highly valued activity in the general American culture. There is no term in English that is the equivalent of the Yiddish *shmuesen* 'social talking for the purpose of enjoying each other's company,' a word applied equally to adults of both sexes and which has very pleasant connotations.

#### 4. GENDER AND LANGUAGE

How women are valued in society can be observed in the fact that so many words for

unpleasant talk have the semantic feature [+female]. Gender is indeed pervasive and an important part of society that is why it lexicalizes clear attitudinal differences in its references.

A great deal of research has been carried out into these differences. Gender-biased language affects everyone, both males and females. Women and their treatment are an inextricable part of society. There is no way to investigate human and cultural behavior without considering women. Nor can we ignore attitudes toward men. Studying speech and other social behavior has been largely a study of male activities. Yet, all-male-centered accounts of society are sadly incomplete and inaccurate. Speech about and by women is an excellent example of how language behavior mirrors social attitudes and facts. English vocabulary does reveal attitudes toward women.

It seems to be common knowledge nowadays the fact that *man* includes *woman*, and that *he* can refer to *she*, but the opposite is not possible and acceptable. In Old English, the word for a male was *wer* and *man* meant 'human.' In time, the word for human, then, became the word for a male, but there was no corresponding change for *woman*, originally *wifmann*. Many people, even women, defend the practice of using *man* to stand for women nowadays because of its historical origin. However, that such usage makes women invisible can be shown by usages of other terms for human beings. Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (2003:243-246) quote an anthropologist as saying something like:

When we woke in the morning, we found that the villagers had all left by canoe, leaving us alone with the women and children.

The women and children were also villagers. The insidious thing is that this implies that women (and children) are not full members of this human category, that of being villagers. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet also cite an NPR broadcast on January 14, 2000: "Over a hundred Muslim citizens were killed, and many women and children." This implies that Muslim citizens do not include women and children. In both instances, which should be not considered singular examples, males are taken as the default people, not females.

These authors add that it is not only male humans who are the default category of humans, but heterosexual males, as shown in the following quote:

Language as it is used in everyday life by members of the social order, that vehicle communication in which they argue with their wives. (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 244)

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The vocabulary of a language indicates what is important to its speakers. It also mirrors the attitudes of a culture: what is taboo, what is valued, and what is not. Speaking practices themselves tell us what position people have in their societies. As long as women's speech is chattering, nattering, babbling, and chit-chatting, clearly their speech is not valued. So pervasive is our social attitude that women are inferior that even female scholars blame women for their own subjugation, saying that men are dominant because women encourage them to be so. This ignores the fact that society does not allow women not to be encouraging to men.

Nonetheless, as Janet Holmes and Maria Stubbe (2003) have shown, women can be direct when their position needs them to be, but, more importantly, they can take the very forms of speech which have long signaled their weakness and use them to exert authority. They retain their power, but by their cooperative, facilitative, nonthreatening language allow corporations, teams, and committees to function smoothly with minimum damage to the face of coworkers. In fact, women's style may well be the style of the future: cooperation instead of raw competition.

Examination of a vocabulary can reveal a good deal about a culture. The lexicon of a language is a mirror of its speakers' attitudes and ideas; a mirror which reflects and which does not determine; it does not hold prisoners. As Kay and Kempton (1984) underline, Whorf himself could not have thought that we cannot break out of our cultural mode, since his works imply that we should do just that.

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## PRAGMATISM OF MODAL VERBS: CASE STUDY OF 'ICAO' REQUIREMENTS

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**Abstract:** *Airspace nowadays is being used by almost all states of the world. Therefore, airspace users have become increasingly more aware of the necessity that common air rules should be applied, in order to avoid any hazards. The language of these air laws had to be as simple and clear as to be perceived correctly by everyone. The historical context of the World War II determined that the first international meeting of the states that had national aviation structures should be in Chicago, and the language used for negotiations or the final text of the Convention was English. Not all of the world states could be represented at the Chicago meeting because some of them were still at war, but countries that were interested in being part of the Convention were represented by a third party. The domination of the allied forces at the end of the war, with regard to air supremacy, resulted in a series of international documents, all of which written in English, then translated into the six languages of the United Nations. The current paper aims to analyze the pragmatic uses of modal verbs as they appear in some of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to determine whether or not their meanings may lead to instances of miscommunication or altered messages generated by interpretation in languages other than English.*

**Keywords:** *standards; recommended practices; modality; pragmatics*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The 'Chicago Convention' of 1944 has been considered the landmark agreement that set the foundation for safe air navigation standards and procedures. One of its main objectives was the development of international civil aviation "... in a safe and orderly manner, [...] on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically" (1944). Article 37 of the Convention informs us that each contracting State undertook to

collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation (1944).

Accordingly, the Convention made official the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), whose main responsibility, then as today, is to adopt and amend international standards and recommended practices related to aviation. All signatories of the Chicago Convention, counting 54 states back in 1944, and 192 as 2019, have voluntarily agreed to adopt and implement the

aviation standards and recommended practices (SARPs) designed under the auspices of ICAO. SARPs are published by ICAO in the form of Annexes to Chicago Convention. SARPs do not have the same legal binding force as the Convention itself, because Annexes are not international treaties. Any differences that may appear between SARPs and a contracting state are published as Supplements to Annexes.

Although ICAO is a UN agency and its documents are published in all UN official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish), starting with 2001, English became the official language of aviation. For that reason, all aviation personnel – pilots, flight crews and air traffic controllers must be proficient in English. There are nineteen annexes to the Chicago Convention, released by ICAO and they cover all aspects of air navigation, from personnel licensing, to operation of aircraft, security and safety management.

The aim of the current paper is to analyze the pragmatic uses of modal verbs as they appear in some of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to determine whether or not their meanings may lead to instances

of miscommunication or altered messages generated by interpretation in languages other than English.

## 2. MODAL VERBS AND THE SEMANTIC-PRAGMATIC OCCURRENCE

The use of modal verbs in English has been studied by many grammarians and linguists (Quirk *et al.* (1985), Palmer (1986, 1990), Papafragou (2000), Halliday (1970), Jespersen (1924), Cohen (1971) etc.), yet, there is hardly a steady delineation between mood and modality, between the semantic and pragmatic uses of modals, their clear functionality and instances of ambiguity. Theories related to modal verbs cover almost the entire spectrum of their ‘possible’ associations with semantics, semantic barriers, pragmatics, speech theories, logics, philosophy, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis etc. Therefore, we intend to remain anchored to the semantic-pragmatic occurrence of modal verbs in six of the Annexes released by the International Civil Aviation Council and try to determine whether their meanings are crystal clear for all users when they utilize the Annexes in English, or a translated version in their own language.

From the English grammar’s perspective, modals are auxiliary verbs “denoting the mood of a verb” (Oxford Living Dictionaries online), verbs “used with another verb to express an idea such as possibility that is not expressed by the main verb” (Cambridge Dictionary online). Modality, on the other side is defined in relation with “a speaker’s or a writer’s attitude towards the world. A speaker or writer can express certainty, possibility, willingness, obligation, necessity and ability by using modal words and expressions” (Cambridge Dictionary online); “a particular mode in which something exists or is experienced or expressed”; “a particular method or procedure” (Oxford Living Dictionaries online).

If the above definitions are not enough or create slight confusion, we proceed with further information pertaining to grammar: modal auxiliaries do not have tense or mood; they can only be related to the idea of present, past or future given their association with other verbs.

Semantically speaking, modal verbs confer plus of information, sense or nuance in relation to the manner in which the action or state is achieved, presupposed or implied, whereas pragmatics regard modal verbs in their use, minding their different meanings, their polysemy. Linguistic theorists classify modal auxiliaries into various categories, in accordance with their meanings:

- intrinsic, in terms of human control over events: 'permission', 'obligation', and 'volition' (Quirk *et al.* 1985:219);

- extrinsic, which do not primarily involve human control of events, but do typically involve human judgment of what is or is not likely to happen: 'possibility', 'necessity', and 'prediction' (Quirk *et al.* 1985:219);

- “containing an element of will” (Jespersen, 1924:320-1 *apud* Haan, F. de, 2013:4);

- “containing no element of will” (Jespersen, 1924:320-1 *apud* Haan, F. de, 2013:4);

- epistemic, in the light of the speaker’s assessment of probability and predictability; they are external to the content, being a part of the attitude taken up by the speaker: his attitude, in this case, towards his own speech role as ‘declarer’ (Halliday, 1970:349) or the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it. (Palmer, 1986:54–55);

- deontic, expressing notions like duty, obligation, permission, forbidding. They evaluate a proposition according to some moral code or someone’s opinion about whether the situation is desirable or not (Palmer, 1986:54–55).

Another classification of modal verbs has been done against a scale of degrees of certainty in relation to the speaker’s proposition.

In the light of our intended goal, that of analyzing the pragmatic uses of modal auxiliaries, we will focus mainly on such characteristics as *request, offer, obligation/strong obligation, advice, volition, possibility, probability, interdiction*. Then we will analyze the translation of some of the modal verbs into the Romanian version of one of the annexes, only to check whether their initial meaning (in English) is preserved (or not) in the second language. Our attempt may be justified by the fact that the international airspace is used by states with different cultural background, various sets of cultural perceptions, and, although all of the airspace users are proficient in English, certain nuances of the English language may be interpreted differently by some of them. Moreover, the ICAO requirements, or standards, function as ‘air laws’ to all airspace users and any misinterpretation of a law may lead to air incidents or even air crashes.

## 3. CASE STUDY OF ‘ICAO’ REQUIREMENTS

The selection of the Annexes to be scrutinized was done in relation to the number of modal verbs occurring in each of them (see Table 1). Their titles

may also be relevant, presumably, for the use of certain modal verbs and the omission of others. Thus, Annex 1 refers to *Personnel Licensing*; Annex 2 focuses on *Rules of the Air*, Annex 10, *Aeronautical Tele-communications*, Volume IV, copes with Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems, Annex 17 includes *Security* issues, in relation to Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Annex 18 aims at standardizing *The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air*, and the newest of the Annexes, 19, adopted in 2013, clarifies notions pertaining to *Safety Management*.

Table1. Distribution of modal verbs in selected annexes

	ANNEXES					
	1	2	10/4	17	18	19
shall	525	216	1296	18	74	53
should	65	24	74	78	19	27
may	90	79	180	34	18	19
might	7	5	20	4	2	0
can	37	40	129	0	0	4
could	6	0	31	0	2	3
be able	5	3	20	1	8	0
will	19	53	155	16	8	6
would	8	9	86	6	7	6
must	4	10	52	5	0	3
have to	1	1	5	0	0	0
has to	1	0	3	1	0	0
need	11	11	44	6	1	8

Mention should be made that all nineteen Annexes are perceived as ‘standards’ and ‘recommended practices’ (SARPs), whereas only six of them do not include in their Editorial Practices the following clarification: “It is to be noted that in the English text the following practice has been adhered to when writing the specifications: Standards employ the operative verb “shall” while Recommended Practices employ the operative verb “should” (see Annexes 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 17).

**3.1 Standards versus Recommended Practices.** All annexes under analysis include definitions of the terms “standards” and “recommended practices” in their *Forwards*:

*Standard:* Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matériel, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of impossibility of compliance, notification to

the Council is compulsory under Article 38 of the Convention.

*Recommended Practice:* Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matériel, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavor to conform in accordance with the Convention.

These definitions, alongside with the editorial practices of associating *shall* with *standards* and *should* with *recommendations* are supposed, desirably, to be understood just the same by all law abiders. Grammar rules do not yet explain the fact that *standards* should be read as mandatory enforcement of the laws exactly as they are written in the annex, whereas, *should*, leaves the contracting states some opportunities of doing things slightly differently, provided that dissimilarities are made public to all of the other signatories of the Convention and included in Supplements to Annexes.

Therefore, from the pragmatic perspective, users of ICAO documents must become familiar with the strength of *shall* (1), which carries the meaning of ‘vital obligation’, while *should* (2) leaves no place for advice as long as it is almost always associated with a stated condition or an inferred one; occasionally *should* may be found in reference to ‘chance’ or ‘possibility’.

(1) Contracting States shall use the services of medical assessors to evaluate reports submitted to the Licensing Authorities by medical examiners. (Annex 1:1-6)

The transport of dangerous goods by air shall be forbidden except as established in this Annex and the detailed specifications and procedures provided in the Technical Instructions. (Annex18:4-1)

(2) Level 3 and level 4 transponders should be able to accept at least two complete sixteen segment plink ELMs in a 250 millisecond interval. (Annex 10-4:3-70)

An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft would be able to land should this become necessary shortly after take-off and it is not possible to use the aerodrome of departure (Annex 2:1-3)

It is then only natural that *shall* appears extensively within the annexes – it refers to laws – whereas, *should* may not exceed its number of occurrences because it is in reference to

recommendations, which cannot outnumber the laws. Figure 1 shows the distribution of *shall* and *should*; it is also relevant to note that the number of occurrences are in connection with the contents of the annexes, as well.




Fig.1 Ratio of modal auxiliaries *shall* and *should* in the six ICAO Annexes

Thus, Annex 10, Volume 4 – *Surveillance and Collision Avoidance* numbers 1296 uses of *shall* (it is also the longest of the selected annexes: 288 pages) and there is no other meaning of it than ‘strong obligation’ or interdiction, should the modal be used in its negative form.

In contrast, Annex 19 – *Safety Management*, the latest document adopted by the Organization uses *shall* only 53 times and *recommend(ed/ation)* for 42 times, throughout 44 pages. The correlation between the two may be explained by the complexity of the ‘safety management’ concept nowadays, on the one hand, due to the unprecedented evolution of aviation, in all its aspects, and, on the other, by as many challenges, threats or risks involving the idea of safety necessity.

Given that the ICAO documents were intended to provide the legal framework within which all contracting states should share the international airspace safely, it is no wonder that words/phrases in connection with law abiding, interdiction, necessity prevail. Apart from *shall* and *should*, there are other verbs used to express ‘obligation’/ ‘interdiction’/ ‘recommendation’ in the annexes: “central auxiliary” *must*; (the) “marginal” *need* or “semi-auxiliaries” such as *have to* or *be to* (Quirk *et al.*:1985:137). None of them, though, has the strength of *shall*, even if, to non-native speakers, users of the Annexes in English, aware of the importance of these documents, such subtle characteristics of the auxiliary verbs, together with the differences of meaning they carry may escape.

Similarly, *should* may be replaced by *may* or *can* when recommendations are made. Meanings

will not be the same for grammarians, whereas for non-linguists the perception may be in terms of personal commitment to the action involved. Consequently, ‘permission’ may be interpreted as suggestion/recommendation when the lack of obligativity appears. Such is the case of *may/can* expressing possibility: auxiliaries do no longer ‘make suggestions, or recommendations’, they only stress the idea of freedom of choice, which, again, leads to the ‘absence of obligation’:

Note.— Intermediate segments may be transmitted in any order. (Annex 10-4:3:44)

Such specific measures of protection of workplace recordings required by legislation may include the issuance of orders of non-public disclosure. (Annex 19:ATT-B3)

**3.2 Will/would versus multiple possibilities.** If the modals *shall* and *should* reflected the idea of ‘standardized’ behavior, respectively, of suggestion/recommendation, things become more complicated for non-native users of English when it comes to dealing with *will* or *would*. In case of these modal auxiliaries, there is not any language specification or editorial practice mentioned. Therefore, even proficient users of English may have difficulties in perceiving nuances of the messages including *will/would*.

*Will* reflect willingness, agreement, certainty, commitment to abiding the law, determination, request, threat, while *would* suggests various degrees of certainty, prediction, estimation, possibility, interdiction, refusal, promise.

With such a wide array of options, how will the user of the annexes be sure that he understood the message clearly? What if such instances of the language in use occur in verbal communication? Will messages always be conveyed? Hard to predict such suppositions – no study in this respect has been done yet. The only use of *will* in Air Traffic Controllers’ specialized phraseology is the reply ‘WILCO’, meaning “I understood your message and I will comply” and being used to indicated the pilot’s willingness and commitment to what has been indicated to him, or requested of him from the air traffic controller.

Judging by the examples extracted below from some of the annexes we may only hope that readers will not stop from reading and ask themselves what the difference is between one sentence and another, while they are using the same modal auxiliaries and that, in case they need to use a translation, the message is preserved intact as in the original document.

If the pilot does not reply, ATC will take this as confirmation that the use of Code 7500 is not an inadvertent false code selection. (Annex 17:ATT-21)

If an air traffic control clearance is not satisfactory to a pilot-in-command of an aircraft, the pilot-in-command may request and, if practicable, will be issued an amended clearance. (Annex 2:3-10)

A specific request for notification of differences will be sent to Contracting States immediately after the adoption of each amendment to this Annex. (Annex 18: (vii))

A definition does not have an independent status but is an essential part of each Standard and Recommended Practice in which the term is used, since a change in the meaning of the term would affect the specification. (Annex 2: (vi))

Destination alternate. An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft would be able to land should it become either impossible or inadvisable to land at the aerodrome of intended landing. (Annex 2:1-3).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Participants at the Convention of Chicago in 1944 may have never thought that the language in which acts were originally written will create confusion to non-native users. Apart from the nationals of the six languages of the United Nations, the other beneficiaries of the acts had to use translations. The international air laws, in their essence, remain clear and the same, but the manner in which the message is sent to receivers may affect clarity. From this perspective, of the Gricean maxims related to discourse, quality, quantity and relevance have been achieved, whereas manner, in our paper, reflected by the use of modal auxiliaries has but partially been accomplished.

Moreover, there is evidence that semantic barriers occur and they consist of obstacles that appear due to interpretation of meaning. In this respect, the Romanian Association of Private Aviation Operators have forwarded a request to the Ministry of Transport and other specialized fora to preserve the original aviation documents, written in English, in order to avoid confusion and undesired incidents. For example, the only linguistic possibility of the Romanian language to express obligation is by means of the verb 'trebuie', which is equally used for nuances such as 'willingness', 'determination', 'commitment' etc., while most of the translations into Romanian are made by non-specialized people, whose lack of

knowledge in the field of aviation may often lead to worthless translations.

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## POWER DISTANCE IN THE KOREAN CULTURE AS IT EMERGES FROM A K-DRAMA

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**Abstract:** *Real immersion into the Korean society is not that feasible for a European, given the huge cultural and spatial distance between Europe and Asia. Despite the tremendous economic and social development of Korea, this country's culture (as well as the entire Asian culture) is still very much influenced by the teachings of Confucius, the famous ancient Chinese philosopher, who preached on filial piety, respect towards elderly people, loyalty, personal morality, and courage. Real immersion into the Korean society is not that feasible for a European, given the huge cultural and spatial distance between Europe and Asia. Despite the tremendous economic and social development of Korea, this country's culture (as well as the entire Asian culture) is still very much influenced by the teachings of Confucius, the famous ancient Chinese philosopher, who preached on filial piety, respect towards elderly people, loyalty, personal morality, and courage. Understanding some differences between the Korean and the European cultures will help us avoid any misunderstandings or tensions once we have the chance of meeting 'the other' face-to-face, and, in the long run, become better citizens of the world.*

**Keywords:** *K-drama; cultural dimensions; power distance; cultural differences*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

For many foreigners, South Korea seems a country full of contrasts: on the one hand, there are technological achievements that outrank the American ones (most of the mobile phones in the world are produced by Samsung, while the Korean cars – Kia, Hyundai or Ssangyong - are exported all over the world). At the same time, Korea's architecture is comparable to that of many American cities. On the other hand, this country is still very much influenced by the teachings of Confucius which are full of rules, ceremonies and rituals, veneration for the ancestors, filial piety, and advice for proper behaviour between people of unequal status or rank. Of the four philosophical or religious systems (Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Christianity) currently operating in South Korea, Confucianism seems to have had the strongest influence on the lives of the people in this country. It has not impacted only their spiritual life, but all aspects of society to the extent to which the history of Korea cannot be understood without Confucianism. In the many difficult moments along the recent history of the peninsula (the Korean War between 1950 and 1953 and the economic crisis of the mid-1990s), the Confucianist values gave the Korean people a certain stability and provided them

with the motivation to make this country what it is today. Until the mid-1960s, South Korea was one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world. Under these circumstances,

no one expected the 'economic miracle' that would enable Korea to become the first of the 'Four Little Dragons' (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) (...) of Asia and to develop into a major world economy (Kohls, 2001:4).

Despite the progress South Korea has made in the past 50 years, people in the West still know very little about this country. On the one hand, this lack of knowledge is due to the geographical distance between Korea and the countries of Europe or America. On the other hand, this state of affairs could also be attributed to the rather limited literature available. This may prove both a curse and a blessing, in that it may motivate people who took a liking in this Asian peninsula to explore it by whatever means they can, using all the sources its culture offers. This is exactly what I am going to do in this paper, namely to bring to the fore some aspects of the Korean culture which reveal its hierarchical, authoritarian structure. All this will be done on the basis of a recent K-drama series, *Descendants of the Sun* (2016), which, though not a genuine reflection of the Korean reality, does

capture many aspects that a non-Asian perceives to be different from his/her own culture.

The paper is structured as follows: section (2) briefly describes the framework (Hofstede's *cultural dimensions*) employed for the analysis of the data. Section (3) introduces the reader to the phenomenon of *Hallyu* ("The Korean Wave"), which was initially led by K-dramas (to be followed by K-Pop and Korean films) and which contributed greatly to the global circulation of the South Korean culture. Here I will also touch upon the plot of the *Descendants of the Sun*, the drama series subjected to the analysis in terms of power distance, which will be carried out in section (4). The last part of the paper (5) contains some conclusions.

## 2. HOFSTEDE'S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

In being confronted with people of a different culture, we tend to judge them according to patterns of thinking and behaving that are typical of our own culture. In such situations, Ting-Toomey (1999) recommends "mindfulness", which she defines as follows:

Mindfulness means being particularly aware of our own assumptions, viewpoints, and ethnocentric tendencies on entering any unfamiliar situation. *Simultaneously*, mindfulness means paying attention to the perspectives and interpretive lenses of *dissimilar others* in viewing an intercultural episode. (Ting-Toomey, 1999: vii, emphasis in the original).

Given that there are so many cultures in the world, each with its own set of "shared perceptions about beliefs, values, and needs that affect the behaviours of relatively large groups of people (Lustig & Koester, 1999, quoted in Andersen, 2003: 241) and given the process of globalization which brings more and more cultures together, the need to explain and organize the possible problems in intercultural communication emerged. One solution in this respect was provided by Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede *et al.* (2010), who suggested that many of the cultural differences displayed verbally, as well as nonverbally in organizations<sup>1</sup>, can be analysed along 6 dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance, indulgence vs. restraint, power distance, and long-term orientation. Out of

them, only power distance will be summarized below, as it is important for the analytical part of the paper.

**Power distance** refers to "the degree to which power, prestige, and wealth are unequally distributed in a culture" (Andersen, 2003:242). This dimension varies considerably among cultures. Thus, cultures characterized by high power distance indexes (PDI) accept an unequal distribution of power (power is concentrated in the hands of a few people, rather than being distributed equally through the population) and the hierarchical role relationships. At the same time, in such cultures, rewards and punishments depend on the people's age, rank, social status or title. Moreover, in large power cultures, people show deep respect for power hierarchy, both in organizations and in institutions. In low power cultures, power is distributed equally among its members, who are rewarded according to their performance and who are consulted by their superiors/managers in important issues. On this dimension, South Korea scored 60 (Country comparison, *Hofstede Insights*, 2019), indicating that it is a rather high power distance culture.

I chose to focus on this dimension for the following reasons: (1) it is a robust dimension that stands the scrutiny of time, especially for a country like South Korea; (2) it is a dimension that people belonging to many cultures and ethnic groups will be able to understand.

The next section will introduce the reader to a cultural phenomenon, *Hallyu* or the Korean Wave, which transgressed the borders of South Korea and contributed greatly to the economic development of the country.

## 3. HALLYU AND K-DRAMAS

**.1 Korean dramas**, which initially led the Korean Wave, have stretched beyond Asia to enthrall audiences all over the world, transcending language and cultural barriers. The surprising fact is that these drama series, produced in such a small nation in East Asia changed rapidly from a local into a regional and a global phenomenon.

The birth of the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*)<sup>2</sup> coincides with the financial crisis that hit many Asian countries in 1997, including South Korea. It was in this period that its president, Kim Dae-Jung

<sup>1</sup> *Organizations* are defined as 'work places', as opposed to *institutions*, which cover schools and the family (Hofstede, 1980).

<sup>2</sup> The *Korean Wave* is the literal translation of the term *Hàn-liú*, which originated in China. The first syllable refers to "Korea" and the second usually evokes "flow" or "current," signifying "style" (Lie, 2012: 339).

realized that apart from the information technology, drama, film and pop music could get the country out of the critical situation. Consequently, a lot of effort has been invested in creating cultural ‘products’ aimed at both entertaining the Korean audience, as well as at being exported to the neighbouring countries.

Starting with mid-1990s, after South Korea established diplomatic relations with China, Korean dramas and pop music have been broadcast in this country. In time, a number of K-dramas have had a strong impact on audiences in different parts of Asia: *What is Love?* (MBC, 1992) was broadcast in Hong Kong, *Fireworks* (SBS production, 2000) in Taiwan, *Autumn in My Heart* (KBS, 2000) was shown in the Philippines, while *Winter Sonata* (KBS, 2002) was aired in Japan. The reason why K-dramas are quickly assimilated by other Asian peoples is that they promote values that are common among the cultures influenced by Confucianism.

Recent years have witnessed the expansion of the Korean wave in new areas, such as the United States, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Cha & Ma, 1996 (cited in Marinescu, 2014:90) are of the opinion that:

in the extra-Asian areas, the impact of this type of cultural industry on consumers was especially connected to the reception of *hallyu* within large Asian communities living in America, and, to a lesser extent, in western Europe.

Ju (2014: 35) reported that the drama *Jewel in the Palace* (MBC, 2003) has been exported to “more than thirty countries, including Australia, Canada, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Russia, and Romania”, while Nam (2014) stated that the screening of this particular television series (original title *Dae Jang Geum*) saved the Romanian public station TVR from financial crisis.

**3.2 “Descendants of the Sun”.** A very recent and successful drama series (16 episodes) that has transcended the Asian barriers is “Descendants of the Sun”, directed by Lee Eung-Bok and Baek Sang-Hoon, produced jointly by Korea and China in 2015 and aired by *Korean Broadcasting System* (KBS2) between the 24<sup>th</sup> of February and the 14<sup>th</sup> of April 2016. Unlike most of the K-dramas, which are filmed just a couple of hours before being broadcast, *Descendants of the Sun* was fully pre-produced. This contributed to a smooth flow of the episodes and of the plot, making the viewers wait impatiently for the next episode.

For a better understanding of the analytical part, a brief presentation of the plot would be in

order at this point. The drama focuses on the love story of two couples, Captain Yoo Si-Jin and doctor Kang Mo-Yeon, on the one hand and Master Sargent Seo Dae-Young and First Lieutenant (and military doctor) Yoon Myung-Ju, on the other hand, whose feelings are tested in a number of extreme situations (various secret missions of the soldiers, an earthquake in a distant (imaginary) country Uruk, the epidemic that breaks after an earthquake). Both couples fight for their love, but for different reasons: the former realize that their lives are too different to be able to make ends meet – Si Jin has to kill to save innocent people, while his girlfriend, dr. Kang has to save lives, even those of wrongdoers; the latter have to face the prejudice which is very much present in the Korean society: Seo Dae-Young has a lower social standing than his girlfriend, something that her father finds difficult to accept.

*Descendants of the Sun* has enjoyed immense popularity both locally and also internationally, sparking global interest in Korean products (the ones advertised for in the drama), culture, and language. At the same time, it contributed to a revival of the *Hallyu* phenomenon, which seemed to have been in decline for some time. In Romania, this drama series is available to stream on Viki, with English subtitles.

#### 4. POWER DISTANCE IN “DESCENDANTS OF THE SUN”

The research questions that guided the analysis of the power-related scenes in the K-drama are the following:

- a) How is power distance displayed verbally and nonverbally in each of the three organizations (military life, medical life and Uruk electric power plant) that appear in the movie?
- b) How is conflict between people of the same social rank handled in those instances when the three organizations have to interact?
- c) Are there signs of a decrease in power distance in the Korean culture?

With these questions in mind, let us proceed to the analysis of the power relations in the Korean drama *Descendants of the Sun*.

**2.3 Power distance in the medical area (Haesung hospital in Seoul & Medicube in Uruk).** I shall first focus on how people in high position in the medical field make use of their power, starting from the Confucian idea that there is no such thing as equality among people. The K-drama clearly shows that social superiors are

granted power and privilege, while those who have a lower status are obligated to defer to social superiors and comply with their requests.

At Haesung Hospital in Seoul, Dr. Kang Mo-Yeon has to see the chief doctor who had asked her to organize a research paper for him. From the dialogue between them, it is obvious that the help provided by Dr. Kang is in exchange of the chief doctor's help in her promotion:

- (1) Chief doctor: "You worked hard. Was it of any help to your studies?"  
 Dr. Kang: "Yes. It helped me a lot with my studies."  
 Chief doctor: "You did a nice job with the charts as well. You only have the interview portion left in your path to become a professor, right?"  
 Dr. Kang: "Yes, I've been getting ready."  
 (17:42 – 17:54/1<sup>3</sup>).

But on the day of the interview, Dr. Kang had to face the harsh reality in South Korea's hospitals. Although she had been pretty much living inside the operating room since her graduation from the medical school, she lost the professor position to her counter-candidate, Dr. Kim Eun-Ji, not because the latter is better or more competent, but because she is socially more powerful: her family is a big shareholder of Haesung Group which finances the hospital. It seems that Dr. Kang was not unfamiliar with these practices, only that she hoped that among the numerous cases of nepotism, which seems to be "endemic in Korea" (Kohls, 2001: 179), there would be one exception in which people like her would be hired for their true skills, as it usually happens in most European cultures. This emerges from an answer-question she addresses the chief doctor after she found out that she was passed over:

- (2) Dr. Kang (to Chief doctor): "Having connections is a skill. Of course, I know that. So who is it next time? The minister's son-in-law? The hospital director's nephew? In at least one out of three times, shouldn't true skills be honoured?" (23:38/2).

One of the netizens, who apparently is not Korean, expresses her indignation at this state of affairs by writing:

<sup>3</sup> Dialogues and print screens from the movie will be accompanied by the exact moment followed by the number of the episode in which they occur. Thus, 17:53/1 means that the line was uttered at 17 minutes and 53 seconds in episode number 1.

Bianca Bella: "How sad! How can that be? Doctors need skill." (22:51/2).

The other doctors in the hospital, who work with both candidates for the professor position, know that promoting Kim Eun-Ji is a mistake (since her operating skills leave a lot to be desired), but at the same time they are also aware of the fact that the system is so deeply rooted that they cannot change it.

Hardly had Dr. Kim been promoted to professorship that she started bossing Dr. Kang around. As the latter was a bit older than the former, she refused to do some of the most difficult tasks assigned to her by Dr. Kim. But this would always remind Dr. Kang:

- (3) Dr. Kim: "You are supposed to do the things that a professor tells you to do!" (24:15:2).

What she meant was to have Dr. Kang's help in the OR when she realized she was not able to perform the surgery. Dr. Kim's insolence stirred Dr. Kang's rage and, given the fact that she was a *sunbae*<sup>4</sup> to the former, she retorted:

- (4) "You are not a doctor. You are just the daughter of your father." (42:41/2).



Fig. 1. Haesung Hospital Chairman's invitation for dinner addressed to Dr. Kang (49:40/2)

Losing the chance to get the professorship was not the only mishap that Kang Mo-Yeon had to face at Haesung Hospital. As she was a beautiful single woman, the chairman of the hospital (who was a divorcee) seemed to fancy her to the extent that one day he came to the office she shared with some of her colleagues and told her:

<sup>4</sup> *Sunbae* translates as one's superior in status and rank.

- (5) “Doctor Kang! Please leave your schedule open this evening. Have dinner with me!” (49:40/2).

The chairman’s body posture (hands stuck in the trousers pockets), the direct gaze, as well as the intonation and rhythm of his speech made this invitation sound more like an order, so that even Dr. Kang had doubts related to his intentions:

- (6) Dr. Kang: “By any chance, did I just get a date request from the chairman?” (49:51/2)

In the evening, much to Dr. Kang’s surprise, she was not taken to a restaurant for dinner, but straight to a hotel, where the chairman wanted to make use of his power and take advantage of his employee in a very blunt fashion:

- (7) Chairman: “We can order food here. Do you want to go wash first while the food comes? Or should I first?” (51:25/2).

Two netizens sided with Dr. Kang:

glacialemluna\_944: “waaaaooow. girl get the heck out, you don’t need that.” (51:25/2).

broccoli<sup>5</sup>: “girl slap him he’s a disgrace to all men out there” (51:48/2).

As if hearing the advice of the two online commentators, Dr. Kang slaps her boss, a gesture that will attract his rage and vengeance, especially due to the fact that, in his presence, she was expected to show deference both as a woman, and as a subordinate. This attitude is imposed by Confucianism, “one of the basic tenets [of which] is that women should be subordinate to men and should defer to them at all times” (Kohls, 2001: 108). Even if her social position was lower than that of the chairman, she would not let herself be humiliated by him, though for many women like her, he could have made a good marriage partner. His revenge came soon, when the Haesung Group, which was building an eco-friendly power station in Uruk (an imaginary country in the Balkans), asked the hospital to send a group of doctors to that geographical area, to look after the health of the people working on the construction site. Dr. Kang is appointed the leader of the group to depart for Uruk, which, except for one person, was composed of medical staff (doctors and nurses) who had no money or connections. This shows that people in

key positions in an organization can use their power to take revenge on those who do not comply with their wishes, be they professional or personal.

Another way in which power distance is manifested in the Korean culture is in the use of various *terms of address* for people who are higher up in the social hierarchy and who are also older. In Korea, one’s status is determined, among other things, by “one’s age and one’s title and seniority at work” (Kohls, 2001: 107). Consequently, the persons of a lower social rank have to address the ones higher up by using their title or their title and surname. When this linguistic etiquette is not complied with, Koreans will react to it. There are a number of situations in the K-drama under investigation that illustrate the misuse of the linguistic etiquette. One such situation occurred in episode 5, when two of the main characters, First Lieutenant Yoon Myung-Ju (who is a military doctor) and Captain Yoo Si-Jin have a short conversation in Uruk.

- (8) YMJ: “Did you meet Kang Mo-Yeon here coincidentally?  
YSJ: “Why are you calling her *Kang Mo-Yeon*? She’s your unni<sup>6</sup> and sunbae”. (40:52 – 41:02/5).

Although the two of them had been friends since childhood, the captain requires of the military doctor due respect for his girlfriend, Dr. Kang, who is slightly older than Yoon Myung-Ju and is also professionally in a higher position in the medical field (*sunbae*). As a reaction to this scolding, in another episode, Yoon Myung-Ju (who happened to be in the same room with Dr. Kang at MediCube) while talking on the phone with Yoo Si-Jin, referred to her colleague as:

- (9) “Kang Mo-Yeon-**si** (referring to her as an equal), Kang Mo-Yeon-**nim** (as a superior), Kang Mo-Yeon-**yang** (as someone younger). Our family tree hasn’t been settled, so I’m not sure what to call her.” (25:12 – 25: 15/6).

As Song (2005: 100) puts it, “Korean sentences do not merely describe events or situations but are also embellished with various expressions of social or interpersonal relationships between the speaker and others, including the hearer”. The subber of the movie provided an indication of the meanings/functions of the bolded honorific particles in the example above. But there is more to

<sup>5</sup> Online commentators post comments under a pseudonym.

<sup>6</sup> *Unni* is a term used by females to address older sisters, while *sonbae/sunbae* is used when addressing someone higher up in the social/professional hierarchy.

that: with respect to the ending *-si*, this is basically attached to terms denoting family relations and also to proper nouns. In the example above, the use of this particle indicates that the subject of the sentence (i.e. Dr. Kang) is considered to be superior to the speaker (i.e. the military doctor Yoon Myung-Ju) (Ihm *et al.* 2001). As far as the other particle *-nim*, by means of which Korean speakers show deference to their interlocutor, is concerned, this is usually attached to job titles. When attached to full names without an accompanying title, the level of politeness decreases. If we compare the two honorific suffixes, *-si* “is significantly lower on the scale of politeness. (...) It would be used in the same workplace to address a person not very different in age, in a similar job position, but of somewhat lower rank, with whom one is not close enough to leave off formalities” (Lee and Ramsey, 2000: 232). The level of politeness of proper names accompanied by the suffix *-nim* is higher than that of proper names followed by *-si*.

In a later episode, after “the family tree” has apparently been settled between the two female doctors, they have an argument about the necessity of bringing a large amount of medical supplies from Korea to Uruk. After explaining that these supplies were to be handed over to the UN military force, Dr. Kang retorts:

(10) “Any other questions, *hubae-nim*?”

Despite the tense relationship between the two females, Dr. Kang uses an appellation that shows respect to her interlocutor, even if the term of address (*hubae*) indicates a person of a lower status. This attitude was also sensed by the online commentator, [sharonolukoga](#), who wrote: “first time I’ve heard *hoobaenim*, respect.” (49:65/5)

Power is reflected not only in the use of various suffixes, like the ones discussed previously, but also by employing the humilific interjection *ja* ‘hey’. As we shall see, this interjection is not confined to the medical field only, but also occurs among the people working in various other fields (see section 4.4.). At Haesung Hospital in Seoul, news has arrived related to an earthquake that occurred in Uruk. The mother of one of the doctors (Lee Chi-Hoon) who had volunteered to go to this area comes to the hospital and asks the chairman to make a phone call to Uruk, to find out if her son is alive or not. When the chairman tells her that this is not possible, she starts screaming at him:

(11) “**Hey!** I contributed to that satellite. Connect me right away!” (38:47/7)



Fig. 2. Lee Chi-Hoon’s mother shouting at the Haesung Hospital’s chairman. (38:47/7)

The print screen in figure 2 captures the astonishment (eyes wide-open, open mouths) on the faces of the medical staff on hearing the appellation ‘Hey!’. The reason why the doctor’s mother made use of the interjection emerges in the short dialogue between the nurse in the wheelchair (right behind Lee Chi-Hoon’s mother) and his wife (seated on the left of the photo):

(12) Nurse: “Your mother-in-law called chairman ‘Hey!’”  
Chi-Hoon’s wife: “Well, the land of this hospital is all Chi-Hoon’s”. (38:57-39:00/7)

This means that wealth outranks social or professional power in certain circumstances and entitles one to use humilifics. This is in line with Kohls’s statement that a Korean person’s status is first and foremost dictated “by the family in which one was born” (2001: 107).

Let us not have a look at how power distance is manifested in the military life.

**4.2 Power distance in the military life.** Linguistic etiquette is also encountered among the soldiers, who, besides using the ranks when addressing each other, are also expected to indicate their social status by using various terms. An example in this respect is provided by one fresh soldier, Kim Ki-Boon, who used to be a robber and whose life was put on the right track by the Alpha Team member, Seo Dae-Young. In the first episode of the K-drama, when he was taken to Haesung Hospital after having been beaten by the members of his gang for not being able to steal anything and after having been saved by Seo Dae-Young, he tells Dr. Kang, who wrongly assumed that the soldier had mistreated the boy:

(13) Kim Ki-Bun: “No, this *hyung-nim* saved me.” (31:55/1)

Ki-Bun shows respect to the soldier by calling him *hyung*, i.e. ‘older brother’ and by attaching the honorific particle *-nim* to the noun. According to

Lee and Ramsey (2000: 231), this more polite form (i.e. *hyungnim*) is used “when the siblings reach a fairly mature age (after about their thirties or forties) and (...) when there is a relative large difference in age”. What is interesting to notice is the fact that this form of appellation can apply no matter if the ‘sibling’ is a member of the same household or not. In the above example, there is no kinship between the thief and the soldier, but the relationship that develops between them as the K-drama unfolds can be paralleled to one between siblings.

Rank titles and honorifics are employed even by military people who form a couple. This is the case of First Lieutenant and army surgeon Yoon Myung-Ju and her lover Seo Dae-Young. As the latter is inferior in all respects to his girlfriend, he addresses her all the time formally. Due to his status, he is aware that he could never be a perfect match for Myung-Ju and tries, by all means, not to disclose his warm affection for her.

- (14) Yoon Myung-Ju: “When will we be able to speak without ranks and honorifics? If there weren’t any ranks, would you just ignore me completely?”  
Seo Dae-Young: “Yes, that’s right.” (35:36/1)

After this exchange, Seo Dae-Young turns around to leave, but his first lieutenant girlfriend orders him to stop, just by calling out his name. Seeing that he does not comply with her request, she commands him by using the formal style of address:

- (15) Yoon Myung-Ju: “Sergeant First Class Seo Dae-Young, you are leaving without saluting your superior?” (36:55/1)



Fig. 3. Seo Dae-Young saluting his military girlfriend, who abuses her power by ordering him “to hold on like that until he dies.” (37:40/1)

As he was addressed by his military superior who, on the second appellation, employed the military rank as well, Seo Dae-Young had to obey the order: he turned over and saluted her like a soldier, despite the fact that he was not wearing his uniform<sup>7</sup> (see photo in Figure 3).

In a later episode, when the relationship between these two soldiers is still tense, Myung-Ju calls her boyfriend, who is deployed to Uruk, and she speaks her heart out, but he does not utter a sound. Again, she makes use of her higher status and orders him:

- (16) Yoon Myung-Ju: “If you are listening, at least be *respectful* and let me hear you breathing.” (15:47/6) (my emphasis).

The same formality is encountered in the relationship between the two Alpha Team<sup>8</sup> members, Yoo Si-Jin (Big Boss) and Seo Dae-Young (Wolf), who are as close as brothers given the many dangerous situations that they had fought in together. Even in informal situations, they talk to each other formally due to the fact that Big Boss enjoys a higher military rank and status, which blend together so well in the Korean culture. In one particular example (17), it was the lexical item that revealed this level of formality, in the other it was the exchange between some netizens that pointed this out. In episode 3, Seo Dae-Young gets a package delivered by his friend, Yoo Si-Jin, who came from Korea to Uruk and who hoped that the package contained chocolate pies. Knowing who the parcel came from (his girlfriend), the former replies to his friend, by calling him ‘sir’:

- (17) Seo Dae-Young: “It’s more likely a terrorist bomb, *sir*.” (7:37/3) (my emphasis).

For a non-Korean, the use of such a term is quite unnecessary, especially in the military field where people are tempted to disregard ranks in informal situations like the one presented above.

In episode 6, the two Alpha Team members are in Korea and are chased by some soldiers whom they had trained and who wanted to take revenge

<sup>7</sup> In the Romanian military life, the rule stipulates that soldiers must use the hand salute only if they are wearing their military uniforms, but it seems that in Korea - at least as it emerges from the K-drama-, you can salute or can be saluted if you are wearing civilian clothes. It seems that at least one of the persons involved in the salutation needs to be clad in the military uniform.

<sup>8</sup> Alpha Team = a fictional elite special forces unit in South Korea.

now for the hardships they had to endure during the training period. The fact that these special force professionals talked to each other formally was captured by some netizens:

Slimane: “Are they talking to each other formally? It’s so weird.” (12:32/6)

Cessanz: “They speak formally, but they do it in an informal way, since they are friends.” (13:39/6)

The last comment, though a little contradictory, leads a foreigner to the understanding that there are at least three levels of formality when addressing somebody higher up: high formal, low-formal, and informal speech.

Power distance in the army is not revealed only by the level of speech formality, but also by the way in which people in power can manipulate the less powerful ones. An example worth discussing is the one in which Yoon Myung-Ju’s father, the commander of the army, first tries to separate his daughter from her lover, Seo Dae-Young, on grounds of status difference: he was a high-school drop-out and a non-commissioned officer<sup>9</sup>, while she came from a better-off family and also had benefited from higher education. Though Seo Dae-Young’s presence in Uruk is very much needed, the 3-star general orders him to return to Korea, knowing that his daughter had decided to fly to Uruk as a volunteer. To the father, this seems to be the most sensible solution:

- (18) General: Staff Sergeant Seo Dae-Young. You are dating my daughter, right?  
 Seo Dae-Young: “Yes, that’s right.”  
 General: “I worry about my daughter’s future. So I wish you’d consider my daughter’s future, too. I believe that you know the method well. By that, I mean the most sensible method.”  
 Seo Dae-Young: “Is it a command?”  
 General: “I hope it does not have to be, but if it has to be, then I’m thinking of making it so.” (33:20 – 34:05/3)

The problem here is that the order, which to my mind is unfair, does not come from the general in the army, but rather from a father who tries to find the appropriate match for his daughter. My feeling, as a member of a different culture, is that

<sup>9</sup> “The greatest difference between commissioned officers and the army’s non-commissioned officers lies in the level of authority. A commissioned officer can command all enlisted personnel and other officers under his command. A non-commissioned officer cannot command commissioned officers except those placed under his command for training” (Sherman, 2018).

personal and professional lives should be kept distinct, especially in a domain like the military. Seeing that this measure did not have the expected outcome and knowing well that Alpha Team soldiers’ lives are in permanent danger, the general orders this time Seo Dae-Young to quit the military life and enter his girlfriend’s maternal family’s company to learn business, so that, in case Yoon Myung-Ju (i.e. the general’s daughter) still wants to marry her boyfriend, she should not run the risk of becoming a young widow.

In the army, just like in the medical field (as we have seen in section 4.1, above), if you have no connections, getting to a higher rank is not that easy, even if one proves to have excellent skills. This situation is valid for Yoo Si-Jin, who despite his remarkable deeds of saving his compatriots and foreign politicians in various extreme situations, is condemned to remain a First Lieutenant for a long time, due to the fact that in doing what he thought was right for his people, he disobeyed the orders of his superiors. His father, also a military man, is worried about Yoo Si-Jin’s career and tries to make him aware of the fact that he might have to wait longer than he expected in order to be promoted:

- (19) Yoo Si-Jin’s father: “Who says they’ll put stars on someone like you without any influential support?” (5:10/6)

As the father has just retired from the army and as he did not have a very high rank, he is aware that he won’t be able to help his son get a promotion, especially after Si-Jin broke the military rules, but he secretly hopes that Si-Jin will climb up ranks in the military hierarchy if he marries the Taebaek commander’s daughter, First Lieutenant Yoon Myung-Ju. Given that this girl’s father had a higher rank and that Myung-Ju has also received more education than Si-Jin (she was a military academy affiliated officer and an army surgeon, while he only took the qualification exam instead of going through high school), such a match would propel the Special Forces officer to a higher position. This is in line with Kohls’s opinion that “finding people who will give you a ‘pull’ (*yongul*)” (2001:146) is very important, especially for those who lack powerful relatives or who have not graduated from the best universities.

**4.3 Power distance in the Uruk electric power plant.** In the third organization presented in the drama series, the Uruk Electric Power Plant construction site, the scenes depicting power distance are rather scarce, as this place was only

meant as a ‘meeting point’ for the main heroes. Still, one can notice the behaviour of Manager Go, who is quite authoritarian with one of the young apprentices working on the site, who is not willing to work extra hours, as it is customary among the Koreans. In photo (4), we see the manager corporally punishing the apprentice for taking a nap instead of working. He would have accepted such a behaviour only on the part of his superiors (his boss or the president), but not from someone younger and less skilled, who, moreover, is supposed to be deferential and modest in the presence of his instructor.



Fig. 4. Manager Go punishes his apprentice for taking a nap (30:11/5)

Hierarchy on the construction site “is demonstrated by the adjustment of voice tone and pitch to fit the speaker's position of junior or senior” (Morsbach 1973, quoted in McDaniel, 2003: 257). Thus, when scolding the apprentice, Manager Go raises the pitch of his voice and also increases the speech rhythm, while when he addresses his superior, the Chief Manager Jin Young-Soo, he adopts a milder, more polite tone, and employs flattery.



Fig. 5. Manager Go smiling at his boss (30:34/5)

At the same time, he also smiles at his boss (figure 5) and bows deeply. In Korea, the bow is both a sign of submission and a ritual that conveys respect and denotes hierarchical status. Andersen and Bowman (1999) reported that in power-discrepant circumstances, many Asian subordinates smile more in an effort to appease superiors and appear polite. Such behaviour complies with cultures characterized by high power distance.

**4.4 Power distance in the interaction between the three organizations.** An earthquake in Uruk brings together the three Korean organizations deployed there: the medical staff, the military forces, and the staff of the construction site. The disaster requires that all three organizations should cooperate for the sake of rescuing the persons who got trapped under the rubble of the power plant and for treating their wounds. The problem that emerges is who should be in charge of these operations

According to Kohls (2001:103), the hierarchical structure of current Korea is the following (my emphasis):

Table 1. Modern class structure in South Korea (cf. Kohls, 2001:103)

<b>High</b>	<b>Professors, bureaucrats, landlords, upper class (through family inheritance), business executives, judges, lawyers, medical doctors, famous television personalities, movies stars.</b>
<b>Middle</b>	Teachers, <b>business managers</b> , artists, blue-collar workers, <b>military officers</b> , farmers.
<b>Low</b>	Construction workers, day labourers, beggars, prostitutes, the handicapped, criminals.

Despite this well-established status/power structure, the person who is the least entitled to get control of the rescue operations, namely the Chief Manager of the Uruk power plant, Jin Young-Soo, is the one who wants to exert his power over the leaders of the other two organizations.

- (20) Chief Manager Jin: “The person in charge of this site is me, the Uruk Power Plant manager!. ME! So do what you are told!” (5:41/7).

The verbal message is reinforced by non-verbal elements such as high speech volume (shown by the capitalized ME) and rate, as well as gestures, such as pointing the finger at this interlocutor or touching him, which clearly indicate his use of power, as shown in figures (6) and (7) below.



Fig.6 Chief Manager Jin’s pointing gesture (5:51/7)




Fig.7. Chief Manager Jin’s touching behaviour (46:02/ 7)

Both gestures employed by the manager of the power plant, namely pointing with his index finger at Yoo Si-Jin, the Alpha Team leader and touching the latter’s chest in an attempt to stop him from starting the rescue operations are indicators of lack of manners among ordinary South Koreans. In this particular context, the rude behaviour is the prerogative of a person in power. The chief manager exploits his power even further, by using humilifics when addressing the military officer, as shown in excerpt (21) below:

(21) Chief Manager Jin : “**Hey**, you, **piece of rice**. You understand me, **bastard?**” (6: 03/7) (my emphasis)

In this utterance, he violated the Korean etiquette three times: first, by using the humilific interjection “hey”, secondly by addressing a person of an equally powerful status with the derogatory slang expression “piece of rice”<sup>10</sup>, and thirdly by

<sup>10</sup> “Piece of rice” is a derogatory slang term for a captain This information was provided by one of the subbers of the movie.

making recourse to the literal meaning of the word “bastard”, namely that of an illegitimate child, which in Korea is considered an “unperson”. The stigma of being an illegitimate child is still very strong in the current Korean society. Thirst for power makes the same power plant manager address Yoon Myung-Ju in an inappropriate manner:

(22) Chief Manager Jin: “And you! You **wench**, you think you’re all that because you wear a uniform and because of your rank! **Lower your eyes!** (33:07 – 32:12/9). (my emphasis)

As a woman abiding to Confucianist teachings, Yoon Myung-Ju is supposed to be submissive to men (this is the reason why she is ordered to lower her eyes). But her military rank and her medical education confer a much higher status on her than that enjoyed by Manager Jin.

The power distance problem in the interaction between the three organizations is solved by the Alpha Team leader, Yoo-Si-Jin, who seems more familiar with the changes in power position in cases of emergency. Even if he was much younger than the power plant Chief Manager and despite his lower degree of education as compared to the doctors of MediCube, as a military officer he was bestowed with maximum power:

(23) Yoo Si-Jin “At a disaster site, the commander of the rescue team has the final authority, and that’s ME!”

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis has demonstrated that, despite the economic and technological development, the South Korean society is still vertically structured, with clear status demarcations and respect paid to the elderly people and to the ones in higher positions. This rigid stratification still prohibits interclass dating or marriage, as we have seen in the case of couple formed by Master Sergeant Seo Dae-Young and First Lieutenant (and military doctor) Yoon Myung-Ju.

The excerpts from the movie showed that the people in power can control the lives of their subordinates (Haesung Hospital Chairman and Dr. Kang), can grant favours to the persons they consider socially higher up than others (the professor at Haesung Hospital who despite getting a lot of help from Dr. Kang, chooses to promote someone less skilled, but richer than her), may get various favours (Chi-Hoon’s mother is enabled to talk to her son in Uruk, in spite of the military restrictions). A social system with large power

discrepancies like South Korea's also produces unique nonverbal behaviour. Thus, powerful people are expected to be shown only positive emotions, whereas negative emotions are shown to low-status persons. The smiles employed by the Koreans are meant to flatter or appease a superior and to smooth the social relations. At the same time, the persons at the top of the social hierarchy may adopt a certain posture (hands in the pocket), a certain gesture (finger-pointing), or a certain interpersonal distance (very close, as was the case of Haesung Hospital chairman and Dr. Kang) to exert power over the others.

As far as the answer to the last research question is concerned, the K-drama provides evidence that some characters seem to make progress in breaking the old Confucianist tradition. One of them is the female military doctor, Myung-Ju, who unlike many women in the current Korean society, knows what she wants and is not afraid to fight for it. She is not afraid to openly and bluntly confess her love to her boyfriend (unlike Dr. Kang), who is inferior to her in terms of status and military rank, and she is not afraid to fight for her love, even if this means going head to head with her father, who also happens to be her and her boyfriend's Commanding Officer. The other person who adopts a similar attitude is the Alpha Team Captain, Yoo Si-Jin, who has been taught honesty and righteousness by his father and who acts on the basis of these values, refusing to submit to his superior's command, triggered by personal interest. This may be proof that the Korean culture is undergoing change in the direction of less power distance.

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## WRITING THE DIFFERENCE: THE MINORITARIAN PERSPECTIVE OF ITALIAN MIGRANTS IN QUÉBEC

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**Abstract:** *Canada and the United States have an established literary tradition linked to immigration and minorities. However, for Canada, this tradition was mainly, if not exclusively, expressed in English. Instead, the historical context of Québécois literature reflects the close link between the French language and a single cultural community: this has made it impossible to include minority voices in the context of Québec's literary context. Today, now that Québécois literature begins to look ahead, taking exploratory journeys towards "foreign lands", diversity has become the main theme of emerging writers. Certainly, in the younger generation, as in the previous ones, identities are still only defined starting from a pre-established cultural and family background, perhaps Québécois, but perhaps also Haitian, Algerian, Chinese, Polish or Italian. Marco Micone and Fulvio Caccia, among the first, wrote from a space that is at the same time both internal and peripheral to Québec society. Their 'marginality' is expressed, above all, through targeted choices of language and form: the provocative mixture of continuity and diversity, affiliation and dissidence, as well as the importance they give to language, characterize their writing and make a significant contribution to the development of Québécois literature.*

**Keywords:** *immigration; Italian; Canada; Québec; marginality*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Canada was for a long time considered by thousands of immigrants as the country of the last frontier, and yet in recent decades it has developed a multicultural policy attentive to the ethnic singularities of which it is composed. And while for the Canadian immigrant the debate with the "other" language is carried out in binary terms, language of origin/English, in Montréal the linguistic binomial becomes a trinomial. Montréal is now the city where the difference is articulated, where "the difference is written", to paraphrase a very famous 1985 issue of *Vice Versa*.

My discussion will focus on the analysis of the immigrant culture in Québec that has long been censored by the ruling classes which, for decades, have imposed a uniformity of mentalities and the exclusion of potentially dangerous groups. It is clear that the Italian community will necessarily be the object of this analysis because, in addition to being numerically the most important group after the English-speaking and Francophone communities, it is also the one to which the two writers Micone and Caccia belong. They now represent the whole community of migrant and

transcultural writers in Québec for whom writing in French has become a political manifesto.

Since 1946 to today, Canada has welcomed 5,000,000 immigrants. In Québec at present this includes more than 800,000 members of ethnic minorities, almost 300,000 of whom are of Italian origin. Since the Second World War, five million Italians have had to leave their country. The social reforms that followed one after another in Italy failed to satisfy the less well-off classes: in fact, a 1951 census showed that at that time over six million peasants still did not own property or land, and a very high percentage of these resided in the South of Italy. Following violent peasant revolts, the Italian authorities granted land to only 5% of the rural population, since the ruling classes preferred emigration rather than the ceding of land. The exodus was huge, but the host countries reacted positively to the arrival of the immigrants because these individuals represented an ideal workforce, especially because of their modest wage requirements. Therefore, we can say that emigration would never have existed if it had not helped consolidate the economic and political power of the ruling classes of the host countries. This also applies to Québec, of course.

## 2. ITALIAN POST-WAR MIGRATION

How did Québec react to this massive post-war exodus? We must remember that, in the 1950s, immigrants had heard little, very little, about Québec and even less of its cultural particularity. Therefore, they emigrated to Canada, or worse to America, and not to Québec.

Twenty years later, in spite of Law 101, 70% of young Quebecers of Italian origin continued to attend English schools, since, on the one hand, English speakers had gained political support among immigrants without having to resort to either economic or social threats; while, on the other hand, many French-speaking Quebecers wanted to marginalize the Italians, and immigrants in general, so as to protect spheres, such as that of the civil services, which had always been under their control. Starting in the 1980s a huge step forward was made: simultaneously with the birth of an urban literature in Montreal, there was the emergence of texts containing a multiplicity of different languages and voices, since, as Fulvio Caccia states: it is not the state that makes culture, but men; and, I would add, all men, of all nationalities and ethnicities. From that moment on, Québec has been the scene of a pageant in which languages, dialects and idiolects intertwine with ideological positions, coming from writers of different origins.

And it was at this historical moment, and not by chance, that the first issue of *Vice Versa* was published, and it can be considered as an example of the new phase of Québécois literature. In fact, the creation of *Vice Versa* in 1983 is emblematic because of the choice to publish it in three languages: French, Italian and English, shifting and de-dramatizing the tension between English and French that has always existed in Québécois society and, thus, introducing the Italian community as an active partner in the culture of Québec. As stated by Lamberto Tassinari, editor of the magazine, “L’Italien devient un troisième pôle, une langue quirompt la dualité au Canada et qui représente toutes les autres langues et identités, exclues de la communication officielle...L’italien est une provocation pour dire que la manière la meilleure pour rejoindre les autres passe par la langue” (Canzutti, 1998-1999:15). The first issue of *Vice Versa* was officially launched at the National Library, on rue Saint-Denis, with great media coverage, but most of the ‘cultured’ public reacted to the magazine with coldness and, I would say, diffidence, given the objective of the magazine itself, which was to redefine the Québécois identity.

What then was the goal of the creators of the magazine? Their original idea? *Vice Versa* tried to make visible the social transformations underway and to grasp the profound meaning of the relationship and coexistence of individuals and peoples in the post-industrial era. In other words, the magazine immediately sought to define *migrant ethnicity*, meaning ethnicity as a result of ethnic group, in the usual sense of nature and race, seeking in it the signs and principles of a new humanism. Therefore, Caccia, D’Alfonso and the other editors proposed migrant ethnicity as a force for change and a place for investigation and for the affirmation of Québécois identity. In fact, for the often silent Québec, which seemed to have given up on a dream, solving the immigrant problem meant getting rid of the “maladie Québec” and radically redefining Quebec’s identity. So, *Vice Versa* sought to awaken this unexpressed cultural wealth by introducing more languages and dampening the French/English polarization, thus providing the example of an unprecedented equivalence of languages and cultures.

## 3. “LA TRANSCULTURE” IN *VICE VERSA*

After the publication of Nepveu’s article “Qu’est-ce que la transculture?” in 1989, studies on the role played by the magazine *Vice Versa* multiplied. This trilingual magazine, founded by intellectuals of Italian origin, Fulvio Caccia, Bruno Ramirez and Antonio D’Alfonso, and directed by Lamberto Tassinari, became a transcultural laboratory in Québec, as well as place for the affirmation of a new concept of identity. The prefix “trans” designates a moment of transition and the adjective “transcultural” perfectly defines the network of relationships existing in Québec between the various cultures that populate it. For the *Vice Versa* editors, it was not a matter of baptizing a new literary movement, but of stirring up a debate within Québécois literature, Canadian literature, and literature *tout court*. In their introduction, Caccia and D’Alfonso lay claim to the otherness, the difference, of the creator of Italian origin, borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari the concept of “minor literature” (Deleuze, Guattari, 1975). Caccia e D’Alfonso define the status of the intellectual of Italian origin in Québec as “minoritaire à l’intérieur d’une minorité, à cheval sur trois cultures et autant de langues” (Caccia, D’Alfonso, 1983:201). To reinforce this concept, Caccia often used expressions such as Scarpetta’s *impureté postmoderne*; Juteau-Lee *fuyante* ethnicity or

Weinfeld's *affective* ethnicity; Vattimo's *faiblesse forte*; Deleuze and Guattari *mineur* and *devenir minoritaire*; without forgetting the Kafkaesque notion of literature and language.

D'Alfonso even aspired to the creation of an 'italic', deterritorialized literature, since he claims that migrant writing represents the radical otherness in Québec, thus moving away from the positions of Caccia and especially of Micone, who aspired to assimilate migrant writing into Québécois literature. Moreover, Pierre L'Hérault himself, author of an article on *L'intervention italo-québécoise dans la reconfiguration de l'espace identitaire québécois*, affirmed that the two cultures, the Italian and the Québécois, have found a common ground in the concept of a shared otherness, linked to the common destiny of the two groups, both minorities from the linguistic and identity points of view.

Therefore, the key word for *Vice Versa* is *transculturel*, written in three languages on the cover: "Magazine transculturel. Transcultural magazine. Rivista transculturale". In *transculture* Tassinari and Caccia find

la capacité de symboliser sa propre blessure qui agit comme force fondatrice de l'identité, équilibrant de la sorte la tentation d'échapper au passé ou d'y sombrer (Tassinari, 1983:23).

*Vice Versa* was created after the earlier experience of an Italian magazine, the *Quaderni culturali*, founded in January of 1980, also by intellectuals of Italian origin. The magazine was the organ of the Association of Italian-Québec Popular Culture. It was started in the Montrealese neighborhood of Saint-Michel, a neighborhood with a large Italian community, which was the magazine's intended readership, which explains the choice of the use of Italian. The title chosen, *Quaderni culturali*, reflects the nature of the articles which focused on cultural activities: debates, theatrical performances, film screenings. Anchored in the social reality of Montreal, it focused on the history of the migrant community and, above all, on the experience of the Italian community. The magazine published seven issues, published between 1980 and 1982. The first series, with two issues, appeared in Italian in 1980, and dealt with political topics. The last two issues, published in 1982, mark a progressive opening to the three languages, as evidenced by the titles of the sections "Allarghiamo il discorso/Elargissons le discours.../In wider terms". It was in this issue that the magazine's transformation into *Vice Versa*

was announced. On a single page was written: "*Quaderni culturali* cambia nome! Change de nom! Changes name!". Lamberto Tassinari forged the path that led a periodical like *Quaderni culturali* to become a transcultural journal. Tassinari remembered the fracture within the editorial board between those who wanted to preserve the political and social aspect of the old periodical, and those who wanted to attribute a new dynamism and meaning to its trilingualism, move away from the ghetto of the community and turn toward the greater society.

With *Vice Versa* the experience of emigration transformed into a tool for analyzing reality and became a means for facing future developments. The heavy handed graphics of *Quaderni culturali* gave way to the more abstract and conceptual graphics of *Vice Versa*. Looking to the future, *Vice Versa*'s founding intellectuals sought stylistic, formal, linguistic or writing solutions that aimed to create bridges, establish dialogue, overcome differences and reduce inequalities. The future society which they were thinking of was a shared space in which all, while maintaining their diversity, could have a dialogue, and achieve their aspirations and desires. We must remember that a first attempt at linguistic openness had already been made by the publishing house Guernica, created by Antonio D'Alfonso in Montréal in 1978 and, from the beginning, dedicated to the publication of authors of foreign origin, but also of English-speaking poets. Guernica made translation its main mission, thus anticipating the linguistic openness proposed four years later by *Vice Versa*. An important contribution to this goal can be found in the publication of the anthologies *Quêtes. Textes d'auteurs italo-québécois*, edited by Caccia and D'Alfonso, and by *Sous le signe du Phénix. Entretiens avec quinze créateurs italo-québécois*, edited by Fulvio Caccia, which gather the testimonies of intellectuals of Italian origin who write in English or in French in Québec in various artistic fields.

In the title chosen by Caccia, the evocation of the *Phénix/Phoenix* refers to a concept of the Italo-Québécois identity in the making. It was about to undergo a transformation that would necessarily result in something different from its initial condition. The text also emphasizes the membership in a community and the social promotion of the descendants of emigrants, often poor and uneducated, who became artists, creators and key players in the cultural life of Québec. The figure of the *Phénix*, emblematic representation of the migrant creator, refers to the continuous metamorphosis to which every culture is subjected, but even more so to the migrant's *mestizo*

culture. Through the use of the figure of the *Phénix*, a symbol of continuous metamorphosis, Caccia suggests that “ce délicat travail de mutation culturelle, auquel est soumise toute société et, à plus forte raison, toute communauté immigrante” (Caccia, D’Alfonso, 1983:200) never stops. That means, for Caccia, that immigrant culture emphasizes the ‘acculturation’ phenomenon of every culture<sup>1</sup>.

For Caccia, Italy allows the Québécois to “se confronter à sa propre origine pour affirmer son américanité, et cela en faisant l’économie du rapport conflictuel avec la culture-mère: la France” (Caccia, D’Alfonso, 1983:260). The challenge is to “se réorienter, de recommencer la culture française ailleurs et autrement” (Caccia, D’Alfonso, 1983:261). This acculturation, however, is experienced with sadness by the writer and leads to emptiness, loss, and crisis.

The texts of Italian migrant writers focus on the dramas and tragedies of Italian immigrants and their descendants, whose stories seem to remain under the shadow of an iniquitous destiny that pursues them from Italy to America. The journey to the new continent does not change the fate of the characters but, on the contrary, helps to radicalize their existence by adding the inequalities of American capitalism to the injustices of European history. Immigration was a traumatizing experience for most Italian families; the shock of adaptation, the pain, manifested themselves in the syntax, in the rhythm of the dialectal language spoken by the parents. This dialectal language, an agglomeration of regional archaisms, of Italian and English expressions, thus becomes the language of memory and exile for the second generation.

The children of immigrants deny their parents’ language; they refuse it. The learning of the *predominant* language and the frenetic adherence to the values of the consumer society are the means to make the break. In this regard, I refer to the tetralinguistic model of Henri Gobard, which modulates our relationship to languages. First, Gobard claims (Gobard, 1976), there is a *vernaculaire*, the maternal language, of rural origin. It designates the *ici*. Then, there is a *véhiculaire* language, a language that is urban, of the State, bureaucratic, and commercial. It is spoken everywhere and causes the first step toward

deterritorialization. The *référentiaire* language, then, is that of culture. It is the language of *over there*. Finally, there is the *mithyque*, the religious language: the language of the afterlife.

If we want to apply the stated model, we can say the different regional dialects of immigration are a *vernacular* language: Sicilian, Neapolitan, Milanese. English is the *predominant* language for most Canadians with the exception of the 15% who have attended French-speaking schools in Québec. The *predominant* language corresponds to the first break with the *vernacular* language, the language of origin, it is the first manifestation of the difference. English is the reference language for many Canadian Italian speakers and works to create a reterritorialization. Finally, Italian is the mythical language.

English then is useful to the Italian-speaking intellectual to recover his past, to understand it. It is in English that he can trace the genesis of the rejection of his language of origin and it is in this language that he will write most of his works except for a part of the Italophones, those of Québec, who have passed from English as a *predominant* language to French language as a *referencing* and cultural language. However, whether he wants it or not, the Italian intellectual will have to deal with Italian. He will do it either by ignoring it or by reappropriating it. For example, for Caccia Italian will always be the Eden-like language of before. Dialect instead will be discarded by the Italian-speaking creator: he prefers fragments in the Italian language as indices of Italianness and immigration within his work.

In an interview published in *Vice Versa* in 1984, Micone explains how he created a language suitable for his *pièces*. At the beginning, he wrote in an international French, fearing that a more popular Michel Tremblay style of French would ridicule his purpose. Then, he realized that the normative language was too neutral and so he tried to create a popular language that was not a mere imitation of the current French Québécois, but the language spoken by the Italians in Montréal. In any case, the immigrant does not have a language all of his own. Against the myth of the passage to Paradise, Micone proposes the soberest vision of immigration as a loss and the immigrant as the victim of an adventure he has not chosen: not only a simple economic adventure, but a process that changes one’s vision of oneself. Language then becomes the main agent of the victimization of the immigrant. The Italian-speaking writer’s search for identity then passes through the theme of the loss of the country of origin, to which is added the

<sup>1</sup> Here Caccia takes up Todorov’ concept of “acculturation”, which states: “On voit bien la différence entre l’être acculturé, à l’aise dans les deux cultures, et l’être déraciné, qui a oublié sa langue d’origine mais n’a pas appris celle de son pays d’adoption” (Todorov, 1989:364).

conflict between the values of the host country and those of the motherland.

This is precisely what the Italian playwright Marco Micone wanted, deliberately choosing French as the language of expression in *Gens du silence* (1985), his first theatrical *pièce*. Structured on peasant and worker roots, the migratory experience and their participation in becoming Québécois, Micone relies on class solidarity and the common working origins of immigrants and Québécois to overcome the differences.

For the writer of Italian origin, there is no inferior culture just as there is no inferior individual; however, there is a dominant culture imposed by groups of individuals, who are also dominant, thanks to the economic and political power they hold.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The city and the culture are no longer unique literary allegories but bifid realities to be assailed politically and culturally, since it is precisely the diversity of the minorities that constitute and represent the process of modernity fundamental to the great western metropolises.

Now that Québécois literature is beginning to look ahead, taking exploratory journeys to 'foreign lands', diversity has become the main theme of emerging writers. Marco Micone and Fulvio Caccia, among the first, wrote from a space that is at the same time internal and peripheral to Québécois society. Their 'marginality' is expressed above all through targeted choices of language and form: this provocative mixture of continuity and diversity, affiliation and dissidence, as well as the importance they give to language, mark their writing, giving the literature of Quebec a significant and evident development.

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## NATIONALIST DISCOURSE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THE CASE OF MARINE LE PEN AND NIGEL FARAGE

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**Abstract:** *Nationalist discourse and nationalist parties reappeared on the political scene as a consequence of some recent events, such as the economic crisis, globalization and massive migration. The leaders of the nationalist parties try to make their voice heard not only in their respective countries but also in the European Parliament. The present paper analyzes some of the characteristic features of nationalism and of nationalist discourse. The method of investigation will be that of discourse-historical analysis, as it is appropriate to describe the main discursive strategies and the linguistic features that characterize right-wing political parties discourse. We choose to discuss some of the most vocal representatives of such parties, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage.*

**Keywords:** *nationalism; populism; communication, discourse-historical approach*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

When some former European leaders such as Robert Schuman, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand advocated for the creation of the European Union as a means to consolidate peace, to fight nationalism and to prevent another world war, they hardly imagined that some decades later the European Parliament would be the scene where those reasons should be advocated for again. The European Union was meant to be a construction built step by step, based on solidarity of the member states and to become, in time, an economic and political force. The principles on which that union is based were seen as leading to general progress and prosperity. All the member states are supposed to benefit from them, as they have been established on mutual agreement. A single market, free movement of people, goods, services and capital were meant, along with other treaties and agreements, to ensure economic development for each and every member state. There was even an attempt to put in place a European Constitution, failed due to the opposition of some member states, such as France, Ireland, and Portugal, among others.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the enlargement of the European Union by the admission of some Eastern-European countries from the former Soviet Bloc led to the revival of the nationalist discourse in many countries. The reasons were the same everywhere, be it in France,

in Great Britain, in Germany, Austria and Italy: the common “threat”: the invasion of their country by migrants from the former socialist countries, now members of the European Union. In the nationalist view, these migrants represent a danger for their fellow nationals as they would “steal” their jobs, they could represent a danger for their national integrity as they are concerned about their national views, culture and civilization. Another great “fear” is that caused by the Muslim migrants, Roma people, Jews and Turks, all representatives of a minority which is responsible for all the bad things happening in their respective countries. The economic crisis which began in 2008 and struck all the countries contributed in a great measure to the revival of nationalist ideology and, consequently, to the revival of nationalist parties. They developed a specific discourse, as a means of communicating their ideas and influence the peoples thoughts and beliefs, and more important than that, as a means of gaining their supporters’ votes in national and European elections.

In this article we intend to present an analysis of nationalist discourse in Europe. We intend to focus on the nationalist discourse developed by the parties described as right-wing parties or radical-right parties and on the main characteristics of such a discourse, pointing and illustrating the main strategies and linguistic features specific to this kind of political communication. The point of view from which the analysis will be conducted is that of discourse-historical approach, which is put into practice and

recommended by most scholars dealing with that particular matter (Wodak and Nugara, 2017).

## 2. NATIONALISM. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES

**2.1 Nationalist ideology.** Nationalism as a concept and then as an ideology is closely linked to the concept of nation. Nations on the old continent, Europe, began to take shape by the end of the XVIIth and the beginning of the XVIIIth century, when the communities of people began to be more stable and to share a common territory, common ideas and beliefs, a common language, even, if not always, the same religion. No doubt that religion was important at the time, and it was to become an important nationalist asset in time. Apart from that, those communities found out that they have in common habits, customs, ceremonies linked to official events, so some kind of sameness was in place. A nation is also based on a common language, spoken within the limits of a “national” territory. What happens when your territory is no longer inhabited by those you used to call your co-nationals? What will be the consequences if your national values referring to civilization, national heroes, national myths, national symbols such as the flag, the anthem, heraldic symbols are threatened? Should one protest against it? Should one try and prevent it? Should one engage in a fight (ideological or military) to protect what is considered to be one’s nation, one’s national state and nation values? The answer is obvious, so all this lead to the creation of an ideology. Unfortunately, social and political factors, such as wars, invasion of sovereign states by other states, limitation of some rights and liberties, the imposition of an official language different from the native one, the imposition of certain rules perceived as oppressive laid o solid foundation to nationalism.

At its beginnings, nationalism referred to maintaining the same language, culture and civilization within the boundaries of the same state. More exactly, it meant neglecting dialects as being unimportant compared to a unique language, the national language, which was to be recognized as a European national language. (G. Lüdi, 2010:22-24). The same author mentions that nationalist discourse insisted upon the importance of founding a homoglossic society within the boundaries of a nation-state, regardless if the language precedes the creation of the state or the other way round. Nevertheless, the author specifies that this is a received idea, based on the existence of a single language, which will reinforce the idea of a nation-state.

The single language is not the only value put forward by nationalist ideology. F.-B. Huygne (2010, 39-44) discusses another concept supported by representatives of this ideology, which is the mentality of a community. This mentality is based on the conception that “we”, a community of people living in a territory, have some important values to preserve and to fight for. The author specifies from the beginning that he disapproves mentalities such as those of Milosevic, former Serbian leader, insisting on forming a national state, enlarging a nation, giving a state to this nation as this is a national claim. The scholar’s work is about identifying types of historic ideologies: the Wilsonion one, based on the spread of American values as being universal, the Marxist one having at its bases the dialectical materialism and the German Nationalist-Socialist ideology, the most hideous, the expression of the superiority of a race.

When we speak and think about nationalism, nationalist ideas and values, we should be tempted to consider them as positive values. Such positive values are embodied in early historic heroes, of their heroic efforts to preserve their national specificity. This aspect is sometimes over evaluated and used to increase the importance of such examples, which may or may be not based on real facts, in the end. So, urging people to follow the example of such and such legendary hero, or comparing a contemporary leader with one of them is an attempted manipulation of nationalist speakers, aiming at psychologically influencing the public attitude. Volker Fuchs (2010, 59-61) states that, in this case, the idea of nation is linked to the identification of race, blood, original country and is supported by cults and myths. In his opinion, it is not a correct interpretation of the idea of a nation.

We cannot overlook the evolution of the nationalist discourse which is more present than ever in the contemporary society.

Nowadays, globalization, which was once seen as positive, productive and beneficial, became one of the worst and gloomy perspectives. From now on, it is not a purpose to be achieved; it is no longer the intended objective or the ultimate end. The new conditions, such as massive migration, free circulation of goods and persons within the European Union, lead to a new orientation of the nationalist discourse.

**2.2 Nationalist discourse.** The literature about nationalist discourse is vast and it tends to become even vaster, since new factors intervene and changes in the whole world are rapid, dramatic, unexpected and not without

consequences. Such consequences are reflected in the studies of numerous scholars who analyzed the discourse developed by various representatives of the nationalist ideology, promoted by parties which put forward the idea of nation and nationalist values.

At first, studies were conducted about political discourse since it is the most common and widespread variety of discourse. The most common perception is that political discourse should be identified by means of its actors or authors, meaning the politicians. (T.van Dijk, 1997). In his opinion, politics field should be limited to some major concepts denoting official and unofficial political actors, events, encounters, settings, political systems (like democracy and communism), political ideologies like “perestroika” or liberalism and political group relations, such as power, inequality, hegemony and oppression.

One of the keenest analyses of national discourse is that of Ruth Wodak (2018, 403-420). The author discusses the concept of nationalism, which, at the beginning, was considered as a “project of modernity, related to the tendency towards homogenization of populations, thus defining modern statehood”.

She cites several definitions of nation, nation-states, national identity and nationalism. The definition of nation-states given by B. Anderson (1995, cited in R. Wodak, 2018) although criticized by the author, but recurrent in many other studies about nationalism refer to an imagined communities or to imagined political communities. The respective communities are imagined and limited at the same time as they are not unlimited and as the members of the respective community may have never met or seen face to face. The same author discusses some other concepts as transnationalism (“the establishment of social, cultural economic and political ties that operate beyond the nation state”, being conducted by powerful actors, members of the government or of political organizations or representatives of multinational corporations). Another related concept is cosmopolitanism, referring to the belief that all humans belong to a single community, sharing the same values, based on the same principles and, generally speaking, pursuing the same target, that of surviving. According to this concept, all human beings share common moral views and principles and they are not limited to national boundaries.

Since national identity plays an important part in the so-called nationalist discourse, we shall elaborate upon the theme saying that the most common way of constructing this national identity

is to put in plain view symbols of the nation: the flag, the anthem and specific turns of phrase. They are considered as being harmless, but it is not always the case. Sometimes, those harmless symbols can incite to conflicts, more or less violent, as it has been seen during sporting or political events.

At the same time, the author discusses the discursive construction of national identity, explaining that this is based on some key assumptions, as she calls them. One of them is that “nations are primarily mental constructs” (Wodak: 2018), which has already become a “received idea”; then we have another assumption, stating that national identity includes a set of dispositions, attitudes and conventions internalized through socialization. We chose to mention these assumptions because they appear repeatedly in nationalist discourse nowadays.

Some other scholars, such as R. Eatwell (2005) analyze the rise of, as he calls them, the New Right Wing Parties in post-war Europe. This article is important because it specifies that nationalist discourse is made up and/or presented by party leaders, charismatic, able to seduce their public and voters. We find that in this article, the author made the most explicit portrait of a nationalist leader: he must have „a sense of a great mission”; he must have a discourse of leader-follower symbiosis”, he must make proof of abilities in communicating with his followers (via social-media and other means of communication, old and modern). The author indicates that it was important, during the 1980s, to notice that issues on cultural and national identities appeared due to the changes of political chess-board: then dissolution of the former Eastern bloc, the reunification of Germany and the immigration, affecting many countries in their economy and in their ethnic structure.

Ruth Wodak, R. Eatwell and other authors who studied and wrote about nationalism considered that the best method to approach this concept is the Discourse-Historical Approach.

**2.3 Methods of analysis of nationalist discourse.** In an interview to the specialized publication (“Mots”, 115/2017), Ruth Wodak speaks about the main discursive strategies and linguistic features that characterize right-wing political parties discourse. The same methods are described in “Methods for Critical Analysis” (R. Wodak M. Meyer, 2009:93-94). This analysis is based on three dimensions: the identification of the specific contents and topics of a specific discourse;

the investigation of the discursive strategies; the examination of the linguistic means and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations. These strategies consist, mainly, in nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation and, finally, intensification and mitigation. All these strategies pursue precise objectives and are linguistically expressed by specific devices. For example: a strategy as nomination pursues as the main objective the discursive construction of social actors, objects, events or actions and the devices are various tropes, such as metaphors, synecdoches or metonymies. Predication has as an objective the discursive qualification of social actors, phenomena or events and is presented through stereotypes, mostly attributions of negative or positive traits, collocations or explicit comparisons. Another strategy, in our opinion, the most relevant, is argumentation, which is meant to justify the statements of the speaker, and the most common way to realize that from a linguistic point of view is the use of topoi or common places. The most usual strategy, as it is the most expressive and it creates an immediate effect is that of identification and mitigation. It is linguistically realized by the use of diminutives, tag questions, indirect speech consisting in paraphrasing some statements, insisting on some specific aspects.

**2.4 Nationalist parties.** The number of nationalist parties that exist nowadays in Europe is quite impressive. They are known as nationalist parties, Radical Right parties or Right wing parties. They are to be distinguished from far-right parties and populist parties. In her interview to the specialized French scientific magazine “Mots” (115/2017), Ruth Wodak defines right-wing populism as a “political ideology that rejects political consensus and usually (but sometimes not) combines *laissez-faire* liberalism and anti-elitism. Populism is anti-pluralism and anti-elitist.” They pretend to defend the rights of common people, the people in the street, the so-called native inhabitants of a country whose life, social status and well-being are endangered by the arrival of immigrants. They are characterized by a chauvinist discourse; they instrumentalize a minority, ethnic, religious or linguistic as the cause of all current misfortunes. Populist right-wing parties promote a politics of fear and they portray themselves as the defenders of their nation. It has to be said that nationalist and populist parties represent a part of the political forces in a country, taking part in the elections, whereas far-right parties do not.

Nationalist parties exist in almost all the countries of the European Union, but not all of them take an active part in the political life in their respective country. Some of them take advantage of certain social and political circumstances to appeal to the votes of their supporters in some period of crisis. It is the case of the French Nationalist Front, renamed The National Rally, having as a leader Marine Le Pen, and the case of the United Kingdom Independent Party from Great Britain. It is quite remarkable that those two parties succeeded in winning many votes in a period of time in which the European Union had to face some major crises, such as the financial crisis, the massive immigration crisis and the Brexit situation. All these factors led to internal debates concerning the sovereignty of the member states. It was the occasion seized by nationalist parties to present themselves as the saviors of the nation.

In this respect we are going to analyze the discourses of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage, the most prominent figures of nationalist parties in Europe, discourses made in the very core of Europe, the European Parliament.

### **3. MARINE LE PEN’S NATIONALIST DISCOURSE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

Although she needs no introduction, we will say, briefly, that she is a French politician, the president of the National Front, a nationalist party formed by her father in 1972. The party is now Le Rassemblement National/ The National Rally. This party promote nationalistic ideas and ideology, being opposed to the participation of France in the European Union, to the euro as a unique coin, to euro zone, to free migration, to globalization, to a unique law for the members of the EU, to the Schengen Area, briefly, opposed to all the values promoted by the European Union. She „inherited” the leadership of the Nationalist Front from her father, whom she is at loggerheads with at present.

As a political leader opposed to any rule of law which is not that of the National Front, she opposed Sarkozy, Hollande, Macron and, perhaps she will again run for president for the next elections. She is also a European Parliament member belonging to the group called Europe of Nations and Freedom. She gave some speeches at the European Parliament, not so many, as she was more often than not absent, but she was there when she thought the moment was important.

For instance, she gave such speeches in 2015 and 2016, on two different occasions, when she found an opportunity to present the point of view

of her party. The two discourses are two very good examples of what a nationalist discourse looks like.

As for the first speech we are going to analyze, it is a speech delivered when the relationship between France and Germany were very good and when Europe was confronted with a massive refugees crisis.

Here are some considerations about Marine Le Pen's discourse.

a) We identified, first of all, the termes of address:

- *Madame Merkel*, (Madam Merkel) without indication of her official position; it is the first mark of disrespect;

- The second term of address, the most disrespectful, is „*Monsieur le vice –chambellan, administrateur de la province France*” (Mister vice –chancellor, governor of the province of France) ; the purpose of the use of this term of address is to diminish and depreciate the political position and official position of François Hollande, the president in office of the French Republic.

b) The next remark concerns a succession of reasons for which M. François Hollande should not be regarded as the president of a state. In order to justify her words, she uses some grand terms, such as „sovereignty”, „interest of the country”, „to depend on Germany concerning the issue of migration”.

We also notice the presence of a short narrative sequence, meant to diminish the members of the European Parliament, described as being obedient to Angela Merkel.

After insulting both European leaders, Angela Merkel and François Hollande, separately, she insults them altogether:

„*Vous venez ici tous deux en séance de rattrapage*” (You come here to try again to pass your exams), as if the two leaders of two important countries in Europe were poor students, trying hard to finish their academic year or their education.

After diminishing the importance of the two outstanding European leaders, Marine Le Pen presents herself as the unique person capable of saving the nation, the French nation and not only that, but all the other peoples who want to fight for sovereignty, so she addresses her colleagues from the party called Europe of Nations and Freedom.

c) We should also take into consideration some other means which are not linguistic. It is about non-verbal communication. She uses her mimic, her gestures, her voice and the intonation of her voice to underline the ideas of her speech. She points her finger at those she considers guilty for

the crisis or even disasters she predicted. She is like an actress in a play she wrote herself, promoting herself in the leading role.

On another occasion, in 2016, the same Marine Le Pen gives a speech at the European Parliament after the vote for Brexit. All of a sudden she describes the British people as „nos amis britanniques” (our British friends), she says that the vote is a remarkable event, compared in its importance to the fall of Berlin wall, so, once again she uses those terms to impress the audience.

This is another opportunity to show her support for the political entities who advocate against the European Union, against Euro-zone, against migration, against national interests of the sovereign nations. It is interesting that she calls this rise against European values „democracy”. Her speech is a little more structured and we notice a sequence of arguments in favour of all entities willing to quit the European Union”.

This is an important characteristic of nationalist discourse: to express a strong opposition against the present state of facts, which is bad, to enumerate plenty of arguments against it and to leave the audience with the conclusion that she is right in everything she advocates against.

#### 4. THE DISCOURSE OF NIGEL FARAGE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Nigel Farage is another nationalist leader; his party is UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). He became famous after his campaign in favour of Brexit and for his promises in favour of British citizens, which proved to be false.

His speech at the European Parliament is characterized by:

- The use of irony: he addresses the members of the European Parliament telling them that they are in denial, as if they were suffering of some kind of illness; he mentions, as Marine Le Pen has done before, that they imposed a lot of sacrifice on some people (the Greeks) in order to impose their policy.

- The use of diminishing words: „I know that you have never worked in your life, none of you have ever done a proper job in your lives”.

- The use of a discourse that has as a conclusion: „I told you so”, explicitly insulting the fellow members of the European Parliament, but presenting himself as the clever man, the only one capable of saving the situation.

- When he is frequently interrupted by the audience, he finds the moment to produce another populist phrase: he knows they protest because

they are in favour of the so –called „establishment” which he despises and criticises. He uses again the argument of a superior thinking and of the idea that what he supports is the benefit for his country.

When he is confronted with Jean Claude Juncker, he has a violent approach, insisting again on his superior thinking and on the fact that he had predicted all the crises that struck the peoples of the European Union and that he is the only one who has the proper solution to the predicted crises.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

It is a fact that nationalist discourse addresses a specific public, consisting of the voters and supporters, who, obviously, embrace the same ideology. This kind of discourse is meant to offer some comfort and confidence to a community of people who still believes in “traditional values” such as the nation and the sovereignty of nations, the need to protect those values against those who endanger them. Sometimes it is difficult to differentiate nationalism from populism. The leaders of nationalist parties take advantage of each and every political context to promote their ideas. These moments are usually moments of crisis and of difficulties either on national or international level. The strategies are more often than not those of an argumentative approach, meant to convince the audience.

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## THE CULT OF THE EAGLE METAMORPHOSED- A SEMIOTIC APPROACH

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**Abstract:** *Although the symbols of a country do not necessarily have a vital importance for the welfare of its existence and its priorities do not side with symbolism, it is hard not to consider them as a study element as long as they constitute the DNA of the culture, heritage and history of a certain civilization. A special history is the century-long journey of the symbol of the eagle, mostly due to a deep relationship of various peoples with its cult as a mythical bird. As the numerous archaeological records show, the symbol of the eagle, often referred to as the backbone of the personality of the peoples, has been part of the earliest world cultures. Not in vain, do we encounter it either single or double-headed in Sumerians, Hittites, Persians, Arabs, Romans, Byzantines and Seljuks without forgetting Pelasgians appearing with such representative symbols of the eagle cult. In this long journey of its, the symbol of the eagle has frequently been metamorphosed by converting from one configuration into another. But as a symbol whose natural environment is the flag, what does it represent in the mythology of the respective peoples? Why was it considered a holy bird? Can it be considered as a converging element within the context of cultural structuralism, since its myth or symbol is present everywhere? Through the language of symbols, this paper aims at giving a semiotic insight of the underlying significance that the many metamorphosed versions of this cult acquire on the basis of difference within the cultural context.*

**Keywords:** *emblem; national flag; intercultural context; symbol; semiotics*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays the current climate of intercultural communication and cultural relativism appears to be very influential and not easy to argue about, when a lot of emphasis is placed on “diversity” and “identity”. The present paper comes in the form of a descriptive study based on some qualitative research incited by a curious personal inquiry on the emblematic symbol of the eagle which in the position of a modest traveler the author found metamorphosed from one configuration to another within its own natural habitat, the national flags of some of the countries of the Balkan region, namely Albania, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.

Although the symbols of a country do not necessarily have a vital importance for the well-being of its existence and its priorities do not side with symbolism, it is difficult to not consider them as a study element as long as they form the DNA of the culture, heritage and history of a civilization. Every region or country has its own traces, histories, legends, mysteries and truths. Everything comes from antiquity as a continuous chain until present and is preserved everywhere as a rare value.

Understanding our past determines actively our ability to understand the present. Symbols are a language that can help us understand our past and then write our own histories personally or culturally and thereby define ourselves. A special history is the century-long journey of the symbol of the eagle, mostly due to a deep relationship of various peoples with its cult as a mythical bird.

### 2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND CHALLENGING QUESTIONS

In this long journey of its, the symbol of the eagle has frequently been metamorphosed by converting from one configuration into another. But as a symbol whose natural environment is the flag, what does it represent in the mythology of the respective peoples? Why was it considered a holy bird? Can it be considered as a converging element among the concerned countries within the context of cultural structuralism, since its myth or symbol is present everywhere? A tangible fact though often avoided or not studied thoroughly by the official historiographies comes from the language of symbols. Through the language of symbols, this paper aims at giving a semiotic insight of the

underlying significance that the many metamorphosed versions of this cult acquire on the basis of difference within the cultural context. The methodological approach implied here is of an obvious semiotic character.

The targets under scrutiny, the national emblems, are taken apart so that their constituent elements- the various signs that make up the structure become visible, after which the author will analyze how they acquire meaning because of their difference from other elements in the chain. First of all, the relationship between sign and meaning is arbitrary. Secondly, flags have no inherent meaning, but that meaning is enabled by difference. Thirdly, the sign "flag" only acquires meaning on the basis of difference within a certain context and it functions here within the relationship between the poles of structuralism's basic binary oppositions: those of freedom/ submission, identity/ anonymity, similarity/ diversity.

### 3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A lot is said about the eagle, from the characterization of it as an omen bird, to the qualifying designation of it as the backbone of the personality of the peoples. The fact is that the eagle symbol as the numerous archaeological records show has been part of the earliest world culture. It can be found in the remainings of the Hittite civilization dating from a period that ranges from the twentieth to the thirteen century BC.

Not in vain, do we encounter it either single or double-headed in Sumerians, Hittites, Persians, Arabs, Romans, Byzantines and Seljuks without forgetting Pelasgians appearing with such representative symbols of the eagle cult.

The division of the Roman Empire in 395 AD in the West Empire with Rome as its seat and the East Empire seated in Constantinople imposed the transformation of the single-headed eagle into a double-headed one. The Hittites drew upon a double-headed eagle so that they would never be surprised. The mysterious two-headed eagle, one of the most intriguing and powerful ancient symbols, has been present in the archaeological imagery for many centuries. It is believed to be one of the world's oldest symbols used by a number of different ancient cultures. Byzantium was created by cultures, artifacts, conventions and cultural events with stratification of Balkan populations among which the Illyrians were one of the main peoples. Byzantium made use of this emblem and acknowledged it as an official heraldic coat of arms at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century AD.

The form and colors of the Byzantine flag were designated during the rule of Justinian I, the Illyrian emperor. In this period, the eagle seems to have been adopted as an imperial symbol by the West Empire, during the rule of Frederick II, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Several Eastern European nations adopted it from the Byzantines and continue to use it as their national symbol to this day, the most prominent being Russia. However the design was in use in the East for centuries before it was officially adopted by the Byzantines and was independently adopted as the symbol of several other historical states.

Documented with archeological artifacts that are subject to art, the double-headed eagle in Albanian lands dates back to the 6th century BC.

The eagle symbol finds its natural passage from the time of antiquity to that of the Middle Ages. The double-headed eagle has been used as an emblem by countries, nations, and royal houses in Europe since the early medieval period. The official data speak of an adoption of the eagle symbol from the Byzantine despots to the Serbs and in the 15th century to the Russians. Later this eagle was also used by the Austro-Hungarian Empire as did the German and Austrian confederations.

The most historic moment that concerns Albanian people is exactly when the League of Lezha chaired by George Kastrioti Skanderbeg in 1444 chose this flag this time with the ancient symbol as a unifying element. Skanderbeg wanted to make a union of the southern and northern tribes. From that moment on the Albanians would succeed the red and black flag of the Kastrioti family to the following generations without ever changing it. For the sake of this heritage it is nowadays one of the oldest national flags in Europe and consequently even in the world. Worth pointing out is the fact that the national flags were designed really late: the national flags of France, Italy and Germany date to the 19th century.

Meanwhile, in Albania the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century coincide with the organization of some of the most important leagues in the Albanian lands which consequently brought about a variety of flag production. It is almost impossible to list all Albanian banners that were identified in this period. They represented areas and provinces, patriotic organizations, societies and large lobbying that had linked their life to the strengthening of the national identity. To be noticed during this period are the changes in the number of the eagle's feathers, the horizontal or vertical placement of the

emblematic bird on the flag's field, changes in the placement of the head, beak, eyes or other elements. Thus, we do not have a definite consolidation of the form of the flag, but it does consolidate over the years. There will continue to be changes in the flag's stylization as all the regimes will try to add their identifying elements. However, over the centuries, these changes did not affect the essence of the flag with respect to the preservation of its identity.

#### 4. THE EMBLEMATIC SEMANTICS

The eagle with one body, one heart and two heads is a very powerful ancient symbol that is believed to be one of the oldest in the world.

The double-headed eagle is a common symbol in heraldry with esoteric meanings connected to it. So what does the ancient symbol as we know it signify? What is its implication and what does its use intend to show? First of all, it is most commonly associated with the Holy Roman Empire, and with the Byzantine Empire.

Bicephalic beings imply a semantics of powerful attribution, of the power-controlling omnipotence, a symbol that shows duality which is displayed mostly in the shape of an eagle or in the configuration of twin brothers at times. In Byzantine heraldry, the heads represent the dual sovereignty of the Emperor both in secular and religious matters and/or dominance of the Byzantine Emperors over both East and West.

In fact, from the visual point of view, the emblematic eagle is the image of double eagles, of two joined eagles. Whereas from the symbolic point of view it is the image of one eagle with two faces i.e. two opposite angles like in the binary oppositions of white and black, day and night, good and evil, i.e. two opposites that hold the weight of the universe.

Moreover, the two-headed eagle is a strengthening of the symbol and a duplication of its powers, a symbol for leadership and vision. It could not be mere coincidence that such different cultures across thousands of years have adopted the same symbol and accommodated it on the fields of their flags and banners.

The flag abstracts a nation's past memories in an unwritten language understandable by the eye and the heart of a sensitive person. Which memories does our flag reveal fluttering? They are neither blows against the neighboring countries, nor memories of greed and plundering. They are memories of unwearyingly self-defensive efforts and inexorable long-lasting bravery that have left

traces in the recordings of all civilized peoples. (Konica, 2001:105).

With these extraordinary words would Faik Konica define his idea of the national flag, its symbolism and the very truths that it brings from the centuries.

The symbol of the eagle is not unique to any single culture. Rather it has been more of a universal symbol that is held in high esteem and worshiped in many different cultures around the world. The chemistry between the various peoples with the cult of the mythical bird has been rooted and sealed, through generations, in heraldry, archeology, ethnography, biblical scriptures, legends, literature and songs.

In early Christianity the eagle was seen as a symbol of hope and strength, representing salvation. Whenever the eagle appears in the book of Revelation, it does appear in a context that suggests it is on the side of God.

... but those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles; they will run and not grow weary they will walk and not be faint (Isaiah, 40:31).

As the chief over all winged creatures flying higher than any other bird, the eagle is believed to convey the powers and messages of the spirit serving as man's connection to the divine. Articulated in one of ABBA's song lyrics, the feeling of soaring high up in the sky, dizzy heights and stately majesty like would sound like the following:

They come flying from far away  
now I'm under their spell  
I love hearing the stories that they tell  
They've seen places beyond my land  
and they've found new horizons  
they speak strangely but I understand  
And I dream of an eagle  
And I dream I can spread my wings.  
(ABBA, *The Eagle*: 1977)

The emblematic bird is symbolic of the importance of honesty and truthful principles. The fierce beauty and proud independence of this great bird aptly symbolizes the strength and freedom historically aspired by the people and convey the philosophy of living life at its fullest, freely and independently.

The following poem by one of Albania's most notable modern poets, Xhevahir Spahiu seems to perfectly arrange and capture the sense of freedom and euphoria of this deep relationship.

The Eagle

Out of the azure heavens  
the eagle swooped down one day  
Onto the flag.

The heart  
said to the hand: carve!  
And the hand carved it in stone.

The eagle  
from its refuge in the cliffs  
Penetrated the expanses of song.

Penetrated  
the hero's breast  
And replaced the heart.

(Spahiu, 1993:135)

But let us go back to the starting point of the issue in question.



Fig.1. The national flags of Albania, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia respectively.

Let us take a look at the overall common features of the four national flags listed in the above graphics. Each of the referred emblems has its own history and beliefs associated with the national eagle symbol.

In the two-color Albanian flag the red is considered a divine color, symbol of the blood and consequently war as it associates with the idea of warfare. In its universality the black color becomes symbol of the historical trinity referring to the past, death and sustainability.

The three-color Romanian flag represents the blue sky under which its people live free, the yellow represents their fertile -and-grain-rich plains and the red represents the blood spilled to preserve the former two. The banner/shield on the eagle holds the emblem for the five main Romanian lands/territories. Whereas the eagle itself holds in its claws a sword to represent the army's might, the scepter for the ruler's legitimacy

and a cross in its beak, a token to represent the orthodox-Christian pride of its people.

The flag of Montenegro features the country's coat of arms against a red background. The coat of arms is a double-headed golden eagle wearing a golden crown. In its right claw, it holds a golden scepter while on the left it holds a blue orb, a sign of Episcopal authority. In combination with the scepter it symbolizes the unity or the close connection of Church and state. On the eagle's breast, there is a blue shield that has a lion passant in the centre on a green field in front of a blue sky. Derived from the same motif present in the arms of Venice, which had considerable influence in the history of the area, it represents the Biblical theme of the Resurrection, or Christ Victorious.

The national flag of Serbia is a horizontal tricolor of red, blue, and white with the coat of arms consisting of two main heraldic symbols placed left of center. The principal field featuring a white double-headed eagle on a red shield with its tongues, beaks, legs and claws in gold, between two golden fleur-de-lis, stands for the Serbian state. The red shield with a cross in the midst of four firesteels, stands for the Serbian nation. The four cyrillic S-es (which are actually betas) is that it means Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava (Only Unity Saves the Serb)

Undisputedly, the most common characteristic among the four is the presence of a bicephalic Aquila being a symbol of imperial power of Byzantine and ultimately Roman origin.

Nevertheless, with reference to the ornamented stylization of the other three emblems, the Albanian one has got a distinguished form, that of a very dynamic eagle, somehow aggressive but quite unique and which does not seem to match with either the symbol of the Montenegrin neighbors, the Romanians' or the Serbians'.

From the most ancient symbols we can understand what a people thought of themselves. What were the characteristics that they wanted to reveal by selecting that symbol. Differently from the flags of Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, which seem to suggest the historical succession of the status quos of the respective countries, the Albanian flag with the simplicity of its design being the defamiliarizing element in the chain of the referred emblems seems to be placing emphasis on the significance of its two colors, thus blood, past, death and sustainability. Certainly, within this national spirit the most important families of an Illyrian origin could not choose but the most ancient symbol, the one which had mostly been proudly succeeded by their ancient predecessors

and make of it a token of immediate selfidentification for centuries. For instance, at the beginning of his work titled "Une race oubliée; les Pélasges et leurs descendants" ("A forsaken race: Pelasgians and their descendants") published in Paris in 1894, Edouard Schneider (former chief engineer in Shkodra) would write about Albanians in terms of their relation to the eagle, a bird whose designated territory was called "Shkypnie" (the Albanian word for "Albania" in the Gheg dialect):

In Albanian the eagle is called "shkybe". The noun suffix "-tar" of the word "shqyptar" defines the action of an eagle watchman or eagle hunter. "Shkyptar" would either be an eagle guard or an eagle hunter. Even Albanians themselves are called "eagle's sons". Furthermore, "Shkypnie" designates the eagle's territory and the sons of this territory are the "Shkyptarët" (Schneider, 1894:22)

This denomination originates from an old legend about a young boy who while hunting in the mountains saw a big eagle flying above his head with a snake in its mouth which the eagle took to its nest and left it there. Out of curiosity the boy approached the nest in order to see the eagle's shelter by near. Being still alive the snake was about to pinch and poison the baby eagle that was inside the nest when the young boy intervened and killed the snake by drawing an arrow at it. After having saved its life the young boy claimed the baby eagle as his own and headed home. In order to take back its baby, the mother eagle promised to reward the young boy with the sharpness of its eyes and the strength of its arms and the people would call him in its name. The deal was settled and as the years passed, the young boy grew up being recognized by its land people as strong and heroic. During these years, the little eagle grew up too and accompanied the young boy in hunting for wild animals in wild forests and in each battle with enemies.

The locals were amazed by the bravery of the man and used to call him "The son of the eagles" and the lands where they lived were called The Land of Eagles (Shqipëri) – Eagle (Shqipe).

## 5. REDEFINING THE CULT OF THE ALBANIAN EAGLE

As a matter of fact, the symbol of the eagle, as the many archaeological data reveal, was a crucial component part of the earliest cultures. Even though it did not constitute a unifying canonical element, its myth or symbol was present everywhere. There are many elements that show its presence in various archeological and ethnographic

objects but also in the construction domain of the time. Fortunately, to this day, they continue to find expression through these domains.

In shape the stylized eagle of the flag is very different from that carried through ethnography, but it remains a fact that the symbol of this bird has traveled in ancient times in the form of worship. The configurations that in the following centuries were translated as an eagle shape was preceded by other such forms that were identified as eagle shaped symbols. These are symbols that metamorphose by transforming from one version to another. For instance, when we talk about ethnography and its antiquity, it is enough to remember that the "xhubleta", (an undulating, bell-shaped folk skirt, worn by Albanian women), in which the symbol of the eagle is presented in all its forms, has a 4000 year old heritage making it the oldest garment still preserved in the Albanian tradition.



Fig.2. The Albanian "xhubleta"

So in the canon of the representations of the eagle symbol, "xhubleta" comes across as an expression of the longstanding worship and admiration for this powerful bird. Recently, the metamorphosis of the emblematic double-headed eagle has generated in a widely used hand signal meant to visually illustrate the double-headed eagle and denote Albania in International Sign Language as well.



Fig.3. Albanian double-headed eagle hand gesture.

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## ICON AND REPRESENTATION IN VISUAL COMMUNICATION

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**Abstract:** Signs and symbols are basic elements in the visual communication process. Through them, multiple and inexhaustible possibilities of meaning are transmitted. Thus, what we recognize as being in accordance with nature, what we have learned to accept as natural is found under the sign of iconicity. In the process of creating icons, the real plays a secondary role. Essential are the various traditions of pre-existing representation, which interpose between real and sign and which act as mediating cognitive schemes, provided by the community in which we have integrated. The identification of visual signs is based on the emotional impact of the visual structures used, and the creation of a visual identity involves the production of a symbolism that is based on the mechanisms of perceptual psychology and produces an emotional association between the art consumer and the creator of meanings. Interaction between those who propose a visual concept and those who receive information in the form of a visual sign only occurs when cultural, social and ideological compatibility exists. For the very association between perception and emotion is based on patterns. We are talking about cultural recognition codes that represent a guarantor of our compliance with the world and they play an essential role in our cultural representations.

**Keywords:** community; intercultural context; communication

### 1. ICONICITY AND VISUAL COMMUNICATION

Visual communication is the kind of communication that is made through images. It involves the existence of a language, consisting of symbols, shapes and colours, which contribute to the formation of the image. For each image at the level of thinking there is a meaning, and this can be that of a concrete object or an abstract concept.

An important aspect in visual communication is to define how this type of communication is its own language. Thus, the message does not address a receiver directly, but in an abstract manner, involving multiple codes, decodable depending on the environmental conditions and the cultural level of the receiver. Decoding involves a semiotic approach, whose purpose is to learn *to look* and *to understand* the complexity of a sign's evolution, its transformation continues, depending on context and social, historical and addressability factors. In this respect, one of the tasks of semiotics is "to say whether and how we use signs to refer to something" (Eco, 2010:20), and for the understanding of social or cultural reality, *semiosis* and *representation* have the defining role:

The task of semiotics is to understand the ability of a species to produce and understand signs and, on

the human level, the work generating knowledge that ability that allows people to carry it out. First is called *semiosis*, the second is *representation*, that is the deliberate use of signs to search, classify and know the world (Sebeok, 2002:25).

In the field of visual communication, semiosis is the transmission of meanings by means of symbols. Thus, a semiotic situation is identified with a communication situation through images, the semiosis designating the process by which an artist communicates, the process of communication being made possible by the systems of significance. The meaning of the sign will be affected by the background of the viewer; its environment, education, culture, and experience will be related to how the sign will be read. One of the best examples is the use of colour as a symbol in different cultures. For example, in Western Europe, black colour is a symbol of death and sadness, and in China at funerals is used the white, which is totally opposed to European values.

The symbolic message can be understood, in terms suggested by Roland Barthes (2007) when he establishes a text / image combination reader as an encoded or non-coded iconic message. Regarding the encoded iconic message, we are talking about an interpretive process that takes place by applying one's own knowledge of the

systematic coding of an image. The image of an apple, for example, could involve the idea of life, freshness, but also knowledge or temptation; as the viewer's cultural level is more advanced the more varied the range of interpretations. A feature of encoded iconic visual messages is the alternation and amount of images that depend on what is wanted from an informational point of view.

As far as the iconic non-coded message is concerned, it works at denomination level. For example, a photo can be interpreted as a codeless message, read as such: it is a photo. Messaris (1997) argued that the purpose of visual communication is not interaction, but the forcing of the limits of understanding and knowledge of the world. Thus, the interaction between those who propose a visual concept and those who receive information in the form of a visual sign appears only when there is a cultural, social and ideological compatibility. At that time appears and the feedback, enriched with the combination of perception and emotion, the images having a beneficial social role by supporting the processes of integrating and developing a social identity. We are talking about the establishment of a cultural paradigm that presents itself as a constellation of values, beliefs and methods of questioning, shared at one point by members of a community.

## 2. CONSTITUTION OF VISUAL IDENTITY

The constitution of a visual identity involves the production of a symbolism composed of unmistakable pictorial schemes based on the mechanisms of perceptual psychology and which produce an emotional association between the receiver or the art consumer and the producer of visual meanings (art objects or consumer objects). An important step in this direction is visual exploration. It functions as an index of mental schemes and of various aspects of cognitive and motivational-emotional processes.

When we relate to the material configuration of an artistic object, we must understand that it does not only reflect the remembrance of things seen by the artist according to an immutable order of nature, but also some imaginary structures. They depend on a network of sensitive perceptions and, at the same time, on the problematic frames of the shared thinking of the artist and his contemporaries. Thus, we are talking about a series of artistic signs and ensembles that are systems of significance and which are based on some structures that generated the general conditions of

the production and conception of the work of art. In this respect, P. Francastel notes:

The need for works of art and paintings in particular to be treated as objects of civilization that can only be known and judged after a preliminary decipherment, that is, after having been confronted with both the springs their perceptual origins - often very difficult to reconcile - and our own ways of encompassing the outer universe and, at the same time, the painting itself. A picture, like a text, can only be known and judged if we have a minimum of historical and technical knowledge. Like a text, a picture must be read, deciphered. And there are laws and methods that are still very little known to guide this study. The primordial prolongation of our culture is due to the fact that, generation to generation, our predecessors have studied in detail texts, almost unique sources of history and of the history of the spirit (Francastel, 1997:7).

The deciphering of the artistic object is closely related to the concrete reality and at the same time to the imaginary reality that the general visual environment is on it, which is characteristic of a socio-cultural space at a certain time. In this respect, the visual arts function as a system of signification that establishes a reality and which

gives both individuals and societies the opportunity to discover certain relationships between the fields of perception, real and imaginary that no other mode of activity of the senses or spirit would not allow us to penetrate or express them (Francastel, 1997:10).

For the basis of any artistic approach lies an ideological program based on a series of sensitive relations between the real and the imaginary that made possible the artistic creations at a certain time:

at the base of each large figurative ensemble lies an ideological program that determined the number, the choice and distribution of figurative schemes. But which of us is today able to settle in the cathedrals of Chartres and Bourges and to reconstruct spontaneously, reading the stained glass, the system of medieval thinking? In addition, these stained glasses are made because, through a terrible effort of mind, we find that in a game of cubes a perfectly coherent scheme starting from the identification of some reorganized combinatorial elements in a rationalized string once and for all in our spirit? Do they not have to reveal rather a kind of sensitive relationship between real and imaginary, opening our way to encompassing complex and disputable values? In the end, should we reconcile the ideological program imposed by sleeping partner on the artists, or re-enter into contact with the performers' interpretive and manual

behaviour? (...) Can we believe that Renaissance people have spontaneously understood so many allegories that presently scholarly commentaries as subtle as they are solid and contradictory? (Francastel, 1997:24).

Therefore, to talk about visual identity and its constitution means to relate to the understanding of a complex system of significance based on an ideological program, the expression of a co-determination between real and imaginary, which underlies the possibilities of material configuration of creation artistic in a specific socio-cultural space at a certain time.

### 3. THE ROLE OF CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPATIBILITY IN VISUAL INTERACTION

P. Chombart de Lauwe defines culture as a set of models, imagery-guides, representations to which members of a society relate in their behaviours, in their work, in their roles and in their social relationships (Chombart de Lauwe *et al.*, 1970). From this perspective, every individual appears as a bearer of a particular culture, and inter-individual communication as an intercultural one. From a semiotic perspective, the basis of such communication is symbolic signs, which, organized in symbolic systems, have a defining role in the formation of collective mental representations. In this respect, Susan K. Langer (1942) concludes that each symbolic system is in solidarity with a certain mental organization through which individuals understand the world.

In the conception of Susan Langer, a certain age is characterized by a certain way of putting problems through a "technique" of people to formulate questions about the surrounding reality. This question-making technique determines the ways in which answers are obtained, which means that it predetermines the way in which ideas, ideologies, and conceptions about the world are produced. By drawing attention to the various levels of awareness, the author concludes that while ideas are always aware, it is quite rare to be aware of the questions that they answer, and in terms of the "problem-solving" technique less frequently, almost never, even never, for example, with regard to the ordinary man.

The answers to questions and questioning are a tribute to the same "technique" of asking questions or problems and at the same mental organization. But they will vary from one age to another and from one culture to another depending on other

"techniques" of problem-solving of the world and other *mental organizations* (intellectual, imaginary, symbolic) valid for a certain time. We are talking about a "technique" of problem-solving and mental organization that determines any hermeneutic act in the socio-cultural sphere, including the visual. In this respect, Geert Hofstede locates the "infrastructure" of a culture in so-called *mental programs*, by which he understands "ways of thinking, feeling or acting" that were "imprinted in a person's mind" (Hofstede, 1996:20). These *mental programs* functions as a "technical basement" of cultures:

The sources of individual mental programs come from the social environments where someone grew up and gained life experience. (...) The mental programs are varies as much as the social environment in which they are acquired" (Hofstede, 1996:20).

The social psychologist thinks culture as "mental software", speaking in this sense of a "secondary culture" which he defines as "collective programming of thought that distinguishes members of a group (or category of people) from another" (Hofstede, 1996:21).

The idea of understanding "secondary culture" as a collective programming that distinguishes members of one group from another can be understood in the sense that American philosopher Thomas Kuhn proposes the concept of "scientific paradigm" (Kuhn, 1976). Only in our sense will we use the concept of "cultural paradigm", which has been used more and more lately, both in social philosophy and in anthropology, psychology and sociology.

For Th. Kuhn, the central concept in characterizing the nature and dynamics of science is *paradigm*, and the criterion of distinguishing between science and non-science is problem solving. Unlike the knowledge contained in the abstract statements of the theory and in the general methodological rules, knowledge in paradigms is a *tacit knowledge*. Paradigms guide the members of the scientific group in solving new problems without their awareness of the step-by-step paradigm. They apply it, and sometimes even creatively, but can not talk about it through general formulations. This results in a quasi-conscious character of paradigms that derive from their *collective character*, although the formation of a paradigm is usually related to the name of a great thinker. The fact that members of a disciplinary group share a paradigm explains that they communicate almost completely and without major difficulties, and also explains the unanimity of

professional judgments. This is not the case with researchers who share different paradigms, as *paradigms are immeasurable*; they can not be compared, because there is no common “unit of measure” for them.

The incommensurability of the paradigms stems from the fact that the observations made by the researchers on the same reality are also immeasurable, and the paradigms involve *incompatible assumptions* about the basic entities of the studied domain and their behaviour, and they imply different criteria of delimitation of “real” problems and “legitimate” solutions. The communication jam, from Kuhn's point of view, occurs because the followers of a paradigm can not convince the followers of the competing paradigm with the superiority of their point of view, nor will they be able to understand and accept the point of view of others. Therefore, the arguments of the two sides will be circular they will only be understood and accepted by researchers already working in the same paradigm. Kuhn also rejects the assumption that there are criteria for assessing paradigms and these would be independent of the adoption of a paradigm:

Just because there is a transition between immeasurable, the transition from one paradigm to another rival can not be done step by step, constrained by logic or by a neutral experience (Kuhn, 1976:195).

The transition from one paradigm to another is through *conversion*, a term that Kuhn uses to suggest the non-rational character of adopting a paradigm.

Kuhn's theory highlights the relativity of any communication, which stems not from the “communication incompetence” of the interlocutors, but from the very nature of language and knowledge. It can also be applied in terms of the cultural dimension of reality, namely when we talk about “cultural paradigms”. Thus, within a community, it is sufficient to have two different, competing cultural paradigms for the same for the same area of the real, so that obstacles may arise in the communication. And the obstacles are caused by the incommensurability of the two paradigms.

Within each paradigm, the way of thinking and knowing is structured around a *referential*, and its understanding depends on the possibility of decrypting as appropriate as possible the meanings that define a cultural product, including in the visual. In a study proposed in 1971 for the *University Magazine of Moral Sciences*, Ferdinand Gonseth brought attention to the idea of a perceptual individual referential, on the basis of which he

explained the predetermination of our observations. The so-called “inclined fir tree parable” formulated on the basis of a personally heuristic episode during his train journey to Zürich - the perception he has when the train stops in front of a group of fir trees with their parallel trunks seemed to slash the entire surface of the glass - this illustrates an epistemic fact, namely the existence of an *a priori* in the described experience, namely *the belief that the train is on a horizontal road section*, based on the vertical relationship of the compartment as an absolute vertical. What struck the Swiss philosopher in particular was the sudden way in which the illusory referential made room for a more realistic reference.

Commenting on the episode narrated by Gonseth, Vasile Tonoiu considered that comparisons and analogies can be established with a large number of psychological phenomena, including phenomena of social psychology, as well as numerous cultural and ideological phenomena. It can happen to us, for example, that, from one day to the next, to be able to judge altogether a set of problems, a conduct or a whole set of values or ideas, and “in all these experiences there seems to be something that suggests a referential change” (Tonoiu, 1978: 33-34).

If the concept proposed by Gonseth targets an individual perceptual referential, whose importance lies in the ability to explain how observations are pre-determined, the sociologist Raymond Budon (1992) proposes the concept of “position effect” and brings to the forefront the idea of an ideological referential that operates at a cultural level. Thus, the French sociologist is questioning about the predetermination of the ideas of a knowing subject in relation to an “overall situation” that gives rise to a kind of perception based on illusion. The position of the subject in the “overall situation” is not confused with a certain social status, although often the membership group plays an important role in this. The illusion is shared by several social groups and is determined by the “position effect” (Boudon, 1997: 555-600). Thus, we speak of an ideological and cultural referential that functions as a system of fundamental representations and attitudes whose assumptions we are not aware of and which common people do not realize, but only follow. This ideological and cultural referential embraces cultural horizons and life horizons in general, contributing to the development of a cultural paradigm that establishes a specific language and specific grids of interpretation.

In the same way, Michel Foucault speaks of *episteme* as about the conditions of possibility of a cognitive field accessible to a culture:

the assembly of relationships that unite, at a certain moment, those discursive practices that give birth to epistemological figures, sciences and virtual systems [of knowledge] (Foucault, 1997:250).

Foucault postulates the uniqueness of the episteme within a culture. But a culture can also be presented as a “paradigm game” as a network of paradigms, sub-paradigms and meta-paradigms. Thus, although one can not speak of a “unifying paradigm”, one can observe the existence of *dominant* paradigms and of some *dominated*, which predetermines in different degrees the conditions of constitution of any possibility of knowledge.

Edgar Morin considered that theories and reasoning, as well as the cognitive (intellectual and cultural) field in which they are formed, are controlled by a great paradigm. It controls the epistemology itself which, in turn, controls the theory and even the practice to which the theory sends. Thus, the individuals of a community know, think and act according to the paradigm that their culture has enlisted in them. Morin does not postulate the uniqueness of a particular paradigm in a culture (in an era or in a community), but speaks of “big” and “small” paradigms of “adverse” or “intolerant” paradigms. In his conception, within a culture there may be several paradigms, between which several types of relationships can be established, from cooperative implications, juxtaposition and competition, to mutual ignorance, mutual indifference, complementarity, antagonism or intolerance. Within these paradigms we identify “a technical and cognitive capital - of sciences and skills - which can be transmitted in principle to the whole of society” (Morin, 1999: 179) and “a specific capital”, which shapes the features of the original cultural identity and “maintains a particular community by reference to its ancestors, to its dead, to its traditions” (Morin, 1999: 179). This double capital, on the one hand, controls the phenomenal existence of society, and on the other hand it is self-perpetuated through the succession of generations, reproducing itself in every individual. Thus, even at birth, each individual receives a cultural heritage that provides for social formation, orientation and development:

it is the cultural heritage that, by assuming the integration of the individual into a particular society, complements the heredity and ensures the perpetuation of society" (Morin, 1999:181).

As a generative system, culture it is constituted in a cultural quasi-code, which appears as a kind of sociological equivalent of what is the genetic code for living beings. It

maintains the integrity and identity of the social system, assures self-perpetuation or invariant reproduction, protecting it from uncertainty, danger, confusion and disorder (Morin, 1999:182).

The constitution of culture in a cultural quasi-code is an expression of an ideology that structures the collective mentally and provides interpretation schemes that form the reading grids of reality. At visual level, these interpretive schemes function as ways of creating meaning in a dual perspective, namely, on the one hand, we are talking about the creative approach and the way in which it is intrinsically reflected in its results, and on the other hand we are talking about the approach interpretive applied to the visual, in the attempt of an interpreter to capture its most intimate meanings.

#### 4. THE CULTURAL CODES OF RECOGNITION AND THE CULTURAL REPRESENTATION OF THE WORLD

The signs that we recognize as iconic are not directly related to a referent and our perceptual experience related to this, but rather to everything we knew about it in culture. In constructing the icon, the real is not essential, but the various traditions of pre-existing representation that interpose between the real and the sign, assuming the role of cognitive mediation schemes provided by the community in which we live, and which have the role of mediating the perception of reality. In this respect, Umberto Eco brings attention to the phrase “recognition code, by designating the rules according to which a form is loaded with meaning by reference to a number of variables such as repertoire, convention or context” (Eco, 1982:271). The “recognition codes” become a guarantor of the compliance of our representations with the world, since what is totally unknown to us is in fact imperceptible. Thus, we can say that the signs are “according to reality” only to the extent that they collide with the recognition codes of a particular context.

The way we perceive and represent the likeness is dependent on a “perceptual guide” that Eco calls “cognitive type” or “cognitive scheme”:

We have a cognitive type of the Moon and it has to be very complex. Indeed, we recognize it in the sky, whether it appears all over, whether it appears from

it only a sickle, or it looks red or yellow like a polenta, even when it is covered by clouds and guessing it after the light it scatters. The fact that it is spherical and that even if we see them, only one face, it has another part that we never see and never saw, it is part of a more complex molar content (Eco, 2010:315).

In addition, Eco signals that the confrontation of signs, icons with natural reality has never led to mutations in their artistic representation. For example, in the European medieval art, the rhinoceros was represented as an animal with scales, as this was how his image was fixed in painting of Dürer, which in turn used a cultural prototype:

This is why the iconographic techniques were preferred, because (to resort to the classic example of Gombrich) Dürer's rhinoceros presented scales by virtue of a cultural type (Eco, 2010:325).

The relatively late confrontation of painters with a true rhinoceros did not result in the modification of his cognitive scheme, which was commonly used in painting. This is explained by the fact that the signs that create the illusion of resemblance operate on the basis of rules and conventions, and in the establishment of similarity a process of interpretation takes place. In this respect, Richard Woodfield emphasized that

what has been called the history of seeing is really the history of a learning process through which a socially coherent public was trained by the artist to respond in a certain manner to certain signs (Woodfield, 2011:11-13).

Therefore, the cultural representation of the world is based on a hermeneutical process that is based on the existence of cultural recognition codes that function as perceptual guides and on which we base our knowledge, including when we are in the realm of vision.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Understanding visual communication means referring to the particular language that it involves. This is a language based on icons and symbols, whose understanding is closely related to the interpretation schemes offered by ideologies that at a certain moment contribute to structuring the collective mentality of a socio-cultural space. In this context, the purpose of visual communication is to force the limits of understanding and

knowledge of the world, since the visual environment, characteristic for a socio-cultural space at a given moment, is constituted by both elements of concrete reality and elements of imaginary reality, both working together to define the ideological and cultural referential that frames and defines a certain cultural horizon.

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## THE NEW MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART AS A PLACE OF COMMUNICATION FOR THE. “SECOND WAVE” FEMINIST ART WORLD

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**Abstract:** *This abstract underlines the relationship between exhibitions held at Tucker's New Museum of Contemporary Art during the 1980's and the "Second Wave" Feminist Art World. Within the museum ambit, Tucker was a pioneer in dealing with themes such as diversity and how sexual sensitivity can affect artistic representation. Tucker's interest lay in tackling concepts which, for various reasons, such as market, political and sexual discrimination, were not necessarily visible. The museum was conceived as a laboratory of ideas connected to issues of everyday life. The Tucker exhibitions which handled the relationship between sexuality and its varied forms of expression were: "Extended Sensibilities: Homosexual Presence in Contemporary Art," 1982; "Difference: On Representation and Sexuality", 1984; "Let the Record Show", 1987. These exhibitions were the first to reflect systematically on how art was a means to bring together differing points of view regarding sexuality: the European approach and North American approach. Presently, the debate inherent to art and feminist criticism is flourishing, and there is a proliferation of literature regarding "Second Wave" art practice and criticism between the 1970's and 1980's (Kate Mondloch 2012). According to some currents of thought, the 1980's were characterized by "theoretical feminism": a model of psychoanalytical and poststructuralist criticism, wholly dedicated to language, representation and the psyche. According to both Kelly and Kolbowski, there is no general concept of feminism but a concept born and developed in differing ways and at different times. This underlines the problem of a general periodization of the various forms of Feminist Art.*

**Keywords:** art; cultural approach; exhibition; feminism; periodization

### 1. FOREWORD

The advent of the French May Student Revolution spread quickly throughout both the Old World and the New World<sup>1</sup>. Among the themes present in this contestation was debate inherent to ethics and Art Institutions (Guidi, 1982). In 1969, Harald Sezeeman organized the “*When Attitudes Become Form*” exhibition:

The major characteristic of today's art is no longer the articulation of space but of human activity; the activity of the artist has become the dominant theme and content. It is in this way that the title of the present exhibition should be understood (it is a sentence rather than a slogan). Never before has the inner bearing of an artist been turned so directly

into a work of art. (Sezeeman, 1969, no page number).

A further hallmark of these years of contestation was the strong attention paid to the democratization of art; it was believed that the Art World should not be the sole domain of the social elite but one which was accessible to all.

From this, one can also understand another aspect regarding the democratization of Art, that is, how artistic and museum spaces also had an educational role to play in respect to the public (Brook, 1968).

During the 1970's, following McLuhan's “*the medium is the message*” concept, many artists experimented with themes inherent to *Art and Reality*, and these artists paid attention to medium as a means of both social analysis and the communication of varied artistic forms.

Naturally, the concept of “*medium*” regards photography, film, video and television. It entails a complete turn-around of the concept (...) The

<sup>1</sup> Some authors retain that the *Second Wave* feminist movement began with the 1968 Student Revolution (see: Baumgardner J. and Walker R., (2000), *Manifesta: Young Woman, Feminism and the Future*, Straus and Giroux and Drake J. (1997), *Third Wave Feminism, Feminist Studies*, 23 (1), pp (97-108).

difference between painting, drawing and sculpture should be neither levelled nor eliminated. The term “medium” makes clear that alongside “new media”, classical painting, graphics and sculpture must also be regarded as a means of communication. (Romain, 1977:21)

During the first few months of the Student Revolution, women began to perceive that:

Many young women had their first political experiences within the student movement and in left-wing organizations, in particular the New Left parties. They acquired skills in political analysis and in organization. But they found themselves so frustrated by the subordinate position they occupied in relation to men. There was a pervasive indifference to their particular interests and needs as women. They were “angels of the mimeograph machine” (angeli del ciclostile) doing behind the scenes support work for those (mostly men) who had a public presence as leaders, speakers, and writers. (Barkan, 1985:31)

In this period, various feminist collectives were set up in which women examined:

(...) the sources of oppression and sources of strength in both their personal lives and society in general. Often this examination leads to considerable growth in the lives of the participants each of whom begins to work in her own way to change the system of sexist oppression (...) (NYRF, 1975:1).

Marcia Tucker became acquainted with New York feminist collectives in 1968:

Talking honestly with a group of women with whom you know you are completely safe opened up a new way of being for me. I found out that many other women shared my experience, which was extremely illuminating.

The personal became political for us; shared personal experiences have moved us into the dimension of action. For instance, our group participated in marches against the conditions in women’s prisons, facilitated new consciousness raising groups in the arts, and did all kinds of organizational work to support women both inside and outside the arts. (Tucker, in Pachmanovà, 2006:118).

A problematic aspect concerning the *Second Wave* feminist movement, prevalently made up of middle-class white women, regarded the relationship between social class and ethnicity. This peculiarity gave rise to Afro-American and Latin-American feminist groups which had on their

political agenda not only respect for the civil rights of women, but also for the rights of the ethnic group to which they belonged. For instance, the *Black Panther*, who organized feminine self-awareness groups, followed the dictums of Marxist class-warfare ideology and wished to create their own state.

A further typology was the NAACP, which also had feminist collectives within its organization. However, the NAACP aimed to improve the conditions of the ethnic group it represented by peaceful means.

## 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART

Tucker opened her New Museum of Contemporary Art in a small space within the *Fine Art Building* (FAB) at 105, Hudson Street in the TriBeCa area of New York on 1<sup>st</sup> January, 1977. Tucker’s first collaborators were: Susan Logan, Alan Schwartzmaniz and Michiko Miyu.

A particularity of the Museum was that it was not equipped with a display area but had only offices from which to coordinate exhibitions and manage contact with artists and the Press.

The first three exhibitions which Tucker organized were held at venues external to the FAB<sup>2</sup>.

Due to the sale of the FAB, Tucker moved her museum to *The New School for Social Research* at 65 Fifth Avenue on 14<sup>th</sup> July, 1977 with the help of Vera List (Tucker, 1978). This new location had both offices and a display area and the first exhibition which she held there was *Early Work by Five Contemporary Artists*. This exhibition ran from 11<sup>th</sup> November to 30<sup>rd</sup> December, 1977.

Tucker’s idea to open an exhibition space originated from the previous decade when she was working at the Whitney Museum. Owing to her position here as curator, she had the opportunity to work with both emergent and established artists, both male and female. The position also allowed

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<sup>2</sup> The first exhibition, which was entitled “*Memory*” and held on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1977, took place at C Space, at 81 Leonard Street, New York. The second exhibition, “*Four Artists: Drawings*” was held in Tokyo at the Contemporary Museum from 20<sup>th</sup> August to 20<sup>th</sup> September, 1977. The third exhibition took place in Woodstock at The Gallery of July and August between 23<sup>rd</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> July, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> At a later juncture, the museum moved first to the Astor Building at 583 Broadway in SoHo, and then to 235 Bowery, between Stanton Street and Rivington Street.

her to compare and contrast herself with the various concepts and currents existing in America in that period<sup>4</sup>.

In 1976, Tucker wrote to Brian O'Doherty regarding her intention to introduce a new style of museum management:

a workable, serious contemporary art center that would bridge the gap between alternative spaces like The Clocktower and Artists Space and the top-heavy bureaucratic structures.

At the end of the 1970's, great weight was given to *Art Museum Collections* as a means of distinguishing one museum, gallery and alternative space from another. This created a hierarchy of importance among the various structures exhibiting artworks. This did not favour contemporary art given that the artists were neither as well-known nor as highly sought-after and so their works were less likely to be purchased for inclusion in Institutional Collections.

(...) museums focused increasingly on their collections, on acquiring works and showing them, and on looking for collectors to donate or to will their collections to the museum, they became increasingly out of touch with what was actually happening today. (Tucker, in Pachmanová, 2006:111)

Given the then limited number of contemporary artworks present in museum collections, Tucker wished to emphasize the relationship between works of art and the world at large; without this connection, contemporary art in a social vision, could not assume dialectical importance within the art world. This was on account of the fact that only such a vision could highlight this relationship, and the same was true for neglected groups of artists tackling social and political issues, for example AIDS, Feminism and Ethnicity, through their works.

Through the exhibitions and debates she organized around exhibition themes, Tucker succeeded in presenting this connection between the world at large and the Art World.

In the 1980's, when Tucker's museum was in a position to hire a larger number of collaborators, she published the first book in the series entitled "Documentary Sources in Contemporary Art".

In the same period, the museum undertook its High School Art Program (HSAP), which was an initiative geared towards having problematic adolescents involved in educational programs at the museum. These programs, which were the first of their kind in the United States, were characterized by their interdisciplinary and intercultural methods which were employed so that youngsters could gain awareness of the socio-cultural questions surrounding them in their daily lives.

The Tucker exhibitions which handled the relationship between sexuality and its varied forms of expression were:

"Extended Sensibilities: Homosexual Presence in Contemporary Art", 1982.

"Difference: On Representation and Sexuality", 1984.

"Let the Record Show", 1987.

**2.1 *Extended Sensibilities: Homosexual Presence in Contemporary Art, 1982.*** In the introduction to the exhibition catalogue, the curator, Daniel Cameron, expressed his personal vision and three forms of "Homosexual Content":

**Homosexual Subject Matter:** the manufacturers of mass-produced goods targeted the heterosexual market while undertaking to endow products with features which would attract other typologies of consumer. For what concerned the Art World, the gender of exhibition visitors and those who bought works of art was of no relevance. Due to that fact that the sexual identity of art exhibition visitors and those purchasing artworks was of no importance to the artist, Cameron believed that mass producers should not take the gender of consumers into consideration, either.

**Ghetto Content:** the focus of this categorization was once again the consumer, yet with a difference; both the producer/artist and the consumer/public were homosexual. "Ghetto Content" suggests mass-produced goods and fine art works aimed at social minorities. "Ghetto Content" can be observed in art, the Media and in items produced by homosexuals for Gay and Lesbian consumers.

**Sensibility Content:** this third category was conceived as the sum of the previous two approaches. "Sensibility Content" was characterized by its having no specific public and by its being born from personal sensibility and academic study, from the experiences of an artist inherent to the idea of homosexuality seen as a concept.

Knowledge of the concept did not imply sexual orientation; without being explicit, artists

<sup>4</sup> As examples: Ree Morton, Gladys Nilsson, Nancy Graves, Jane Kaufman, Lee Krasner and Joan Mitchell. For a complete vision see <https://www.whitney.org/artists>.

manipulated images and material to create a concrete representation of the concept of gender using homosexual overtones.

**2.2 “Difference: on Representation and Sexuality”, 1984.** This exhibition was managed by the guest curator Kate Linker and by two co-curators who were responsible for the choice of films projected at the film forum which ran alongside the exhibition. With regards to the “*Difference: On Representation and Sexuality*”, Marcia Tucker stated:

The point of view of this exhibition is specific, since gender itself is not the subject of the show; it is instead an intellectual as well as visual exploration of how gender distorts "reality," as seen through the work of thirty-one artists, both male and female. (Marcia Tucker, in Lincker, 1984:4).

This reality is the result of artistic thinking and so it is a subjective way of interpreting a determined reality. The aim of this exhibition was to underline how each artist reads reality through bias, what Tucker defined as “a visual exploration of how gender distorts reality”. Tucker believed that what an artist experienced helped form his sensibility towards certain thematics and points of view and these biases or cognitive distortions were to represent the basis of this exhibition.

Making reference to Freud and Lacan<sup>5</sup>, the modalities used in the analysis of these biases were mainly psychoanalytical.

**2.3 “Let the Record Show”, 1987.** The curator of this exhibition was Olander. He contacted Coalition to Unleash Power ACT UP activists to produce an installation intrinsic to the AIDS issue. Throughout the 1980’s, New York City bore witness to the deaths of approximately 75,000 people due to this disease, accounting for something in the region of 20% of those Americans dying from AIDS (New York Times, 2001). The installation was entitled “SILENCE=DEATH”.

The installation was a provocation towards State and Federal Healthcare Institutions and individuals who, according to ACT UP, in an attempt to achieve their own political ends, were those responsible for the institutional reserve and

maneuvering which barred the spreading of information regarding AIDS.

### 3. CONCEPT OF FEMINISM BUT A CONCEPT BORN AND DEVELOPED IN DEFFERING WAYS AND AT DIFFERENT TIMES

In the introduction to her book “*Mobilities Fidelities*”, Martina Pachmanová wonders:

How can women (and other marginalized groups) speak so that they would be really listened to? In other words, how to make visible (and readable) what has been forgotten, and what was subdued by various systems of power? (Pachmanová, 2006:7).

In reply to Pachmanová, Marcia Tucker said:

We wanted to emphasize the relationship between works of art and the world at large, because without that connection art – and contemporary art especially – becomes valued by only a few people within a very small, closed system. Moreover, only through making this relationship clear could various neglected groups, including women, finally emerge from obscurity, and the reasons for their historical and cultural dislocations be properly examined. (Tucker, in Pachmanová 2006:115).

The concept of relating works of art<sup>6</sup> to the world at large with the aim of having art become a means of social criticism, according to *Second Wave* Feminists, allowed for a restructuring of the concept:

“[...] system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (Moscovici, 1973:ix–xiv).

The organization of exhibitions and the relative debates inherent to a given theme was a means through which the community could elaborate

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<sup>5</sup> See: Nancy Fraser (2013), “Against Symbolism: the Use and Abuse of Lacanianism for Feminist Politics” in “Fortune of Feminism. From State Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis.”

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<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that in the three aforementioned exhibitions the participating artists were not only female but also male. As there was a tendency to stereotype males negatively, this was a choice which “*Second Wave*” Feminists did not wholly approve of. (see: Ruspini, E., 2003, “Le Identità di Genere”, Carocci, Roma). Tucker’s capacity to include male artists in these exhibitions had a positive effect on the reconstruction of social representations.

certain issues and begin to question the Social Representation Theory<sup>7</sup> of these issues.

Considering the art practice and criticism of “Second Wave” feminists between the 1970’s and 1980’s (Kate Mondloch, 2012) through the theory of social representation, it may be hypothesized that a classification of feminism linked to a specific period can become difficult in that a Manichaeian distinction would imply that social and political history had evolved simultaneously and in the same way.

At the end of the 1960’s, the feminist movement in the United States was divided according to the objectives which were considered as having priority.

As their main objective, the radical feminist movement belonging to Black Panther had the development of the Afro-American liberation movement and used a Marxist class warfare approach. (Davis, 2016).

Radical feminist groups, such as the New York Radical Feminists, largely made up of upper-middle class white women, gave priority to male oppression:

As radical feminists we recognize that we are engaged in a power struggle with men, and that the agent of our oppression [...]. We do not believe that capitalism, or any other economic system, is the cause of female oppression, nor do we believe that female oppression will disappear as a result of a purely economic revolution. (NYRF., 1975:1).

As can be seen from this extract, the Afro-American struggle for liberation goes unmentioned and one can understand a Socio-democratic rather than a Marxist vision<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> “The Social Representation Theory belongs to the realm of social psychology, and claims that social psychological phenomena can only be properly understood if they are seen as being embedded in historical, cultural and macro-social conditions. The concept of Social Representation, that is, the collective processing: “[...] of a social object by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating” (Moscovici, 1963, pp. 231-260)“ (Rega, 2010:3).

<sup>8</sup> A further aspect of European and American feminist groups made up prevalently of white members was: “an emphasis that has been picked up and extended in the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, our sexual identities as male or female, our confidence in language as true or false, and our security in the image we judge as perfect or flawed, are fantasies”. (Rose, 1985:32).

These are just two examples to underline how the feminist vision in a single western nation had different priorities during the same historical period.

This diversity of sensibility inherent to feminism was reflected within the contemporary art world. Recently, these differences have also been expressed by Mary Kelly and Silvia Kolbowski, two artists who took part in the *Difference: On Representation and Sexuality* exhibition.

In the 1995 article *A Conversation on Recent Feminist Art Practices* Kelly sustained that: “Sometimes we fall into periodization [...] different historical and political contexts produced very different forms of feminist intervention in art” (1995:64). Kelly was working in Europe and when she went to the United States, she understood that concepts born and developed in Europe, for instance *Psychoanalysis*, were perceived differently there.

In the same article, Kolbowski argued the importance of noting that when Kelly produced *Post-partum* in Britain, Judy Chicago was producing works in America. There were clear differences between Kelly and Chicago concerning: “what was going on in each country in terms of feminist art practice and feminism in general”. (Kolbowski, in Kelly, 1995:52).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

During her life, Marcia Tucker had close contact with the main artistic and social movements existent at her times. In addition, her position as curator at the Whitney Museum allowed her to acquaint herself with both emergent and well-established artists.

These two areas of experience gave Tucker the opportunity to elaborate her critical sense; having the possibility to frequent not only mainstream artists, she was able to make comparisons between both well-established and up-and-coming artists to ascertain whether the former were able to bring anything new to the artistic world.

During the months which Tucker spent in TriBeCa working at the *Fine Art Building*, she opened the headquarters of her museum and, at the same time, got to know individuals, such as Stephen Eins who then founded *Fashion Moda* and Alanna Heiss who went on to establish *P.S.I.*, people who were to change the whole concept of museums and galleries. In the same period, Tucker acquainted herself with feminist collectives and female artists.

In those years, TriBeCa was the fulcrum of experimental art in general. The area was home to hitherto unknown American and foreign artists who were to become well-established in the coming years.

The singularity of Tucker's New Museum of Contemporary Art was its creation of an exhibition space in which contemporary artists could display their works.

The 1970's witnessed large-scale social contestation towards the establishment, a phenomenon which also permeated into the artistic world and thus, art became a means of social protest. Through her exhibitions Tucker demonstrated great sensitivity towards social issues, so much so that some of her exhibitions have achieved iconic status in the history of contemporary art. A further example of Tucker's sensitivity is represented by the fact that she incorporated the works of male artists into exhibitions handling the various forms of sexuality, something which as-of-then had prevalently been the domain of feminist artists.

The current proliferation of literature on "Second Wave" feminists has presented a problem regarding the periodization of the feminist movement (Merck, 1987, Gever and Summer 1986) Given that events concerning history, politics and art around the world have evolved neither in the same way nor at the same time, a new school of thought is now developing, one which does not divide the feminist movement into precise historical periods, such as "First Wave" and "Second Wave".

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## THE ISSUE OF THE LATIN AND DACIAN ORIGINS OF THE LANGUAGE AT THE DAWN OF ROMANIAN CULTURE. THE EMERGENT FORMS OF ROMANIAN LITERATURE

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**Abstract:** *This paper deals with a topic as complex as it is interesting and relevant. Analyzing the issues of Latinity and Dacism as sources of the Romanian language, providing an overview of the various theories addressing the Romanian ethnogenesis and defining several Romanian historiographical works as emerging forms of Romanian literature, the article provides a general perspective on the dawning of Romanian culture, its sources and specificities. The Romanian language and culture are described in a scientific way, in accordance with historical truth.*

**Keywords:** *Latinity and Dacianism; ethnogenesis; chronicles; religious writing; migrationist theory*

### 1. THE CHRONICLERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE "TRANSYLVANIAN SCHOOL" ON THE LATIN VERSUS DACIAN DILEMMA

In the introduction [*Predoslavia*] to *Letopiseşul Ţării Moldovei* [The Chronicle of the Moldavian Country], chronicler Grigore Ureche states that the Romanian language is a neo-Latin language, showing that many of our words come "From the Romans, who are Latin", since "we call « pâine » what they call « panis »; « carne » what they call « caro »; « găina », what they call « galina »" (Ureche, 1958:67)<sup>1</sup>. All the later efforts of humanists were designed to follow in the same line and the idea was further developed by several generations of scholars. The issue of the Romanian ethnogenesis and of the Latin origins of the Romanian language vastly preoccupied Miron Costin, Constantin Cantacuzino, Dimitrie Cantemir, and towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the main figures associated with the "Transylvanian School" (in Romanian, "Şcoala Ardeleană") – a cultural movement and school of thought, having authored a series of history books, grammars, and dictionaries – reinforced these early ideas concerning the origins of Romanians and their continuity of settlement in

Dacia. Petru Maior, the most scientific mind among the representative figures of the School, formulated the pertinent conclusion that the native language developed on the basic patterns of popular Latin. He acknowledged the influence of Slavic on the Romanian language, but also demonstrated that it hadn't changed its grammatical structure. Petru Maior envisaged the further elaboration of orthographic norms required by the necessary switch to the Latin alphabet and compared the vernacular with other romance languages, demonstrating that it hadn't been altered significantly. A more radical perspective was articulated by Samuil Micu Klein, calling for the purification of the Romanian language of non-Latin elements and the artificial introduction of the ablative case. However, he justifiably advocated the replacement of the Cyrillic alphabet with Latin lettering and co-authored, in 1780, a grammar called *Elementa linguae daco-romanae sive valachicae* with Gheorghe Şincai. In the context of this high-spirited and often passionate cultural background, a few prominent theories came into shape.

### 2. THEORIES ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE AND LANGUAGE

There are three main theories concerning the geographic space in which the Romanian ethnogenesis took place, referring to the actual

<sup>1</sup> Original fragment: „De la râmleni, ce le zicem latini, pâine, ei zic panis; carne, ei zic caro; găina, ei zic galina.” Our translation.

territories having harbored the Romanian people and language during the first stages of their formation.

**2.1. The North-Danubian theory.** Advocates: Dimitrie Cantemir, Petru Maior, Bogdan Petriceicu Hașdeu. The Romanian people and the Romanian language came into being in the territories on the left shore of the Danube. However, this theory does not account for the formation of the South-Danubian dialects.

**2.2. The Romanian ethnogenesis occurred simultaneously on the Northern and Southern shores of the Danube.** Advocates: A. D. Xenopol, Nicolae Iorga, Sextil Pușcariu, A. Rosetti. The Northern Dacian-Romanian elements have been of a greater importance.

**2.3. The migrationist theory.** Advocates: Franz J Sulzer, Robert Roesler, J. C. Engel. The Romanian people was born on the southern shores of the Danube, in a territory somewhere between Bulgaria and Albania, from where it migrated to Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. According to this theory, the Romanians arrived after the Hungarians and Saxons. This theory distorts and mystifies historical truth.

### 3. EMERGENT ROMANIAN LITERARY TEXTS

**3.1. The Relevance of Ureche, Costin and Neculce's chronicles.** Apart from the said approaches concerning the "Latin versus Dacian" dilemma, the emerging indigenous culture was mostly composed of historiographical literature. *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei* [The Chronicle of the Moldavian Country] is a first turning point in relation to the previous chronicles written in Slavonic.

Concision is deemed virtues narrationis, the most important characteristic of the historiographical style. The text is mainly defined by its moralizing intent. "Involuntary expressiveness" (Negrici, 2017) thus becomes a major feature of the narrative discourse, and the style relates closely to the spoken tradition. The chroniclers approach the issue of the Latin lexical fund of the language, they discuss historical topics, describe mentalities, and therefore become a source of inspiration for the Romanian "Forty-Eighters" – a significant group of 19th century unionist literati.

Grigore Ureche presents a dramatized version of history, as seen from a moral, Christian perspective. The chronicler uses irony, antitheses, sayings, direct speech. Ureche's style is not

scientific, as the matters considered are "brought to life" by evocative narrations and descriptions. Alexandru Piru notes that as a storyteller, Grigore Ureche avoids rhetoric ornamentation, is severe in style and excels at moral portraying, as he is able to sketch a portrait or a wider scene in a few simple, essential lines, by employing a method which is very similar to the technique of engraving (Piru, 1962; 1970). Sometimes, the characters linger in the reader's memory due to the famous catchphrases attributed to them by the chronicler (e.g., Alexandru Lăpușneanu). Pompiliu Constantinescu notices that Grigore Ureche spotlights heroic elements in a way that resembles Titus Livius' (Constantinescu, 1928-1938/ 1989). When he analyzes Stephen III of Moldavia's eulogy, Eugen Negrici details the impact of Latin historians on Ureche's writing, consisting of the overall presence of moral considerations, the chronicler's solemn remarks and the text's well-balanced organization, as well as of the factual tension of determinations (Negrici, 2017). Nicolae Manolescu (1990) considers that Grigore Ureche's sentences reflect the difficulties generated by the switch from the oral to the written culture, a polarization which gives way to anacolutha, to cumbersome syntactic constructions and word-order discontinuities.

Miron Costin is "our first war correspondent". His texts are memoirist in character. In this case, the chronicler mainly provides an account of the "workings of the world" ("viița lumii"), because his purpose is to introduce the Romanian culture to "this type of written material called lyrics" [„acest feliu de scrisoare, care se cheamă stihuri"] and hence comes to articulate a treaty on prosody. Eugen Negrici writes that in contrast to Grigore Ureche, who frequently lacked historical data and had to research different aspects, Miron Costin, on the contrary, felt the need to select the most important information in an immense inventory of terrible events, political mutations, and fascinating historical figures (Negrici, 2016:47, 123-124). Both Iorga and Călinescu mention the fact that for its last part, Costin's chronicle becomes a true novel, in the sense that fantasy and the author's emotional or personal inputs are dominant (Iorga, 1969; Călinescu, 2003).

Ion Neculce transcribes 42 legends which are strongly impregnated with the spiritus loci (the anima, the spirit of the place). The chronicler's bet is on the sensational dimension of events. His texts are malicious, vindictive pamphlets. George Călinescu writes, in reference to Neculce's work, that "As you read Neculce's chronicle, a name

pops into your mind: Creangă<sup>2</sup> (Călinescu 2003), that is to say, with Neculce, there's a mixture of peasant wisdom and townsmen's culture. Valeriu Cristea similarly states that Ion Neculce is the scholar who guided the first steps of cult literature away from folklore (Cristea, 1974:176). Ergo, the chronicler managed to enter the Romanian history of literature following the path of legend and folk history. Neculce mostly relied on folk narratives, from which he collected stories, rumors, proverbs, superstitions. Ștefan Ciobanu demonstrates that Neculce is an extremely skilled portrayer, as the characters he builds are not static, but described in full motion and evolution (Ciobanu, 1989:290-300). The personalities of rulers particularly shift in spectacular ways.

Dimitrie Cantemir was uncommonly erudite. The style of his Hieroglyphic History [Istoria ieroglifică] is allusive, ironic, sometimes gnomic, some other times philosophical. Nicolae Manolescu thinks that "Cantemir's work is both naive and sophisticated, elementary and refined"<sup>3</sup> (Manolescu, 1990:77.). Elvira Sorohan notes that the Sensus allegoricus (allegorical meaning) is grounded with Cantemir on the use of different morally significant masks. Thus, the masks do not conceal personalities, but rather reveal typologies (Sohoran, 1978:37, 105, 109, 111; 1998:294).

**3.2. The religious dimension of human existence (15th to 18th centuries).** The emergence and development of the Romanian culture was directly connected to the evolution of religious ideas. In the Romanian principalities, like everywhere else, the medieval man was religious. His existence was guided by faith and the hope of salvation. The Middle Ages man had a more acute perception of the fleetingness and instability of human life, of ethical and religious values. Predominantly religious, the medieval culture hence produced religious texts and was strongly influenced by religious elements. Men lived their lives according to religious principles, but at the same time held onto certain superstitions.

All these observations are also present in Miron Costin's philosophical poem *Viița lumii* [The Workings of the World]. Written between 1671 and 1673, in verses of 13 to 14 syllables and comprising 130 lyrics written in Cyrillic lettering, it was later published by Bogdan Petriceicu

Hașdeu in Latin characters. The poem contains pessimistic reflections on the fate of man and the universe, their evanescent, precarious and unpredictable essence, as well as optimistic musings concerning man's ability to escape fate by deed and thought. The sources having inspired Costin are David's Book of Psalms and The Ecclesiastes, while the theme might have been provided by Quintus Curtius. Also, there are distinct elements in the poem which can be traced back to folk funeral laments, to proverbs or regional aphorisms. The composition is structured in four main parts: there is an introduction to the topic, an argumentation, a lamentation (an *ubi sunt* sequence very similar to one of François Villon's), and an epilogue.

Another important scholar of the period is the Moladvian Metropolitan Dosoftei. Striving to find the best Romanian equivalences for the original biblical texts, he translates David's psalms into Romanian. His purpose is primarily pragmatic, ecclesiastic, but the translator is also preoccupied with the rendition of prosody and versification, with the quality of the writing style. The remarkable delicacy, vigor, musicality, expressivity, and solemnity of the verses, as well as their overall sententious aspect, are evident. Poetic visions are terrifying. The religious poet prefers morally infused verse, which thereupon become true lyric confessions. Dosoftei is a bold experimenter and a virtuoso of rare rhymes. The author of *Psaltirea pre versuri tocmită* [The Versified Psalter] often follows an autochthonous folkloric pattern, as well as the Polish model provided by Kochanowski.

Another Metropolitan of vast erudition was Antim Ivireanul [Antim from Iveria], the Metropolitan of Bucharest. A pragmatic personality, he printed numerous books for priests, an illustrated chronograph, etc. His most important work is *Didahiile* [The Teachings]. In these "teachings", the author proves his awareness regarding the conventional nature of the language. He addresses his listeners directly, capturing their interest by means of special metaphors: "the toil of teaching", "the bait of words"<sup>4</sup> (Ivireanul, 2011). Word-order is sometimes overstrung in his sentences; Greek expressions are used as a means of persuasion. A religious event or character is always spotlighted in the sermons in such a way as to be placed in the right light for moral parables to spring out of the design. Direct contact with the

<sup>2</sup> Original fragment: " Când citești cronică lui Neculce, un nume îți năvălește în minte: Creangă." Our translation.

<sup>3</sup> Original fragment: "opera lui Cantemir este naivă și sofisticată, elementară și rafinată." Our translation.

<sup>4</sup> Original fragments: „mreață a învățaturii”, „undita cuvintelor”. Our translation.

audience is achieved through portraying pamphlets and panegyrics. Antim Ivireanul is not a mediocre theologian or compiler. He is a true scholar able to process his sources, trying to make his speech as accessible to the public as possible.

Like all medieval scholars, Antim Ivireanul is a man of the church. His cultural efforts as a typographer, engraver and painter are all impacted on by the spirit of the Middle Ages. At this period, any work of art is meant, first of all, to fulfill a religious purpose. Extremely knowledgeable about the Bible, Antim Ivireanul is an ecclesiastical orator able to master all the keys of his instrument: solemnity, familiarity, its parabolic, poetic and messianic character.

Vaarlam, the author of *Cazania* [The Sermon] (1643), also called *The Romanian Book of Learning*, also uses a scholarly style in his writings. *Cazania* is defined by its simplicity and its concise, commonplace language. Compiling a series of sermons, the book illustrates the same type of literary rhetoric. Some episodes involving saints are narrated, so as to reach the listener's heart quickly. Legends and fairy tales of ethical and religious significance are also included, in this case following the patterns of folk stories.

Deeply involved in various fields of life and knowledge (social, legal, political), the Church had a significant impact on education in the Middle Ages (as monasteries and convents often housed schools), but especially on culture: most cultural activities were hosted by monasteries, including the transcription and printing of books of worship or teachings.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

In sum, the concerted effort to demonstrate the Latin character of the Romanian language, the emergence of indigenous literature as a development of historiographical writings, the first attempts at expressiveness and the consolidation of certain classical rhetoric practices in religious texts were the dawn of Romanian culture and spirituality and found scriptural forms and techniques that

made it possible for these early writings to be preserved in time.

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## THE PEDAGOGICAL COMMUNICATION

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**Abstract:** *Communication, in its twofold verbal and non-verbal articulation, is the constitutive element of pedagogical communication, therefore the in-depth knowledge of its elements and its complexity, both theoretically and experientially, is indispensable for the quality of any educational intervention. In order for communication to be as effective as possible, an optimal harmonization of one's physical, emotional and mental levels is needed; this helps to increase the awareness of our expectations, is able to put more focus on the goals for which we communicate, it makes us further understand how these affect relationships with others and clarifies the meaning of the images we have made of ourselves, of the others and situations. The teaching / learning process presupposes that the student is the protagonist of the educational and cultural process. He must be stimulated so that he can "learn to learn" and be facilitated in the acquisition of relative autonomy and awareness. Communicative acts of communication, active listening, desire and admiration, gaze, understanding and empathy are part of the communication acts marked by success. In order for the trainer to be an attentive promoter and facilitator of individual potentials, it is essential that he can move in the complex of relational dynamics having to his work a work of knowledge and deepening of the personal self, to be able to use himself with the awareness of his potential and of their limits and do not incur gaps and inconsistencies caused by the lack of an experiential training. Listening to oneself means being more in touch with what is happening within us, keeping our channels of communication clean, it is this, in fact, that helps us to understand our needs and desires and to channel in positive, reactions and emotions.*

**Keywords:** *education; awareness; communication*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In order for the trainer to become an attentive promoter and also a facilitator of individual potential, it is essential that he can move on the whole of relational dynamics having to his knowledge a work of knowledge and deepening on the personal self. This is important in order to be able to use oneself, with the awareness of one's own potential and limits and not run into gaps and inconsistencies caused by the lack of experiential training.

### 2. AUTHENTICITY IN COMMUNICATION

**2.1 Listening to ourselves.** Means being more in touch with what happens inside us, keeping our communication channels clean, this is what helps us understand our needs and desires and channel positive reactions and emotions. Self-awareness in relation to the body, affective, emotional and behavioral plan is at the base of the operative effectiveness of the facilitator. To be fully in relationship with the other it is essential that the

subject is able to be fully in relationship with himself, which means being able to listen to what comes from his own body and from his own emotions, what he is experiencing and experiencing in the here and now, without any cancellation, distortion, alteration or manipulation.

Therefore, in my opinion, the prerequisite for effective pedagogical communication is precisely starting from oneself, that is, listening to oneself. "Starting from yourself" means that every saying and doing is not true, if it is not embodied in the singularity of people. This position of starting from oneself not only allows an erotic relationship with knowledge (erotic, because it is charged with the passions of the eros of women and men), but frees the energies of the single woman, of the single man because she authorizes desire. I think this practice can be revolutionary in the way teachers and students are at school and in all situations in which individuals are formed. Starting from oneself involves leaving the need to enter into desire. Having to be at the base of the Italian school's educational tradition. This was the conception of the church which, in fact, until the second half of the

twentieth century, was the main training agency and therefore the most important cultural reference also in the field of state education. The concept of having to be envisaged involves a veiled, more or less veiled, approach to a normative educational method. The student or student must follow the principles to be translated then into behavior. The principles are indicated first by parents and then by teachers.

The having to be therefore follows a trajectory: from the outside (parents, teachers) within the consciousness of the learners, having to have has its base of support in the will, in fact, it needs the will just as a lever to do the passage from the outside to the interiority of each of us (Diotima 1996:61-68).

At school, when a student and a pupil does not apply to the study, the teachers do not say “does he have little will?” They do not say “is he willing?”, Or “he does not put us in good will” meaning that if the student would like to study. Now we all certainly agree that more and more students are not willing. I maintain that the pedagogical practice based on the binomial having to be - will no longer work above all with respect to those, and they are increasingly numerous, who do not study. The sense of duty, it is often said, has been greatly attenuated.

Margherita Porete wrote a book *The mirror of the simple souls* to which the great thinkers were watered, one of these is the famous master Eckart, but also the Jewish philosopher Simon Weil referred to the text of Margherita Porete. The text of the Porete therefore revolutionizes the vision of the world based on the ethics of having to be through the criticism of the good will that was its mainstay. Margherita Porete speaks, in fact, of dying at the will of the good, taking leave of the virtues and choosing Love as the only dimension capable of making room for the experience of God in ourselves.

The crisis of the concept based on having to be open opens up spaces for a freer educational vision, I certainly mean freedom not as free will, but as the freedom to be true to oneself. The will, in fact, already shows in the word the effort, the sense of fatigue that is not negative in itself in formation, but because it means effort to adapt, to be "like" in which the true sense of self is lost, its own originality. It is therefore not a bad thing that the tiring circle of having to be - will is broken. It can be an opportunity to “begin to tell the truth” of the existence of everyone who struggles to move forward with his own being, but also in school, in the fields in which we work.

In fact, desire is perceived when one acts freely. For psychoanalysis, desire is the engine of life, it is the basic passion that then determines the quality of others. From common sense, desire is seen as an act

of will: I want that kitchen, I want that coat, I want that folder. Desire, on the other hand, unlike will, cannot be expressed by the mind, is an inner movement, is an erotic force towards “the desirable exterior”, “the not yet qualified”, as Luce Irigaray states (1990:89-92).

**2.2 Acceptance.** Founding attitude of pedagogical communication is the acceptance mode. This term means the ability to accept the feelings of others, expressed by his statements, without feeling the need to evaluate them, or to act on them with investigative modalities, questioning the other or asking for additional information and / or clarifications. The purpose of acceptance is therefore the facilitation of the spontaneous and natural communication of the other.

This required attitude passes of necessity from the ability to eliminate any evaluative attitude that tends to be present in each of us, moving away from evaluations of another type, such as interpretative ones, which end up labeling the subject imprisoning him in rigid and asphyxiated definitions.

Trying to deepen this communication mode in more detail, two operational indications take shape in the foreground: the warmth and the correspondence of communication, which do not mean, however, emotional involvement or deference and dedication. Basically, it is a question of possessing communicative skills capable of safeguarding the learner both from our hyper-involvement and coldness, guaranteeing him the possibility of establishing “a binding characterized by human warmth, interest, responsiveness, degree of emotional attachment clearly and precisely delimited”.

**2.3 Desire and admiration.** Desire and admiration are two important passions for a freer teaching. It is the passion of those who put their desire into pedagogical work. In most cases, however, this passion is silenced and even experienced as excess because in the common sense it has no value.

This means that teachers can no longer put themselves neutral in front of the contents, because they are traversed by their interiority. The two moments are essential and one does not exceed the other. When teachers, teachers are unable to set their desire in motion in the pedagogical work, they cannot convey the vital sense of what they teach, because there is no choice in them, there is no preference, but only one neutral adhesion. Teachers then often teach because they “must” as well as, perhaps, at the time they had to study as pupils. But

in this way their creativity was extinguished and consequently they shut down the creativity of the students from whom they demanded obedience, because they teach passive adaptation. At school, in fact, the most precious part of every person in training is at stake, the most sacred part that concerns and relates to the soul of each of us.

Reconsidering desire as the engine of passions involves admiration. If a trainer / a trainer acts his desire it arouses admiration (or envy), this means that you see something that you would like to have, something for which in some way you would like to be instead of. Putting the desire into the field therefore arouses the admiration of the students and the students. I think the admiration has to do with that attitude that each of us had as a child, as a child towards his mother when we admired everything about her in seeing her at work towards us and in the world. What is the great work that teachers do in pedagogical work? It seems to us an exercise in balance between knowledge and love. On the exercise of knowledge of the teacher there is no need to put words; however on the balance between knowledge and love it is necessary to spend a few more words. If we remove the psychological sense of love and give it the symbolic meaning, (that is, we speak of the logic of love and not of love) the impersonal transcendent sense of love appears to us clearly as the capacity to go beyond oneself, which allows the respect for the sacredness of the person, his inviolability and therefore becomes a powerful lever of birth and growth, the possibility of becoming for boys and girls, for boys and girls, young people and adults. The teaching, in this sense, is one of the most creative professions, precisely because it is able to create (Muraro 1991:3948).

In the communicative process the gaze is very important, an aspect that put into play in the pedagogical relationship in a conscious way, becomes the ability to read the student or the student in fidelity to himself. Often, in fact, we must mirror ourselves in mirrors that give us a false image of us, of our being. I think that having to be is also a series of distorting mirrors that force us to change in order to adapt to those requests that are made to us, to having to be and not being. In this sense it is precious the look that respects who we are, our desire. For example, during self-management pupils taking the school wrote in a document "We want to be in the school, not to be alone".

**2.4 Active listening.** The other competence that must be implemented in the pedagogical relationship is listening. The ability to listen actively is then the first step to be able to send effective,

congruent messages, useful for a real understanding of another person, both in the context of affective relationships and in that of work relationships. If by listening one intends to pay attention to what another is saying, it is easy to understand that active means that listening is mainly required to be, in fact, comprehensive.

Looking more closely at the ability to listen comprehensively, it emerges that it cannot be separated from the capacity for observation, because knowing how to listen implies knowing how to observe, that is to say to know how to conduct a careful and competent observation. The main risk that you can incur by listening to someone is to be convinced that you understand, while instead we are performing an operation of interpretation, projecting our meanings on the situation and the words of the other person.

Being "learner-centered" is a coordinate of great methodological value because it invites the trainer not only to pay attention to what the learner says, but to what he expresses and what happens at that precise moment in the relationship itself. Practicing active listening means listening not only with the sense of hearing but also with the sense of sight, stimulating the whole body to become receptive so as to grasp the other's non-verbal communication with the greatest attention and validity possible. It will be important to listen not only to what the learner says, but the way he says it and also what he does not say.

Comprehensive listening must be carried out with the entirety of our person, paying particular attention to the emotions of the other person, expressing the desire to really understand, means centering communication on the You, implies not being afraid of pauses and silence, but on the contrary, respect them and use them to understand.

It is absolutely useful to make ourselves aware of what constitutes an obstacle, a barrier, an element of misunderstanding, in ways and attitudes, to learn how to use strategies that facilitate interpersonal communication instead. To listen, however, you need to be interested in who and what you listen to, so listening depends on respect for the other. If in me there is no waiting and amazement towards whom I am facing, I can hear, but I cannot hear. I can't get to her / him. Our cultural outlook tends to incorporate the other from us. In fact, we accept the other and we can only see it if it is like us that the other, the other, we tend to homologate to the regulatory model. Listening has meant so for me to be able to recognize and redistribute the different riches of the group, giving value to what usually has no value in the school, for example to the greater

freedom of some and some of the greater constraint of other/ others. To be able to acquire understanding listening skills one must acquire: the ability to free oneself from one's habitual way of seeing and interpreting events and situations in order to be able to approach and understand the other's point of view. A question that is useful to ask oneself repeatedly in the case of comprehensive listening concerns the meaning of what we are listening to and observing relative to our interlocutor, the in-depth knowledge of the rules of communication, the ability to know how to observe oneself and to know how to self-monitor to understand more clearly also the dynamics of interpersonal relationships.

The obstacles to comprehensive listening that Mucchielli identifies as the main and most frequent are: subjectivity (subjective interpretation), professional deformation, therefore responding with habitual conduct, rational meaning, then stopping at the literal or intellectual meaning of the expression or of the phrase (Mucchielli 1978:185).

The fundamental competences for comprehensive listening imply that the operator is capable of neutralizing personal conditioning, including social stereotypes, of which each is imbued, in order to access the value system of the other and the authentic meaning of what we are perceiving and with which we are measuring our capacity for comprehensive listening, that is to say the real meanings that the other attributes.

### 3. AUTHORITY AND POWER IN COMMUNICATION

Precisely because talking is central, we must be aware that authority and power are played in communication, in the way we speak, in the same discursive strategies. I understood this aspect through the studies of the Palo Alto school, published in the *Communication Pragmatics*. Below all our discourse there are relationships, it is the plan of meta-communication. Every communication of ours also says "in what relationship I'm putting myself with you listening". Their research highlights that, despite the infinite variety of human communications, the underlying relationships are only of two types: the symmetrical ones that are those that have inside the root of the competition, and the complementary ones that are those in which one it presupposes the behavior of the other and easily tends to become hierarchical. The metacommunicative plan remains hidden, but we must make it explicit because it is there that power or authority is played, we must also act on this

underlying plane the communication to escape from the bottleneck of two unique communicative or competitive or hierarchical relations. The problem is precisely how to pose within communication. In the discourse it is a question of finding that particular measure in speaking that takes into account the subjects involved in communication, does not falsify the data of reality, but at the same time opens to the freedom of the other, of the other, allows an exchange (Bocchetti 1996:18 -19).

### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The pedagogical relationship has the characteristic of being a relationship of disparity, that is, between a teacher who knows how to enrich, enlarge from the Latin "augere". The most widespread meaning of authority is authority and has nothing to do with power. That circle of respect, love and esteem that sets the pedagogical relationship in motion is the fruitful circle of the relationship of disparity. This exercise of authority allows us to give wisdom and obtain admiration in exchange not only for the teacher, but, through the teacher, also for the knowledge of which he / she is the mediators and the mediators. All this leads back to the regime of interest, of the guide that is needed to be able to help grow and for this it is not necessary to have a role, registers of votes, but only to be recognized as such.

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## HEDGING AND BOOSTING STRATEGIES IN ALBANIAN NEWSPAPER OPINION PIECES FOR DIALOGICAL COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSES

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**Abstract:** *This paper focuses on the use of hedges and boosters as interactional metadiscoursal devices in Albanian newspaper opinion pieces. More specifically, I attempt to investigate their role in the realm of dialogical communication in these articles and how their writers engage readers in informative and persuasive processes. Based on Hyland's interpersonal model of metadiscourse (2005), this study looks into both of these strategies and some very common hedging and boosting items/phases in a small specialized corpus. The quantitative and qualitative analyses in the second part of the present article discuss general issues related to this topic, but also concentrate on differences and similarities between texts written by male and female writers. Several illustrations support my observations and contextualize these devices in silent dialogues between interlocutors for communicative and persuasive purposes. The last part includes some tentative remarks, potential suggestions, but also some limitations in this study.*

**Keywords:** *hedges; boosters; opinion pieces; communication; readers*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Opinion pieces are frequent articles in Albanian newspapers and are generally written by well-known analysts. They touch upon and discuss issues related to political, economical, educational, social and cultural developments in Albanian and sometimes even abroad. Although authors of these pieces are not affiliated with any newspaper, apart from a few exceptions, they do tend to align with certain viewpoints of newspapers more often than not. Also, apart from expressing their own opinions on specific issues, analysts attempt to influence readers by forwarding arguments and employing efficient persuasive strategies.

Linguistically speaking, opinion pieces are to be classified as argumentative texts, in which particular stances should be defended by means of supportive premises. So, from a discursive perspective, they are structured differently from other types of texts and are generally rich in vocabulary, but also in grammatical constructions. They offer to a linguist opportunity to investigate linguistic phenomena from various perspectives both at the local and global level of the text.

Additionally, opinion pieces are dialogical *per se*, in the sense that they engage both writers and readers in ongoing silent communicative processes. The linguistic interaction in this instance is as

important as their structure and content. A metadiscoursal approach of investigating them would integrate discourse features and interlocutors' presence (or voices) at the same time. Being aware of readers' presence in discourse, writers attempt to follow particular communicative strategies for persuasive ends and to jointly construct it with them. It is worth looking into linguistic means which assist these strategies, but which also include or even exclude alternative voices in discourse.

My aim in the present article is to study uses of hedges and boosters, frequent devices which open or close dialogue with readers, recognize or close down alternative voices. More specifically, I intend to explore their roles in opinion pieces, and find out potential differences and similarities between male and female writers in terms of quantity and quality. The main motivation for conducting such a research is that both strategies have not been explored in the given context so far. This article would serve as a preliminary study which can be elaborated in the future.

The paper is basically divided into two main parts. The first section deals with some theoretical issues and the second one with quantitative and qualitative research. Tentative remarks, potential suggestions and limitations in this study follow.

## 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework adopted in this article is Hyland's interpersonal model of metadiscourse. He states that metadiscourse is often defined as 'discourse about discourse' / 'talk about talk', clearly referring to aspects of the text itself and its internal organization (Hyland, 2005:16-18), but his more promising and encompassing model considers it to be an interactional process "between text producers and their texts and between text producers and users" (Hyland, 2010:125).

Within this model of metadiscourse, the interactional dimension comprises two frequent processes, namely hedging and boosting, which assist ongoing interactions between writers and readers in dialogical contexts. All the silent dialogues between them are considered to be in response and in relation to the other "voice(s)" present in discourse.

Hedging can be seen as "an intentional action in that the speaker chooses a linguistic device over and above the propositional content of the message which will affect the interpretation of the utterance" (Fraser, 2010: 202) and includes linguistic items, such as *may*, *perhaps* or *it is possible*. The use of hedges involves a lack of full commitment to the propositional content of the utterance, conveys a moderate utterance claim (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 84) and acknowledges "the reader's right to refute claims by marking statements provisional" (Hyland, 1998b: 226).

Boosters include items, such as *obviously*, *certainly* or *no doubt* mainly used to express writer's certainty in what it is stated so as "to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their audience" (Hyland, 1998a: 350). Their main role in discourse is to "attribute an increased force or authority to statements" (Bondi, 2008: 32), but also to contribute to dialogical interactions by indirectly highlighting the presence of the audience in verbal exchanges. At the same time, they downplay the presence of the audience (Hyland 2005, 52-53) and limit the possibility of disagreement (Bondi, 2008: 33). Additionally, boosters often express "the speaker's commitment to the truth value of what is being said" (Ådel, 2006: 174) and are "regarded as an important aspect of the evaluation-interaction-stance process" (Toska, 2012: 61). The illustration included in the qualitative analysis section below will exemplify both the role and function of boosters within the interactive model of metadiscourse embraced in this study.

## 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In order to conduct empirically systematic research in this article I have built a small specialized corpus containing opinion pieces extracted online from two major Albanian national dailies, namely *Shqip* and *Panorama*. The corpus is called Corpus of Albanian Newspaper Opinion Pieces (CANOP) and amounts to more than half a million words. It contains opinion pieces written from January 2013 to December 2014. Ten samples for each month have been randomly chosen covering different topics, and each of them ranges from 500 to 2,000 words. The gender variable has also been taken into account, so apart from the two subcorpora (*Shqip* daily and *Panorama* one), sub-subcorpora have been created including male and female writer pieces respectively. The following table contains more detailed information about CANOP.

Table 1 CANOP size

Gender	No. of texts	Words
Male	446	542,598
Female	34	39,429
Total	480	582,027

Each of the sample texts has also been indexed so as to include information about the newspaper and the period when the piece has been published in it. For instance, SM140208/PF140208 means that the piece has been taken from *Shqip* (S) or *Panorama* (P), has been written by a male writer (M), or female writer (F), in 2014 (14), in February (02) and that it is the eighth sample (8) in CANOP. All the illustrations included in this article will provide such relevant information.

All in all, I will investigate the frequency and use of 80 common hedging and boosting items or constructions, such as *ndoshta* (*maybe*), *patjetër* (*of course*), *për mendimin tim* (*in my opinion*) or *me siguri* (*definitely*). For both the quantitative and qualitative analysis I have made use of the versatile commercial software WordSmith Tools 6.0, which allows one not only to obtain statistical data but also to extract examples in the proper relevant discourse context.

## 4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this section of the paper I will attempt to provide statistical data about the frequency of the hedges and boosters in CANOP, but also about some related phenomena, which enable me to

interpret quantitatively and qualitatively their use in opinion pieces by both male and female writers. It is important to note from the very beginning that the number of text written by male writers makes up almost 93 % of the entire corpora, as Table 1 shows, which is justified, since they outnumber female writers considerably in both newspaper opinion pieces which they write.

Table 2 and 3 below show the occurrences/hits of hedges and boosters as used in CANOP by male and female writers as well as the normalized frequency per 1,000 words.

Table 2 Frequency of hedges in CANOP

Gender	Hits	per 1,000 words
Male	1,803	3.32
Female	169	4.29
Total	1,972	3.39

Table 3 Frequency of boosters in CANOP

Gender	Hits	per 1,000 words
Male	1,413	2.6
Female	113	2.87
Total	1,526	2.62

The number of hits does not tell us much about the frequency of these devices in CANOP, but the normalized value is somehow significant in order to have a clear picture about differences and similarities between male and female writers. At first glance, we might suggest that there are some differences in the quantity of hedges used by male and female writers, but nothing relevant regarding the use of boosters.

However, it is worth conducting the significance test to have a better insight into the frequency values between male and female writers in the use of hedges and boosters. "The higher the G2 value, the more significant is the difference between two frequency scores", as for instance:

95th percentile; 5% level;  $p < 0.05$ ; critical value = 3.84

99th percentile; 1% level;  $p < 0.01$ ; critical value = 6.63

99.9th percentile; 0.1% level;  $p < 0.001$ ; critical value = 10.83

99.99th percentile; 0.01% level;  $p < 0.0001$ ; critical value = 15.13

(<http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/llwizard.html>)

Table 4 Log-likelihood values for hedges

Gender	Hits	per 1,000
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		words
Male	1,803	3.32
Female	169	4.29
$p < 0.002$	critical value =	9.34

Table 5 Log-likelihood values for boosters

Gender	Hits	per 1,000 words
Male	1,413	2.6
Female	113	2.87
$p < 0.334$	critical value =	0.93

The significant test definitely shows that both hedges and boosters are underused in opinion pieces written by male writers relative to female ones, but only the case of hedging is significant and not that of boosting. The *p values* clearly denote these differences in Table 4 and Table 5.

In this part of the paper I also would like to touch upon the issue of dispersion of hedges and boosters in CANOP. The point of dispersion plot is "to show where the search word occurs in the file which the current entry belongs to. That way you can see where mention is made most of your search word in each file" and the plot dispersion value "ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.9 or 1 suggesting very uniform dispersion and 0 or 0.1 suggesting "burstiness" (Katz, 1996)" (Scott, 2012).

Table 6 Hedges dispersion plot in CANOP

Gender	Dispersion value
Male	0.962
Female	0.928
Total	0.961

Table 7 Boosters dispersion plot in CANOP

Gender	Dispersion value
Male	0.991
Female	0.940
Total	0.990

The dispersion values in Tables 6 and 7 clearly indicate use uniformity of hedges and boosters by both male and female writers. Thus, it shows that these devices are employed throughout the sample texts in CANOP despite the respective frequencies.

## 5. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this last section of the paper I will conduct some qualitative analysis to see how hedges and boosters are used in real discourse and how they operate along the interactional metadiscourse dimension. Examples extracted from male and

female writers are intended to instantiate and support my claims.

The following tables include the ten most frequent hedges and boosters employed by male and female writers. It is interesting to note that in both cases the devices used are almost the same, nine for hedges and eight for boosters.

Table 8 Ten most frequent hedges in CANOP

No.	Male		Female	
1	duket	seem	duket	seem
2	ndoshta	maybe	ndoshta	maybe
3	rreth	about	mendoj	think
4	gati	around	besoj	believe
5	mendoj	think	rreth	about
6	mbase	perhaps	gati	around
7	besoj	believe	thujajse	nearly
8	thujajse	nearly	mundet	possibly
9	afër	about	mbase	perhaps
10	mundet	possibly	pothujaj	almost

Table 9 Ten most frequent boosters in CANOP

No.	Male		Female	
1	qartë	clearly	sigurisht	obviously
2	krejt	absolutely	qartë	clearly
3	natyrisht	certainly	natyrisht	certainly
4	sigurisht	obviously	krejt	absolutely
5	plot	completely	plot	completely
6	tregon	show	tërësisht	entirely
7	pa dyshim	without doubt	dukshëm	visibly
8	tërësisht	entirely	patjetër	of course
9	plotësisht	completely	me siguri	for sure
10	me siguri	for sure	tregon	show

This shows no significant diversity of types of these devices used by male and writers, and at the same time demonstrates that they are common in opinion pieces in terms of what they denote in metadiscourse. At this point we can see that in the case of hedges the differences are only relevant quantitatively and not so much qualitatively. And in the case of boosters we note very close similarities in terms of both quantity and quality.

The following examples illustrate the use of hedges and boosters in real context and some metadiscoursal functions in the interactional realm between writers and readers. In examples (1) and (2) below the hedges *duket* (*seem*) and *ndoshta* (*maybe*) have been employed to involve the audience's alternative voices in discourse. This channel of dialogue can be seen as a rhetorical strategy adopted by prudent writers who wish to project themselves as reliable in their statements by forwarding their opinions and not undeniable facts.

(1) Por këto identitete nuk **duket** se i pengonin shqiptarët e shkuar në Spanjë që sipas Markos përbënin një komunitet kompakt e solidar edhe pse vinin nga të dyja gjinitë, nga të gjitha prejardhjet fetare, nga fshatrat e qytetet ... (SM140710).

But these identities **do not seem** to obstruct the past Albanians in Spain, who according to Marko constituted a compact and solid community even though they came from both genders, from all religions descents, from villages and towns ... (my translation)

(2) Unë nuk e di nëse shqiptarët e zgjedhur për ta pritur dhe për të folur me zonjën Bonino i dinë të gjitha këto. **Ndoshta** po dhe **ndoshta** jo. (PM131002)

I do not know whether all the elected Albanians to meet and talk with Mrs. Bonino know all of these. **Maybe** yes, **maybe** no. (my translation)

Similarly, in examples (3) and (4), written by female writers, the uses of cognitive hedges *besoj* (*believe*) and *mendoj* (*think*) aim at engaging readers in dialogue. Their main function in the present contexts is to present the propositions as mere opinions marking uncertainty and expressing moderate claims. However, unlike *duket* (*seem*) and *ndoshta* (*maybe*) in the two previous examples, they convey plausible reasoning, which, in all likelihood, is based on writers general perception but also on their background information or experience.

(3) **Nuk besoj** se fjala “new” e bën qeverisjen e re të ngjashme me “new Labour” e Blerit apo “new Democrat” të Klintonit. (SF131003)

**I do not believe** that the word “new” makes the new governance similar to Blair’s “new Labour” or Clinton’s “new Democrat”. (my translation)

(4) Personalisht **mendoj** se Rama ishte i sinqertë kur deklaroi para disa ditësh në TV se ai mendon që Hoxha ishte një katil. (PF140102)

Personally **I think** that Rama was sincere when he declared a few days ago on TV that he thought that Hoxha was criminal. (my translation)

What is extremely important to note in all four examples is that hedging strategies in the respective contexts convey writers’ attempt to withhold complete commitment to propositional contents.

On the other hand, the main function of boosters in discourse is to “attribute an increased force or authority to statements” (Bondi, 2008:32) but also “to construct a dialogical environment by recognizing and including the presence of the audience in interactional verbal activities” (Toska,

2015:66). Unlike hedges, boosters close down alternative interpretations to the utterance. For instance, in examples (5) and (6) below, *krejt e qartë* (*completely clear*) and *sigurisht* (of course) convey some persuasive force and present the statements as facts.

(5) Eshtë **krejt e qartë** se tema e bashkimit kombëtar do të jetë një temë kryesore e kësaj fushate elektorale. (PM131003)

It is **completely clear** that the issue of national unity will be a central topic of this electoral campaign. (my translation)

(6) **Sigurisht** që ndryshimet e mëdha nuk mund të ndodhin brenda një dite, jave apo muaji, por ato mund të fillojnë nga gjëra të vogla. (SM130301)

**Of course**, major changes cannot occur within one day, week or month, but they can begin with small things. (my translation)

Also, *tërësisht* (*entirely*) and *pa dyshim* (*without doubt*) promote confident and determined writers, who, for communicative and persuasive ends, have opted for the boosting strategy to invite readers to align with their views. This means that alternative viewpoints are recognized by writers, but they have chosen “to narrow this diversity rather than enlarge it” (Hyland, 2005:145) and to take full commitment to their discourse.

(7) Ndëshkimi, sado i pamundur duket, është **tërësisht** i mundur nëse faktet janë aty. (SF140802)  
However impossible the punishment may seem, it is **entirely** possible, if the facts are there. (my translation)

(8) Ata **pa dyshim** duhet të jenë zëri i rëndësishëm që duhet të marrë përsipër drejtimin në këtë situatë. (PF140102)

**Without doubt** they should be the important voice which should undertake the management in this situation. (my translation)

Hopefully, the small scale qualitative analyses of these examples in this section have clearly shown the roles and functions of hedges and booster in newspaper opinion pieces. It is also hoped that the real examples extracted from CANOP have contextualized them accordingly in support to the claims I have made.

## 6. FINAL REMARKS

This short article attempted to focus on the hedging and boosting strategies employed by male and female writers in Albanian opinion pieces for

dialogical communicative purposes. Hyland’s metadiscourse approach embraced here offered valuable insights into issues related to hedges and boosters’ presence along the interactional dimension. Quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted in this small-scale research showed that hedging is a process more preferable to female writers rather than male ones, although there is no significant distinction regarding the types of devices included in this process. The boosting process was also much present in these pieces and it was common in the way it was adopted for persuasive purposes in order to get the readership align with the viewpoints expressed in these pieces. Boosting devices are almost equally used by male writers and female ones with the intention of closing down anticipated alternative interpretations in discourse.

There are also a couple of limitations in this short study. Additional important devices, such as attitude markers, self mentions and engagement markers, which are part of the interactional metadiscourse model, have not been looked into this paper. The main reason for not including them here was because I wanted to focus only on dialogical communication, and hedges as well as boosters do enable this. However, I do suggest that further studies integrate a more comprehensive investigation in the realm of dialogical communication including the missing devices in order to evaluate the writer-reader’s response to metadiscourse interaction.

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## INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION AT HOME: THE CASE OF ALBANIAN UNIVERSITIES

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**Abstract:** *The White paper on Intercultural Dialogue, launched in 2008 by the Council of Europe, emphasizes, among other things, the role universities can play in fostering intercultural dialogue by integrating it into the course content and teaching activities becoming thus actors in putting it into practice. In the growing internationalized context of universities worldwide, there is a need to sustain intercultural dialogue not merely through good policies but above all through good practices that would work primarily towards developing competences, most importantly intercultural competence, for the internationalization of curricula, thus making internationalization a tangible reality for mobile and non-mobile students. In this regard, adopting an intercultural dialogue approach oriented towards internationalization at home (IaH) would benefit universities by equipping their students with competences for building a more interconnected and diverse society. In this paper, I will make an overview of the internationalization process that has swept Albanian higher education drawing more particularly on how universities address the IaH perspective and how, if so, they highlight the importance of intercultural dialogue. For this discussion, I will draw on the content analysis of strategic documents adopted by some Albanian universities, public and private, as well as on the results obtained from a survey on internationalization conducted between December 2018 and January 2019 with students, academic and non-academic staff from these universities. In the end, some suggestions will be attempted as regards the integration of intercultural dialogue in policy documents about internationalization, its role in IaH activities and practices and how these can be implemented.*

**Keywords:** *Albanian higher education; intercultural dialogue; Internationalization at Home*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

A national priority for the third year under the Erasmus call, the internationalization of Albanian Higher Education Institutions, is seen as a process that should aid and encourage Albanian universities to create their own profile and brand in the educational market to respond to competition, support teaching and research, create quality mechanisms adhering to European standards in Higher Education. Although internationalization is now an undeniable reality in Albanian Higher Education and some Albanian universities have already adopted an internationalization strategy, responding to internationalization with efficient practices, services and human resources, despite endeavours, is at times a rather unsystematic, spontaneous, or worse, chaotic process.

Embedded in the educational context of modernization and reformation of Albanian Higher Education under the aegis of the law on Higher Education (MESY 2015), the National Strategy for Research, Innovation and Technology 2017-22 (MESY 2017), which aims at reinforcing reforms in

research and Higher Education in Albania harmonizing them with the principles of the European Research Area, as well as in the larger political, social and cultural context of the country's European agenda to meet the challenges of EU integration<sup>1</sup>, the process of internationalization, which in its most tangible form concerns student and staff exchange, will aid Albanian HEIs to grow internationally and by that become nationally (and not only) more competitive.

Moreover, the institutional review reports from the accreditation process that took place in Albanian Higher Education in 2017 evidenced internationalization as a priority for most Albanian HEIs and their ambition to grow more international. Caught up in the current enthusiasm of the process, which is primarily understood in terms of

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<sup>1</sup> *National Strategy for Development and Integration*, (Këshilli i Ministrave 2016), which has internationalization of Higher Education under pillar 3 'Investing on human capital & social cohesion' (2016: 133), is oriented mainly towards students and staff, exchange opportunities, internationalized study programmes.

possibilities for mobility, the approach that internationalization can also be understood as a process that takes place at home by accommodating local students into an international background through the internationalization of the curricula is somehow overlooked or the attempts to it are rather poor or limited. Albanian Higher Education Institutions are more oriented towards internationalization abroad and less aware of the ‘Internationalization at Home’ (IaH) approach despite commitment to internationalize the curricula.

The need for international visibility coupled with the recent criticism about the quality of Albanian higher education culminating in a students’ protest (December 2018) should somehow dictate this change of focus in the internationalization process and orient it more towards IaH, which I see more closely linked with the university’s mission to enhance intercultural dialogue.

In this paper, I will look into how Albanian universities address the IaH perspective and how, if so, they highlight the importance of intercultural dialogue. For this discussion, I will draw on the content analysis of strategic documents adopted by some Albanian universities, public and private, the institutional review reports from the accreditation process in 2017 as well as on the results obtained from a survey on internationalization conducted between December 2018 and January 2019 with students and academic staff from these universities.

In the end, some suggestions will be attempted as regards the integration of intercultural dialogue in policy documents about internationalization, its role in IaH activities and practices and how these can be implemented. Pointing to these issues is important not only for responding to internationalization more adequately to both mobile and non-mobile students and staff but also to work towards improving the quality of education.

## 2. FROM INTERNATIONALIZATION TO INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

**2.1 Internationalization at home.** In its most tangible form, internationalization is about free movement of students and staff from their own institutions to others for more opportunities to share their educational and cultural experience. This implies a focus on mobility with an array of various possibilities made available to staff and students by internal and external funding schemes, the most ambitious being the Erasmus programme. In this regard, Olivé-Serret (2009:101) lists three types of consequences of the programme: for

students, for universities, and for society and the economy. He (2009:101-102) explains:

By coming into contact with other cultural and linguistic environments, students change their views on others, they gain much culturally and they learn to work in multicultural groups. [...] Because of this mobility, universities have had to adapt to the new situation by learning to understand other educational systems, addressing the equivalence dimension (the Bologna Process) and accommodating international students with different requirements and working methods. [...] European societies and the economy, in a time of globalisation, are as a result in a better position to address the new challenges by offering posts for young graduates used to multicultural and multilingual environments.

Still, not all students and staff are likely to go on mobility in that the number of those who get the chance to benefit from the mobility experience is always lower compared to those who remain at home. This means that the focus should be on how non-mobile staff and students can enrich their international and intercultural experience at home. This attention given to internationalizing the experience of students and staff on campus known as internationalization at home initiated at the University of Malmo in Sweden by Nilsson aimed to provide equal opportunities for international experience for everyone, especially for those who have fewer chances of studying or working overseas with a view to “develop the international outlook and the intercultural capabilities required for employment and participation in democratic societies (Robson et al., 2017).” (Robson 2017:369-370)

This approach has brought about changes in the way internationalization, a rather shifting concept, is understood or advanced. Internationalization at home cannot be understood without the internationalization of the curriculum, which assumes that academic staff will have to play an important role in the process, which requires a revision of the course content, of the learning outcomes, didactic approaches and all other elements that contribute to promote the teaching of competences, skills, values that work towards building global citizenship in a context largely marked by globalization and internationalization. Global citizenship, an old but rather broad, nonconsensual and interdisciplinary concept, approached differently in literature by scholars from a range of disciplines, is here introduced in terms of learning. I will not attempt a definition here and would rather dismiss the criticism concerning the

global citizenship - national citizenship dichotomy, as posing a risk for national contexts or as favouring certain elite groups (Yemini 2017:62), and approach it rather loosely in terms of individuals supplied with cosmopolitan ideas, views and values, which access this diverse world or encounter with the various cultures more flexibly and easily. I will view it more connected with global learning, global learning communities and how this connects with the internationalization of Higher Education. In this regard, Mullens and Cuper (2012: 42), embed the discourse of global citizenship within higher education and in a highly internationalized context. As they point out, despite the missing consensus on a single definition, what is certain is that:

There *is* consensus that today's citizens are living in a diverse and globally interconnected world (economically, socially, environmentally, politically), and that it is therefore imperative for institutes of higher education to move decisively forward with plans to design a curriculum that supports students in succeeding in this globalized environment. (Mullens and Cuper, 2012:42; emphasis in original)

This success will largely depend on building in them skills and behaviour patterns that respond to the ever-growingly internationalized university context, globalized economy and society in general. Mullens and Cuper (2012:42) refer to Collins (2009) to point to three worldwide phenomena that dictate the need higher education institutions have for placing globalization and internationalization in their strategic agendas, namely the fact that students will more and more be exposed to cultural encounters whose implications and interrelationships are complex, which might impact them either positively or negatively, and the need for cognitive skills which “will include methodical approaches to inquiry, understanding, and expression—skills needed in our current, information-based economy.”

Robson (2017:371) maintains that

[u]niversities aiming to educate global citizens often focus on generic capabilities such as open and reflective behaviours, self-management, conceptual, and analytical skills, and other competences considered necessary to life and work in international settings.

The concept of competence might need an explanation here. She (2017:371) makes reference to The Council of Europe guide (2016) to competences

necessary for students to live together, as democratic citizens in diverse societies [whose] aim is ‘not to teach students what to think, but rather how to think, in order to navigate a world where not everyone holds their views, but we each have a duty to uphold the democratic principles which allow all cultures to co-exist’ (Council of Europe, 2016:7).

This takes us back again to the concept of internationalization at home as the path to “develop spaces for rich learning for the non-mobile majority, creating emotional and intellectual engagement with real tasks that enable students to re-think their ‘situatedness in the world’ and the ‘political meaning of intercultural experiences’ (Rizvi, 2009:264-265, cited in Robson, 2011)” (Robson, 2017:371). Internationalization at home is even more demanding than internationalization abroad because it requires more efforts from the universities themselves, their staff and units, in particular their teachers who will

“need to see the value of global learning, for both themselves and their students; [...] to advocate for global learning beyond their classrooms; [...] to acquire new skills, and they might even be asked to change the way they think about their work or reflect on their own beliefs and values; [...] to guide students in their transformations [...]; and they must create global learning communities in classrooms and link students’ international and local intercultural experiences (study abroad, international service learning, internships, and field/clinical experiences) to classroom learning. (Agnew and Kahn, 2014:35)

**2.2 From internationalization to intercultural dialogue.** Universities stand thus as “a microcosm of society” (Sarr, 2009:74) in that they are the venues where diversities—individual, cultural ethnic, religious, ideological and many more—encounter. As providers of education, they play an important role, if not the most important, in building values, skills and competences that allow individuals to negotiate their own identities in respect of shared values and cultural diversity enabled by intercultural dialogue.

Intercultural dialogue owes much to the internationalization of higher education. Poglia, Mauri-Brusa, and Fumasoli (2009:24) see intercultural dialogue as a follow up of internationalization in that the momentum internationalization received from late 1990s onwards required that universities dealt with diversity and so make intercultural dialogue “a strategic goal.” Furthermore, for them (2009:24) internationalization of higher education is relevant here

because much of the practical experience of intercultural dialogue in academic settings involves foreign students, either those enrolled at the university or those taking part in exchange programmes [...].

Moreover,

the internationalisation of higher education is not just an academic management issue but also a matter of scientific fact, one which by its nature is automatically linked to cultural diversity and thus to intercultural dialogue too (2009:24).

In this sense, if internationalization has to be the case, it really has to start at home.

**2.3 Why intercultural dialogue matters?** To respond to a growingly multicultural environment, recognizing the inadequacy of assimilation and multiculturalism as models to cope with it, the Council of Europe published a White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living together as equals in dignity” (2008) to encourage intercultural dialogue as the path to respect and promote cultural diversity. In the White Paper (2008:10-11), intercultural dialogue is defined as

an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect [...]. It operates at all levels – within societies, between the societies of Europe and between Europe and the wider world.

The Paper (2008:31) acknowledges the role higher education institutions should play to sustain it “through their Education Programmes, as actors in broader society and as sites where intercultural dialogue is put into practice.” Placing the emphasis on intercultural learning, the Paper calls for scholarly assistance to appropriately address these issues in teaching. Among the five policy approaches for promoting intercultural dialogue, the Paper identifies the promotion of learning and teaching intercultural competences with key competence areas being democratic citizenship, language and history. The role of universities in building citizenship was emphasized earlier on in this paper. Integrating intercultural dialogue in their mission, universities empower their role in teaching and learning citizenship and the competences associated with it, most notably intercultural ones. Foreign language education plays a role here in that it is the viable means towards understanding the various and multiple

cultural realities. The same holds true for history, as it allows entry viewpoints to other perspectives. As such, intercultural dialogue should form part of the internationalization agendas of universities. (Council of Europe, 2008:53-54) Fostering intercultural dialogue empowers the processes and approaches to building competences and values necessary for responding to a growingly internationalized university context. Integrating it in the IaH approach is even more important because it will work towards increasing intercultural awareness even among non-mobile students and staff.

### 3. THE STUDY

**3.1 Introduction.** In this article, I will be concerned with the question of intercultural dialogue and in particular with how it is addressed in the internationalization agendas of Albanian universities. I will connect it with the IaH approach in order to question whether it is addressed at all. I will take into consideration six Albanian universities, four public universities and two private ones. For a more comprehensive view, I have selected universities of diverse and varied profiles. The universities under consideration are The University of Vlora “Ismail Qemali” (UV), “Aleksander Moisiu” University of Durres (UAMD), University of Korca “Fan S. Noli” (UNIKO), University of Medicine (UMT), European University of Tirana (UET) and Metropolitan University of Tirana (MTU), hereinafter identified by their acronyms, when necessary.

**3.2 Methodology.** For the purposes of this analysis, quantitative and qualitative data will be used. Content analysis and survey will be conducted. The aim is to obtain different perspectives into this issue, which I call, the institutional perspective, that is, how the universities see themselves in this process and how they position themselves here, i.e. how they address their mission; the external perspective, that is how reviewers view these universities, their progress and commitment in this regard, and the internal perspective, that is, how students and staff feel about it and how they work together towards it. To examine the first two perspectives, content analysis will be conducted, for which reason the following sources will be used: the strategic documents of each university, basically their internationalization strategies, statutes or development strategies to see whether and how these universities address their role in internationalization and how they foster the

process; the institutional reviews prepared by the external review teams during the accreditation period. The documents are available online and an examination of these documents will allow for some external perspective in this study.

The survey will be used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data but most importantly to learn about the opinion of the main stakeholders in the internationalization process, that is, students and staff. The survey was conducted in December 2018 and January 2019 and formed part of a needs analysis study for internationalization in the framework of writing a proposal for an Erasmus KA 2 project.

The survey was administered online by the University of Vlora “Ismail Qemali” for quick and transparent data collection and analysis using the survey planet app. Two questionnaires were prepared, one for students and one for academic staff. Dedicated links to the questionnaires were sent to the other universities. The items in the questionnaires aimed at identifying awareness of internationalisation among students and staff, if they had benefitted from these processes at their home university, what needs they had and how ready they were to respond to these processes. Some of the items were similar in both questionnaires: language competence, exchange opportunities and their recognition by their home institution, information days for mobility opportunities, applications for grants etc., reasons for applying for mobility, information channels used for exchange opportunities, summer schools, grants etc., the skills needed for a successful international experience abroad, academic programmes and how aligned they were with international ones. The aim was to introduce indicators to measure internationalization qualitatively and quantitatively.

For the purposes of this analysis, only some of the items of the questionnaires will be used whose responses help to get an understanding of how interculturally aware staff and students are and whether there are any attempts to respond to issues such as internationalization at home and intercultural dialogue.

**3.3 Research questions.** For this study, I focused on the following questions:

- a) How universities approach internationalization;
- b) How they respond to the global world and to building citizenship;
- c) What competences they seek to foster;
- d) Do they address intercultural dialogue as one of their aims in their mission;

e) Do they address language learning/teaching for intercultural dialogue and internationalization.

Hypothesizing that Albanian Higher Education is more oriented towards internationalization abroad with a great focus on mobility and international partnership and participation in projects, I conducted a content analysis and a survey to prove it.

**3.4 Data analysis.** As underlined earlier, for the context analysis I made use of the strategic documents<sup>2</sup> of the universities and the institutional review reports from the accreditation process. In examining these documents, I looked for the following: approach to internationalization, building citizenship, intercultural dialogue, competences other than the professional ones.

The analysis of the strategic documents would reveal the following:

- a. internationalization is aimed at mostly in terms of international partnership and collaboration, mobility, joint research and programmes (all);
- b. intercultural dialogue is not addressed at all as such (all);
- c. there is a strong focus on lifelong learning programmes (UV, UMT, MTU);
- d. competences, besides the professional ones, are mainly seen in terms of the interpersonal, individual and transversal (UV, UMT);
- e. cultural awareness and intercultural competence are generally overlooked, except for UV, which emphasizes intercultural competence in its internationalization strategy and UAMD, which emphasizes cultural awareness in its mission.
- e. the global is mostly viewed in terms of society and environment (UV, UMT).
- f. building citizenship is scarcely mentioned, except for UAMD, which has it as one of its missions and UV, which mentions it in its development strategic plan.
- g. internationalization at home is not addressed at all as such, except for UV which in its internationalization strategy points to the internationalization of programmes and curricula rather than IaH.
- h. as for language, no policy towards fostering internationalization or intercultural dialogue is described as such.

<sup>2</sup> By strategic documents, I refer to development strategic plans, internationalization strategies, statutes or any other similar documents that emphasize the mission and vision of the universities and help to get an understanding of their approach to internationalization. For this analysis, I have made use of the documents that are available on the official webpages of these universities.

From the analysis of the institutional review reports, the following can be reported:

a. The report for UET (2016) points out that UET has an internationalization agenda, a wide-ranging list of partner organisations, contributions from European and American scholars in their conferences (2016:2), preference for recruiting staff with a PhD from a Western university (2016:11); internationalization and student mobility are key strategies (2016:19), research strategy aims at supporting internationalization (2016:23); priorities are in the area of international cooperation (2016: 8), engagement in international projects and CBHE projects (2016:21-22), high number of cooperation agreements (2016:22), support for staff to apply for international research projects, publish and participate in international conferences (2016:22). However, the report identifies that there are no joint degrees, although this is a priority (2016:17) and that the number of non-Albanian students is low as most programmes are in Albanian (2016:25).

b. The report for MTU (2017) points out that internationalization is a key objective of the university's mid and long-term Development Strategy (2017:20). MTU pursues a strategy of collaboration and partnership (2017:3, 9), advancement of research agendas nationally and internationally (2017: 4). The institution's policy is to invest on academics that have worked or been trained abroad (2017:4). There is continuous improvement of academic programmes based on international models (2017:2). The review notes that MTU has a supporting policy for mobility of student and staff but still there is no significant impact on student mobility (2017: 9) and that there are attempts for modules in English to facilitate student mobility (2017:4).

c. The report for UNIKO (2017) points out that its development plan emphasizes internationalisation policies (2017:15), the institution is committed to internationalization through the mobility of student and staff, the signing of many agreements; it participates in many international projects (2017:4), pursues an open strategy of collaboration and partnership at various levels (2017:9), organizes an annual conference and publication (2017:21). The report points out, however, that professors have had no international teaching experience for the 5 past years (2017:20), internationalization of studies is another step (2017:21) but no evidence of how this is done is provided, the reference is only to research, participation in international projects is good but participation among students and staff is

still low (2017: 8), research is carried out individually rather than strategically (2017:21).

d. The report for UV (2017) points out that internationalization is one of its main priorities (2017: 16). UV's internationalization strategy is reflected in its teaching and research ambitions, good participation in external projects, acknowledging the resource constraints (2017:4). Cooperation and partnership are central to the university's goals of internationalization, notable also in the faculty and departmental strategies (2017:9), mobility is at the heart of the Internationalization strategy, the then draft strategy<sup>3</sup>, statutes (2017:9). UV encourages international activity in research and scholarship through joint projects and conferences (2017:10), a global network of Albanian researchers that has been set up to assist in developing international relationships and supporting mobility (2017:10), collaboration with other research organisations (2017: 21), prioritisation of candidates with a PhD degree from an overseas HEI (2017:22). The report also notes that the flow of students and staff is modest because of language (2017: 9-10). Erasmus mobilities, foreign language courses in the curricula are encouraged by introducing courses in foreign language sessions (2017:17).

e. The report for UAMD (2016) points out that the university desires to increase the level of international mobility of staff and students (2016: 10), to have study programmes in line with local, national, international trends (2016:4), to provide more cooperation agreements, benefits for students (links with the market), programmes, staff (for mobility) (2016:9). However, the current volume of international activity in both project work and mobility is modest (2016: 4).

f. The report for UMT (2017) points out that the new strategy has internationalization a priority, among its goals, (2017:7). There are plans for further Inter-institutional agreements, for more joint research projects, development of joint programmes. There is a considerable number of signed agreements, exchange arrangements for both students and staff (2017:9), the university is actively engaged in promoting an internationalization agenda. There is a wide range of international collaborative activities that provide opportunities for staff to work with international universities (2017:11).

As for the survey, for the purposes of this analysis, I selected results from items in the

<sup>3</sup> At the time of the review, the strategic plan of UV was still in its draft form.

questionnaires, which asked questions regarding their language competence, the skills they would need for a fruitful mobility experience, the reasons why they would go on mobility and their opinion about the study programmes at their home university. Below are the responses to these items.

Among the questions asked, one concerned their knowledge of English. English is important for internationalization, which does not mean that the importance of local languages should be overlooked. In any case, to this question, they answered in the following way:

Table 1. Students' command of English  
Do you speak English?

	Yes	No	
UET	94.6	5.4	
UAMD	94.4	5.6	
UV	93.1	6.9	
UNMED	100	0	
UNIKO	97.1	2.9	
UMT	95.5	4.5	
	If yes, what is your level of command		
	Poor	Intermediate	Fluent
UET	5.6	83.3	11.1
UAMD	4.9	48.1	47
UV	7.9	62.4	29.6
UMT	0	17.4	82.6
UNIKO	5.7	22.9	71.4
MTU	4.5	36.4	59.1

The next item concerned the skills needed for mobility. They were given a list of skills to choose from. Below are the results:

Table 2. Skills needed for mobility

If you were given the opportunity to study on exchange programmes, what do you think would be the skills you would need in order to have a satisfactory and successful experience? You can select more than one alternative.

	Academic merit	Knowledge of the local language	Knowledge of English	Intercultural competence	Ability to adapt oneself in a new environment	Other
UET	19.6	16.9	23.3	11.9	27.3	1
UAMD	25	21.9	21.9	3.1	28.1	0
UV	16.3	17.5	25.4	10.8	27.8	2.4
UMT	27.8	18.5	20.4	7.4	25.9	0
UNIKO	16	16	22.2	14.8	30.9	0
MTU	20.8	7.5	30.2	11.3	28.3	1.9

The other item regarded the reasons why they would go on mobility. The results are as follows:

Table 3. Reasons to go on mobility

What would be the reason(s) that would make you apply for an exchange mobility at an international university? You can select more than one alternative.

	UET	UAMD	UV	UMT	UNIKO	MTU
Academic experience	18.4	22.2	15.9	52.2	11.4	11.1
Cultural exchange	4.3	0	4.2	4.3	2.9	11.1
New life experience	28.6	16.7	20.6	8.7	28.6	12.5
Knowing people from other cultural backgrounds	1.6	5.6	2.6	0	5.7	8.3
Desire to travel and visit other countries	3.2	0	5.3	0	5.7	8.3
The grant	2.7	5.6	3.2	8.7	0	9.7
Improving communicative and discursive skills in a foreign language	6.5	16.7	12.2	4.3	24.3	6.9
Establishing new contacts	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	12.5
Creating new opportunities	31.9	33.3	31.2	17.4	28.6	15.3
Other	2.2	0	4.2	4.3	2.9	4.2

Last, they were asked to give their opinion about the study programmes offered by their university.

Table 4. Students' opinion about the study programmes

What do you think of the study programmes offered by your home institution? How do they align with those offered by other universities worldwide?

	Not at all	Little	Satisfactorily	Much
UET	5.4	15.7	59.5	19.5
UAMD	27.8	66.7	5.6	0
UV	15.9	33.3	46	4.8
UMT	21.7	56.5	17.4	4.3
UNIKO	5.7	25.7	68.6	0
MTU	0	18.2	59.1	22.7

On the other hand, academic staff were asked similar questions. To the question about their command of English, they answered:

Table 5. Teachers' command of English

	Do you speak English?		
	Yes	No	
UET	100	0	
UAMD	100	0	
UV	95.5	4.5	
UMT	100	0	
UNIKO	92.9	7.1	
MTU, international	100	0	
MTU, local	100	0	
	If yes, what is your level of command		
	Poor	Intermediate	Fluent
UET	5.4	29.7	64.9
UAMD	0	37.1	62.9
UV	3	37.9	59.1

UMT	0	26.3	73.7
UNIKO	7.1	28.6	64.3
MTU, international	0	25	75
MTU, local	0	0	100

Table 6. Teachers' ability to teach in English

	Can you teach classes in English or any other foreign language?		
	Yes	No	I am not sure
UET	89.2	0	10.8
UAMD	88.6	2.9	8.6
UV	89.4	0	10.6
UMT	91	0	0.9
UNIKO	89.3	0	10.7
MTU, international	100	0	0
MTU, local	100	0	0

As for the skills needed for mobility, they answered:

Table 7. Skills for mobility

	If you were given the opportunity to teach/be trained on exchange programmes, what do you think would be the skills you would need in order to have a satisfactory and successful experience? You can select more than one alternative.					
	Academic/professional performance	Knowledge of the local language	Knowledge of English	Intercultural competence	Ability to adapt oneself in a new environment	Other
UET	62.2	5.4	8.1	5.4	13.5	5.4
UAMD	40	5.7	20	17.1	11.4	5.7
UV	30.9	10.7	26.2	12.8	17.4	2
UMT	42.1	18.4	13.2	5.3	18.4	2.6
UNIKO	30.2	7	23.3	20.9	18.6	0
MTU, international	40	10	10	25	15	0
MTU, local	66.7	0	16.7	16.7	0	0

As for the reasons to go on mobility, they selected:

Table 8. Reasons to go on mobility

	UET	UAMD	UV	UMT	UNIKO	MTU, international	MTU, local
Academic experience	19.6	21.4	18.6	12	19.1	25.8	28.6
Cultural exchange	9.2	10	8.6	6.3	8.4	9.7	14.3
New life experience	16.3	15	14.6	18.3	16	6.5	14.3

Knowing people from other cultural backgrounds	10.5	5.7	7.5	6.3	5.3	6.5	7.1
Desire to travel and visit other countries	2.6	4.3	3.6	4.2	3.1	6.5	7.1
The grant	4.6	5	6.1	4.2	6.9	3.2	0
Improving communicative and discursive	11.1	10.7	8.6	12	8.4	9.7	7.1

Skills in a foreign language							
Establishing new contacts	12.4	14.3	16.1	17.6	15.3	16.1	7.1
Creating new opportunities	13.1	12	16.4	14.8	16.8	16.1	14.3
Other	0.7	0.7	0	0	0.8	0	0

Besides the above, teachers were asked two more questions about the study programmes. Below are the responses:

Table 9. Teaching and learning activities

Do you think the teaching and learning activities foreseen in the study programme(s) your course(s) is/are part of train students to adapt themselves in new intercultural environments and groups?					
	Not at all	Little	sufficiently	Satisfactorily	Much
UET	2.7	0	24.3	43.2	29.7
UAMD	2.9	2.9	42.9	28.6	22.9
UV	0	6.1	31.8	43.9	18.2
UMT	5.3	5.3	42.1	31.6	15.8
UNIKO	0	7.1	17.9	46.4	28.6
MTU, international	0	37.5	12.5	25	25
MTU, local	0	0	25	75	0

Table 10. Teaching and learning activities for intercultural competence

Do they give students the possibility to build intercultural skills and international knowledge?					
	Not at all	Little	sufficiently	Satisfactorily	Much
UET	0	2.7	35.1	32.4	29.7
UAMD	2.9	5.7	37.1	25.7	28.6
UV	0	9.1	22.7	4.7	21.2
UMT	0	10.5	42.1	26.3	21.2
UNIKO	0	10.7	21.4	39.3	28.6
MTU, international	0	37.5	25	25	12.5
MTU, local	0	0	25	25	50

**3.5 Interpretation of results.** The analysis of the strategic documents and institutional review reports reveals that internationalization is taking place in similar lines in Albanian universities: emphasis on international cooperation, preference for recruiting staff with academic qualifications from Western universities, organization of and participation in international conferences, involvement in international projects for research

and development, emphasis on student and staff mobilities.

However, the reports also evidence lack of joint degrees, although this is a priority, low flow of international students, as most programmes are in Albanian, attempts for modules in English to facilitate student mobility.

Quantitative data from the survey suggest that language skills (herein English) are in place. The majority of students and staff reported they speak English at an either intermediate or advanced level. Academic staff are confident to teach in English or another foreign language. Almost all students and staff speak another foreign language, Italian mainly, then French, German, Spanish, Greek and others, mostly at an either intermediate. There is awareness of the need to possess good language skills which seems more a matter of individual choice rather than an institutional concern.

Of the skills appreciated most when on mobility (academic merit, knowledge of the local language, knowledge of English, intercultural competence, ability to adapt oneself in a new environment, other), academic merit ranked higher among students and staff, whereas intercultural competence was overlooked. Where high, the respondents came mainly from language departments.

Of the reasons that would make them apply for mobility (academic experience, cultural exchange, new life experience, knowing people from other cultural backgrounds, desire to travel and visit other countries, the grant, improving communicative and discursive skills in a foreign language, establishing new contacts, creating new opportunities, other), students mainly selected ‘creating new opportunities’ (UMT students selected ‘academic experience’). Whereas for most staff academic, experience ranked first.

About study programmes, opinions varied. 59.5% UET, 46% UV and 68.6% UNIKO students find them aligned with international programmes, whereas 66.7% UAMD and 56.5% UNMED students find them little aligned.

As for the course content, the opinions of the staff varied: 45.9% UET, 34.8% UV, 57.1 % UNIKO staff think they satisfactorily integrate an international component. 43.2% UET, 43.9% UV, 46.4% UNIKO think the teaching and learning activities foreseen in the study programme(s) satisfactorily train students to adapt themselves in new intercultural environments and groups, 42.9% UAMD, 42.1% UMT think sufficiently. 35.1% UET, 37.1% UAMD, 22.7% UV, 42.1% UMT academic staff think they sufficiently give students

the possibility to build intercultural skills and international knowledge, whereas 39.3% UNIKO think they satisfactorily do so.

The results presented here suggest that there is not a systematic approach as regards the international and intercultural component in the course curricula. The need to foster the intercultural component in the teaching and learning processes appears to rather be a matter of personal choice on the part of the academic staff.

Intercultural dialogue as a process that strengthens internationalization is not addressed as one of the university's missions.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The study presented here aimed at examining the situation of internationalization in some Albanian universities. It was particularly attempted to see how/if intercultural dialogue, a process well connected with the IaH approach, is addressed in the internationalization agendas of these universities.

The interpretation of qualitative data from the content analysis of the strategic documents and the institutional review reports as well as the quantitative data from the survey suggests that although internationalization is now a reality in Albanian Higher Education Institutions, it follows a course of its own rather than takes place along proper institutional approaches. This is so because Albanian HEIs either lack a proper understanding of what it entails or concrete policies and strategies to do so are missing. There is a need to develop, where absent, or revise, where present, internationalization strategies in order to integrate intercultural dialogue, intercultural competences, cultural diversity, global learning, global citizenship and foster an IaH approach to work towards internationalizing the curriculum in order to make local students feel better accommodated in an internationalized educational environment at his/her home university. The growing international landscape in Albanian universities requires effectiveness and adequacy in managing internationalization processes through effective managing practices and good resource allocation. This will require increasing awareness among the university management in the first place and then among other university structures and units.

Highlighting the importance of intercultural dialogue, respecting and promoting cultural diversity, proposing an intercultural approach to manage it will better connect Albanian universities with society at large, locally and internationally.

Integrating these issues in the routine activities organized by the university's support structures as well as in the course content, learning outcomes and didactic approaches, will make both students and staff more responsible about their role in the internationalization of their universities.

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Security and  
Intercultural  
Communication



## THE SOLIDARIST DISCOURSE AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. REVISITING SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY AND MORALITY IN GLOBAL POLITICS

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**Abstract:** *The post-Second World War international order was based on the idea of order among states, as embedded in the United Nations' system. This principle shaped state behaviour with respect to the sanctity of sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention in states' internal affairs. However, the promotion of human rights at home and abroad ran parallel, as secondary principle of the UN system, and centred on justice within states. For a long time, order among states (meaning absence of inter-state armed conflict and non-intervention in state's domestic affairs) and promotion of justice within states (meaning the need to promote human rights as global responsibility, even if this infringes upon state sovereignty) were perceived as mutually exclusive. This paper tackles solidarism and humanitarian intervention and analyses the core arguments of the solidarist discourse. By revisiting the concept of state sovereignty, solidarists try to reconcile the tension between order among states and justice within states. Building on moral and legal arguments, solidarism tries to shape state behaviour in international politics by drawing attention to the global responsibility to protect. Methodologically, the underlying research question is: what are the main pillars of the solidarist discourse with respect to humanitarian intervention?*

**Keywords:** *solidarism; the English School; humanitarian intervention; human rights*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this article is to present and analyse the pillars of solidarism in world politics with respect to humanitarian intervention. The contrast between two historical periods is envisioned here (the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period) in what falls under legitimate state practice.

Discourse analysis entails a variety of approaches and methodological or analytical tools (Corpădean, 2013a; Corpădean 2013b; Mureşan, 2015; Corpădean 2015; Pop-Flanja, 2015). In this article, the solidarist discourse will be tackled as one built around chief arguments pertaining to moral imperatives for humanitarian intervention, legal grounds for humanitarian-driven action and global responsibility for human rights protection.

The article is divided into two main parts. The first one is further subdivided into two different sections: one will dwell on humanitarian intervention, by defining it and explaining its core features, whereas the second one will outline the main tenets and beliefs of the English School in the

field of International Relations (or the International Society School). The second part will detail and analyse the main arguments of solidarism with respect to the re-interpretation of sovereignty (namely sovereignty as responsibility).

### 2. SOLIDARISM AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

#### 2.1 Defining humanitarian intervention.

Defining humanitarian intervention has been a chief endeavour and, by now, this is based on systematic empirical research and solid conduct of documentation. English School scholars have been preoccupied with the international society of states, high degree of order among states, and the role of norms in regulating state behaviour. R.J. Vincent defined intervention in his seminal book *Nonintervention and International Order* as follows:

Activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the

domestic affairs of another state” (Vincent, 1974:13).

Vincent’s definition from the early 1970’s exposes a key feature of international order during the Cold War period and a stringent necessity in inter-state relations, namely the rule of non-intervention in the domestic politics of states, which is the corollary of state sovereignty. Consequently, intervention was traditionally regarded as violation of state practice and international law, as a controversial action.

According to Weiss and Hubert,

the definition of ‘humanitarian’, as a justification for intervention, is a high threshold of suffering. It refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large scale loss of life (including, of course, genocide), massive forced migrations, and widespread abuses of human rights. Acts that shock the conscience and elicit a basic humanitarian impulse remain politically powerful” (Weiss; Hubert, 2001:15). According to Michael Walzer, “humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts that ‘shock the moral conscience of mankind’ (Walzer, 2006:107).

Scholars like J. L. Holzgrefe and Allen Buchanan provide a definition which includes the act of humanitarian relief and which clearly mentions the preoccupation for human rights associated with such practice: “[Humanitarian intervention] is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals others than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Holzgrefe, 2003:18; Buchanan, 2003:130). A further clarification is provided by Holzgrefe, by stating that this operational definition is meant to deliberately exclude other types of engagement occasionally associated with the term: “nonforcible interventions such as the threat or use of economic, diplomatic, or other sanctions, and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state’s own nationals”; the purpose of this differentiation is meant to tackle the issue of “whether states may use force to protect the human rights of individuals other than their own citizens” (Holzgrefe, 2003:18).

There are specific characteristics of humanitarian-driven acts, such as the ones discussed in this article, and all fall under the umbrella of *forcible humanitarian intervention*.

Therefore, the definition provided by Jennifer M. Welsh is here considered accurate: humanitarian intervention entails “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering” (Welsh, 2004: 3).

Consequently, in this article, humanitarian intervention is understood as joint actions undertaken by a group of states or by an international organization, such as the United Nations, within the boundaries of another state with the purpose of ending human rights violations associated with humanitarian emergencies.

## 2.2 Solidarism and the English School.

Pluralism and Solidarism are two conceptions developed by the English School in the field of International Relations. The English School (also referred to as the International Society School or the British institutionalists) designates a group of scholars (not all of them English, but all of them studying and publishing in Great Britain) whose main preoccupation revolved around *the society of states* or *the international society*, as opposed to the international system (as understood by Realism and Neorealism in International Relations).

The English School thinkers are Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Adam Watson, James Mayall, Robert Jackson, R.J. Vincent, Tim Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler and others. Their most important tenet is that the international system of states is embedded in a society of states which encompasses norms, values, rules and institutions, all acknowledged and accepted by states and all of which enable the functioning of the system (Ruggie, 1998:11-28; Neumann; Wæver, 2005:41-70; Wheeler, 2003; HerȚa, 2012:9).

According to Hedley Bull,

a system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole [...]. A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another (Bull, 1977:9-10, 13).

In 1966, Hedley Bull published the essay called “The Grotian Conception of International Society” in which he distinguished between two conceptions of international society: pluralism and

solidarism. The central assumption of solidarism is “the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law.” In contrast, pluralism claims that “states do not exhibit solidarity of this kind, but are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law” (Bain, 2018:1). As shown by Hidemi Suganami, one key component of the “pluralism/solidarism divide” revolves around the issue of humanitarian intervention, namely

whether the society of sovereign states should accept the practice of unilateral military intervention as a legitimate response to massive violations of human rights by a regime against the people it governs” (Suganami, 2010:25).

The pluralist conception rejects the legitimacy or legality of this practice in inter-state relations whereas solidarism focuses on both moral and legal arguments to support such practice in world politics.

During the Cold War period, pluralism prevailed in the international system and order among states, based on sovereignty and non-intervention in states’ internal affairs, was considered the most effective way to dissuade inter-state warfare. However, the 1990s brought along new challenges for (human) security, but also witnessed the transformation of war (with civilians being the targets and ethnic cleansing as main strategy). Humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq (1991-1992), Somalia (1992-1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995), the genocide and failed intervention in Rwanda (1994), all spurred a new debate revolving around pluralism-solidarism, with many scholars arguing for forcible humanitarian intervention triggered by human rights abuses and humanitarian crises. As such, solidarism was widely revisited and supported.

### 3. THE SOLIDARIST DISCOURSE. REVISITING SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY AND MORALITY IN GLOBAL POLITICS

The bulk of the solidarist arguments centres on the preoccupation for human rights, for individuals, perceived as key subjects in international law, rather than for states and their rights. Wheeler asserts that

solidarism is committed to upholding minimum standards of common humanity, which means placing the victims of human rights abuses at the

centre of its theoretical project, since it is committed to exploring how the society of states might become more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics (Wheeler, 2003:37).

Solidarism basically posits that humanitarian intervention is legally permitted and morally imperative (Herța, 2013:18). In what follows, I will present and analyse the main pillars of the solidarist discourse in terms of sovereignty, responsibility, and morality in world politics.

One strong argument of the solidarist discourse is centred on the notion of sovereignty. In short, solidarism revises the essence of the concept and discusses the sovereignty as responsibility. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established at the UN Millennium Assembly in September 2000. It was launched at the initiative of the Canadian government and in 2001 it issued the Report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* (Evans, 2008:38-39) and a supplementary volume of research essays, bibliography, and background material, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert. *Ab initio*, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty set out three pivotal goals:

1) to promote a comprehensive debate on the issue of humanitarian intervention; 2) to foster a new global political consensus on how to move forward; and 3) to find new ways of reconciling the principles of intervention and state sovereignty (Welsh, 2002: 510).

At this point a contextual clarification is in order, since it helps us understand how the responsibility to protect (R2P) was coalesced. The post-Cold War order was no longer challenged by the conventional inter-state aggression (with the exception, of course, of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), but rather by internal conflict and intra-state turmoil that grossly and shockingly affected civilians, shifting the *locus* of the violence from the military sector to the societal one. Cases like Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Kosovo, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Darfur are all illustrative in this respect, but also they point to the failure of the international community to prevent the atrocities and the human suffering.

During the Cold War era, the right to intervene was at the heart of the debate, but gradually the centrepiece of the debate changed over the 1990s, thus providing a positive context for the emergence of R2P. The realities of intra-state wars (or civil wars) in the 1990s displayed ethnic cleansing,

child-soldiering, famine, human displacement, brutality against civilians. Therefore, the right to intervene in such shocking and extraordinary situations became a legitimate response to human rights violations and to human suffering.

Chantal De Jonge Oudraat observed that

unlike in the early 1990s, the debate at the end of the decade focused not on the question of whether humanitarian considerations could be characterized as ‘threats to international peace and security’ and thus justify intervention in states’ domestic affairs, but rather whether such interventions needed the authorization of the UN Security Council” (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000:419).

It is against this background that the responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged and, as emphasized by Evans, it indicated “the solution” and the transition from the right to intervene to interventions dictated by and aiming at the responsibility to protect. The R2P was inherently related to new security issues, such as intra-state warfare (ICISS, 2001:4-6), to new threats in a globalized world, such as non-state actors, the salient issue of refugees or internally displaced people/IDPs, human security (Kaldor, 2007; Thakur, 2006), failed states or, as William Zartman called them, collapsed states (Zartman, 1995).

As stated in the ICISS Report, the responsibility to protect is based on certain core principles:

- A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
- B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (ICISS, 2001: XI).

Moreover, according to the ICISS Report,

The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in:

- A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty;
- B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;
- C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law;

D. the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself (ICISS, 2001: XI).

The emerging norm states that, as a last resort, the international community or the states within it are legitimized in employing military force against another state with the purpose of saving endangered civilians. This right, it is argued, derives from a shift in conceptualizing sovereignty in world politics, namely from “sovereignty as authority” to “sovereignty as responsibility.” The huge difference is that while the former refers to states’ control over their territories and population, the latter “suggests that sovereignty is conditional on a state demonstrating respect for a minimum standard of human rights” (Welsh, 2002:510-511). This assertion is also taken by others in order to pinpoint to the limits of sovereignty, as inherent in the UN Charter:

The responsibility to protect norm states that, as a last resort, the international community or states within it are legitimized in employing military force against another state with the purpose of saving endangered civilians. This right, it is argued, derives from a shift in conceptualizing sovereignty in world politics, namely from “sovereignty as authority” to “sovereignty as responsibility.” The huge difference is that while the former refers to states’ control over their territories and population, the latter “suggests that sovereignty is conditional on a state demonstrating respect for a minimum standard of human rights” (Welsh, 2002:510-511). This assertion is also taken by others in order to pinpoint to the limits of sovereignty, as inherent in the UN Charter:

According to Chapter VII, sovereignty is not a barrier to action taken by the Security Council as part of measures in response to ‘a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression’; in other words, the sovereignty of states, as recognized in the UN Charter, yields to the demands of international peace and security. And the status of sovereign equality only holds effectively for each state when there is stability, peace, and order among states (Weiss, Hubert, 2001:7).

In conclusion, solidarism focuses on states’ ability and, most importantly, states’ willingness to respond to human rights violations and to human suffering. Basically, the belief is that states cannot by-stand genocide and massive human rights abuses and are ready to support human rights domestically and abroad, even if this entails the

revisiting of sovereignty. The main arguments of the solidarist discourse are built around moral imperatives (Pantea, 2013), legal grounds (since most states have signed international treaties and conventions regarding the promotion of human rights) and the need to attach responsibility (for human rights protection) to state sovereignty. The underlying context is centred on a globalized world in which international order (or international peace and security for that matter) are best protected by absence of intra-state warfare and humanitarian emergencies, because spill-over effects of such internal armed conflicts would destabilize entire regions and would ultimately pose a serious threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the solidarist discourse does not tackle order among states (meaning absence of inter-state armed conflict and non-intervention in state's domestic affairs) and promotion of justice within states (meaning the need to promote human rights as global responsibility, even if this infringes upon state sovereignty) as mutually exclusive, but rather as congruent goals of the international society of states.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The content of this paper is the result of the author's research work which has been undertaken over the last eight years and which has been implemented in the author's academic work with students, as well as in her research. The author takes full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper.

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## **CIMIC TASKS DURING THE ROMANIAN AIR POLICING MISSION IN THE BALTIC STATES. “BALTICA 07”**

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**Abstract:** *This paper is aimed at analyzing the concrete aspects of the human interactions generated by the presence of the Romanian military in the Air Force in missions outside the national territory. Thus, the intention is to investigate empirically the real CIMIC-related problems, faced by the Romanian Air Force in carrying out missions outside the national territory. I have chosen for this short study one of the Air Force missions carried out by the Romanian Air Force troops in 2007 on the territory of the Baltic States, namely “Baltica 07”. Therefore, I investigated problems and the way they were solved by the Romanian military personnel. The research allowed and led to pertinent conclusions regarding the importance of CIMIC operations in support of Air Force missions accomplishment that were performed outside the national territory.*

**Keywords:** *CIMIC (civil-military cooperation); interoperability; air policing; CAOC (Combined Air Operations Centre)*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

This paper, laying the theoretical foundations of *CIMIC* structure from communication and military sciences, based on papers written or coordinated by authors like: Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1981), Habermas (2005), Zaalberg (2005), Dobrescu *et al.* (2007), Schiff (2009), Nielsen & Snider (2009), Soliman & Coskun (2015) and Vasile (2017), aims to empirically investigate the actual *CIMIC* problems encountered by the Romanian Air Force in carrying out missions outside the national territory. We chose for this study one of the real Air Force missions performed by the Romanian Air Force troops in 2007 on the territory of the Baltic States.

Investigating these issues and how they were solved by the Romanian military allows us to make pertinent conclusions about the importance of *CIMIC* operations to support the accomplishment of the Air Force missions outside the national territory. Among the variants of the case study, I have chosen for this paper the case study on events, roles, relationships, in which I propose the analysis of concrete aspects of human interactions generated by the presence of Romanian Air Force soldiers in missions outside the national territory. Therefore, I have chosen the case study method because, as experts point out, this is

a strategy to carry out research that requires empirical investigations in relation to a particular contemporary

phenomenon in a real life context and using multiple sources of information interviews, questionnaires, testimonies, evidence, documents (Yin, 1994:196).

This method allows the

focus on a concrete case (which is interpreted in detail, i.e. giving in depth references about individuals, groups, target organizations), taking into account all its contextual particularities (Robson, 2002:180).

“Baltica 07” consisted of

defending the integrity of the Baltic Sea Airspace in peacetime for 24 hours with aircraft capable of taking off and acting in the event of an aircraft being broken by error or intentionally, the flight regime in the airspace of the Baltic States (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:4).

It lasted for 3 months, between 31<sup>st</sup> July – 31<sup>st</sup> October, 2007. 4 Mig-21 LanceR „C” aircraft and a detachment of 67 personnel from 71<sup>st</sup> “General Emanoil Ionescu” Air Base, Câmpia Turzii were part of this mission. The mission took place within NATO, “under the command and tactical control of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) of UEDEM, Germany” and “in cooperation with the Lithuanian commanders at the Siauliai and Karmelava base.” (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:4)

## 2. THE GENERAL CONTEXT

**2.1. Geopolitical context.** The Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were part of the USSR until the collapse of the communist empire. In 1991 they became independent, and since 2004 they have been members of the European Union and NATO.

In the transition period towards the European and Euro-Atlantic bodies, the Baltic States faced strong pressure from Russia to join the newly established Community of Independent States, as successors of the USSR, but their European vocation as well as Russia's inability to produce any credible influence on them, has ultimately led to adherence to NATO and the European Union. Under these circumstances, the borders of the Baltic States have become borders of the European Union with Russia, but especially with the North Atlantic Alliance with Russia's powerful military force, a potential enemy.

The situation of the Baltic countries is also complicated by the proximity of the Russian Baltic territory of Kaliningrad, in fact a Russian military fortress at the heart of Western democracy, but also by the relatively low level of development of the national military force and a military infrastructure based on the Soviet technology and facilities of the last century. The massive Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea, both in Kaliningrad and in other maritime areas in its sphere of influence, poses great challenges to the sovereignty of the Baltic States. Given their NATO membership, the defense of their airspace with the involvement of the Alliance's resources is fully justified. A number of 13 NATO member states participated in rotation with troops and aircraft on air defense missions to protect the Baltic Sea airspace since April 2004 as support missions. Since March 2006, as missions under the common umbrella of the Air Defense, the Baltic Airspace became a NATO Airspace (Laurențiu Chiriță, in Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:5).

**2.2 The cultural, social and economic context of the mission.** The Baltic countries are northern cultures, similar to Norway and Sweden, but with no negligible Russian influences. Occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, a fact unrecognized by the US and other Western democracies, the Baltic countries underwent a powerful process of Russianization, massive Russian-speaking population transfer, and the requirement of studying Russian. Nowadays, within the population of the three Baltic countries, the Russian population represents a quarter of the

Estonian population and one third of the Latvian population, and the capital of Latvia, Riga, has a mostly Russian population.

The official languages in the Baltic States during the Soviet period was preserved locally, but in parallel with the Russian language, so that today the elder population and even middle-aged people know and frequently use Russian language. In Latvia, for example, about 34% of the population speaks Russian at home, including people who are not Russian. The fewest Russian speakers are in Lithuania.

The religion of the Baltic countries is traditionally Christian. The Soviet occupation and infusion of the Russian-speaking population determined the penetration of Catholicism by powerful Orthodox communities. There are also segments of the population who, under Western influence, have adopted various reformed, Protestant and Neoprotected cults. The Lithuanian population is 77% of Roman Catholic; Latvian is divided between Lutherans (700,000), Catholic (500,000), and Orthodox (370,000), while Estonia is the least religious in Europe, comprising 75% of the population without religion, the rest of the population being divided into Lutherans and the Orthodox.

From a social perspective, the Baltic countries have the characteristics of the Nordic countries of Europe, and they are rapidly adapting to the Nordic lifestyle, with major emphasis on the recovery of the national cultural specificity, education and health. There are significant differences between the three Baltic countries. While Lithuania grants one of the highest education budgets (14.7%), being one of the most educated nations in Europe, but also the highest suicide rate in the world, in Estonia the average education is at the odds while Latvia education and health are in distress.

Economic life in the Baltic countries has witnessed a significant development after gaining independence. With oscillating growth rates marked by ups and downs, Baltic countries economy is today one of the most robust among the Eastern bloc countries of the European Union. All three Baltic countries have adopted the single European currency, which has led to a strong integration into the economic circuit of the Eurozone. At the same time, the Baltic countries are massively geared towards high-productivity, high-productivity industry and a great deal of human intelligence.

**2.3. Military development in Baltic States.** One of the major concerns of the Baltic States, after independence, was the development of

military forces to ensure its preservation and defense. Rapid joining NATO structures and massive participation in the Alliance's military activities is one of the core drivers of this concern.

Of the three Baltic countries, only Latvia has a professional army. The Latvian defense concept is based on a Swedish-Finnish model, which involves the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force and a mobilization centre to build this force. Lithuania abolished compulsory military service in 2008, but it reintroduced it in 2015, keeping under arms a staff of 15 000 active soldiers.

Estonia has never intended to abolish the compulsory military service, which has a variable duration of 8-11 months, depending on the specialization, but it also prepares a Paramilitary National Guard (League of Defense). As a result of massive cyber attacks on national security structures, the Estonian Army set up, in 2006, the Emergency Informatics Response Team of Estonia (CERT). The organization operates on security issues in the country's networks, aiming at providing the vital data transfer infrastructure in Estonia. Following the Estonian experience in the field, NATO has decided to place, *The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre for Excellence* (CCDCOE) in Estonia.

The Baltic States cooperate in several cooperative initiatives at the level of the armed forces, including the Baltic Battalion Baltic (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Sea of Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and joint military education institutions, as would be the, *The Baltic Defense College* from Tartu. Future cooperation projects include sharing of national training facilities for military training and specialization training (BALTRAIN), as well as collective training of battalion-sized contingents for use in NATO's rapid response force. In January, 2011, Baltic countries were invited to join *NORDEFCO*, the defense framework of the Nordic countries.

Since joining the North Atlantic Alliance, The Baltic Sea armies participated and still participate with significant force and means at international peace missions, in theatres of operations in different parts of the world, with a wealth of experience in this field. They have an important contribution to the development and dissemination of experience in various fields, participating in the work of centres of excellence and even hosting some of them. It is of interest for our study Latvia's participation in the NATO Centre of

Excellence in the field of civil-military cooperation of Lower countries.

**2.4 Socio-cultural, demographic, economic and military profile of Šiauliai, Lithuania.** The town of Šiauliai, residence of the military base where the Romanian detachment for the "Baltica 07" mission was deployed, is the fourth largest city in Lithuania. The choice for the Baltic mission was determined by the existence of the strongest airborne base left by the Soviets in the area, after the independence of the countries, with the longest route in the Baltic States (3500m), which provides the best possible facilities for air police missions.

According to the 2001 population census, the city's population is 276 406 inhabitants (10% of the country's population). Ethnic Lithuanians comprise 93%, the Russians – 5% and the remaining 2% consist of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Roma, Latvians, Armenians and other ethnic groups. Approximately 94% of the city's population considers Lithuanian as their native language, 5% speak Russian, and the rest speak Ukrainian, Belarusian, Latvian, Roma, Armenian. Approximately 80% of the 20 year-olds know Russian, while only 17% can speak English and 7% German.

The economy of the city was dominated by the leather industry during the Russian Empire, completed during the Soviet period by electronic products, mechanical engineering, woodwork, construction industry. However, the status of the Soviet military base led to slower economic growth than other Lithuanian cities, the Soviet army retaining the city in a closed one for its inhabitants and thus, forbidden for foreign citizens, due to its military importance. Therefore, the local population was not in contact with foreign citizens and in no way with NATO forces.

The city has a well-structured education network at all levels, from pre-school to university. There are 8 gymnasiums, 7 high-schools, 16 secondary schools, 7 primary schools, 9 non-formal education schools for children, 29 kindergartens. 21 000 pupils studied in education schools in 2006. Within the university education, over 15,000 students study at Šiauliai University and in other 5 higher education institutions.

### **3. CIMIC TOPICS FOR THE "BALTICA 07" MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

**3.1 CIMIC specialized training for mission accomplishment.** Given that the air policing mission to be conducted in the Baltic States was

not isolated in time and space, but it was an episode in a series of previous and subsequent missions of the same nature carried out by the air force of 13 NATO member states, the foreign military presence in Šiauliai Air Base was a habit for the population, the press and the civilian city institutions, NATO civil-military relations being already consolidated. Communication channels, supply lines, cooperation programs, media promotion, protocols for special and unexpected situations and so on, were already established. From *CIMIC* perspective, NATO's specialized forces, as well as the national detachments that preceded the Romanian one, carefully elaborated everything that was necessary in terms of procedure and cooperation. The task of *CIMIC* specialists involved in the preparation of the mission was only to familiarize the Romanian military with all these arrangements and possibly to fill some of them with aspects specific to their capabilities and means. However, the relatively general and theoretical nature of the training, connecting the Romanian detachment to this system in a short time so as to ensure the continuity of the mission and maintaining its qualitative standards required maximum receptivity from the mission personnel and rapid adaptation to an unknown environment, not only geographical, but also economic, social and cultural. Unlike the Soviet army, which was known to keep the city's population and civil institutions in terror and isolation, NATO forces came with a radical change of attitude: openness, collaboration, cooperation, promotion, social and cultural integration, unconditional mutual acceptance, good intention. The military personnel of the detachment to be deployed to Siauliai were trained to fully understand this type of civil-military relationship. They were informed about the culture, religion, habits, traditions, city population mentalities, the degree of acceptability of civilians in relation to foreign soldiers, as well as the way of behaviour during the mission, especially related to attitudes, behaviours, accepted or unaccepted gestures. At the same time, specialists responsible with technical interoperability, logistics, public relations, have been trained on how to come into play and on specific *CIMIC* activities that they will carry out.

According to *CIMIC* Manual, all military participants in this mission were to receive a behavioural guide, entitled *The Soldier's Manual*. In case of "Baltica 07" mission, such a handbook was drafted, but a little bit adapted to the specificity of the deployment area, probably

starting from the premise that the deployment area is not actually a military theatre of operations, and detainee personnel, except for those involved in logistics or technical cooperation, interact with civilians only socializing, cultural or leisure activities. A brochure was distributed to the military personnel, but containing general theoretical data, valid in any theatre of operations, without concrete reference to the deployment area. I consider, however, that a manual specifically designed for this mission, would have been of great help to the military personnel and it could ensure that what they received as information and recommendations during mission preparation are at their disposal at every moment.

### 3.2 *CIMIC* topics regarding military interoperability

a. Aspects regarding the use and completion of technical and operational facilities: Being the 13<sup>th</sup> rotation of NATO Air Policing mission in the Baltic States, the Romanian detachment did not have to deal with major problems in providing technical and operational facilities for the mission. Since April 2004, when this mission started with the contribution of Belgium, until August, 2007, when the Romanian detachment took over the mission from the French detachment, the Šiauliai military base was given substantial improvements and modernizations in order to operate at the level of NATO exigencies and missions' specificities.

For the Romanian Air Force, however, this was the first combat mission with fighter planes carried out outside the country, after the Second World War" and, "the most important mission entrusted to the Romanian military aviation since joining the NATO structures" (Laurențiu Chiriță, in Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:4). As a result, the Romanian detachment military personnel were put in the position to solve unusual issues regarding the force deployment, as well as ensuring all the conditions for mission accomplishment. To this end, a mission-training detachment consisting of 30 military specialists from all branches, who assessed the technical, operational and logistical needs, was sent to Šiauliai and made a connection with the Lithuanian Air Force and with local authorities, as well. Given that each participating country has made available military aircraft of various types (F-16 AM – Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal: Tornado F.3 – Great Britain; F-4F Phantom – Germany; F-16C, F-15C Eagle – USA, Turkey; MIG-29 – Poland; Mirage F-1M – Spain; Mirage 2000C – France; MIG-21 LanceR C – Romania) for the direct

operation of the aircraft, technical means had to be deployed. In addition to the four fighter planes, the Romanian detachment deployed a C-130 Hercules aircraft for logistics needs as well. On their way to Siauliai, all aircraft made a stop in Warsaw for cross-servicing (supply with air, oxygen and fuel).

The Lithuanians provided only hangars for the four aircraft, an autonomous start-up unit and the fuel needed to supply the aircraft. In terms of personnel, an autonomous protection cell was provided, Romanian troops being part of it. At the same time, the Romanian detachment benefited permanently from the collaboration of military commandants and specialists from the Siauliai (operating base) and Karmelava – the Center of Reporting and Control (CRC). All these facilities were part of the requirements defined within NATO by the HNS concept of Force Nation Support. The Multinational Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Kalkar – Germany provided the command and tactical control, and CC – Air Ramstein, the operational control.

Fortunately, during the mission development, Romanian pilots were never asked to take off for any real case of violating the Baltic States airspace (Laurențiu Chiriță, in Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:6). In all these stages of preparing and taking over the mission from the French detachment, the *CIMIC* competencies of the mission commandant as well as of the specialists who prepared the mission have been requested in full. In this respect, there were no issues or difficulties. NATO *CIMIC* specialists have implemented from the very beginning of the Air Policing Mission in the Baltic States, clear, precise, unambiguous operational protocols and concepts, so that issues of misunderstanding or negotiation with military and civilian persons or institutions have been made clear without difficulty.

The commandant of the Romanian mission, as well as some of the military participants, however, noticed a relative indifference and uncertainty of the Lithuanian side, in the course of activities, due to the still low level of development and implementation of NATO standards in their Air Force, at that particular time.

**b. Logistics interoperability issues:** As already mentioned, for the logistics of the mission, “Baltica 07” detachment used a transport aircraft that deployed to the military base at Šiauliai everything that was needed: equipment, spare parts, maintenance materials, weapons and ammunition. For the other logistical needs, the detachment had already prepared supply and channels locally. The military personnel were

accommodated, at the expense of the Romanian state, in the two hotels in the city, where all conditions were ensured: rest, meals, hygiene, equipment maintenance, etc. For shifts, hotel restaurants provided food packages and adapted their schedule according to the timetable of these shifts. The detachment commandant had prepared channels of communication and cooperation for staff medical insurance, at clinics in the city. Two English-language translators were permanently available to the detachment who responded to all requests from the detachment staff. Communication with the families of the military personnel was made at their own expense by telephone and internet.

### **3.3 Cultural and social interoperability.**

Reports from the military press of the time, noted that interoperability within NATO, from a doctrinal perspective,

was an exclusive technical exercise and did not include cultural interoperability, either in terms of cultural cooperation or knowledge of the local conditions (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:6).

However, it is clear from the “Baltica 07” participants’ reports that, in practical terms, NATO has set up a highly developed and structured PR program, the improvement of which all national detachments that followed have contributed to the Air Policing mission accomplishment. The Romanian detachment has fully assumed this program, trying to give it a specific Romanian touch, “by often writing down in the activity plan, special activities for the civil society” (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:6).

**a.** Aspects regarding the language of communication with the military personnel and civilian actors: Given that more than 80% of the population aged over 20 speaks Russian and only 17% speaks English, communication with military and civilian personnel in the deployment area has become problematic. Lithuanian Air Force personnel with whom the Romanian detachment has cooperated are presumed to know acceptable English, a universal language of communication in aviation, but also a language of communication within NATO. However, this was not their natural language of communication, which is why, even in relations with this staff category, there were some difficulties. As for officials and civilian population, relations with them would not have been possible if the Lithuanian side had not permanently secured two young English translators, language in which Romanian personnel could easily communicate.

And, in this situation, the communication suffered because in-depth understanding, as well as the effective identification of the speakers with the transmitted content was vitiated by the successive passage through two stages of understanding: one coming from the transmitter's mother tongue to the English language and the second, the other way round. Under these conditions, communicators focused more on logical, than on affective reception. Unfortunately, the Romanian detachment was not assigned a Russian-language person who, in most cases, could have simplified the process of understanding, reducing it to a single stage, in favor of stimulating affectivity in communication. Some activities, especially those carried out among young pupils or children in orphanages, were, from communication point of view, limited to non-verbal communication..

**b.** Aspects of promoting the trust of the Lithuanian population in the Romanian Air Force during their mission: As reporters pointed out on the spot,

The entire period in which the Romanian detachment from Šiauliai carried out its activity, represented as many days of identity expression, of reflections and personal impressions, of supporting the image of Romanian Air Force and of Romanian Army (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:6).

There have been visits of military and civilian personalities, journalists from various publications and televisions, groups of pupils and students at the military base where the Romanian detachment was deployed; two MIG 21 LanceRs participated in the events dedicated to the Lithuanian Aviation Day. All these activities have contributed fully to the development of the trust of the military, officials and the Lithuanian population in the Romanian Air Force, increasing the mutual acceptability and thus, facilitating the accomplishment of the missions.

The appreciations made by the Lithuanian Air Force and the Ambassador of Romania in Lithuania at the mission's ending ceremony confirms the full success of the promotion of Romania's image, trust and respect for the capability of the Romanian Air Force to carry out missions within NATO.

**c.** Aspects regarding the promotion of Romanian and Lithuanian national culture: Activities within the scope of this objective have become a tradition within the military base of Šiauliai. Each participating nation has made efforts to promote its own history, culture and civilization. The Romanian detachment followed, in the

rotation, the French one, which has a common historical and cultural heritage with the Lithuanian people, especially during the Napoleonic Empire. As a result, our detachment had to cope with the French standard and present its history, culture and civilization at the highest level. As part of the joint activities carried out together with the civilian population (sports contests, visits of officials, press or school pupils) presented films of Romania, the Romanian Army and Romanian Air Force, talks were held and questions were answered. The common neighbourhood of Moldova with Lithuania during the reign of Stephen the Great and other Moldovan rulers was revealed, and also the similarities of the destinies of the two peoples under the influence of the Russian, Ottoman, Napoleonic or Habsburg empires. The beauties of our country as well as aspects of historical and contemporary culture and civilization were presented.

From the talks with participants on the "Baltica 07" mission, however, the level of presentation of our detachment was much lower than of other participating nations, the issue being of interest for future missions. At the same time, the total lack of interest of the Romanian Consulate in Vilnius, which did not carry out any specific activity of supporting the Romanian detachment during mission development, was noted. Only the presence of the Romanian Ambassador in Lithuania at the celebration of the mission ending was highlighted.

**d.** Aspects of symbolic actions of cultural and social integration: visits to kindergartens, schools, universities, administrative and cultural institutions: Based on reports from the military press, scientific communications, and talks with participants on "Baltica 07" mission, the symbolic actions of cultural and social integration were part of a program well established by NATO *CIMIC* specialists, so the Romanian detachment was given the opportunity to interact with the civilian environment in various forms. In the magazine *Cer senin*, lieutenant-commander Gelu Miron, the detachment PR officer In the *Cer senin* magazine, lieutenant-commander Gelu Miron, the detachment officer of the detachment, presented the main activities that our soldiers participated in. Of these, we only notice those of interest for our theme:

the preparation of over 100 food packages on the occasion of the Christian Feast of the Assumption, donated to the Orthodox and Catholic churches in the region; ... participation in the opening of the 2007-2008 school year at 'Pilot Judreanu Stepano

Dariaus' School in Judrenai-Klaipeda, where school supplies were handed out to students in the first grade; participation in sports events; visit to an orphanage in Šiauliai, where donations were made... (Barac & Săftoiu, 2007:6)

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

All these activities resulted in the integration of Romanian troops into the Lithuanian community of Šiauliai, even temporarily, as well as the increase of mutual trust between them and the local community.

However, at the time of the "Baltica 07", Romania's experience in the field was still limited. The Romanian legislation did not allow the allocation of funds for such activities, which, as one of the participants noted, was carried out "often by collecting personal funds". It is supposed that symbolic value perspective, these actions did not obviously and professionally involve the national symbols, the values specific to the Romanian people. I believe that for such missions where the armed conflict is absent and therefore the cultural component of the mission can be maximized, the detachment must be provided at the stage of preparation of the promotional material mission specific to the Romanian culture and civilization, simple objects printed with national symbols (flags, scarves, handkerchiefs, pens, toys, figurines, etc.), and for visits to schools and orphanages, or for protocols, packs of non-perishable goods, or symbolic gifts. Indisputably, there should also be special financial resources available to the detachment for such activities, which can be managed by the public relations officer and the mission commander. Given that the frequency and importance of the Romanian Armed Forces missions outside the national territory are increasing year after year, that the international military cooperation actions in NATO, non-NATO exercises, applications and training are becoming more frequent, the Ministry of National Defense should prepare within the specialized structures, through orders and purchases, or through their own forces, a wide range of promotional materials, both for the promotion of Romania as a nation and for the promotion of various branches. At the same time, for the immediate preparation of specific missions, specific promotional materials should be made, as well as if charitable actions, packs of non-perishable products, professionally packaged and inscribed with national symbols are to take place. Under any circumstance, when missions outside the national territory require CIMIC-type

actions, the status of the Romanian military force must be a state of national dignity, of affirmation of the Romanian Armed Forces as a distinct entity, solid values and principles undoubtedly anchored in the cultural and spiritual patrimony of the Romanian people. Under no circumstances should the Romanian Army and, in particular, the Romanian Air Force leave the impression of the Alliance's "poor relative". The indisputable professionalism of Romanian soldiers participating in missions outside the national territory must be favoured with the dignity, honour and prestige of the country of which they are citizens.

#### 4. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The present paper is part of a larger research work included in my PhD thesis, in which I have widely approached CIMIC structure and the communication process.

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## TERRORIST ATTACKS – A CHALLENGE IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION

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**Abstract:** *The aim of this paper is to analyse communication strategies in extreme crisis situations, such as terrorist attacks, in order to identify what are the similarities and differences from this perspective, in the case of several incidents that occurred in Europe in the last years. What is the focus of the messages conveyed by response organisations, government officials or political figures and is there a pattern in the speeches delivered in this context, throughout different European countries? This is the question that we address, taking into account that terrorist attacks have a strong impact and different emotional dynamics.*

**Keywords:** *crisis communication; discourse analysis; terrorism*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to analyse the communication process in terrorism crises, in states within the European Union, and how public authorities convey their messages to the public. The stakes are high and complex as the message, though generally addressed to the citizens of the state that was directly affected by the crisis, is a message that goes beyond national borders, a message that needs to be in line with the position on terrorism not only of that particular state but of the European Union in general, and a message that should not show vulnerability and discourage such wrongdoings in the future.

According to Owen Hargie and Pauline Irving, there is insufficient research material that combines the area of crisis communication and terrorism. An explanation could consist in the fact that crisis communication refers not only to the crisis *per se*, but also to the before and the after of the crisis. Since

terrorism is rarely a one-off incident. It is usually an ongoing process, which may begin before the event with a warning and continue after the attack with claims of responsibility and justification, and threats of further violence

the task of analysing communication strategies and their efficiency is challenging. (Hargie & Irving, 2016:1-5) Taking into consideration the complexity of such an endeavour, this article will tackle one aspect related to crisis communication

in such contexts, more precisely the first official statements made by prime ministers or heads of four European states - Belgium, France, Spain and the United Kingdom- during the crisis, with the purpose of comparing their messages to the public, of identifying the patterns of these messages and the differences in approaching the events.

Unfortunately, terrorist attacks, though relatively uncommon in Europe, cannot be regarded as isolated incidents. According to the Global Terrorism index 2016 of the Institute for Economics and Peace (Sydney, New York, Brussels and Mexico City), in OECD member countries, deaths from terrorism increased in 2015 by 650 per cent, compared to 2014, 21 of the 34 OECD countries experienced at least one terrorist attack with the majority of deaths occurring in Turkey and France. (IEP, 2016)

A study of Aino Ruggiero on CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) crises reveals that terrorist attacks affect “a collective sense of security on a society-wide level for the whole of the international community”. Hence, the harm is as international one, it influences values and generates “a fierce societal discourse and a public debate following an attack”. The author emphasizes the importance of understanding the stakeholders and their needs. The needs of the stakeholders indirectly affected by the crisis are not addressed by direct crisis management, which is why they need to be addressed in the communication actions. Three important means by which crisis communication

can contribute to the crisis management networks are through information exchange, warnings and instructions. An empathetic approach is also required to address people's needs for safety (Ruggiero, 2017:53-57).

One of the scales used by communication specialist Timothy Coombs to classify crises is the dimension intentional-unintentional, as a controllability dimension of the attribution theory. In combining this dimension with the internal-external factor, he classified the crises in four types: faux pas (unintentional, caused by external agents), accidents (unintentional, caused by internal agents), transgressions (intentional, caused by internal agents) and terrorism (intentional, caused by external agents). Identifying the type of crisis is of great importance according to Coombs, as it is an indicator of what types of responses should be given from the point of view of the communication strategy. The responses considered as being suitable to these type or crises are the suffering strategy, as it presents the organization as a victim of the external factor and it limits the degree of responsibility. (Coombs, 1995: 454-457) Note should be taken that the responses proposed by Coombs refer to those of the organizations and victimage is to be interpreted as reassurance of the non-responsibility, not as a sign of weakness.

## 2. TERRORIST ATTACKS – DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The important communication dimension of terrorist attacks is recognized by scholars, who talk about a new form of terrorism that has the purpose of making an impact “at the very heart of democratic politics, undermining public confidence, attempting to change government policy and influence electoral outcomes” (Canel & Sanders, 2010:449). Non-traditional approaches on security developed from the 1990s, with a focus on extending and deepening security (Herța, 2017:284). Taking into consideration the extent at which terrorist attacks increased since the 1990s, the communication dimension of security, with its layer of emotional complexity, is an aspect worthy of being analysed.

**2.1 Methodology and Data Collection.** The four terrorist attacks chosen as subjects of analysis are the 22 March 2016 Brussels bombings, the 14 July 2016 Nice truck attack, the 3 June 2017 London Bridge attack and the 17-18 August 2017 Barcelona attacks. The reasons for choosing these attacks are the fact that all four target countries are members of the

European Union and they share common values, they happened within an interval of two years and were all attributed to the same attacker, the Islamic State. Hence, all these common traits make a comparison between the crisis communication responses of the public authorities justifiable and relevant to the subject matter.

The terrorist attacks committed in Western Europe by Islamist extremists, from 2015 to 2017, resulted in the killing of more than 330 civilians. *The New York Times* created a chronological graphic of the death toll of the attacks. To sum up the events in the four cases mentioned above, chronologically, the first one is the Brussels bombing, where two bombs were set off at the main international airport and a third exploded in a subway station, causing 32 deaths. The second attack is the one in Nice, France, when 86 civilians were killed by a man driving a truck down a crowded promenade where people gathered to celebrate Bastille Day. The third attack of the series is the one in London, where three attackers drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge and stabbed people at Borough Market, causing the death of 7 people. Even if the number of casualties in the Manchester attack is higher, the reason for choosing the London attack in the analysis of the communication strategies is that it is the third one happening in the UK, in an interval of three months. The fourth terrorist act analysed is the van crash into pedestrians in the centre of Barcelona, killing at least 13 people. (*New York Times*, 2017).



Fig.1. Death toll of the terrorist attacks in Western Europe (April 2016-August 2017)

In order to study the meaning of written and spoken text and to identify the possible motivations behind public discourses in the above mentioned crises situations, the research method applied is discourse analysis. The sources include academic research, official websites of public institutions and mass media. Though no claim of completeness can be made in discourse analysis, as analysts cannot avoid being subjective or influenced by their position (Chilton, 2004:205), this type of research allows to present a facet of the wide spectrum of crisis communication.

**2.2 Analysis and Results.** In a study by the Belgian House of Representatives in the aftermath

of the 2016 Brussels bomb attacks, a brief outline of the operation of the Crisis Centre of the government presents crisis communication in a positive light. The information unit of the Crisis Centre that was activated after the federal phase of the emergency plan was proclaimed and information was provided to the public through the alert tool BE-Alert. However, the ASTRID network, the sole operator for the communication system for Belgian emergency services, was not fully functional because of technological failure and incorrect usage. (*The Belgian House of Representatives*, 2016:22-25).

Since the purpose of this paper is to examine the immediate response of governments and heads of states and their messages to the population, we will look into the statement of the Belgian prime-minister, Charles Michel, during a press conference organized the same day as the bomb attacks in Brussels. After paying tribute to the victims and their families, as well as to the security and rescue services, the prime minister calls for calm, solidarity and unity:

[...] what we feared has happened. Our country and citizens have been hit by a terrorist attack, in a violent and cowardly way. [...] I would like to stress that in this tragic and dark moment for our country, I call for calm and solidarity. We are facing a difficult time, but we have to all face this unified as one, with solidarity and unity. (Michel, 2016).

Regarding the actions that were taken against the crisis situation, he mentions additional security measures, extra military reinforcements, extended border controls and tightened security on public transport (Michel, 2016). Though the prime minister calls upon people to be calm, his attitude is in discord with this recommendation, which is justifiable taking into consideration that the crisis was of such magnitude, it was still on-going at the moment of the news conference and it was for the first time that Belgium has raised the terror threat to the highest, fourth level.

HM King Philippe of Belgium also addresses the nation in a short, Dutch-French bilingual televised speech. The King speaks on behalf of himself and Queen Mathilde, expressing sympathy for the victims and those affected by the attacks and gratitude for the emergency and security services.

Shattered lives, deep wounds, these sufferings are those of any country. Mathilde and I share in your sorrow, you who have lost a loved one or who have been wounded in the cowardly and despicable

attacks today.[...] Faced with the threat, we will continue to respond with determination, with calmness and dignity. Let's maintain confidence in ourselves. This trust is our strength. (King Philippe of Belgium, 2016).

Although the prime minister's speech is focused more on the actions that were taken and that are about to be taken, the two speeches are homogenous in describing the attacks as cowardly and in the appeal to the population to keep calm.

Following the attack of Nice, the President of the Republic, François Hollande, addressed the French nation in a televised broadcast, after the meeting of the crisis inter-ministerial unit on the 15th of July, 2016. The state of emergency which was already in place because of the Paris attacks on 2015 was extended by three more months. The president does not refrain from using words with a big negative emotional impact, such as *horror*, *tragedy* or *massacre*. The fact that the attack happened when French citizens were celebrating their national day is considered to have a symbolic value, it is an attack against freedom, against human rights. The president expresses solidarity with the victims and their families and does not try to diminish the impact of the attack at the level of the entire country:

All of France is under the threat of Islamic terrorism. Therefore, in these circumstances, we must show absolute vigilance and unwavering determination.[...] we will further reinforce our actions in Syria and Iraq and continue striking on those who precisely attack us on our own soil in their hideouts. (Hollande, 2016)

His statement did not lack criticism. According to Philippe Marlière, professor of French and European politics, in an article for *The Guardian*, *an ashen-faced Hollande* jumped to conclusions and made statements with reference to the Islamic terrorism at a time when no obvious links to radical Islam had been established by the police. Questions were also asked with reference to the security failure that allowed the attacker to access the Promenade des Anglais. (Marlière, 2016) However, regarding the first part of the criticism, there is no reason to cast doubt on the information the president had on the nature of the attack.

Although the president does not try to diminish the impact of the attacks, he ends his speech with assuring citizens that France is strong enough to defeat its enemies:

France is grieving, it is distressed, but it is strong and it will always be stronger – I assure you – than the fanatics who today wish to attack it. (Hollande, 2016)

The president's message to the French nation is in line with that of Prime Minister Manuel Valls. In his message, Valls expresses sympathy and offers support to the victims and their families, presents the measures that are being taken and prompts French citizens to be united in defending their values:

We will stand firm. France will not succumb to the terrorist threat. We have entered a new era; France will have to live with terrorism. And we must form a united front. This is President Hollande's message. We must stand together, demonstrate composure, collectively. (Valls, 2016).

When a terrorist attack occurs, the general reaction is that of fear. In the quest of safety, citizens can try to find refuge in power and this reaction is known as "the round the flag effect". However, this effect is considered to occur only if the crisis is handled well by the political figures. In the case of Theresa May and the 2017 London Bridge attack, some believe she made several mistakes, such as taking such a drastic position against terrorism that she affirmed she is willing to go even over human rights, if they stood in her way of fighting terrorism. (Martínez-Solana, 2017:1569 - 1580)

In her statement following the London attack, Theresa May, after informing the population on the events per se and the actions that were taken up until that moment, changes form addressing the public to addressing the police. She praises the police for the way they handled this situation, as well as previous similar ones: "As so often in such serious situations, the police responded with great courage and great speed". She also thanks the public that defended themselves in front of the attack:

On behalf of the people of London, and on behalf of the whole country, I want to thank and pay tribute to the professionalism and bravery of the police and the emergency services – and the courage of members of the public who defended themselves and others from the attackers. (May, 2017)

After praising people for their handling of the crisis, May expresses sympathy for the victims and their loved ones. Hence, there is no room for presumptions that mistakes were made in handling the crisis. As it was the third such incident in three

months, May points out that the attacks are not connected. This affirmation also addresses potential suspicions that the current crisis could have been influenced by a poor crisis management of the previous ones.

In order to prevent similar situations from happening, May proposes a four step approach. In the first step she proposes an offensive approach against Islamist extremism. Hence, she clearly identifies the enemy and what they want to attack, namely British values such as *freedom*, *democracy* and *human rights*. The second step is an international joint effort to regulate cyberspace. The third step is more drastic and it consists in taking military action to destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria. British tolerance is presented as a weakness. The fourth step is to review Britain's counter-terrorism strategy and to empower the police and security services. By stating that *it is time to say enough is enough*, May points out that Britain is not powerless in front of the threat and she is calling for a review of Britain's counter-terrorism strategy. The last part of the statement is dedicated to the voting on a general election that May was campaigning and that will not be disrupted by the current events.

We must come together, we must pull together, and united we will take on and defeat our enemies. (May, 2017).

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II did not deliver a speech immediately after the attack. She expressed sympathy for the victims and appreciation for the Police service in a statement addressed to the Police Commissioner (Proctor, 2017). She addressed both attacks happening in the UK that year in her video Christmas message in December 2017, which had a focus on the importance of *home*. The monarch states:

This Christmas I think of London and Manchester, whose powerful identities shone through over the past 12 months in the face of appalling attacks. (Queen Elizabeth II, 2017).

As to the last case of terrorist attack presented in this paper, Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy expressed solidarity with the victims of the attack in Barcelona, at the meeting held at the Government Representation Office in Catalonia, on 18 August 2017. Rajoy begins his speech with highlighting that the priority at that moment is represented by the victims of the attacks and their families. He takes an international approach to the

problem of terrorism, and he places the attack in Spain in a broader European context:

The people of such places as Madrid, Paris, Nice, Brussels, Berlin and London have all experienced the same pain and the same apprehension as the people of Barcelona are suffering today, and I want these opening words to be for them, to convey to them the affection, solidarity and empathy from the whole of Spain and from the rest of the world. (Rajoi, 2017).

Throughout his speech, he emphasizes the idea of unity, whether it is the unity of the citizens of Spain, unity of the political spectrum or unity of the entire world that shares the same values of liberty and dignity of human beings.

Today, the fight against terrorism is the main priority of free and open societies such as ours. This is a global threat and the response must be global. All of those who share the same passion for liberty, for the dignity of human beings and for a society based on justice and not on fear and hatred, are allied in this same cause. (Rajoi, 2017)

Nevertheless, the constitutional status of Catalonia and the society divided over the question of independence could also be a reason for the emphasis placed on the idea of unity.

After thanking the police forces and public servants for their work and professionalism and assuring those in charge of security of the support of the Government in their endeavour, Rajoy points out that the situation they are confronting with is not new and that they previously faced the *absurd and irrational pain caused by terrorism*. It is interesting how the prime minister turns the existence of previous such situations into a proof of ability to handle them.

It can be defeated through institutional unity, police cooperation, prevention, international support and the firm determination to defend the values of our civilisation: democracy, liberty and the rights of individuals. (Rajoy, 2017)

In line with the international approach of his speech, he also expresses gratitude for the messages of solidarity and support received from international leaders.

Similar to the reaction of the Queen of the UK, King Felipe VI of Spain did not deliver a speech immediately after the attacks in Barcelona. However, in his traditional Christmas address the focus was on the situation on the Catalan separatists. Regarding the terrorist attacks, he

states that Jihadist terrorism continues to be a global threat that can be defeated through democratic unity and international cooperation. (King Felipe VI, 2017).

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

As one of the stated purposes of this paper was to identify patterns in the discourses of government officials and heads of states and their messages to the population, we can conclude that there is a common structure in the four cases analysed. In all four speeches, the heads of government expressed sympathy for the victims and their families, offered information on the state of affairs and the measures that were or are to be taken, showed appreciation for the efforts of the emergency services and the police and emphasized the idea of unity and triumph in the face of the existing threat. Also, all speeches make reference to the fact the terrorist attacks targeted fundamental values of the states, such as democracy, liberty, human rights or unity.

However, we can observe differences in the degree of emotions displayed in the speeches and the degree of sympathy for the victims. In the speech of Theresa May, for example, sympathy towards the victims is briefly expressed only at the middle of the speech, the focus being on the professionalism and good crisis management of the police and emergency services. This aspect, together with the anti-terrorism four steps plan that the prime minister presents, conveys the message of control and determination in fighting terrorist threats.

Another aspect that differentiates the discourses is the manner in which the call to action in dealing with terrorism is represented. There are two different such representations. One interpretation is that of national unity and strength of the state in dealing with the threats, such as is the messages transmitted by the British prime minister and the French prime minister and president. Another direction is the one of portraying terrorism as a global threat and, as a result, the fight against this threat should be a common one. This perception can be noticed particularly in the speech of the Spanish prime minister, but also in the message conveyed by the Belgian prime minister. In the case of Belgium, even the public speeches of the day prior to the attacks were delivered by the Belgian prime minister together with the French one, and the recent terrorist attacks in the two countries were presented as interrelated.

The country's history of terrorist attacks is also interpreted differently in the case of two speeches, namely the one of Mariano Rajoy, where the existence of previous incidents is presented as an evidence that the country has handled and can handle such threats in the future as well, whereas in the speech of president François Hollande the multiple terrorist attacks that the country had to face is presented as a weakness. However, note must be taken of the fact that the extent at which France was affected by terrorist attacks was higher than in the case of Spain.

The messages are also slightly dissimilar as to what is expected from the population. Though all speeches contain calls for unity, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel advocates for citizens to keep calm, whereas Prime Minister Theresa May encourages British citizens to be vigilant.

To conclude, throughout the discourse analysis of the four crisis situations, we can observe similar communication strategies but also specificities in the messages conveyed to the public. Nevertheless, these observations are related to the first responses to the crisis situations and they are limited to the analysis of the discourses delivered by several representatives of the states, with no claim of analysing the entire crisis management strategy. As future directions of research, an analysis of the external reactions to terrorist incidents, such as statements and messages of other states or of the EU institutions, could provide a more elaborate image on the communication strategies employed in terrorist attack situations in Europe.

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## THE ROLE OF SECURITY CULTURE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS

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**Abstract:** *The present paper aims at investigating the role that a strong security culture can play in the fight against fake news. Fake news are designed to target the stability of the security environment of different public actors, be they statal, organizational, social, economic, etc. The question the researchers attempt to answer is whether or not a well-developed and firm security culture can prevent fake news from reaching its goal and destabilizing the security environment. Consequently, the researchers will investigate what security culture is at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, what effects fake news can have on society and to what extent a mature security culture can diminish the impact of fake news. The analysis will be based on the answers to a questionnaire that the researchers developed and applied on a target group of 295 respondents and that was designed to measure the degree of interconnectivity between a mature, well-developed security culture and an understanding of how fake news functions and how it can be thwarted.*

**Keywords:** *security culture; fake news; security interests; assessment of accuracy; disinformation*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of fake news has become increasingly contentious, widespread and hard to tackle in recent years and it has been proven to have affected elections in several democratic states, to have fostered the spread of nationalist and populist ideologies, to have subverted the values of liberalism and to have introduced many countries to illiberal challenges. Many researchers and specialists have focused on identifying and understanding the underlying mechanisms that make fake news such an effective tool in upending social stability and the *status quo*. However, even if better understood at present, fake news has of yet not been countered efficiently. The best ways to do so at present seem to be, on the one hand, education, under many guises and focusing on many aspects from media literacy, to critical thinking to a more structured approach to historical studies and, on the other hand, resilience building, namely using positive narratives to support and promote the very values that fake news attempts to subvert. In this context, we propose a study on the role that security culture can play in thwarting fake news. Our endeavor stems from the second category of measures that could be taken against fake news but it is also rooted in education, as only through education can one achieve a clearer understanding of what security is and how it can be

fostered. Our research firstly aims to pinpoint what security culture is more precisely not in a military, but in a societal context and how it can be built. Secondly, we shall present a synthesis of why fake news is efficient as a destabilizing force in order to see to what extent a stable and mature security culture can counter the projected effects of targeted fake news. Thirdly we shall analyze the results to a questionnaire that was designed to measure the participants' level of security culture and their understanding of how fake news operates in order to determine whether or not security culture can raise the level of awareness as to the effects of fake news

### 2. SECURITY CULTURE: WHAT, WHY AND HOW

Culture is a system of values, practices, behaviors and aspirations which have been proven useful over time for certain communities and societies. As Fisher explains, "culture is a pretested design, a store of knowledge that has been crafted by humans who have gone before, a design that has been socially created, tested, and shared, and one that can be transmitted to the child." (Fisher, 1997: 44) Culture is learned and shared behavior, which systematizes the way in which things are done for the benefit of the community or society as a whole. As such, culture is also a mechanism of social

integration; however, in this respect, one other result of belonging to a certain culture needs to be taken into account. As it is based on mental habits and patterns, culture fosters the development of what Fisher calls “cultural lens” (Fisher, 1997:42), which colors, meaning shapes, the way in which members of a certain community or society reason, perceive, and even think about certain issues.

Security is the aggregate of individual and social representations according to which members of a society can carry out their activities freely and free from obvious threats, protected from dangers and trusting in future progress. Security entails the long-term stability of economic, political systems, individual prosperity and cohesive social relationships.

In this context, a definition of security culture arises. It is the result of social interactions which take place in groups, organizations, communities, societies preoccupied with the aspects of social security, with certain learning processes and knowledge acquisition processes in accordance with the individuals’ need for protection and safety. Security culture is adaptive and it is developed in relation to the evolution of society and it is shared from one generation to the next through various means of communication and through various emulative behaviors. The goal of security culture is to foster free human activity, to encourage progress and to help individuals develop the tools they need to become aware of possible threats and to respond to them appropriately.

Roer discusses security culture in an organizational context and proposes a set of elements that form and inform security: *policies*, *technology* and *people* (Roer, 2015:30). These three elements can be adapted to the larger context of a society’s security culture as follows. Policies are the reflection of the ideas, norms, customs that are particular to a certain culture and that have an impact on that society’s security. They may be formulated explicitly as laws or regulations or they may remain implicit. However, they are based on the culture the individuals share and want to uphold. These policies regulate all domains of public life: economy, education, healthcare, politics, justice, defense etc. Technology does not refer strictly to IT related items. It also refers to physical, virtual or mental infrastructures, to military equipment, to sanitation endowment, to educational facilities, in one word, to all the scientific and knowledge applications of a certain society. People are an important element of security culture because they produce, perceive and benefit from policies and technologies. They use the technology and they form and inform the

policies. Their culture determines the policies they adopt, the technology they develop. But their culture plays another important role: it helps people understand how their society functions, what can be improved and what they can do to ensure their progress. In a word, it is people who determine the degree of security they enjoy by the competence and knowledge they have to regulate through policies and to enforce and develop through technology.

Roer (2015: 44) explains that Social Learning Theory can be used to ascertain the processes that people use to learn and develop their own security culture. This process consists of four steps: *attention*, *retention*, *reproduction* and *motivation*. Of interest for our current endeavor are the first two steps since one way of determining the level of respondents’ security culture is to measure their attention to what is currently going on in society and their retention, meaning the extent to which they remember the information they hear and they adapt it to their level of interaction and knowledge. The questionnaire we designed measures the respondents’ knowledge of security culture as well as their perceptions regarding its promotion and efficiency in the public space. The second objective is to assess to what extent the respondents are aware of what fake news is and whether they have identified such news.

In order to measure the target group’s level of security culture, we designed several questions based on the concept of security interest, the lines of action, the main ways to ensure national security, and the list of national security interests as they are outlined in *The National Defense Strategy 2015-2019* (NDS). The list of interests tested is:

- guaranteeing the state’s national character, sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility;
- defending the country’s territorial integrity and inalienability;
- defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law;
- protecting fundamental rights and liberties of all citizens and guaranteeing their safety;
- guaranteeing the right to preservation, development and expression of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minorities;
- capitalizing on our country’s resources and geostrategic position, in order to reach the welfare level that citizens are entitled to;
- reducing development disparities and the reconstruction of major public systems;

- ensuring the irreversible nature of belonging to the trans-Atlantic collective defense system
- consolidating the European Union and actively participating in integration processes within the Union. (NDS, 2015:8-9)
- To this list we added a few more:
- developing the necessary capabilities to react to hybrid threats (eg. cyberattacks)
- preventing and fighting tax evasion and other forms of economic and financial crime;
- guaranteeing the independence of the justice system;
- preventing and fighting terrorism;
- preparing institutions and the population for crisis situations.

These added interests reflect topics that have been highly debated in society in recent years and that revolve around issues which may pose threats to national security. The aim was to see to what extent the population views them as relevant for national security. The results will be discussed in section 3.

### 3. FAKE NEWS: WHY DOES IT WORK?

Fake news is a highly used and contested term nowadays that has become an umbrella term for any sort of information that is meant to alter the public's opinion on a certain issue. In this category fall: misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, blatant lies, half-truths, etc. It is important to notice from the very beginning that fake news is not the same as false news and the difference is quite relevant to the study of the effects that fake news has. False news presupposes that there is a truth that the news contradicts, goes against. Therefore, people can still find a point of certainty to refer to, a yardstick to measure the information against, their world perception is not completely distorted since the truth still exists even if a certain piece of information contradicts it. This is not true, however, of fake news. It is not simply false; it could be partially true, it could be valid in certain contexts, it reflects certain groups' values or beliefs while discrediting others. As the authors of *Fake News. A Roadmap* explain fake news aims to provoke a reaction in the audience and not necessarily communicate information or strategy (Allan et al., 2018: 8-9).

Fake news is most often associated with propaganda and disinformation. Voicu explains the difference between these two concepts. Propaganda is defined as “dissemination, using the mass media, of rumors, half-truths or even lies

without them necessarily being deception, while disinformation represents the effort of the enemy state to mislead the individuals, groups or governments with a view to influencing elites or public opinion” (Voicu, 2018:17) To sum up, propaganda may not necessarily be negative, opinion also supported by Barclay (2018: 330), while disinformation is always intentionally deceptive.

The question remains regarding the reasons why fake news has become so pervasive in contemporary society. The authors of *Fake News. A roadmap* explain that truth still matters at present. The debate, however, is over the fact that “what qualifies as a legitimate source of truth has been politicised.” (Allan et al., 2018:13) Identifying a reliable source of information has become increasingly challenging at present, given the multitude of available information and also the ease with which this information can be cherry-picked to suit the interests of the communicator. O'Connor and Weatherall propose certain models that explain the way mainly scientific, but not only, information is spread from scientists and experts to the general public and to politicians. They make one very pertinent observation regarding the role that a propagandist can play in distorting this information. They notice that the propagandist does not need to produce fraudulent results.

Instead, by exerting influence on how legitimate, independent scientific results are shared with the public, the would-be propagandist can substantially affect the public's beliefs about scientific facts. This makes responding to propaganda particularly difficult. Merely sussing out industrial or political funding or influence in the production of science is not sufficient. We also need to be attuned to how science is publicized and shared (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019:17).

The same idea can be taken over and applied to the field of security as Voicu explains. He stresses the fact that “fake news causes distortions in the social tissue of liberal democracies, as a symptom of populism” (Voicu, 2018:18). Authoritarian regimes rely on the media not to present events and facts but the lies that the state supports, to cause emotional responses, and given that this distorted information is repeated often enough, it becomes the new truth and it is widely accepted.

Another underlying reason that fake news functions so well in contemporary societies is the means available to disseminate it as well as the fact that the media is reliant on clicks in order to attract advertisers that finance their work. To take issues

separately, firstly, the advent and development of social media means that anybody, anywhere, irrespective of their qualifications can spread news, information for whatever purpose. As we shall see in section 3, in the analysis, the respondents have identified online sources as the most problematic, although they are also one of their primary means of finding out information. The mere volume of information that is available at any given moment on any given topic means that the public's ability to sort through it, to analyze and verify it is frayed to a maximum. And this situation is similar to all attempts of becoming informed, on all given days. The human cognitive system cannot process so much information and it becomes overloaded, which is why reliable sources of information are needed lest they should fall prey to propagandists' intentions. *Fake News. A roadmap* authors also notice that populist politicians who are identified as the most likely to employ fake news have often been accused of distorting facts and questioning "sources of information previously considered authoritative and trustworthy, i.e. the scientific community, journalists, and academics. This enables them to raise the legitimacy of their personalised, authentic standpoints. Listening to the voice of the expert would mean subjecting oneself to an imposed authority that goes against what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin back in 1967 identified as the "real populist ideology" of "unbroken", continuous plebiscite." (Allan *et al.*, 2018: 13) This idea is very relevant for the reason that fake news functions: if every person's opinion is equally important on any issue, regardless of their competence in the respective field, then there is no authority, and every user can create their own alternative truths and choose to align themselves with others whose beliefs are similar in echo chambers and filter bubbles. We can speak about opinions, beliefs and emotions driving society, rather than facts and knowledge.

Moreover, the media reflects the same trend as it can no longer be relied upon to present the truth. They need financing, which depends on the number of viewers or consumers they have.

The spreading of fake news [is a] highly strategic communicative approach that requires the actor to know his/her audience well and anticipate their reactions. Populist politics take this even further; it presents emotional and personal sources of truth as superior to knowledge gained from science, academic inquiry, or discussion (Allan *et al.*, 2018).

Appeals to emotion rather than reasoning elicit faster responses and, as O'Connor and Weatherall

point out, the novel and the unexpected that generate audience engagement are not always problematic, but these criteria can cause real troubles when they are applied to politics and economics. However,

the mere ability to broadcast information is not sufficient to create influence. You also need those to whom you are broadcasting to listen. And here we see the value of creating and distributing content through groups defined by a subject of shared interest or agreement (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019:172).

And this is where propagandists come into action. O'Connor & Weatherall explain through scientific models how polarization works, how people end up being so completely separated, trapped in their respective echo chambers and filter bubbles, how his separation becomes so acute that societal links are on the verge of fracturing.

This means that establishing connections through affinity groups provides powerful tools for influence, especially when the influence tends to push them farther in directions they are already inclined to go. And if the purpose is merely to drive polarization—as opposed to persuading everyone of any particular claim-posing to people on both sides of an issue as someone who shares their opinions, and then presenting further evidence or arguments in support of those opinions, will be very successful (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019: 172-173).

The same opinion is backed by Voicu who also stresses the fact that when referring to a strategic level, the implications are even direr, as

fake news campaigns are designed to sow distrust and confusion, to deepen social and cultural divides by using ethnic, racial and religious tensions (Voicu, 2018:18).

Emotions and the manipulation of emotions that stem from deep-rooted beliefs are the bedrock of how and why fake news functions.

To synthesize, fake news is aimed at creating societal tensions on all levels, depending of the disseminator's agenda. It can function as both propaganda as well as disinformation and it depends on a funds-reliant media that is on a quest to attract clicks as a means to fund itself. Emotions have been proven to provoke quicker and more dramatic reactions and engagements on the part of the audience. On the other hand, the audience is flooded with massive volumes of information and lacks credible sources of information which may

cause disengagement, distrust and confusion. The result of our questionnaire have proven that respondents feel the need to have the information market regulated to some extent, to have a system in place that flags and registers fake news. The result of our questionnaire will prove that respondents feel the need to have the information market regulated to some extent, to have a system in place that flags and registers fake news.

#### 4. HOW RELEVANT IS SECURITY CULTURE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS?

The main purpose of our research was to investigate what determinations and correlations exist between security culture and fake-news. More specifically, our endeavor focused on the question whether a more robust and mature security culture can diminish the impact of fake news. This main purpose was performed through the following two objectives: (1) defining security culture fundamentals of the target group; and (2) defining the main approaches to fake news of the target group.

The questionnaire that helped accomplish the purpose consisted of 25 questions regarding security culture and fake news and it was administered in the period November 2018-January 2019, both in printed form and via an online Google forms.

The main target group was represented by persons that have an interest in the security and defense field due to their studies, to their professions, or to their research. 295 answers were collected, all from Romanian citizens, and they can be categorized as follows. According to age groups, 60.4% of respondents were young and very young belonging to the under 18 age group and the 18-35 age group. 39.6% fall into the 36-61 age group. The respondents' studies fall into the following categories: 14% secondary school graduates, 25.6% highschool graduates, 23.9% BA graduates, 28.7% are MA graduates, 6% doctoral and postdoctoral studies graduates, and the rest had graduated other types of programs (postgraduate, posthighschool etc.). With respect to professional status, 49% are public servants, 33.6% are not employed (pupils and students fall into this category), 13.4% are employed in private sector and the rest are in liberal professions or retired. According to gender, 45.9% of respondents are female and 54.1% are male. As we can see the group is steady having a balanced composition with heterogeneous slopes. That makes it perfect

for our research, by having the chance to compare and extend results.

Given their knowledge, three quarters (75.2%) of respondents correctly identified what a national security interest is, namely "the state's legitimate preoccupation and efforts to promote and defend the values that guarantee its existence, identity, development and stability". Given their understanding of what a security interest is, a little under two thirds of respondents (60%) stated that Romania's security interests are not correctly and coherently represented and promoted in the public space. Only 19% consider that the interests are correctly and coherently represented and promoted in the public space, while 21% do not know. This last number is also quite large, which may mean that these undecided have trouble correlating the information regarding security interests that they have to what they are exposed to in the public space or that they may have restraints regarding their own ability to interpret the promotion of security interests since this usually occurs at a larger scale, and may be hard to perceive by individuals. These results indicate the fact that only a fifth of respondents positively appreciate the way security interests are promoted and represented which may point to the fact that the interests are affected by controversial, incoherent, distorted or even fake information.

As far as Romania's security interests are concerned, the question focused on the importance given to a list of security interests for Romania and it required the respondents to rank them from 1 the least important to 10 the most important.

Table 1. Rank of goals of disseminating fake news

	<b>Rank the following goals of disseminating fake news:</b>	<b>Average rank</b>
a.	guaranteeing the state's national character, sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility	9.13
b.	defending the country's territorial integrity and inalienability	8.98
c.	defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law	8.99
d.	reducing development disparities and the reconstruction of major public systems	8.14
e.	reconstructing great public infrastructures (healthcare, educational, transportation etc.)	8.67
f.	protecting fundamental rights and liberties of all citizens and guaranteeing their safety	8.96
g.	guaranteeing the right to preservation, development and expression of	7.39

	ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minorities	
h.	capitalizing on our country's resources and geostrategic position, in order to reach the welfare level that citizens are entitled to	8.23
i.	consolidating the European Union and actively participating in integration processes within the Union	7.86
j.	ensuring the irreversible nature of belonging to the trans-Atlantic collective defense system	8.80
k.	developing the necessary capabilities to react to hybrid threats (eg. cyberattacks)	8.76
l.	preventing and fighting tax evasion and other forms of economic and financial crime	8.44
m.	guaranteeing the independence of the justice system	8.73
n.	preventing and fighting terrorism	8.80
o.	preparing institutions and the population for crisis situations	8.74

The one deemed most important (9.13 average rank) was guaranteeing the national character, the sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility of the state. The interest that was considered least important (7.39 average rank) refers to guaranteeing the ethical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities. This latter answer reflects the tensions that exist in Romania between the majority of the population and the ethnic groups. The former answer also shows the concerns that the respondents have with respect to existing threat to national integrity and the state's sovereignty. The interests that we added to the official list garnered as much support as the others, meaning that they are indeed perceived as important by the population.

Moving on to the way security interests are promoted and represented, a question focused on the news sources that the respondents considered most reliable.

Table 2. News sources

	What news sources do you trust most?	Percentage
a	Written press	29.5%
b	Television	36.6%
c	Radio	25.8%
d	Online press	39.7%
e	Social media (social networks, blogs, vlogs etc.)	17.6%
f	Another answer	5.1%

The first thing that can be noticed is that none of these sources of news is considered reliable by a majority of respondents, since none exceeds the 50% mark. The least unreliable is considered the online press, however, as research indicates, online press is also vulnerable to the dissemination of fake news, since the news appears in almost real time and with very few chances of being fact-checked properly. Moreover, once it is online, even if the news is not accurate, it can be shared multiple times before it can be corrected. Television remains an important source of news, however, it is surprising that the written press remains on the third place although, in recent years, many have prophesied the disappearance of written press with the advent of the Internet. Social media has gained notoriety as a tool for the dissemination of fake news as its rise has often been associated with the increase in fake news' reach and scope, as we have explained in section 2. Hence its placement as the least reliable source of news.

Using the vast theoretical pool of definitions and approaches to what fake news is we synthesized several aspects, considered most relevant and accessible to the public. Two of the characteristics of fake news stand out according to the responses, namely the fact that they influence people's opinions and that they disinform. The respondents are focused on the ways in which fake news could be used to affect security interests and destabilize society.

Table 3. Definition of the fake news

	What is fake news in your opinion?	Percentage
a	Fake news represents a new way of influencing people's opinions	83.4%
b	Fake news is the type of news that disinforms	70.8%
c	Fake news is used by certain organizations that have no other weapons	15.3%
d	Fake news is a myth	2.4%
e	Fake news is only entertainment	2.4%

In order to identify what the respondents consider to be the news sources which present contestable information (including fake news) we asked them to select those sources in which they identified such information.

Table 4. Sources of contestable information

	Which news sources did you identify contestable information in?	Percentage
a	Newspapers	35.6%
b	TV shows	80.3%

c	Radio shows	20.3%
d	Online news	67.1%
e	Social media	69.2%
f	I haven't discovered	2.7%
g	All of the above	0.7%

Mirroring and supporting the answers given to the previous question regarding the trustworthiness of news sources, respondents identify as most likely outlets for contestable information TV shows and social media. Online news trails closely behind social media as a vehicle for disseminating untrustworthy information. These answers confirm what the research has argued that the online environment is preferred medium for the dissemination of fake news, while TV shows have become more and more about presenting opinions that support the viewers' points of view than about the facts as they actually are.

We also asked respondents to rank according to importance the goals that the dissemination of fake news has from 1 the least important to 10 the most important.

Table 5. Goals of disseminating fake news

	<b>Rank the following goals of disseminating fake news:</b>	<b>Average rank</b>
a	Disinformation regarding certain economic measures	7.41
b	Disinformation regarding certain political measures	8.45
c	Disinformation regarding certain security measures	7.26
d	Disinformation regarding certain healthcare measures	6.84
e	Disinformation regarding certain environmental measures	6.36
f	Disinformation regarding certain educational measures	6.97
g	Disinformation regarding certain juridical measures	7.85
h	Distracting the public's attention from certain events	8.75
i	Creating misunderstanding among certain social categories (young/old people; working class/retirees etc.)	7.43
j	Diminishing the population's trust in the European Union	6.97
k	Diminishing the population's trust in NATO	6.69
l	Promoting the personal interests of certain public figures	8.19
m	Promoting the interests of certain multinational companies	7.43
n	Promoting the interests of certain countries	7.57
o	Influencing the results of democratic	7.59

	elections in certain countries	
p	Destabilizing democratic governments	7.29
r	Destabilizing authoritarian governments	6.65

As it can be seen, all the goals proposed, which were formulated based on an extensive literature review with respect to the aims of fake news and on observations pertaining to the public debates in Romania, have been ranked as being of above average importance by the respondents. The most important goal according to the respondents is to distract the public's attention from certain events, meaning that fake news is used as a red herring meant to refocus the debates in the public space on unrelated issues so that the important ones go unnoticed. The second ranking refers to fake news as a means of facilitating disinformation with respect to political events. This second ranking may be caused by the fact that politicians, under various guises (from using the term as such, to reference to the so-called deep state, to name just two), use the term fake news when talking about events that are not in consonance with their beliefs, actions or intentions. Thirdly, fake news is used, in our respondents' opinion to promote the interests of certain public figures. This ranking is linked to the previous one, meaning that is public figures use fake news to discredit contradictory opinions, voices or facts, and automatically their point of view becomes stronger. At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest ranking was obtained by fake news used to disinform the public with respect to environmental issues. There may be several reasons for this low ranking, of which the most important one being that the environment is not a priority in Romania, as public debates rarely focus on environmental issues.

Regarding the measures that could be taken to counter fake news ad disinformation, we provided the respondents with a list of the ones considered most effective in the literature and international programs.

Table 5. Efficient strategic actions in countering fake news dissemination

	<b>Which of the following strategic actions do you consider would be most efficient in countering fake news dissemination and online disinformation?</b>	<b>Percent age</b>
a	Developing the instruments to check online distributed information – online collaboration platforms among experts and citizens to identify fake news sources, to limit the circulation	69.5%

	of fake news and diminish their impact	
<b>b</b>	Sanctioning sources that post fake news	69.5%
<b>c</b>	Closing down sites that distribute fake news	49.2%
<b>d</b>	Suspending broadcasting licenses for media outlets that distribute fake news	48.5%
<b>e</b>	Media literacy – campaigns designed to educate the public regarding the evaluation of online distributed information and to increase active public participation in fighting online disinformation	82.4%
<b>f</b>	Developing methods for the public to easily signal a fake piece of news	48.5%
<b>g</b>	Developing public alert systems – providing real time data to the public regarding disinformation campaigns	34.9%
<b>h</b>	Signaling disinformation campaigns – indexing and labeling the sources that produce and distribute fake news, the media resources employed, the domains and the possible goals.	39.7%

The majority of respondents believe that media literacy is the most efficient means of combatting fake news and disinformation. However, this is a long term solution that will show its desired effects once a generation goes through school using a curriculum that includes such programs. When referring to short term solution, more than two thirds of respondents believe that developing instruments to check online information could be effective combined with sanctions applied to those sources that disseminate fake news. Drastic solutions that would come into conflict with the right to free speech only garnered about half of the respondents' acceptance. Thus, closing down sites and suspending broadcasting licenses are only seen as viable options by just under 50% of respondents, which leads us to an interesting conclusion: fake news might legitimize at one point censorship. The least efficient method, with only one third of respondents' appreciation is to develop public alert systems, which, coincidentally, is precisely the method that the European Union has decided to employ. On 18<sup>th</sup> March 2019 it released its Rapid Alert System whose goal is to inform citizens of fake news campaigns in real time.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

We stated in this article that emotions have been proven to provoke quicker and more dramatic

reactions and engagements on the part of the audience. On the other hand, the audience is flooded with massive volumes of information. This blend of factors creates some powerful effects over regular people. Therefore, all persons must have a system in place that flags, compares and registers fake news. Returning to the main purpose of the article namely to investigate what determinations and correlations exist between security culture and fake-news, Pandora's box has been opened. By accomplishing the established objectives of the questionnaire, one can conclude that security culture can influence the impact of fake news, as security culture and the abilities to detect and identify fake news conditions each other. On the one hand, a security culture based on advanced knowledge, well-defined values that are shared by the members of a community or nation offers solid reference points and hard to shake moral values for the evaluation of distorted information which is disseminated in the public space. Moreover, security culture determines certain mental and actional patterns that allow for a critical analysis of the negative narratives meant to weaken the public's trust in the existing security architecture and for measures meant to diminish or even eliminate their negative impact. As it defines group, community, society identity, security culture ensures the bedrock for social cohesion around common objectives which inspire devotion, loyalty, cohesion, belonging, patriotism and these are, in fact, just as many barriers to protect against fake news and to enhance resilience to it.

On the other hand, long exposure to fake news can erode the foundation of security culture. Specific knowledge that ensures an understanding of security issues could become doubtful by use of extreme disinformation, the importance of values could be undermined and social attitudes could be altered by the promotion of populist or extremist ideas, concepts and models. Therefore, the respondents believe that media literacy, security education, tools to verify online news, institutions that regulate the media environment are all necessary to control the damage that fake news can cause in society.

The present article is only the first step in a new potential direction of research. More needs to be done in order to better understand how the influence of fake news could be contained. What this research proves is that a mature security culture entails the fact that it is easier for respondents to understand how fake news operates and what its effects could be and this is the first step towards resilience.

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## **THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ITS FALL UNDER THE SCHOOL OF CONSTRUCTIVIST THINKING. ARGUMENTS. IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS BELONGING TO THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH**

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***Abstract:** This paper aims to highlight the arguments for which the concept of national identity, a concept that has given rise to many debates, falls within the school of constructivist thinking from the perspective of international relations and security studies. The concept of national identity, which, by reference to the nations, captures the psychological and sociological aspects of the individuals from which the nations are formed, faces an evolution at European level, in the context of the re-establishment of the political realities amid accession and integration into European Union. Under the assumption that the social reality is not an objective element, outside the human action and perceptions, along with the assertion that the study of social reality is not independent of its object of study, it is created the framework for the questions, arguments and researches it assumes in its sphere of study of constructivism. From the perspective of constructivist conception, both the identity and the interests of the actions in the international relations are not predetermined, but they are defined by the interaction with the other participants. This way of seeing the reality has also led to emphasizing the concept of security community.*

***Keywords:** national identity; national security; constructivism; security community; international relations*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

After the Second World War, the United States of America took over the supremacy of the world, and the European states were no longer the same powerful actors capable of influencing the international play. But without remaining in the defensive, the European states have tried to compensate for this disadvantage and form a Union to gather their forces in order to counterbalance the increasing power of the United States. The Union of the European states, which initially referred to the economic cooperation between Member States, has gradually come to cover more and more areas, so that it is now an organization operating in many policy areas.

The states are forced to make decisions that have fundamental implications in their evolution, alternating between two coordinates: integration and cooperation, making it difficult for them to choose or delineate exactly the boundaries between the two directions. The current global context, which is based on the interdependence among states, makes it even more difficult to choose solutions. With the emergence of the European

Union, Member States have been forced to inform each other of the problems that have arisen, and reach an agreement, a common point of view, by negotiation, which leads to a common position and decision. The Member States have adapted to the new global order and transferred part of their decision-making power to a higher level of the organizations they have joined.

### **2. SELF-PERCEPTION, IDENTITY**

The concept of ‘identity’ has recently been highly used, and the more its precise definition has been attempted, the more new facets of the notion have been discovered. It is a concept that remains open to polemics and debates, especially from the perspective of social sciences. New unexplored perspectives are discovered as the definition of the notion is attempted.

In the broad sense, the ‘identity’ is built around the individual’s sense of belonging to a group, a feeling that this individual has in common with the other members of the group. The sense of belonging can be manifested in relation to several elements, such as family, country, people, ethnicity, ideology,

professional group, all of which generate a certain type of identity. From this perspective, we call classify the 'identity' in national identity, cultural identity, ethnic identity, group identity and enumeration could continue by associating the individual with other groups. In a globalised world, belonging to more groups is natural, generating the concept of multiple identity that encompasses all of the individual's identity connections.

The concept of multiple identity was supported and evolved on the basis of open society theory, evoked by the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper (1993:198) in which 'individuals face personal decisions', and the political decisions are the result of an argument, being taken in rationally. By promoting the concept of multiple identity, the man is seen as belonging to several social groups, a situation in which he can always choose to identify himself with one group or another, being free to assume any identity he wants in relation to the context. Various identities are considered, in terms of different affiliations, and not a single identity.

Another type of approach to the theory of 'multiple identities' is that proposed by Andrei Marga in his paper National Identity and Modernity, where the author makes an illustration of multiple identities based on the example of a traditional inhabitant of Cluj-Napoca. The author expresses the self-perception of the person, arguing one by one each identity assigned to him (professional identity, local identity, ethnic identity, regional identity, confessional identity, national identity, European identity, Central European identity), thus creating a plurality of identities that seem not to be excluded and which are justified in different contexts and can coexist.

From the perspective of the French sociologist Claude Dubar, the identity issue has reached a deadlock that has been generated by multiple belongings to various communities, associations, groups that have proven to be variable and ephemeral. There are approaches that, starting from the 'multiple identities' theory, risk depriving meaning and sinking into irrelevance the notion of national identity, replacing it with other forms of identity or reducing its importance by bringing the modern forms of identity to the forefront. However, national identity is the nucleus, fundamental identification of the individual, the other associations with different social groups, representing nuances emerged in the context of the evolution of the society, the technology and the easy way of communication. Perhaps the very antithesis that arises between the national identity and all the other forms of identity being voiced

makes the 'old' national identity resist over time and prove its tenacity and stability.

The term of national identity is relatively recent, being used, according to the French historian Anne-Marie Thiesse, author of the paper 'La Création des identités nationales. Europe XVIII<sup>e</sup> – XX<sup>e</sup> siècle' since 1980, although the awareness and the definition of the sense of belonging to a particular nation lie in the 19th century, when the nation-states is formed. Being a community feeling, the national identity has individual elements that vary from one community to another and give color to the phenomenon.

Considering that we, in this paper, propose to analyse the identity in the light of constructivism, including the notion in the school of constructivist thinking, we will briefly present this theory, which has substantially changed the conception of how states relate to each other from a security perspective by the way they identify themselves, but equally by how they perceive threats to national security.

### **3. A REVOLUTIONARY THEORY, CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The 'constructivism' is primarily one of the three paradigms of learning, alongside behaviorism and cognitivism. The constructivist theory of learning considers that the student will better retain the information if he/she is forced to reformulate it to explain it to others, transmitting the message expressed in his/her own words, which is more effective compared to the situation in which the student would perform a simple reading of information. Starting from this initial formulation of the constructivist theory, the social constructivism has later stood out, which is that current which focuses on building senses and meanings by the members of a social group, reaching finally to a common code of communication. Through this common code of communication, the group that uses it identifies itself internally, but also delimits itself from the exterior.

The social constructivism is based on the assertion that the world is the product of social interaction, which can be measured and analyzed with specific scientific means. This form of social constructivism uses, in the study of security, subjective ontology and objective epistemology, in other words, states that the world is socially built and can be measured and analyzed (Sarcinschi, 2005:95).

The constructivism is a theory of scientific knowledge that claims that any type of knowledge is

built and does not naturally rise, so that knowledge is ultimately determined by intersubjective social perceptions, conventions and experiences.

In order to have the image of the context in which the constructivist theory was formed, it must be pointed out that the 'international society of the last three centuries can be described by three defining vectors, which correspond to three traditions of approach in International Relations, each characterized by certain specific processes that they emphasize, to the detriment of the others. A first tradition is the Hobbesian tradition, centered on conflict and war; a second tradition is the Lockean tradition, which emphasizes contractual, exchange relations from international relations (such as economic cooperation relations); the third tradition is the Kantian tradition of the global society, which focuses on transnational solidarity processes and on what we now include in the idea of global governance. Therefore, the society of states of the last centuries is structured around three essential processes: war (conflict), exchange (cooperation) and solidarity (communion)' (Miroiu, 2006:108). No current of thought in international relations is based on one of the three traditions, they complemented each other and combine to give the particular structure of each theory

The 'constructivism' is a relatively new theory in the sphere of analysis of international relations, dating back to 1992, when Alexander Wendt published in the International Organization magazine the article 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', where the author presents the international relations from a constructivist perspective. Alexander Wendt argues that the anarchy is not inherent in the international system in the way other schools of international relations imagine it, but it is rather a construction of the nation-states in the system (1992:399). The constructivism is an attempt to create a connection between rationalistic and reflective theories, which were the dominant theories when constructivism was promoted. The alternative theory of international relations proposed by Alexander Wendt is one of the most revolutionary theories in recent years and has the merit of reconceptualising and rebuilding the field of international relations as a scientific and academic discipline. Wendt (2011:358) considered that the subject of this paper is 'the ontology of international life'. Apart from the fact that the paper has important epistemological consequences, especially for the epistemology of international relations as part of social sciences, it aims to rehabilitate idealistic ontology as the foundation of

knowledge and understanding of international relations. Wendt argues that the researchers of the social world should be more concerned with 'explaining the world' and less concerned about how the world can be known.

The constructivism, from the perspective of international relations, is considered to have two meanings: 'in a first sense, it refers to a certain theoretical approach of international relations and social sciences in general, with implications for the research agenda and methods used, shared by several authors. In a second sense, the constructivism designates a meta-theoretical position on social sciences, based mainly on arguments of epistemological and ontological nature, bringing together a large number of different theories' (Miroiu, 2006:73).

The constructivist theory is covered by Alexander Wendt in antithesis with the theory that, when he published the article 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', was the major theory in the field, namely the neorealist theory or the theory of structural realism. The author regards the constructivism as a theoretical framework in which the fundamental elements of the international politics are conceived as social structures. The identity is viewed as a constant fact that determines the behaviour of international actors, although it can be partially modelled by this behaviour. The assumption that Alexander Wendt considered was that the reference system is in fact a built system. He argued that the anarchy is not a constant structure, but 'the anarchy is what the states understand from it', which determines the behaviour of the states. It is a condition whose meaning is in itself conditioned by the relations of help. The self-help that the states can provide is not the only possibility they have in international relations, but only one of many possible forms of state and interests. From Wendt's perspective, the power and the interest are built realities, and the culture is the one that has a determining role in building them. Every thinking process is essentially a reflective act, says Wendt, and the states are also individual actors (from the general perspective of methodological individualism) and are capable of their own reflective thinking processes. This reflective process of the states has led to the perception of an international system in which states interact with one another by calling on the 'public reason'. This international system is in fact a global (emerging) 'public sphere' in which the states act on the basis of rules perceived by themselves as being of the system. All the states at

global level forms thus more than the sum of its elements, and the understanding of this whole is essential to understanding international relations.

The neorealists believe that the key variable that determines the main actions of the states is the distribution of power among states. Thus, from the perspective of neorealists, in the context of anarchy, the international politics is directly determined by the way in which power is distributed among states. From Wendt's perspective, the international relations can not be studied on the basis of the power distribution among states, because the meaning of the international relations is based on ideas, norms and practices. 'There are collective meanings that constitute the structures that organize our actions', (1992:397) as most aspects of the system of international relations are socially built, being the result of continuous processes of social practice and interaction. The anarchy and self-help are not caused by the structure of international relations, but are determined by the interactions between states and the way in which the states perceive themselves and other states. The anarchy and self-help may or may not depend on these variables relating to the states. And if one of the important variables to which the state relates is its self-perception, then one can conclude that the identity of each state is at the base of Alexander Wendt's argument.

Wendt took as an example the position of England and Germany towards the United States, which can not be evaluated solely on the basis of the resources of these states and their military capabilities, because their military power will always be interpreted differently depending on the position of the state concerned. If the state is a potential ally, the things will differ from the situation in which the state is considered a competitor or an enemy. The British missiles did not have the same meaning for the United States as the Russian missiles, regardless of their number and destructive power, because there is a difference of position between the United Kingdom and Russia in relation to the United States of America. In his article, Alexander Wendt explains from a personal and innovative perspective the relation between the United States and USSR during and after the Cold War, and concludes that the reason why this war ended, which lasted for over 40 years, was not the military impossibility of the two states to continue the conflict, but the fact that they reached an understanding, more exactly, they did not perceive themselves as enemies.

In his paper, Alexander Wendt explains how the interaction between the actors on the stage of

international politics leads to the shaping of the identities, priorities and interests of the states, as well as to the evaluation of the power of others.

The Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory in international relations demonstrates how the European institutions can build, through an interaction process, the identities and interests of the Member States, they learn and develop cooperative skills, rather than concepts that go into the military sphere.

#### **4. CONFIRMATION OF THE THEORY SUPPORTED BY ALEXANDER WENDT BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTI- MISSILE SHIELD BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN DESEVELU TOWN IN ROMANIA**

On 29th March 2004, Romania officially joined NATO by submitting the instruments of ratification with the State Department of the USA, the depositary state of the North Atlantic Treaty, and a few days later, on 2nd April 2004, the official ceremony of the raising of the Romanian flag took place at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Romania acquired the status of ally in 2004, and during the years that followed, our state maintained its active involvement being present with its allies in NATO operations and missions aimed at promoting stability and security globally. Romania has proved to be a constant and coherent ally that has provided permanent support, with substantial contributions in areas of important for Euro-Atlantic security.

Having a permanent concern over what national security interests mean and in the context of adopting policies and perspectives of the North Atlantic allies, Romania has developed a close and sustainable cooperation with the United States of America.

Following the line of foreign policy that our country has approached after the fall of communism in 1989 and conditional upon the security of its own territory in a geographical position requiring a decision making, Romania signed on 13th September 2011 the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the deployment of the ballistic missile defence system of the United States and the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century between Romania and the United States of America. The two documents are of paramount importance and the engagement of Romania by signing them implies the unequivocal marking of the direction and the historical path of our country for a long time. Both the Agreement

and the Declaration concluded between the two states are based on Article 5 of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (Washington DC, 4th April 1949), which states that: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'

The Agreement between Romania and the United States regulates in very clear terms the rights and obligations of the Parties with regard to the deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defence System of the United States on the territory of Romania in the military base of *Deveselu*. *By concluding this agreement, Romania was the first country in the world to host such a system*

*While the* Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century between Romania and the United States of America uses generic terms that do not specifically bind either party and that outline possible future opportunities 'to increase trade and investment, cooperation between business communities and development of more in-depth industrial and technological cooperation.' The existence of the strategic partnership with the United States of America is a long-term and ever-developing commitment that takes shape as common projects are developed between the two states, the pillars of the Romania - USA relation being the political dialogue, security, economics, people-to-people contacts, science and technology, research, education, culture.

In the *Deveselu* Military Base Development Project, we can see some key moments that marked the event, namely: September 2011 - when the agreement on deployment of the missile shield was signed, December 2015 - when the missile shield became active and operational, and May 2016 - when the official inauguration of the missile defence system took place. Since these three moments have been followed with interest from

the Romanian media and there have been numerous press articles that have reported these phases, we propose hereafter to capture the way in which the event was presented.

The signing of the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the deployment of the ballistic missile defence system of the United States and the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century between Romania and the United States of America was considered a success of foreign policy by the Romanian authorities, bringing Romania into an area of greatest interest to its American allies. In this context, the titles of the press articles at the time, as well as their context, are eloquent in the presentation of the pro-American position of the population: 'What the agreement on the deployment of the shield in *Deveselu* sets out: The firm commitment of the USA to defend the Romanian territory by means of the missile system against an actual attack', 'The Americans have arrived at *Deveselu*', 'The American missile shield at *Deveselu* places Romania on the strategic map of the world' or 'Historical moment: The missile shields at *Deveselu* is inaugurated'.

The theory of Alexander Wendt considers that the states have different positions relative to each other primarily by reference to the relations between them. Putting the territory of the *Deveselu* military base at the disposal of the United States of America was not considered a threat from the USA to the security of the Romanian state, given the diplomatic relations between the two states. The analysis of the decision considered the positioning of the United States of America as an ally of Romania and not as a competitor or an enemy. The elements of power and interest have directly shaped the positioning of the two states in this issue and led to the conclusion of the two agreements. The choice made by the two states has been based on mutual trust in assuming and fulfilling the obligations by each party involved. Such a partnership could not have been concluded with other states as it was concluded with the United States of America, with the identities and interests of the states involved in the process having a major importance. The system of relations that have been built socially on the basis of continuous processes of interaction and social practice is the basis of the relation between the two state.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of the normative and

material structures, the role of identity in shaping the political action and the relation of mutual constitution between agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2008:207). The constructivism considerably exceeds the main theories of security. It is important, first of all, because it describes the individual and state security as social constructions that can be endlessly reformulated by eager and willing actors, and not as a static concept, blocked under determined and unchanging conditions, as realists and neorealists assume. More and more theoreticians and practitioners of international relations rely on the conceptual tools of constructivism, especially on removing it from conventional ideas on causality and empirical theory when they approach international politics and security (Kolodziej, 2007:319).

The main postulates of constructivism are proved by the example envisaged in this paper, namely the deployment of the American missile shield on Romanian territory at Deveselu, because the policies of the two states are the result of the intersubjective sharing of ideas, norms and values at the level of state actors. A major contribution of the constructivism is the re-discovery of the nature of social product of the international world. The world of interactions between the international actors is eminently a social space and is regarded as a social creation as a whole, just as its defining components are social products.

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## THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU'S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES: THE CASE OF THE EU BATTLEGROUPS

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**Abstract:** *The post-Cold War circumstances challenged Europe in terms of security and defence. The European states realised that they had to share the responsibility for global security in order to ensure their own integrity. In other words, a common strategic culture was sought to be developed as an expression of an articulated intercultural communication aimed to act as a binding element between the EU member states formerly belonging to the Eastern and Western Blocs. The EU's rapid response capabilities in general and the EU battlegroups in particular were chosen as the best answer to this strategic demand. Despite the EU battlegroups being considered the cornerstone of European 'expertise' in terms of crises management operations, this rapid response capability proved to be a disillusion. For a better understanding of the current status of the EU battlegroups concept, this paper is going to assess its feasibility. Special considerations will be offered regarding its itinerary, the strategic and operational challenges that this concept is facing and, not ultimately, regarding its prospects.*

**Keywords:** *EU battlegroups; rapid response; security*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

A coordinated (Western) European defence was certainly a political chimera in the Cold War era. The situation changed dramatically immediately after the fall of Berlin Wall as the stability of the bipolar world was replaced by the uncertainty of the globalised one. Despite the European states were rarely more secure from military threats originating within the region, salient high security threats emerged from the 'near abroad'. Frozen conflicts such as in Balkans or Transnistria, WMD proliferation, energy insecurity, cyber-attacks or Islamist terrorism posed fundamental challenges.

Facing this new strategic context, the EU member states' military forces amounting a total combined forces of over two millions troops - theoretically, the largest in the world- were, however, “unable to continue to provide the whole range of capabilities in their army, navy, and air force, and could not maintain certain capabilities unless in cooperation with others” (S. Biscop 2005:29). As R. Gates put it, “the demilitarization of Europe has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st” (cited in Council on Foreign Relations, February 2010). As a consequence, the capitals of Europe became aware

that absence of war is not synonymous with security and the newly-emerged challenges cannot be addressed unless they pool and share assets. Under these circumstances a reorganisation of Europe's military forces became a priority.

However, building trust among the EU member states for achieving a recalibration of their national armed forces from territorial defence to expeditionary operations could have been a major obstacle. Therefore, a common strategic culture aimed to act as a binding element between the EU member states formerly belonging to the Eastern and Western Blocs was sought to be developed. According to C. Gray, a “strategic culture can be defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, held by a security community which has had a unique historical experience” (cited in L. Chappell 2009:419). In fact, the EU can fit only partially into this definition as its 'unique historical experience' can be discussed only since the democratisation of the Eastern Bloc.

This post-Cold War status quo was surprisingly a foundation for the EU battlegroups (EU BGs) which came as a test bed for reaching a common European strategic culture that would ultimately lead to a coordinated European defence. But how and why the EU BGs were chosen as the best answer to this strategic demand?

## 2. THE (DIS-)INTEGRATION OF THE EU'S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Despite the EU's structured interest in shaping a coordinated defence can be traced back to the Cold War period, a modern approach emerged through the Maastricht Treaty. Signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as initial premises for developing a common strategic culture. However, the wars in the Balkan throughout the 1990s revealed that "CFSP would only be credible if it was backed up with the possibility to use military power" (B. Schmitt, 2004:89) and as a consequence, the EU member states were forced to place the development of military capabilities at the centre of their national policymaking. This necessity, as K. Keulman put it, "resulted in intensifying motivation on the part of the European Union members to strengthen military collaboration among themselves" (2006:46-47).

Probably the first response to the issue of comparative military inadequacy and to the necessity of a better cooperation in terms of military capabilities was agreed at the Franco-British summit in St. Malo in 1998. In fact, the paragraph 2 of the joint declaration set a clear strategic perspective for the EU "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"(in M. Rutten 2001:8), meanwhile article 4 was visionary and outlined for the first time in an official EU document the demand for rapid reaction capabilities: "Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks" (in M. Rutten 2001:9). As a consequence, at the Cologne European Council of June 1999 all EU member states agreed to transform this bilateral initiative into a European reality by creating European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - EU's own security brand. Indeed, ESDP - later updated and renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - became an integral part of the CFSP and was responsible to deal with all the issues regarding EU security and defence, including to set common capabilities goals, to shape common strategic objectives or to conduct joint crisis management operations. According to K. Keulman, "the ESDP marks a movement away from the civilian nature of the EU and its institutional connection with NATO" (2006:47). Another important event not only in the

crystallisation of the EU's integrated military capabilities but also in determining European propensity for rapid reaction happened six months later at the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999. Apart from establishing the Headline Goal 2003 and the commitment of EU member states for the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 50,000-60,000 troops in the mission spectrum of *Petersberg tasks* (military tasks of humanitarian, peacekeeping or peace-making nature), the Helsinki European Council Summit created the political foundation of the future EU BGs by offering special attention to rapid-response capabilities

the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management (...) special attention will be given to a rapid reaction capability (in M. Rutten, 2001:83).

The idea was reiterated and further developed at the Franco-British summit of Le Touquet in February 2003 (see in A. Missiroli, 2003:39).

Another important document urging the need for rapid reaction forces was the European Security Strategy (ESS). Being adopted in December 2003, it retained in terms of rapid response that "active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (Council of the European Union 2003:11). As revealed by S. Biscop, despite its severe criticism, the ESS was quite relevant regarding the EU BGs as its 'sermon' was connected to the further creation of the rapid-response capabilities (2005:31).

**2.1 A recipe for the development of the EU rapid-response capabilities.** The successful outcome of the *Operation Artemis*, the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe, had a major influence on the crystallisation of the EU rapid-response concept. Launched in June 2003 as a bridging operation for the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), *Operation Artemis* achieved its objective of stabilising security conditions in parts of the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This first EU success in terms of crisis management operation underlined the EU's high efficiency to operate with a small force and "provided EU policy-makers and planners with a real-life template for future rapid response deployments" (G. Lindstrom 2007:10). Subsequently, *Operation Artemis* became a "reference model for the development of a BG

sized rapid response capability” (R. Hamelink 2005:8), affecting in several ways the formation of the EU BGs.

Firstly, *Operation Artemis* influenced the force structure of the EU BGs. In fact, the usage of small scale units of approximately 1500 soldiers proved to be efficient in the Democratic Republic of Congo and EU found it as ideal in the context of limited resources provided by its member states towards a military operation under common framework. Secondly, the mission spectrum of the EU BGs was shaped according to the above-mentioned operation. For instance, as J.Y. Haine remarked, both of them were purposed for Africa – at least, initially in the case of the EU BGs (2004:21). Thirdly, the objective of *Operation Artemis* was to stabilize the situation until sufficient military forces were on hand to settle it; this aspect of force’s sustainability was included initially in the BG concept (M. Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2012:2). Fourthly, as G. Linsdstrom noticed, the EU BG concept incorporated the rapid response nature of the 2003 operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2007:11).

Overall, as J. Kaitera and G. Ben-Ari put it,

without the positive experience of *Operation Artemis*, it is questionable whether the political process for accepting and shaping the battlegroup concept would have been as smooth and swift as it has been (2008:2).

**2.2 The enactment of the EU BGs and the ‘fratricide’.** The EU BGS came into being officially on 10 February 2004 when *The Battlegroup concept* food for thought paper was released by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This document envisaged the defining features of the EU BGs by containing proposals regarding its mission spectrum, deployability, sustainability and command and control (Institute for Security Studies, 2005:10-16). The final version of the EU BG concept was agreed in Brussels on 14 June 2004 by the EU Military Committee and in November same year the first thirteen EU BGs were formed. The EU BGs reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in January 2005 as one EU BG was on stand-by for a period of six months before it was replaced. Subsequently, the EU BGs reached Full Operational Capacity (FOC) in January 2007 as EU had the theoretical capacity to undertake two concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations and to launch them nearly simultaneously.

The EU BGs capability was also introduced in the Headline Goal 2010 as ‘a key element’ (Council of the European Union, 2004:3). Initially,

EU assumed a dual capacity in terms of rapid response comprising ERRF for ‘high-intensity’ operations and EU BGs for ‘low-intensity’ ones in what L. Cladi and A. Locatelli called “a long march to catch up with Washington” (2012:275). However, the EU policy-makers understood that a common European strategic culture was still underway and large military projects such as the ERRF conducted *ab initio* would have constituted a chimera. As a consequence, the EU member states stopped the formation of the ERFF and its area of competence was meant to be fulfilled by the EU BGs. Indeed, this decision was favoured by the rising popularity of the EU BG concept among the EU member states which perceived it as requiring the minimum concession towards a deeper military integration, meanwhile representing an ideal safe haven for advancing domestic priorities on the common European agenda of security and defence. Overall, as R. Gowan remarked, “rapid reaction, and the battlegroups in particular, are no substitute for a strategy” (2005:14); however, the pretext of a possible integration of the national armies under a common European framework was the most plausible excuse of the pragmatic EU member states for justifying the defence expenditures on their national armies.

### 3. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE EU BG CONCEPT

For a better understanding of the feasibility of the EU BG, it is important to proceed to an analysis of the concept by firstly illustrating its main features; secondly, indicating its subsidiary roles; thirdly, revealing the strategic and operational challenges; and not ultimately, highlighting its prospects.

**3.1 Main features.** The EU BG concept is defined in the EU’s partial declassified document *EU Battlegroup Concept* as:

the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined-arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat-support and combat service-support elements (...) In their generic composition, but depending on the mission, Battlegroups are about 1,500 personnel strong (Council of the European Union, 2012b).

In addition, the EU BGs need to be “associated with a deployable force headquarters

and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics” (Council of the European Union, 2012b).

In terms of decision-making, the ambition is that the European Council should be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days and that forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after that decision. This requires that EU BGs are to be built on assets and capabilities held at a readiness of 5-10 days (Council of the European Union, 2012b). Concerning their duration of deployment, EU BGs are on standby for a six-month period, or multiples of it, and should be initially sustainable for 30 days, extendable to 120 days if resupplied appropriately (Council of the European Union, 2012b; Council of the European Union, 2013b:2).

The EU BGs need to be based “on the principle of multinationality and could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States” (Council of the European Union, 2012b). Even though the EU BG concept allows for national BGs as well, it is rather considered to be an exception or an emergency solution. Indeed, as of now, the EU BG roster was fulfilled to a high extent by all EU member states - excepting Denmark and Malta - and invited non-EU states (for more details regarding EU BGs and commitments, see *for 2005-2012* European Union Military Staff, June 2012; *for 2013-2018* Council of the European Union, 2013a; *for 2019-2024* Council of the European Union, 2018b:2).

In addition, the EU BGs are expected to be employed in the mission spectrum of Article 17(2) of the Treaty of European Union - known as the *Petersberg tasks* (Council of the European Union 2004:4). Indeed, the EU BGs can be used under three specific situations: in bridging operations (in support of troops already in the ground such in the Artemis case), in initial entry rapid-response operations (in advance of a larger follow-on force) or in stand-alone operations (in limited scale crisis that require rapid response) (G. Lindstrom 2007:19). Clearly, these situations are not comprehensive or mutually exclusive as a potential EU BG mission may have its own unique features that are hard to be incorporated solely under one or another category.

Taking aside these conditions of employment, where should EU BGs operate? The theatre of operations for the EU BGs is frequently referred to a deployment radius of 6,000 kilometers. However, as shown by L. Chappell, the planning assumption of 6,000 km from Brussels is still an important-but not exhaustive- guidance (2009:427). It is worth

mentioning though that the operational planning process of this rapid response capability can be hardly forecast as no EU BG has been deployed until now.

The headquarters are also important stakeholders in the operational planning process due to their role as primary structures that form the EU’s generic command and control (C2). In general terms, a EU military action has to be led by a Force Headquarter (FHQ) at the operational level and a Component Headquarter (CCHQ) at the tactical level; both under the supervision of an Operational Headquarter (OHQ) at the strategic level. However, in the case of the EU BG only the FHQ and OHQ are compulsory, meanwhile the emergence of a CCHQ depends on the decision of the framework nation. To date, six countries (France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece) have made available their national OHQ for EU military missions. EU can also use NATO’s OHQ under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements or the EU Operations Centre – both located in Belgium – as a substitute for a national OHQ (see Council of the European Union, 2012a:1). Concerning the FHQ, the contributing nations has to provide it as a prerequisite for the formation of a EU BG.

In terms of EU BGs’ performance, EU developed a system of validation that comprises: standards and criteria, common training and certification. However, this system of validation should be perceived as a general guide because the EU places the responsibility of delivering efficient forces on the contributing countries meanwhile the responsibility ‘as a whole’ belongs to the leading nations (see Council of the European Union, 2012b).

The whole process of forming a EU BG and its possible deployment involves a high-stake burden. In fact, how is the EU BG system financed? In terms of financing, the EU BGs are not distinctive from other CSDP military operations. Under this framework, two categories of costs can be determined: common costs and individual costs. Common costs - including incremental costs associated with operational headquarters, local administration, transportation within the OHQ area and lodging infrastructure - are covered by the *Athena mechanism* which is formed by member states’ contributions according to their gross national income. In the meantime, individual costs – including transporting troops from participating countries to the theatre of operations as well as other costs related to the formation of the EU BGs and placing them on standby - are the responsibility of the contributing nations according to the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’. G. Lindstrom summarizes

very well the financial dimension of the EU BGs: “the more personnel and equipment a participating country contributes, the higher its expected contributions costs to be” (2007: 25-26).

**3.2 Subsidiary roles.** Apart from offering EU a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities - as discussed above - the EU BG concept was planned to assume other interrelated roles.

For instance, the EU BG concept was designed as a driver for the national armed forces of the EU member states in terms of capability development, interoperability and rapid long-range deployments (see EU Council Secretariat, 2007:3). In addition, taking into account their wide-ranging scope and ‘low-intensity’ mission spectrum, the EU BGs attracted for the first time the engagement of neutral EU member states in collective ‘hard power’ endeavors. So far Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland contributed to the formation of EU BGs.

Furthermore, taking into account that the EU member states are allowed to invite non-EU countries to participate in EU BGs as long as “this will be done without prejudice to the rights of any member state” (Council of the European Union, 2012b), some non-EU states have also contributed to the formation of EU BGs – i.e. Turkey, Ukraine, Norway, Serbia and North Macedonia; meanwhile Albania has also committed to join an EU BG in the second semester of 2024.

As a consequence, the EU BGs have the potential to represent at European level a ‘forum’ for the expression of the strategic interests of the EU member states independent of NATO; meanwhile at global level, the EU BG concept could represent a ‘strategic identity card’ for Europe by reinforcing its military identity in a concrete manner.

**3.3 Strategic challenges.** This section attempts to indicate the strategic challenges posed to the EU BG concept by its inter-organizational relations with the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the United Nations (UN).

Firstly, when analyzing the relation of the EU BG with the NRF, there is always the dilemma between their duplication and complementarity. On the one hand, there are critical voices that sustain that the EU BGs duplicate the efforts of contributing nations towards the NRF. In this sense, Y. Reykers indicates that

when one simultaneously puts troops on Battlegroup standby and NATO standby, questions of prioritization seem inevitable. Considerations on financial and political costs of deployment, as well

as evaluations of which mechanism best reflects one’s political and economic interests then become increasingly decisive, inherently creating competition (2017:10).

On the other hand, there are some voices that highlight the complementarity of the EU BGs with the NRF. For example, A. Mathewson gave the example of Swedish input to the Nordic BG:

It has entered into arrangements [within the Nordic BG] to provide strategic lift. This is capability which did not exist before the Battlegroup existed. This is an example of a formerly neutral country with previously a focus on territorial defence generating capacity which is usable for the sort of expeditionary operations that both NATO and the EU want to undertake (The Defence Committee of the House of Commons 2008:77).

Taking aside these opinions, the EU and NATO have agreed to coordinate development plans to avoid duplication and redundancies. The most known mechanism is the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement meanwhile the most visible are the joint exercises. Are these arrangements enough? Certainly not as the identity crisis between these two military capabilities is still seeking a resolution.

Secondly, as the EU BG concept was designed as an ultimate mean of cooperation between EU and UN, an analysis of the evolution of UN prerogatives over the former is very relevant in emphasizing the strategic disconnect of the EU BGs. Recalling the *The Battlegroup concept*, it is worth mentioning that the EU BGs were designed to be employed in crisis management operations in response to a request by the UN and under a UN mandate (Institute for Security Studies 2005:10-16); however, EU stated subsequently that the BGs would remain under its political control and strategic direction (Council of the European Union, 2005). In fact, EU signalled the potential disconnect at the end of 2005 when UN requested EU BGs in support of the Congolese elections of 2006. EU refused to deploy them and preferred to support UN through an ad-hoc force formed by the EU member states. Finally, in a note of the Policy Department of the European Parliament of September 2006, it is admitted that the EU BGs can undertake missions “under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate” (in G. Quille 2006:5). Therefore, the EU reasserted its autonomy in the decision-making of deploying EU BGs and as a consequence, this rapid-response capability could not be considered anymore at the UN’s exclusive disposal. Finally, everything culminated in 2008

when UN requested military support for the MONUC UN mission (DR Congo) with a bridging operation. Despite the mission offered ‘ideal conditions’ - similar to *Operation Artemis* -, EU refused the deployment of its BGs (for a more specific analysis of the reasons behind this decision of non-deployment in DR Congo, see L.M. Balossi-Restelli, 2011). In addition, subsequent calls of UN or its members of the Security Council to deploy EU BGs in Libya (2011), Mali (2013) or Central African Republic (2013) were further neglected by the European Council – it is worth mentioning though that some authors argue that the non-deployment of the EU BGs should not be explainable only from the perspective of the decision-making within the EU, but rather from that of those taking the initiative to tackle the above-mentioned crisis (for details regarding the “demand-side” of the EU BGs deployment-debate in Libya, Mali and Central African Republic, see Y. Reykers, 2016:346-365).

As a consequence, it is important to highlight the repercussions of this strategic disconnect on the feasibility of the EU BGs. R. Gowan argued that “ultimately, the battlegroup system’s flaws have retarded EU-UN cooperation in crisis management by diverting both institutions’ hopes an energies into a mechanism that consistently fails to deliver troops” (2009:58). In addition, the commitment of the EU member states to contribute to the formation of the EU BGs without a clear perspective over the connection between this EU military capability and UN provoked massive internal debates in certain countries (see G. Lindstrom 2007:52; L. Chappell, 2009:426-427). Adding insult to injury, the possible employment of the EU BGs in a Kosovo scenario - in other words, without UNSCR - would definitely not only blow up this EU military capability, but also would impact severely the EU’s international reputation as a security provider. Thus, the EU sermon stating that the EU BGs are designed ‘specifically, but not exclusively’ to be used in response to a request from UN requires an immediate resolution.

Overall, the EU BG system is required to clarify its role in the international framework. If relating to the NRF the EU BG concept should solve immediately the identity crisis, in the UN case it has two options: either drawing a clear separation or making sure that the EU-UN cooperation works as well on ground as it does on paper.

**3.4 Operational challenges.** Firstly, the EU BGs’ capacity of deployment poses some practical challenges that not ultimately affect their

feasibility. EU BGs should be based on rapid response and as a consequence, the challenge relies on the ability of the military planners to mobilise sufficient transport capacity at short notice. The strategic transport of the EU BGs is based on a combination of airlift and sealift: most of the equipment is planned to be transported by sea meanwhile the initial presence in the theatre of operations should be assured by airlift. Occasionally, some military analysts highlighted the fragility of EU’s strategic transport (see G. Lindstrom, 2007; C. Major and C. Molling, 2011; Y. Efstathiou, 2019). Indeed, EU’s limited access to strategic airlift coupled with the limited utility of the strategic sealift - even though is more accessible compared to the airlift, it is slow and lacks applicability in case of landlocked operations - place a doubt on the EU’s capacity of strategic transport. As a consequence, the EU member states have sought solutions to the deployment challenge – i.e. pooling, joint acquisitions and leasing.

Pooling sources in the case of strategic airlift could have been the best solution; however the progress is slow due the lack of consensus over assuming the burden. To date, one initiative seems to offer good prospects though for the EU BGs’ capacity of deployment: the planned acquisition of 170 Airbus A400M Atlas by seven countries contributing to the EU BGs (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Turkey). As of 27<sup>th</sup> February 2019, 61 Airbus A400M were delivered and entered in operation meanwhile the rest are expected to be delivered in the next decade (Airbus, 2019:1); however, as UK is scheduled to leave EU this year, Brussels will see its heavy transport aircraft total reduce by around a third (Y. Efstathiou, 2019).

Joint acquisitions can also constitute a solution. Indeed, the EU BGs could be provided since 2009 with access to strategic airlift through the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). This is a multinational initiative transcending NATO and EU that provides its participating nations - excepting US, the remaining 11 SAC members are also contributing states to EU BGs - assured access to military airlift capability though three common-procured Boeing C-17 based at the Hungarian Defence Forces Pápa Air Base. Even though SAC has a limited capacity due to the reduced number of aircraft available, its successful history (see Strategic Airlift Capability, 2018) calls for replication at a larger scale.

Leasing could be the ultimate solution. Indeed, it was shaped through initiatives such as Strategic Air Life Interim Solutions (SALIS) – that have

provided since 2004 the EU BGs with a potential access to six Antonov (An) 124 through a joint EU/NATO leasing agreement of 10 participating states with a consortium formed by Russia-based freighter aircraft group *Volga-Dnepr* and Ukrainian-based *Antonov Airlines*. As revealed in recent news, the former announced at the end of December 2018 that it quits the contract meanwhile the latter even though announcing at the beginning of January 2019 a contract extension with SALIS up until end of December 2021, it supplies under the new terms only two An-124 and as a consequence it is not clear how or from where the resulting shortfall will be made-up (G. Jennings, 2019).

Overall, the capacity of deployment seems to be a long-term challenge for the EU BGs unless EU member states reach a consensus over common acquisition and fair share of burden. Indeed, as proposed by the leader of the German party CDU, the next step could be to start on the symbolic project of building a common European aircraft carrier (A. Kramp-Karrenbauer, 2019).

Secondly, as illustrated in the case of the strategic transport capabilities, an important deterrent is the cost of deployment because most of the burden for the formation and the potential deployment of the EU BGs is supported by the contributing nations. A direct repercussion is highlighted by C. Major and C. Molling:

since the member states contributing to a battlegroup bear the bulk of the burden when an operation takes place, they tend to favour Battlegroup deployments in principle but not the deployments of their own unit" (2011:22).

Therefore, even though one of the primary roles of the EU BGs was to act as an incentive for the transformation of the member states' defence, it seems that the financing system of this rapid-response capability is still blocking this attempt. However, as it will be further discussed, the *Athena mechanism* is currently under revision and the lack of deployment can be paradoxically a window of opportunity.

Thirdly, there are certain EU BGs' features associated with the requirements of rapid-response that can act as a double-edged sword. Indeed, the size and the timeframe of the EU BGs can represent a major operational deficit. For instance, if acting in support of a bridging operation, the vicissitudes of this type of mission can require a wider timeframe or larger size of troops and so far there is no consensus on how it would be dealt

with such a situation. This issue resides in the lack of clarification on the need for a strategic reserve or follow-on force and their usage (see G. Lindstrom 2007:54; F. Kappen et. al., 2015:5).

Fourthly, another important operational deficit of the EU BFs resides in the process of certification which presents some clear drawbacks. For instance, the autonomy of the contributing nations in certifying their own forces within the EU BGs can affect the interoperability and the effectiveness of the force package. In addition, the methodology of checking whether the standards applied to a certain EU BG are in concordance with the EU criteria is not defined and as a consequence, this process is a pure exercise of subjectivity. Not ultimately, another potential drawback can be as well the optional character of the EU-led exercises. As a consequence, the certification process needs definitely a revitalisation. Even though the EUMC agreed last year a *Revised EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide* (see Council of the European Union, 2018a), EU has not delivered so far the widely-expected centralised certification process figuring the European Defence Agency as an independent authority. This target would offer objectivity to the certification process and it would eliminate the potential doubts over the quality of the force package. However, this is a matter of how far the EU member states are willing to cooperate in terms of military projects and as a consequence, reaching this target can be only plausible in the near future.

Fifthly, the decision-making process can be in some circumstances an operational deficit. For example, balancing EU's institutionalized bureaucracy with the requirement of having an EU BG on the ground within ten days after the decision to launch an operation might represent an operational challenge than can be addressed only through exercises simulating the planning process and accelerated decision-making. In addition, the relationship between the domestic decision-making procedures of the contributing nations and its impact on deployment timeframe can be as well very demanding. For instance, some countries need an on-time informing of the decision-makers as any military deployment must be authorized in advance by the Parliament (e.g. Germany), meanwhile other countries do not put a high stake on informing as the deployment is decided by the president (e.g. France). Even in the case of the latter, it is a current trend that emphasizes the requirement of public consultations in case of deployment (see Y Reykers, 2017:8-9). However, some EU member states depending upon a prior

parliamentarian approval such as Lithuania have already harmonized the national decision-making procedures with the rapid-response necessity of the EU BGs (see The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2018). Overall, the rapid decision-making is certainly a major danger; however, the progress achieved so far and the good prospects revealed both at EU level and at national level reveal that this challenge is the most approachable.

Finally, a crucial deterrent for the deployment debate and not ultimately for the feasibility of the EU BGs is the lack of credibility. Despite being envisaged as the cornerstone of European 'expertise' in terms of crises management operations, taking into account that no EU BGs have been used so far, one could easily argue that the EU BGs are nothing else than 'paper armies'. The price is very high if they are not used in the near future because the interest of the member states in maintaining and further developing the concept could greatly diminish – indeed, a 'rarefied' EU BG roster is to be expected for the period 2019-2024 (see Council of the European Union, 2018b:2). In addition, the pressure of taxpayers on the reduction of military spending can be more and more visible and, as a consequence, it can have a detrimental impact on the EU BGs, especially due to their lack of records linked to deployment. Therefore, all these challenges discussed above are not only important stakeholders in the deployment debate, but also can affect to a high extent the prospects of the EU BGs.

**3.5 The way forward - shape it or lose it.** The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to offer an impetus to the development of the EU BGs. Being the first EU official document stipulating the Union's role in maintaining peace (2009, Art. 42.1) and assuming the missions stipulated in the ESS of 2003 (2009, Art. 43.1), the Treaty of Lisbon reiterated EU's ambition to become a global actor (2009, Art. 21.1). However, it could not fully-act in the benefit of the EU BGs as it could not resolve the deliberately preserved - but often not declared – dilemma of the EU member states: national sovereignty vs. EU collective defense and military decision-making.

The newest EU Global Strategy (EUGS), launched on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2016 by the current EU HR Federica Mogherini, highlights not only EU's civilian role, but also for the first time its military one (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016:4). It also proposes the development of EU's rapid-response capability by resolving the EU BG's emerging obstacles in terms of decision-making, funding and

political will (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016:47). However, as M. Drent and D. Zandee warned, "the Global Strategy process should not remain limited to a paper exercise, but should be the catalyst for much needed delivery" (2016:78). Indeed, a window of opportunity arises as the Brexit may have removed some obstacles towards a deeper EU military integration. The effects of the EUGS on the EU BGs seem to be so far positive as long as it has already delivered some initiatives aimed to tackle their above-mentioned obstacles – i.e. the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability. In addition, EUGS created the premises for the EU member states' approval of increased and more diversified 'common costs' in support of the EU BGs – including those associated with deployment – under the on-going negotiations on the revision of the *Athena mechanism* (see Council of the European Union, 2017; Council of the European Union, 2018c). Indeed, according to a recent recommendation of the EU Parliament, the *Athena mechanism* might be incorporated into a newly-established European Peace Facility (see European Parliament, 2019) that is expected to expand significantly the 'common costs', from 10 to 15 per cent of total costs at present to a maximum of 45 per cent of costs (UK Parliament, 12 September 2018).

Overall, a successful outcome for the feasibility of the EU BGs is going to be determined in the near future by the ability of the EU member states to address the strategic and operational challenges that this concept is facing. Otherwise, as M. Gahler put it, "at some point you have to wonder whether another way to do this is not better" (in C. Hasselbach, 1st of June 2013). As a consequence, the current post-Brexit context calls for the EU policy-makers to take a clear decision on the fate of the EU BG concept: shape it or lose it!

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The post-Cold War context was clearly hostile to Europe as the newly-emerged global challenges threatened its integrity meanwhile NATO's security umbrella could not be considered anymore a guarantee. Finding a balance between the necessity of cooperation and the ambition of advancing domestic priorities on the common European agenda was certainly a difficult task for the EU member states. Hidden under the mask of a

chimeric European strategic culture and encouraged by the *Operation Artemis*' positive result, the development of the EU's rapid response capabilities in general and the EU BGs in particular were chosen as the best answer to this strategic demand. Despite the EU BG system being considered the cornerstone of European 'expertise' in terms of crises management operations, it has proved so far to be a disillusion.

Firstly, various strategic challenges emerged when the EU member states attempted to gain legitimacy by placing the EU BGs in the international frame on the basis of 'effective multilateralism'. This subterfuge was divulged by the evolution of the EU BGs' relationship with NATO and UN. Indeed, the potential duplication between the EU BGs and the NRF revealed that their relationship is so far a 'marriage of convenience' rather than a beneficial construction. This is the case as well of the EU BGs' connection with UN which proved to be not only a compromise, but also a potential deterrent for an effective provision of international security.

Secondly, despite the EU BGs were designed as panacea for EU's several capability gaps, their assignment with low potential features revealed many operational challenges. Indeed, M. Kerttunen et. al. illustrated very well this fiasco: "what does it tell about the political ambitions and the military reach of this economic giant of ours if we are deploying expeditionary forces here and there for minor duties and for a relatively short period of time?" (2005:48).

As a consequence, unless these strategic and operational challenges are addressed in a coherent manner, the future of the EU BGs will be dim, if not dismal. As one EU official explained it, the EU BG system is like "having a fantastic Ferrari in the garage. It is there but you just don't know how to drive it" (in H. Hardt 2009:400). In this sense, the post-Brexit context might be a window of opportunity for the EU policy-makers to show they know how to 'drive' it. However, taking into account the well-known pragmatism of the EU member states, it would be reasonable to say that EU BGs have a minimal chance of survival. Indeed, it is rather probable that the EU BGs will have the same fate as the ERRF: a Potemkin village for virtual units.

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New Technology,  
Resources &  
Connections



## MARKETING ALBANIA THROUGH FOREIGN SOCIAL MEDIA

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**Abstract:** *This paper seeks to study the status of the Albania's promotion through foreign social media a new country regarding tourist relations but old as far as a nation, culture and traditions or one of the oldest people in the Eastern Balkans. Its aim is to analyze the current situation of Albania being promoted worldwide via social networking but not only, its cultural values, traditions, sportive activities and more. This research paper will also draw conclusions that help to know and understand this type of tourism promotion. Moreover, there will also be some research into these websites and concrete examples will be brought concerning the travelers reactions and their expectations towards this country. Nevertheless, research will also consist of the impact and reaction this phenomenon is having on the Albanian society and the people themselves. The methodology that will be utilized is that of descriptive and comparative. A number of conclusions will be drawn at the end of this research paper so that to demonstrate this phenomenon's outcomes into the society. This research is proposed to be conducted through a content analysis and description of some foreign social sites advertising Albania in many European and Mediterranean counties using English as means of communication.*

**Keywords:** *cultural values; Albania; tourism; the English language; foreign media*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Travelling has always helped people improve, enhance or use these skills in order to understand particular behavior, enter into relations, gain cultural knowledge and why not adopt. A new form of all these movement has been transformed into tourism. Albania is facing such a phenomenon at a large scale only in the 20<sup>th</sup> century because it has been somehow unknown to the world accounting for this not only the geographical position but mainly the communist regime ruling and isolating Albania for fifty years. Nevertheless, leaving back this grey period and welcoming people from all over the world visiting and seeing Albania has completely altered people's beliefs, thoughts, stereotypes, perceptions. Thus, contributing to the country's economy, its further development and to its process of being integrated into the European Union. It is worth mentioning here the English language which is the main means of communication among Albanians and foreigners, a language which is spreading at substantial rate throughout all institutions in Albania and becoming a lingua Franca here. Sometimes foreigners experience some cultural shock and they make efforts to learn some of the symbols and rituals of the new environment such as words to use, how to greet people, when to

bestow presents etc. Therefore, these social networks have somehow sorted out the dilemma.

In a way, the visitor in a foreign culture returns to the mental state of an infant in which the simplest things must be learned over again. This experience usually leads to feelings of distress, helplessness and hostility toward the new environment. The technology of the internet has played a crucial role towards this phenomenon, serving as a precious source for people's movements and insights of the other countries, assisting them in choosing the proper place or getting acquainted with the new environment. With the quick proliferation and popularity of social networks, information or videos fly in time. Social networks have substantially helped Albania being advertised to the world not only as a country but also bearing its values and traditions.

This paper will outline a range of examples and experiences of visitors shared through social networks and will also analyze its impact.

### 2. NEW MEDIA AND GLOBALISATION

"The world has shrunk into a much smaller interactive field"; this what Chen and Zhang (2010) have stated in their studies. This phenomenon has come as a result of technology and its huge steps in the development of social

media as well as contributing to globalization. Nowadays, multicultural encounters have been multiplied at a fast pace due to the advances in travel and communication technology. Possessing intercultural and communication skills assist people deriving from diverse backgrounds in achieving successful discussions and conversations as well as avoid misunderstandings.

If we ask people to define social media, numerous explanations and definitions come up based on people's experience or their relation to the media. In 2009 Safko and Brake in their publication defined social media as an online world where people interact with each other through comments, posting, liking or sharing. Globalization is part of our daily life affecting life, language, food, lifestyle, even social behaviours. The technological advancement and in particular the Internet have strengthened and united the relation or connection between social media and globalization.

### 3. BENEFITS FOR THE DOMESTIC COUNTRY

In order to determine the impact these social media have on the promotion of Albania as a whole and specifically its cultural values as well as the reaction of viewers and whether there has been any significant rise in tourism in the country, this research paper will focus on the below listed objectives: (1) The impact foreign social sites have in the promotion of Albania as a new democratic country towards European Union; (2) The identification of the benefits for the domestic country; (3) The language used and its spread in relation to other countries of the world.

In this research paper a question has been risen on whether foreign social media are a fruitful and successful way in promoting Albania as a country to the world. In order to address this point, there are some sites demonstrating concrete examples of this phenomenon. Besides some obstacles, I faced during this research paper is the lack of prior research studies on the topic. Secondly, there is limited access to reliable data or figures on the benefits this type of promotion had brought to Albania, be that economic, governmental or even territorial. Finally, the right choice on the official websites taken as samples in this paper.

### 4. SURFING FOREIGN SITES

**4.1 Must Do Travels** is a registered seller of travel in California, Washington, Hawaii and Florida founded on October 15<sup>th</sup> 2016. Its official

facebook page is Must Do Travels with more than 8.345.315 fans and the largest community of travel enthusiasts from around the world. Looking at it, you encounter posts of places and countries around the world, even some never seen before. Among them you spot Albania posted on August 22<sup>nd</sup> 2018 describing it with the following words "Spectacular" with 3.1M views and 3.1 comments (Hysi *et al.*, 2015). The comments provide quite useful and interesting information regarding the country and its cities by recommending it to the people worldwide. Most of them are marveled by what it offers and describe it as a low budget holiday.



Fig.1 Pictures from Must Do Travels

**4.2** Another foreign website which devotes a whole article to Albania promoting it widely is **Culture trip**, a global hyper-growth startup operating in travel, media and entertainment with 7,161,336 followers on facebook. The article accompanied my pictures and videos was updated by Feride Yalav-Heckerth 31st October 2017. At first sight while visiting the site you encounter the following lines:

Currently becoming one of the world's most sought-after travel destinations, Albania is growing fast to accommodate visitors but also staying true to its strong rural culture. From beautiful nature to the more modern urban attractions, there's so much to discover (Yalav-Heckerth, 2017).

As we see here the language used is English becoming the main means of communication in Albania as well as spreading at a high speed throughout the country. What strikes your eye is not only the pictures of the crystal sea waters or the mountains but it makes reference to some aspect of lifestyle. By introducing the sheep, people understand that they many Albanian families take care of their needs through their own garden and livestock which means that rural culture still dominates. It is also worth mentioning that the article is not just confined to tourism but it also deepens into Albanian people and their traits. Describing them as friendly and hospitable

Albanians are a very happy people who are very fond of visitors. So if you ever do get lost, don't be afraid to ask for help; there is always someone who speaks a little English who will be happy to guide you in the right direction (Yalav-Heckerroth, 2017).

Moreover, Albania's history and cultural heritage does not stay apart. Some of its most ancient cities reveal its most beautiful architecture carrying cultural and historical values.



Fig.2 Pictures from Culture Trip

**4.3 National Geographic Traveller** a worldwide website ranks Albania in Top 21 Best Destinations to visit. While searching into its networks I came across a u-tube video where Albania is being promoted depicting its coastal, mountainous and historical beauties. The video has 89.872 views and 149 comments, all referring to the untouched treasures awaiting to be seen and appreciated by foreigners.



Fig.3 Picture from National Geographic Traveller

## 5. ALBANIA AS A TOURIST DESTINATION

Albania is being promoted by international media as the next best tourist destination. All the articles and posts about Albania besides the tourism potential also highlights the quality-price ratio. Official data from the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) confirmed that the number of tourists from the European and worldwide target market has increased. Thus, the number of international tourists that visited Albania in 2013 was 3.255.98, in 2014 3.672.591, in 2015 4.131.242, in 2016 4.735.511 and finally in 2017 was 5.117.700 (INSTAT, 2017).




Fig.4 The number of tourists in Albania (2013-2017), apud INSTAT (2017)

In the meantime, figures show an increased number of visitors from England, Poland, Germany, France, and Sweden. The number of tourists from

Ukraine during 2016 increased by 111 percent, visitors from Sweden increased by 63 percent, Norwegian by 33 percent, Bulgarian by 42 percent, Polish by 30 percent, and Croatian by 22 percent.




Fig.5 Tourism on the increase, *apud* INSTAT (2017)

The rising number of the foreign visitors in Albania has contributed to many benefits for the tourist communities. Bars, cafes and restaurants have blossomed as a result of tourism and the interaction with tourists could cause a sense of cultural pride and open new windows to the world for the locals. Some interesting finding that is also worth involves the discovery of the locals' history and traditions and an insight in the real values while such promotion initiates.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

With the rise of technology and its spread in each corner of the world, the proliferation of information has been made possible with just one click. Now, observed even from the above research it is easier than ever before to be acquainted even with the most unknown, unfamiliar or distant place on the planet in few seconds. Taking into consideration the country being discussed in this paper, we see the numerous benefits Albania has gained by being advertised and recommended by the most prominent and prestigious sites in the world. Firstly, its economy has had a significant rise with the coming of tourists entering the country. Secondly, the Albanian culture covers a great part in their articles something which has made tourists visit it and make its values tangible. Hospitality, friendliness, helpfulness, kindness are some the qualities this nation is characterized by. Moreover, ruins, ancient cities some protected by UNESCO, thousand year castles dominate in these foreign networks creating a link between the present people and the past. Thirdly, it is worth mentioning the diverse sports this new country offers ranging

from winter to summer ones offering tourists the opportunity to experience adrenaline, energy and thrill. Finally, such world with diverse backgrounds, religions and languages, as a result of this encounter is quite explicit. In some parts of the world, people find it difficult and complex to cohabitate and tolerate one's behavior or manners. However, the great travels and movements of people have facilitated such encounters, making it easier for people to understand each other and why not avoid misunderstanding.

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## THE STRATEGIC PLACE AND ROLE OF INTEGRITY AMONG GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND VALUES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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**Abstract:** *One of the capstone concepts within NATO nowadays is integrity. Along with accountability and transparency it plays a major role in driving reform in the defense sector. However, these principles characteristic of (good) governance are not the only ones employed in reviewing and transforming public administration in democratic countries. Consequently, the goal of this article is to overview the governance framework as described by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union, the World Bank (WB) and NATO in order to identify the place and role of integrity among the key principles and values that drive the development and strengthening of democracy in the public realm in developing countries. Based on the findings, the article proposes a framework that allows building integrity initiatives to be approached from a strategic perspective.*

**Keywords:** *integrity; governance; accountability; transparency; rule of law; responsiveness*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The concept that best encompasses the principles and values required of contemporary public administration in democratic countries is that of (*good*) *governance*. Its definitions are dependent on the context of its usage (i.e. corporate, international, national or local) (Singh & Sachdeva, 2011), the goal (i.e. political, social, economic) or the arguable normative framework generated by the adjective “good”, according to a United Nations document on public governance (2011:6-7).

As an overall term, good governance refers to “creating the conditions” for a retrenchment of governing processes, namely state institutions and related processes employed in “maintaining public order and facilitating collective action” (Biju, 2007:23 ). In such a case the concept refers to

a high level of organizational effectiveness in relation to policy-formulation and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy and its contribution to growth, stability and popular welfare ” (Healey & Robinson, 1992:146)

while heeding the principles of accountability, transparency, participation, openness and the rule of law. In line with the above, the European Union

views the concept as indicating the manner in which power is employed when managing a country’s political, economic and social resources (European Social Fund Thematic Paper, European Commission, 2014) for development purposes while abiding by a number of basic principles identified by the Commission of the European Communities in a white paper on European Governance (2001) as follows: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence.

In the same realm of terminology, “governance” refers to the processes involved in making and implementing decisions, as well as to the formal and informal decision makers and structures in place (Singh & Sachdeva: 2011).

According to the World Bank (2017:3), governance concerns policy making and policy implementation in political and social environments riddled with complexity by state and non-state actors driven by conflicting interests and with unequal power. Moreover, the term is related to (WB, 1994) institutions concerned with economic development and public sector reform. As such there are four pillars that sustain governance and reinforce one another in shaping the environment in which they exist: public sector management, accountability, legal framework development, and transparency and information. While viewing public sector management and

associated initiatives like changing the organizational structure of public sector to reflect new objectives, retraining staff, better budgeting approaches, reviewing payment and grading structures to incentivize employees, or binding public managers through performance contracts as the cornerstone of governance, the World Bank also emphasizes the role of the other three in molding the performance of the field.

The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) definition of governance (2004) highlights its multi-level dimensions: political, economic and social as represented by three main actors - state, civil society and private sector. These form a "system of values, policies and institutions", "mechanisms and processes", "rules and practices" that both allow citizens to make their voice heard through the exercise of their legal rights and obligations, and establish boundaries and incentives for "individuals, organizations and firms". The principles that underpin the UNDP concept are, according to document titled *Governance Principles, Institutional Capacity and Quality* : participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic vision.

In the security and defense field, the definition of "(good) governance" is more often than not a matter of implicit rather than explicit statements. In this respect, NATO, for example, views good governance as represented by three major principles: integrity, accountability and transparency. The latter are viewed as means by which building integrity initiatives can contribute to providing security and stability and reducing the obliterating effects of corruption.

## 2. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CORE PRINCIPLES AND VALUES

All of the above considered, it becomes obvious that (good) governance is both a goal for development, security, equity (World Bank: 2017:4), and a means to achieve these desiderata. As an instrument, a better understanding of the principles and the values that support them contributes to guiding public sector management initiatives and reforms. The definitions and approaches of EU, UNDP, WB and NATO overlap to a certain extent outlining what may be called a two-layered hard core of principles, and a soft core. The fundamental principles that cross cut these organizations' definitions of governance and make the kernel of the concept are the principles of

accountability and transparency or openness (in EU's terminology). The second layer of this nucleus is described by the overlap between World Bank and UNDP's approaches through the principle of "rule of law/legal framework for development" on one hand, and by EU' and UNDP's definitions consisting of: participation/equity, effectiveness and coherence/strategic vision, on the other. Apparently, the principles of integrity, responsiveness, equity are mainly dependent on the goals of specific organizations (i.e. NATO and UNDP). However, they are mostly of an implicit qualitative nature and their identification and measurement are mainly possible at behavioral level, rather than at normative level.

**2.1 Accountability and Transparency: the inner core of integrity.** Accountability is first and foremost about the clarity of roles at institutional or government level (e.g. legislative and executive processes) and the incurred responsibility of those involved in policy making and implementation, regardless their rank, status or office within public administration. On one hand, from a traditional standpoint, accountability is a matter of hierarchical subordination and responsibility of administrative structures to political leadership. On the other, the term stands for decentralization, participation, competition, performance and hence for managerial accountability for not just employing inputs, but also for generating outputs and outcomes. Control, verification mechanisms and the capacity to prosecute and convict offenders are an essential part of the principle.

The concept has three dimensions (Agere, 2000:43): political accountability, financial accountability and administrative accountability, each of these being described by specific values and implementation mechanisms.

Political accountability refers to the say that citizens have in electing officials for the executive and legislative branches of the government and inherently to the expectations they frame when casting their vote. The freedom and fairness of the process of elections, along with the respect shown for the results are inherent values of this dimension, whereas the very election process is a mechanism that ensures this type of accountability.

Financial accountability is concerned with the economic and efficient usage of financial resources, as well as with the goals that need to be achieved through budget expenditures. It is relevant and useful in making decisions about "resource allocation and mobilisation" (Agere:

2000). The governing values are timeliness and accuracy in reporting on how budget is used, as well as audit quality reflected in the attention paid to the outputs and outcomes achieved. Some of the mechanisms employed for this dimension are a matter of internal control such as: “power of prior approval” employed to safeguard decisions related to staffing, expenditures, etc., budgeting rules, internal accounting and auditing offices; formal performance targets, or they may have a retrospective nature and are represented by external independent audit offices, parliamentary committees, ombudsmen, the press, etc.

Administrative accountability concerns appointed officials’ obligation to account for how they have completed their duties within a given authority framework and resources. If the previous two types of accountability are the result of a quite simple process consisting of: identifying the values that a government should observe; establishing the standards, rules, regulations, procedures for implementing these; requiring extensive documentation of compliance; auditing for compliance; sanctioning non-compliance, the administrative accountability is concerned with performance, namely with outcomes. That makes the job of control and verification more complicated because apart from establishing what the expectations are, the verification acquires a qualitative dimension triggered by the need to analyze the consequences/impact of action or non-action (Christensen & Perry, 2015:7). Additionally, public participation is necessary and that is a shady area even though it is often regulated by law since it does not necessarily generate real engagement on behalf of public.

What is worth noting concerning accountability in the public sphere is that its exercise is not always visible. It is rather its absence characterized by tell-tale signs such as

poor service delivery, inability to mobilize resources, waste or mismanagement of available resources and neglect of the maintenance of public goods and equipment” (Christensen & Perry, 2015:8)

that draw attention to its necessity. In the end, accountability is a concept which involves not only the obligation or willingness (or both) to assume responsibility and thus become responsible for one’s decisions and courses of action, but also the capacity of outer parties to hold a person or institution accountable for roles and duties assigned.

**Transparency or openness (in EU’s terminology)** basically concern the way the work of government and affiliated institutions, as well as decisions made are unveiled to the public and to the media. It is noteworthy that there are areas like national, international or operational security and defense where transparency and openness are counterproductive, but these are exceptions and not the rule. Apart from the necessity to use accessible and understandable language, institutions should allow for easy access to documents of public interest, or discussions on legal initiatives.

Transparency is a benchmark for accountability. Public institutions have the obligation to be responsive to citizens’ requests for access to information. Both accountability and responsiveness make it possible to track, monitor, evaluate and align performance of government bodies to public’s expectations (Christensen & Perry, 2015). To achieve this goal, the information made public needs to be complete and usable, namely it needs to present all the facets of an issue (completeness) not just the benefits in a timely manner and in an understandable language (usability) (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, *apud* Christensen & Perry, 2015). Moreover, citizens should also be provided with the means to intervene in relation with the information to which they gain access so that the parties concerned are held accountable. Thus, one question that needs to be asked when passing laws on transparency is the extent to which they also contribute to achieving the goal of accountability.

Apart from the benefits of transparency, there are also counter arguments. In this respect, there is research (Hood, 2007; Barberis 1998) suggesting that in the case of disclosing negative information on a state actor, there is the tendency to shift the blame to another party; or subordinates feel constrained to respond for fear they might embarrass their superiors. Such behaviors actually raise difficulties in finding the right solutions for the problems. Another downside of control-oriented mechanisms that limit the freedom of managers and excessively focus on transparency and strict accountability is what is called “conformist behavior” (Prat, 2005), namely public employees’ tendency to discard their expertise and perform well on the job in favor of following the strict standards imposed by the control and verification mechanisms in order to avoid punishment. In such cases, recognizable behaviors are “It is not my job...” or blind acceptance of orders under the motto “He who does not think, does not make mistakes”. Last but not the least,

transparency can be used by politicians to exert control over public administration, which endangers the very core of democratic values. Therefore, transparency needs to be a means towards solving public management aspects and should not be an end in itself.

Transparency heavily depends on the observance of the freedom of speech and civil liberties, and also on the strength of civil society, according to Transparency International (1998:14).

**2.2. Rule of law, Participation, Effectiveness and Coherence: the outer core of integrity. Rule of law/legal framework for development.** According to UNDP, the rule of law is based on the following values: independence of the judicial system,

fairness, honesty, enforceability and speed of the court system/due process, fairness, honesty and competence of the police force, respect for the law by citizens and public authorities, and equal treatment of citizens before the law.

B. C. Smith (2007:77-80) indicates the multifaceted aspects of the concept rendered by the different views on justice which make it all the more difficult to bound within a definition. From such a perspective, the features of the rule of law are: regularity, equality, ubiquity, and natural justice. Regularity consists in the consistent administration of law “under relevant circumstances”, namely those which exclude arbitrariness of power, equal recommendations with the ability to carry them (“Justice under the rule of law recognizes that “ought” implies “can””), acknowledge the ability to obey laws and orders while not making it a responsibility to perform what is beyond the ability to perform, or accepting “performance as a defence... or mitigating circumstance”. Equality is about cases and people. Concerning the former, the principle is that of “like cases are treated alike” and if circumstances do not allow such an approach, then justification based on legal principles must be provided. Hence, discretion can be accepted by the judicial system, especially in cases related to policy, only if it provides for flexibility and timeliness, does not contradict the principle of predictability underpinning legal framework and does not lead to arbitrary decision-making. Equality for people refers to the need to treat all citizens alike, regardless of their official status or other features (ethnic, religious, gender, etc.). The ubiquity of the law refers to the fact there “can be no offence without a law”. Additionally, laws set

clear expectations as to citizens’ legal obligation, and “should be known, general, expressly promulgated, clearly formulated and not retroactive”.

The principles of predictability and subsidiarity are important in relation with the rule of law. Concerning the former, namely its values of clarity in terms of formulation and delineation of line of authority, and fairness in application, it is enforced by the elements that make the rule of law: rules known in advance, rules in force, mechanisms ensuring the application of rules, the existence of independent judiciary or arbitrary mechanisms to solve conflicts, and procedures to amend the rules when they are not applicable any longer (Druckman:1992).

However, there are voices that indicate the “Janus-like nature of governance” (Eckert *et al.*, 2013) when it comes to the rule of law and which is rendered by the increasing number of actors that become part of the governance mechanism and by the division and practice of legal responsibility among different governing bodies. Common practices characteristic of governance like decentralization, privatization, outsourcing, subcontracting, delegation, cooperation, competition disperse, compartmentalize responsibility and in some cases make it difficult to directly connect it to authority. Thus, the very principle of subsidiarity, namely the allocation of governing tasks by areas of specialization, along with the less formal organization of the tasks pertaining to various governing parties brings legal responsibility very close to the point of dissolution. The tell-tale signs of such a situation are the clashes, overlaps or gaps among the governing bodies and, as a consequence, their shifting of responsibility from one to another and claims to non-liability: “The diffusion and privatization of governmental controlling and surveillance practices in the exercise of their internal sovereignty, however diffuse and compartmentalize liabilities, which in effect, threaten to dissolve responsibility”.

**Participation** refers to an inclusive approach in relation with policy development and implementation which brings to the table not only public officials but also stakeholders. It also concerns the involvement of civil society, non-governmental organizations and community representatives in the active fight against integrity related issues. The values guiding the measures ensuring this principle are (UN, 2004): transparency, contribution to decision making processes, respect, promotion and protection of the

right to “seek, receive, publish and disseminate information concerning corruption”.

**Effectiveness** is built upon a need based approach that frames goals, actions through an evaluation of future consequences and, if case may be, a review of previous experience. Moreover, it is related with the best use of available resources to reach organizational goals.

Effectiveness cannot be treated though on its own. It only makes sense in the presence of efficiency – namely the extent to which resources allocated/inputs are fully employed to reach outputs; impact - that is the added value generated by outputs and outcomes; and sustainability across time as a result of continuous improvement at process level.

**Coherence/strategic vision** is the answer to complexity and the guarantee of continuous support to integrity. Therefore, political leadership and consistent behavior across various and diverse realms of public administration are the main ingredients that secure this principle. Strategic vision also involves a long-term perspective that takes into account a variety of factors like economy, social trends, legal framework, environment and technology (UNDP, 1997).

**2.3. Integrity and Responsiveness: tell-tale signs of functioning democratic systems.** **Integrity** is one of the soft mantles that along with the other principles underpinning public administration contributes to public trust.

Integrity is defined from a multifold perspective engendered by its very translation from Latin (*integritas* - wholeness). As such, according to OECD (2009:12), it refers to:

- the behavior of officials in accordance with moral values, norms and rules accepted by an organization’s internal and external stakeholders;
- the climate of an organization as created and maintained through “procedures, informal norms, divisions of labour, incentive and accountability systems, monitoring processes, and use of resources”;
- an organization’s relation with its external environment in terms of its outcomes, openness, responsiveness.

An important acknowledgment of the key role played by integrity in the governance framework, legitimating the latter, granting effectiveness and trust to government activities is made by OECD in a 2009 document. More importantly, the same organization makes a very fine distinction: integrity is about key positive values, and the reverse is not corruption (OECD:2009:15-16) per

se, but vulnerabilities in terms of internal and external accountability, internal administrative controls, statement of goals, resource allocation, political legitimacy, division of labor, management of social expectations, legitimate qualification to access services and benefits, political/bureaucratic/private influence.

What is worth noting though concerning all these principles and values is that they come to life only through actionable validation not just as mere concepts on paper. Thus, according to Howard R. Balanoff and Warren Master (2010):

Programs are good. Audit plans, work plans, investigative plans, strategic plans, resources, and people to carry out those plans are all good, but they are not the answer. These are what public administrators typically focus on when the conversation turns to integrity and accountability. They are all important bricks in the wall, but they are only as strong as the personal integrity of the people who use them and report the results.

**Responsiveness** includes two aspects: timeliness of action taken by institutions and processes to meet the needs, requests, complaints of concerned stakeholders and responsibility “in letter and spirit”.

### 3. INTEGRITY BUILDING – TOWARDS A STRATEGIC APPROACH

The Integrity is a two fold issue. On one hand, it is a matter of personal, individual moral, ethical and legal responsibility. On the other hand, it is also the result of organizational factors that influence individual behavior, the principles delineated above playing an important role in this respect. Therefore, when approaching it in an organizational framework, it requires acknowledgment of the part it plays within the strategic management of an establishment. As such, it is decisively the capstone of strategic management since it incurs responsibility and accountability on behalf of top and line managers to design and to operate management systems that are integrity proof.

Integrity as part of a strategic approach bridges the gaps between legal standards, ethical values and moral concerns. Establishing a legal framework addressing integrity related matters like conflicts of interest, protection of whistleblowers, and access to information is an important landmark and step in any initiative towards building

institutional integrity. However, this is just a compliance framework. In this respect, in an article of 1994 published in Harvard Business Review entitled *Managing for Organizational Integrity*, Lynn S. Paine highlights the key prerequisites of an integrity strategy to succeed beyond mere conformity. These are: breadth, depth and demand and they concern not just the hard core of an organization, namely its management systems, but especially cross-cutting soft aspects like “patterns of thought”, behavior, organizational ethos and values and active endeavors towards identifying an organization’s “ethical compass” and steering course accordingly.

The implementation of these features as part of a clear-cut strategy requires:

- identifying the governance principles and their associated values that best concur with an organization’s existing strategy and the behavior envisaged as necessary to implement it across all levels.

- taking both horizontal and vertical approaches to the identification of the pivotal positions and people who need to contribute and/or be made part of the decisions concerning the design and implementation of an integrity strategy in order to avoid mid and long term roadblocks, critics and unnecessary hassle when strategy outcomes must become evident;

- focusing the education and training of senior officials and managers on ethical decision making, while also highlighting the role played by values in supporting compliance targeted standards and legal provisions;

- integrating values into the operating systems of an organization and making them part of performance overviews and reviews.

- refocusing the attention from compliance based mechanisms only meant to prevent misbehavior or to document the latter and allow legal action to be taken, to an active involvement in continuously communicating all throughout the organization the underpinning governance principles and values, providing the right means and resources for guidance and consultation on these and addressing the integrity related issues at the right time, by the right people, in the right manner.

As already discussed in the previous chapter, governance principles and values are universal. However, the choices concerning which are more relevant are highly dependent on national cultural values, as well as on organizational culture and climate. The strategic outcomes targeted by organizations filter the breadth of values to an

enduring core and that should be the driver for further action in the direction of establishing an integrity strategy. What is more, organization’s vision informs on the behavior required of all levels of management and employees, as well as the lenses through which organizations can be scrutinized by external stakeholders to hold them accountable to their promises.

When it comes to integrity in public administration, according to OECD (2009:10) there is a number of salient values like: justice, equity, transparency, accountability and efficiency. Nonetheless, even in such a case, the OECD signals the need to employ some of them, especially efficiency, in a cautious manner given the type of outputs or “public goods” that various public functions like education, justice system elicit.

An integrity strategy needs consensus, consistency and sustainability. Public administration is about elected officials, appointed personnel, current employees, but also about external stakeholders like the general public and the private sphere, to mention just few. That leads to paradoxes in cases where the integrity framework is not solid enough to lead to enduring changes. Reality has it that the moment political elected officials and appointees are out of office and replaced by new ones, sometimes of opposing views, soft issues like integrity fall short of attention on political agendas in no time. Therefore, identifying key players who are likely one way or another to become involved for short, mid and long-term time periods in the public and private arenas of a state and allowing them to agree that they disagree, that is to reach consensus, sets the stepping stone for building an enduring integrity strategy.

Compliance integrity strategies and supporting institutional tools and techniques are concerned with setting overt regulatory action framework and inducing reactive behavior. They play an important role in oversight (as it is the case with accounting authorities, risk and audit committees and various councils and committees fulfilling this role), assurance of integrity in various areas (e.g. external and internal audit bodies), or support ( e.g. professional bodies, business fora, labor organizations).

Therefore, top management and not only may be inclined to associate law with ethics and preclude themselves of an often encountered assumption that if something is legal, then it must also be ethical. What is more, an integrity strategy that solely relies on compliance only touches upon

the surface of things leaving the in-betweens in a gray area. That ultimately constitutes the “slippery slope”<sup>1</sup> (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), or in other words the grounds for gradual decay in upholding integrity standards. It is a well-known reality that “...covert organizational ineffectiveness, inefficiency, inertia, and/or irresponsibility can be as debilitating as overt inadequacies” (Petrick & Quinn, 1997). Therefore, an attitude of awareness that oblivion of minor covert details concerning integrity transgressions triggers the most appalling disasters is mandatory on behalf of senior managers. That furthermore must be supported by proactive support to putting in place an organizational infrastructure that benefits from consistent and long-term advocacy down the chain of command, adequate policies, resources, and incentives built around organizational core governing principles and values.

#### 4.CONCLUSIONS

Integrity building in public administration from a strategic viewpoint involves, according to OECD: a national system consisting of a number of institutions mandated and assigned to design and implement integrity related policies; a monitoring and evaluation framework aimed at reviewing the effectiveness and impact of the policies in the field; and assessments of integrity risks at national level along with internal and external control mechanisms for mitigating these.

Such a high level approach to integrity building is a two-edged sword. On one hand, it guarantees an important rationale supporting further efforts of breaking the concept down and introducing integrity building initiatives into the framework of public administration, and mandates efforts in the field. On the other hand, such a topic may be sensed by the managers tasked to peruse it and implement it at the level of the organizations they run just as additional bureaucratic burden that imposes a compliance framework. This is the case especially when the integrity building initiatives are top to bottom generated: that is they are recommended from the outside of the national system as part of accession goals to international organizations such as the European Union, or result from development needs that can only be met by complying with the requirements of

funding institutions like the World Bank, United Nations, OECD.

Therefore, integrity as the soft mantle that encompasses accountability, transparency, rule of law, participation, effectiveness and coherence is the result of two important factors: strategic demand and incentivizing factors that reach out beyond mere compliance.

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<sup>1</sup> “Slippery slope” refers to the tendency of accepting major wrongdoings after minor transgressions have been accepted gradually.

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## **STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. A MILESTONE FOR INTEGRITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

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**Abstract:** *Public administration is more often than not a much coveted haven that provides safe and secure jobs along with long life employment especially in countries where reform in the field has not been yet undertaken or where it has failed to produce envisaged outcomes. In such cases, bureaucracy and underfunding are the most common malaises impacting the field and generating integrity issues such as nepotism, cronyism, and misappropriation of funds, to mention just few. Additionally, even in countries where reforms have been undertaken and reported successful such as UK and USA, the business oriented approach to public administration in its turn was found to be afflicted by undesirable effects such as difficulties with internal effort coordination and cohesion, as well as “a weakened public ethos within government” (Gerhard Hammerschmid et.al: 2016, 2). The premise underlying this article is that streamlining public bureaucracy and building integrity based frameworks require a strategic management approach at organization level. Consequently, among other initiatives in this respect, strategic human resource management approached from the perspective of governance principles and values may contribute to the transformation of public administration transformation, and hence to allowing efforts in this field to truly become means to ends and not just an end in itself.*

**Keywords:** *public ethos; strategic human resource management; integrity; governance*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Integrity building in public administration from a strategic viewpoint involves, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): a national system consisting of a number of institutions mandated and assigned to design and implement integrity related policies: a monitoring and evaluation framework aimed at reviewing the effectiveness and impact of the policies in the field; and assessments of integrity risks at national level along with internal and external control mechanisms for mitigating these.

Such a high level approach to integrity building is a two-edged sword. On one hand, it guarantees an important rationale supporting further efforts of breaking the concept down and introducing integrity building initiatives into the framework of public administration, and mandates efforts in the field. On the other hand, such a topic may be sensed by the managers tasked to peruse it and implement it at the level of the organizations they run just as additional bureaucratic burden that imposes a compliance framework. This is the case especially when the integrity building initiatives

are top to bottom generated: that is they are recommended from the outside of the national system as part of accession goals to international organizations such as the European Union (EU), or result from development needs that can only be met by complying with the requirements of funding institutions like the World Bank, United Nations (UN), OECD.

Human resource management (HRM) requires a strategic perspective when employing it as one of the milestones along with budgeting, financial management, procurement in building integrity. Furthermore, in such a capacity, strategic human resource management involves taking a system's view on the HR functions so that development, implementation and/or management of activities undertaken in any HR functional area from an integrity perspective can be overseen and approached in an integrated manner. What is more, this article contends that for integrity building strategies to fully contribute to a specific public administration function, the system of strategic management and, henceforth, its sub component of human resource management, need to be approached from an open-system perspective. That involves encapsulating the foreseen impact of

factors from an organization's external environment in the strategic documents and thus deriving core directions and translating these into ensuing policies, norms, rules and regulations.

## 2. IMPLICATIONS OF A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO INTEGRITY BUILDING

An open system approach to strategic management and, inherently, to strategies related to pivotal domains of an organization in the public sector (i.e. financial, human resource, procurement), incurs three important directions: a

thorough analysis of the trends in the external environment and their impact on the likely course for long, medium and short term; a translation of this analysis into the strategic documents that set the overall direction of a given organization; acknowledgment of the interplay among the key elements of any organization (structure, tasks/processes, technology and people), and the reflection of how these relations work in the final outcome, which in the case of public institutions is public trust. These interdependencies are reflected in the figure below and we will discuss them in relation with how they can or are approached from an integrity perspective.




Fig. 1. A general system model on strategic management

Even though it is quite difficult and dangerous to make generalizations in relation with the environmental factors that impact the strategies of a given organization, there is extensive research and practice that allow us to make valid statements related to these aspects and show how these also impact integrity initiatives.

First, international economic trends and a country's economic development have an important impact upon the amount of resources allocated to organizations in the public sphere and hence to their capacity to fully meet their strategic goals. What is more, for integrity initiatives to be implemented properly resource allocation is mandatory and it concerns: the set-up of specially designed functions within the structure of the organization; enabling these through adequate resourcing (financial and human) to review existing processes from an

integrity perspective and redesign these to meet governance principles and values; providing education and training for people to master the reviewed processes and enable them to uphold governance tenets; and identifying and implementing technological solutions meant to streamline organizational processes and make them functional in accordance with governance tenets. Unfortunately, more often than not a compliance-driven framework for integrity building renders the false impression that integrity is just about more bureaucratic hassle to produce tracking and documenting reports that in the end are archived for auditing purposes. Under such conditions, budget strained institutions are rather likely to pay lip service to integrity initiatives.

Second, the influence of technology nowadays is tantamount. Its contribution to delaying

organizations and rendering their work more agile is already a fact. What is more, the extensive use of technology supports better fulfillment of management traditional roles like planning, monitoring and controlling, but also of those roles technology advancement itself imposes like maintaining a continuous and open dialogue with internal and external stakeholders and employees. The principles of good governance, either core or pivotal - as described in the previous chapter- are endorsed by the use of technological gains. For example, the goal of achieving transparency can be accomplished both in relation with external stakeholders by providing them with relevant information via websites or specially designed applications, but also in relation with an organization's employees and internal communication of organizational requirements, goals, work-in-progress, achievements. The employment of cross-functional technological solutions that follow the logical course of an organization's tasks and depict its processes adequately allows employees to work in an integrative manner and take action in real time should bottlenecks occur along the way. If used appropriately and in alignment with an organization's culture and climate technology becomes an important long-term cost-effective solution for ensuring a balance among the roles and responsibilities of employees, the structure of the organization and the processes that make its fabric. Should the place of technology be obscured in the figure above, it leaves room for extensive growth of organizations in terms of structures and number of people (should the latter be possible under obvious resource constraints imposed by budgetary allocations depending on economic growth and the role played by the organization within the overall public system), slowed pace of decision making as a result of numerous checks and balances established along the way or as a result of power hunger of functional areas, and in the end poor responsiveness to public needs.

Third, socio cultural aspects play a vital role in the ease or difficulty with which integrity as a concept is perceived and hence implemented in public institutions, but also in the private sector. The discussion on this matter involves a lot of considerations. However, for the purposes of this article, Transparency International's National Integrity System (NIS) approach (Heywood, Paul M, Heather Marquette Caryn Peiffer, Nieves Zúñiga: 2017) best reflects the impact social values have on the success of implementing integrity initiatives. Thus, according to this, public

awareness and social values lie at the basis of the governance system of any country (i.e. "legislative, executive, judiciary, public sector, law enforcement, electoral management body, ombudsman, audit institutions, anticorruption agencies, political parties, media, civil society and business") and are supported by three key principles: quality of life, sustainable development and rule of law. In cases when the principles hold little value to the authorities and the public is prone to struggling with daily menial difficulties to ensure individual and social group survival, values are weak and the public is indifferent to higher ends like integrity. What is more, as Van Deth and Scarbrough (1998:2003) note social values evolve and nowadays there is a shift from traditional values like respect for authority and preoccupation for material achievements to independence and self-fulfillment.

Last but not the least, geopolitical trends like shifts from ensuring global equilibrium through military power to maintaining it via economic measures and soft cultural changes generated by Internet-based communication networks; changes from a bipolar world to the emergence/ revival of multiple power centers; large-scale immigration (Cohen & Saul Bernard, 2009) require more than ever institutional and value-anchored pillars to sustain efforts meant to ensure stability and sustainability in a volatile, uncertain, complex environment.

All of the above considered, it becomes obvious that an organizations' strategy is under the influence of a lot of external pressure, not to mention the feedback loop from the organization's outputs and outcomes area (as presented in Figure no. 1) informing on whether previous strategic statements and the ensuing approaches have paid off. If in the private field the outputs and outcomes are tangible enough and hence can inform future strategic direction in a quantitative manner, the adequate identification and measurement of the outputs and outcomes characteristic of public administration is essential to formulating value-adding strategies. Therefore, in this respect, we contend that even though quantitative measurements convey the needed clarity on the extent to which strategic goals are achieved (for instance quantifying institutional transparency through measures like number of sanctions for not complying with obligations related decision-making transparency, the existence of a plan on transparency at the level of public agencies, number of measures on transparency included in such a plan, etc.), for integrity building initiatives

to succeed qualitative measurement is quintessential to turning a compliance system into a value based system. In the next subchapter we provide two such examples based on which we derive a number of principles that contribute to making integrity part and parcel of strategic human resource management. The examples come from a very narrow field of public administration, namely the defense system. The first is meant to illustrate the inherent difficulties raised when integrity initiatives are piecemeal and are only implicitly assumed at the level of the strategies concerning human resources. The other two examples briefly present the advantages of making integrity or its principles and values an explicit strategic requirement for managing defense personnel.

### 3. THREE EXAMPLES OF APPROACHES TO INTEGRITY BUILDING IN RELATION WITH HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In Romania the approach to integrity building has been narrowed and focused on preventing and fighting corruption ever since the country's pledge to comply with European Union standards and regulations in the field and hence gain access to the EU in 2007. Therefore, the corruption theme prevails in the national strategic documents. As far as integrity as a standalone concept is concerned, it does not translate in explicit statements. It can only be inferred from the general declarations concerning how, for example the human resource management system should be treated, how integrity related principles and values like transparency, efficiency, accountability are to be measured, or how education and training in integrity areas (i.e. ethics and anti-corruption legislation) and public awareness activities can be quantitatively evaluated. The strategic documents and the main findings of concern for the goals of this article are listed below as follows:

– *The National Anti Corruption Strategy 2016-2020* - is the capstone document endorsing the activities of central and local public authorities and institutions, as well as of public enterprises in relation with corruption prevention and countering. From this perspective, its role is to “promote integrity via rigorous application of normative and institutional framework” in this area. The values it upholds are: political will; integrity; public interest supremacy; transparency. An important feature of this strategy is that it is correlated with other policies and strategies like: Romania's National Defense Strategy - which acknowledges corruption as a risk and vulnerability; National Strategy on

Public Procurement; National Strategy for Competitiveness; The National Strategy for Romanian Digital Agenda 2020; The National Strategy on Public Administration Consolidation, etc. Its tangible result at the level of its target audience is the mandatory development of integrity action plans that focus on risk management and standards concerning internal managerial control.

– *The National Defense Strategy 2015-2019*, in Chapter III on threats, risks, and vulnerabilities acknowledges corruption as a vulnerability that undermines the state and its development prospects, its economy and good governance, the decision-making processes that seek to benefit citizens and communities, as well as the trust in the rule of law. Moreover, corruption also negatively impacts Romania's image and credibility in its foreign affairs relations.

– *The Defense White Paper (2017-2020)* is the defense planning document that translates the provisions of the National Defense Strategy into defense policy objectives. The outcomes it establishes as key features of the Romanian Armed Forces system for the 2017-2020 time line are coherence and credibility. As far as the human resource management system is concerned, this is approached as one of the elements contributing to an integrated defense management system along with the defense procurement system, financial resource management, defense research, development and innovation management system, and defense infrastructure management. The concept of integrity is presented in the document rather implicitly through direct or indirect variables like: the quality of the human resource selected as defined by established standards (i.e. these are actually presented in the Minister's Order Nr. M.30/2012 of 21 March 2012 endorsing the *Guidelines on the recruitment, selection professional development and career management in the Romanian armed forces*); a career management system based on professional competencies, a meritocratic selection system, predictability and transparency in relation with career progression; professional competency as the main driver for transforming the military educational and training system and military personnel quality of life.

– *The Military Strategy Of Romania - Modern Armed Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and Around the World* - reiterates the need for a qualitative (and also quantitative) approach to filling vacancies, the focus of the selection process on finding the people with the “qualities, capacity and desire to contribute to the national defense

effort”, the contribution of education and training to morale and willpower development, as well as to supporting values like “cohesion, discipline, patriotism, and spirit of sacrifice”, the need to align the management of human resources to “best NATO practices and to consequences generated by the new security environment”. It also acknowledges, similar to the Defense White Paper, the need to improve military personnel quality of life for morale reasons and as a means to acknowledge their contribution to the defense system.

The conclusion that ensues from this overview of strategic documents that impact the outlook and approaches to human resource management in a specific field of public administration like the defense sector is that this framework is by no means compliance driven. As such, it does not provide a clear-cut path to making integrity part of daily values and practices, unlike some other documents from countries where integrity is an already established field of action.

An example of how integrity as part of a value based framework is reflected in strategic documents that drive the approaches to human resource management is the 2016 Defence White Paper of the Australian Department of Defence. The latter makes clear reference to the important role played by integrity and observance of ethical standards to building a responsive defense culture. Additionally it indicates some of the mechanisms made available to manage what is termed as “unacceptable behavior”:

...Defence must operate to the highest ethical standards in leadership and management for all people in Defence. This means acting with fairness and integrity, promoting diversity and inclusion, and maintaining a zero tolerance stance towards unacceptable behaviour. The strength of Defence’s leadership model and its ability to adapt and embrace a more diverse and inclusive culture will be critical to attracting and retaining the workforce it needs for the future....

Over the last four years, Defence has established the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office; released the ADF Alcohol Management Strategy; established mechanisms to increase diversity and inclusion within leadership groups and Defence more broadly; conducted Defence-wide discussions on values and behaviours; delivered Defence education and training programs informed by agreed values and behaviours; and enabled expedited corrective processes by simplifying responses to, and management of, unacceptable behaviour.”

In our opinion, the text above presents some of the key aspects that allow for integrity building initiatives to be properly implemented and these are: consensus on accepted and acceptable values and behaviors; the dissemination of these through education and training; simplified decision making processes that allow for on time reaction to what is considerable unacceptable. Another important point that needs to be made is that the very phrase “unacceptable behavior” allows for the definition of integrity to acquire the necessary depth and breadth that go beyond its mere association with corruption.

Another example in the same line comes from the United Kingdom defense sector and its operating model: How Defence Works, Version 4.1. as of 1 December 2015. Compared to one of its earlier versions (Version 3.0: December 2012) which stated that the goal of obtaining the best from UK defense employees can be achieved by

aiming to fill posts with the right person, with the right skills, for the right length of time, and by building the right leadership, values and behaviours throughout Defence.

the 2015 version highlights a number of pillars that contribute to achieving this desideratum: simple structures; delegation of responsibilities in a fair, transparent manner and to those who are deemed able to fulfill them in the best manner; leadership skills that cover both organizational and business related matters; focus on innovation and efficiency with a view to eliminating redundant processes and bureaucracy; and mentality and behavior that serve the best interests of the Defense establishment. What is more, the Concept makes reference to the defense employees, namely military and civilian personnel, reserves, contractors as a “whole-force concept” that needs to be managed strategically.

#### **4. STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (SHRM): BASIC TENETS FOR THE SUCCESS OF INTEGRITY BUILDING STRATEGIES**

A strategic approach to human resource management in relation with integrity building in public administration involves first and foremost an internalization of the principles and values defining the concept of *good* governance. For example, an organization where transparency of work processes, of information of interest for work execution is obliterated by secrecy, “silo”

mentality cannot act transparently in relation with its external environment. Furthermore, if performance within the organizational framework is focused on outputs, an outside requirement for effectiveness cannot be properly met because of unawareness of how all outputs contribute to the final outcome. In this respect, some of the basic tenets ensuring the success of integrity building strategies are derived from overlapping the

strategies characteristic of the functions of HRM and their supporting policies, processes, practices, programs with the good governance principles. For a better understanding of this, the figure below offers a synthetic view of the main functions of the human resource management system, its relation with the management of the organization as an overall (i.e. design, development, job/role design) and the interdependencies among these.




Fig. 2. A general outlook on the Human Resource Management System. Adapted from Mathis & Jackson (2008)

The tenets which can be identified based on the sketchy presentation of the HRM system above and the governance principles underpinning public administration reform in developing countries are as follows:

- Accountability described as clear roles and responsibilities, decentralization, degree of autonomy in decision making is the backbone of organization management and lays the foundation for the integrity of the processes that are part of an integrated system of HRM.

- Coherence/strategic vision ensures consistency of effort over time, strengthens accountability and thus renders unity of effort.

- Effectiveness in terms of need based requirements drives the organization function of the HRM system, as well as the resourcing, the learning and development and performance management functions of HRM

- Responsiveness of all HR processes in terms of timelines of action and responsibility in the “letter

and spirit” contributes to strengthening the outward focus of public organization onto outcomes like public trust and credibility.

- Accountability in the form of performance qualitative and quantitative metrics related to action/non-action is the key to performance management strategies.

- Internal transparency concerns the supply of complete and usable information in relation with the learning and development opportunities and requirements, reward management strategies as derived from the performance management framework and it also underpins employee relations, as well as health and safety issues.

- The values derived from the principle of rule of law: fairness, honesty, enforceability, competence, respect for law and equal treatment are paramount to guiding employee relations and are enforced by the adequate management of the inherent processes of resourcing, learning and development, performance management, reward management.

The management of human resources (HRM) and its contribution to outputs and outcomes is one of the tell-tale signs of the strategic direction taken by an organization. Consequently, the role of HRM is not only to support strategy, but also to adequately reflect it at the level of its specific functions: planning, recruitment, selection, induction, learning and development, career management, compensation, performance management, labor relations, retirement and post employment actions.

In conclusion, human resource management can act as a strategic booster of personal and organizational integrity if it is approached as a whole (i.e. the functions are treated in an integrated manner with full acknowledgement that changes in one generate ripple effects in the others as partially hinted at by the relations depicted in Figure no.2). Moreover, the HRM system is but a part of a larger system (as described by Figure no.1) whose consistency is rendered by observance of governance principles (doing the right things), moral standards (doing things for the right reasons) and process based decision making (doing things in the right way) (Heywood, Paul M, Heather Marquette Caryn Peiffer, Nieves Zúñiga:2017).

Moreover, an open system perspective on the strategic management of public administration organizations and inherently on the management of their human resources acknowledges the need for coordination among horizontal and vertical decision-making layers inside and outside an organization since any one decision in one area greatly impacts the course of action in others in a given time frame. As far as building integrity initiatives are concerned, it is of utmost importance to adapt and align an organization's integrity strategy and framework to the overall integrity framework established at national level while also ensuring internal coordination among integrity structures, processes and instruments. System openness thus allows for cross-cutting principles and values underpinning integrity to become stronger, if they are already in place, or to permeate organizational climate by enforcing the values that make the "moral compass" of a specific agency.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of the arguments underpinning the efforts to introduce or strengthen integrity within public administration, there are some key elements of the concept that need consolidation via the specific strategies, policies, rules and regulations aimed at implementing it. These are (Heywood,

Paul M, Heather Marquette Caryn Peiffer, Nieves Zúñiga:2017): consistency of behavior both as part of regular patterns of conduct and when confronted with ambivalent situations that require action and proof of moral commitment; cohesion between vision, mission and specific policies; coherence between established goals and the means made available to achieve these; morality of the decision making ensured by placing public interest and public good at the core of the process; and integrity lies in the processes that contribute to establishing policies in the field and to running organizations.

All this considered, this article purports the following:

1. For integrity building initiatives and strategies to succeed, they have to be integrated in the strategies of the key pillars of a public organization: human resource management, financial management, procurement management and in the specific decision making processes normatively and behaviorally on one hand, and hence, quantitatively and qualitatively on the other. That allows for two interconnected approaches to the implementation of integrity initiatives: a horizontal one among area specific strategies that enables weighing in an informed manner the decision making processes concerning resource planning and allocation, and a vertical one down the specific functions of a given domain that ensures sound and thorough implementation of strategic decisions.

2. Strategic human resource management is one of the milestones and not *the* milestone to integrity building strategies in public administration. In the absence of an already established, coherent and working integrity system at national level supported and strengthened by the political level on long term regardless of affiliations and agendas, any attempts at implementing integrity at functional level is bound to fail.

3. Strategic human resource management is not solely the attribute of human resource managers, but the conundrum that needs to be solved by senior managers and implemented by middle and line managers. Therefore, when the pieces of the puzzle are not properly assembled at strategic level, making them work at lower levels of decision making can only generate faulty outputs and outcomes. What is more, managers regardless of their level and functions they run need to juggle both with the "behavioral complexity" and "moral complexity" posed by internal organizational environment and external political, social, economic, technological, legal, environmental

drivers. The responsibility of managers also lies with the type of focus required of them by the nature of the organization they run and hence by the sometimes conflicting roles they need to perform inside the organization and in relation with its external stakeholders. On one hand, managers are concerned with responsibilities like monitoring, controlling, coordinating their organizations' inside processes and their conformance to norms, rules, regulations, standards, etc.. An exclusive concern for these roles yields what is usually known by the name of "by the book" manager type of behavior and most likely to accountable behavior on behalf of the employees. However, the downside of the exclusive focus on what is and can be documented may lead in the long run to undesirable behaviors like: non-commitment outside the "by the book" approach, a silo mentality, lack of cooperation for the "greater good" while sticking to the exclusive cooperation required by hierarchy.

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## THE EDUCATION OF INTERPERSONAL INTELLIGENCE IN SCHOOLS, A NECESSITY FOR A STABLE DEVELOPMENT

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**Abstract:** *Science and technology have revolutionized the way we live. Mass media, communication is made the most distinctive feature in today's time, to the point that many authors have invented, to describe it, the term "communication society". Scientific research on communication and interpersonal relationships have progressed significantly, thanks to the spread of the paths of empowerment and potential human development, characterized by interdisciplinary approaches. Starting from the theory of multiple intelligence, the document focuses on the idea that a school that wants to achieve a good level of inclusiveness must take into account intelligent intelligence forms as Gardner expresses and, consequently, differences in how to learn these intelligence forms promote. In European pedagogy, the willingness to recognize, welcome, and evaluate diversity is specific to the intercultural perspective, and this readiness has generated a movement that goes from pedagogues and educators to those students and students who are or are perceived as being characterized from other cultural (linguistic, ethnic, or religious) modalities. There is a serious educational gap. University inaction is even more noticeable for the topics of communication and interpersonal relationships. Our study aims to present the theories of psychologist Howard Gardner related to education and globalization and compare it with authors, educators and philosophers such as Robert J. Sternberg, M. Weber, Daniel Goleman, T. Gordon etc. In the context of social dynamics, the phenomenon of communication through cultures and subcultures is important, and in this context, the negotiation of social identities. Intercultural competence also requires some skills to earn and then settle in the everyday life of education: observation, listening, interpretation, ability to describe, to connect. As a consequence, educational care in the differences results in a late (new), contingent, non-extraordinary case whose meaning today needs to face further socio-cultural changes and metaphors (hybridization) that want to interpret it.*

**Keywords:** *multiculturalism; social change; migration; education; pedagogy*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Every truthful human development means the collective development of individual autonomies, involvement in the community and the feeling of belonging towards human beings (E.Morin, 2000).

One's immersion in one's inner, swimming in the depths of thoughts or in a calm analysis of the self are the characteristics of this ability that Howard Garner defined as "interpersonal intelligence". This self-reflective and metacognitive ability allows us to live in harmony with ourselves and others.

On the other hand, it is necessary to say that the interpersonal intelligence is part of the revolutionary theory of multiple intelligence that Howard Gardner presented in the 1980s in his "The Theory of Multiple Intelligences" book. His approach, as one can image, has evoked contradictory opinions in the academic field as

well as in the midst of education professionals, such as teachers and high-school and university professors. His aim was to question the unique paradigm of intelligence and its standardized and restricted evidence to propose some possible alternatives related to intelligence. According to Gardner, people need abilities that match the way they are taught most things, interact with one-another and put an end to the thought processes.

Even though many psychologists and scientists, like Robert J. Sternberg, believe that there is no evidence that proves Gardner's attitude and that, that which he defines as intelligence is actually "attitudes" or "abilities", we can't underestimate the positive influence of his theory in the improvement of human potential, considering the learning process as a choreography of an everyday working-size.

Interpersonal intelligence is the 7th of the 9 intelligences identified by experts and undoubtedly one of the most important. It can be summarized in

the ability to see what we are and what we want with realism and objectivity. Such a simple dimension that we don't always develop in an effective and realistic way. Oftentimes we do nothing but live with a substitute of the interpersonal intelligence, convinced that we're in full harmony with our emotions, needs and thoughts. Even if this kind of intelligence is integrated in schools, it should be pointed out that there is always time to improve it, from the personal and emotional perspective. It should be remembered that the interpersonal intelligence, unlike the other intelligences identified by Gardner, is visible only through gestures and behaviours. So, it is an inner creation that requires, above all, a deeper understanding of oneself.

In the actual globalized world, enriched in diverse and interconnecting realities, the education of global civilization is necessary to create citizens that would be committed and interested in solving the actual major cases. The role of schools, in the establishment of student-education strategies in this sense, is central. The actual culture is affected by some problems that cause an "educative emergency" that is wide-spread. With this we are referring to the difficulties of educative relationships establishment that, to be valid, should transmit the vital principles and values to the young generations, not only to help individuals to grow up and mature, but also to compete in the constitution of the collective goods.

This study is an example of the kind of innovations that are needed to make sure that education becomes more important in the sustainment of the needs of our time and to do its job so that students get an education capable of handling the real and ambitious challenge. The core of this research is the analysis of interpersonal communication identifying the laws that guide it, the problems that may disturb it, the educational areas where it can be used. The focus in communication, understood thus, means the shift in interest from the individual intrapsychic processes to those of the interpersonal communication, as well as the momentous privileging of the relationships that characterize the human being in his trans-individuality.

This research was conducted to analyze the communicative process in the various formal and non-formal contexts and with all of the possible dynamics that such a phenomenon is caused voluntarily or unintentionally. It is appropriate to divide the work into two parts and differentiate between them; the first part aiming to analyze those that are considered as "technical aspects" of

communication and above all, to emphasize the inability of all human beings to escape communication in all of its forms and through the use of verbal and non-verbal language. For example, in these days of war, terrorism, and great ethnic and social conflict, it will be important for the contribution that culture and science can give in the rhythm of interpersonal education.. However, this important debate, oftentimes fed by the media, doesn't explain clearly the role of concretization that can be developed by the social and human sciences, in the disposal of the possible interference effects that are available, well-put, simple and well-pronounced.

Our study aims to make a contribution in this sense, making it a point of the situation related to the theoretical knowledge, detailed research, operative experiences and methodologies for the prevention, thought and peaceful solving of conflicts. It will also be related to some diverse levels and concepts in which the conflicts may be manifested: from those micro-social (interpersonal relationships, groups, organizations) up to those macro-social and planetary (relationships among cultures, ethnicities, countries). There are different reasons for this wide-spread conflict: starting with the protection of political interests in competition to achieve success, the desire for power for the need to protect oneself from the prejudices of others, etc.

The theoretical tradition of social conflict started with Machiavel, and Hobbes and then developed from Marx, Weber and others, approves that the behaviour of people has finalized the satisfaction of their selfish interests in a word where society is based on the organized cooperation and the ideological persecution.

The division of society into classes, organizations, different groups is a fact for the neutralization of a better response to a request for social functionalism ; that produce conflict, not diversity but inequality, that attribute a greater certificate to the resources and power compared to the others. Here we must remember that according to M. Weber power depends on the ability to convince those who prefer to act differently.

## 2. RELATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN SCHOOLS

**2.1 For an efficacious education of the relational intelligence in schools.** Thanks to the creation of massive media, communication has become the most discernible feature of nowadays

to the point where many authors have invented, to describe it, the term “society of communication”.

After some decades we have gone from vigilants of TV, from books and newspapers in paper to hypertexts on the internet, from theatres to videos at home, from radio concerts to CDs. In short, media has truly become part, for the better or for the worse, of our everyday lives, to the point that we're not even aware of the fact that we can't live without them. It is not surprising that communication has become a very central object of research and books, school courses and professions go round it.

Nevertheless, except for the great development of media and the scientific research related to it, that which has put down roots in the last decades as well, is a considerable evolution in the field of interpersonal communication, mainly because of the great social and cultural changes caused by the counter-culture of the 60's and 70's which have disestablished the values and models of communication with a focus on role-rigidity, hypocrisy, formality, sexuality oppression, emotions and so on, affirming the newest, basing on the greatest freedom of expression, more elastic relational rules and an greater opportunity to experiment in a creative way.

Even the scientific research about communication and interpersonal relationships has made quite an obvious progress be it for the studies and research in the socio-psycho-anthropologic field, for the clinic experiences as well as those clinic-therapeutic and lastly the spread of the strengthening and the trails of the potential human development, characterized by interdisciplinary approaches.

However, this second evolutionary front is left, for various reasons, in second place in the collective perception, to the point that, when we talk about communication, we now think about media almost ignoring the interpersonal environment that is also very important for our individual and collective well-being.

The quality and quantity of our relationships with others are among the factors that affect our life quality the most for the better or for the worse; they affect the constant formation and transformation of our identity and our individuality; they determine the scale of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in our private lives: in love, friendships, family; they are reflected in satisfaction or disappointment, in few words, they are the basis of all the primary spheres of our social life.

So, individuals and institutions unfortunately don't dedicate themselves enough to these cases, the attention, sources and negative results of this lack of attention are always manifested; there are clear examples of this, numerous elders that are lonely and many children are forced to play alone and only occupy themselves with TV and videogames; impersonality how and when there is doubt and acidity in the workplace relationships, are often characterized by hidden conflicts with colleges, jealousy and envy, clear façade relationships; difficult relationships between parents and children and between relatives an so on.

**2.2 A Serious Education Gap.** The heart of the problem is that; no one has never taught us to communicate and make decisions in healthy and constructive ways in our relationships with others. We learn to talk, to write, to read but no one teaches us to truly listen and understand the other as being different to us.

We learn a human history made of conflicts and wars but we've never been told how to avoid them. We train professionally without any relational training so that we can prepare for the relationships we'll have with our colleges and superiors, which will also have a great, direct (cooperation) and indirect (satisfaction or frustration) influence for and in our job. This surely is a technologically-developed civilization but it is a bit primitive in the communicative-relational plan. Often the family doesn't even have, at least, the sensibility to understand the problem or the capacity to take it; schools may have(or find) abilities, but they're too far from sensibility; universities would have both conditions, at least in some sectors, but lately they have made some space for communication topics and in every restricted case, the massive communications.

The courses of communication sciences were born in Europe, but for now they are exclusively focused on the media and professions that are related to them. Also, they are treated less in the study courses of psychology, sociology, education and education sciences, which have to make sufficeable space for interpersonal communication and relationships with others.

Only in the private training section up to now has some attention been given to these cases and this was only aimed at adults and it was restricted to the greater aspects meaning that it was professionally useful (the welcoming of the client, the image and self-presentation, public-speaking, techniques of persuasion, etc).

The passivity of the university is very visible if we take into consideration the fact that new professions have been launched and gained importance in the recent years because of communication and interpersonal relationships: the relational consultant, the family intermediary, the family psychotherapist, the official for public relations etc.

That is not all. Many traditional professions also, are understanding the importance of these cases and professionals are interested in the integration of their training with knowledge and techniques related to interpersonal communication.

The study refers to schools exclusively, and it might seem unimportant to emphasize the lack of the sensibility of the university in the cases of communication and interpersonal relationships but there is a close connection between the two phenomena. We should first not forget that the university is that which trains the teachers and its sensibility and capacity are responsible for the educational choices made afterwards. Apart from this, the composition of school programs also contributes with different university professors and it is necessary that they become the first avant-garde of the importance of the relational education. Lastly, in the near future schools should decide to place the right weight of relational education on the programs.

**2.3 Logic or Intelligence?** Despite the successive reforms in the last decades, the educational system is still strongly focused on an education logic, that has been treated as a core notion in the cognitive intelligence, neglect, or even the ignorance of other important intellectual dimensions. This is in an open contrast with the multi-dimensional conception of intelligence that approves itself ; this concept , as we know, doesn't only include rigorous cognitive abilities, it also includes the sensor-motoric,communicative-relational, emotional-artistic ones etc.

The success of the books by Daniel Goleman and various other authors on the emotional intelligence are indicators of the need to broaden some narrow definitions and at the same time to increase individual abilities in an empowerment perspective that is reflected in the field of work and in the public sphere as well as the sphere of private life.

The ability to know how to communicate effectively by dealing with interpersonal relationships harmoniously, to express oneself clearly, to know how to be heard by other people, to know how to find commonalities in needs

between oneself and others, have always been appreciated and considered socially and subjectively useful.

Intelligence was believed to be more of an innate ability related to a person's character and because of this it could not be taught. This thesis is now too old and we know we can teach the cognitive intelligence with the appropriate equipment and methods and we also know that we can put the interpersonal intelligence education into work. That's why students should be taught to consciously use the codes and languages of non-verbal communication not just learn one or more languages so they are able to observe and understand the relational dynamics that happen "behind the scenes", so they understand the emotions they get, that make us want to differentiate the real objectives of communication from those that are obvious, to tell the roles and features that are represented by that who is behind those images.

Schools rightfully place a great importance on the linguistic competence but it results in shallowness and emptiness if it is not associated with an appropriate communicative competence. Most relationship problems at work and in our private lives are caused by prejudices, restrictive customs, rigid roles and clichés of various kinds. It seems that we're in touch with each-other but in reality we are always, almost, separated without being aware of it. We believe we communicate with real people but in reality we are dealing with ghosts on our minds, stereotypes that we have created or that have been there because that's how they've been transmitted by our families, friends and media.

**2.4 Teachers Training.** The importance of educational school and university work explains just how decisive the subject of the preparation of teachers , managers and all the personnel that has responsibilities in the field of education is. Professional competence is the condition for the better manifestation of the educative dimension of anticipation.

They should have the ability to create, invent and manage learning environments that are rich in opportunities; they should be able to respect the "multiplicity" of student intelligence and direct their attention to a deep and meaningful learning process; this requires that they know how to guide students towards challenging and great goals, to show that they have great expectations of them, to include and connect students with each-other and with the world.

Whoever learns should know how to follow many different goals at the same time, by knowing how to deal with problematic situations that require professionalism and great preparation. To be on the same level as the expectations of this kind, it is necessary that homework doesn't remain individual responsibility and the appropriate support is given in an institutional level and there are competent leaders in the lead, not bureaucrats.

### 3. SOME PROPOSALS FOR A SUCCESSFUL INTERPERSONAL EDUCATION

Communication is not just an innate gift, it is an art that, like all arts, can be learned very well, if we're motivated to do this and if we have the right equipment and conditions. Motivation is surely present in both students and teachers, who, as I have stated personally a couple of times, if in need of conducting research and studying different fields, choose communication among the other topics they want to focus on in the professional update. Equipment is also present, there are actually many tools for the knowledge of scientific study and the operational techniques, as well as the refinement and awareness methods of oneself and others.

The flaw, for the moment, is the low number of teachers and professors, coaches with specific abilities in this field, who actually wouldn't be enough to start in a very short time, a reform that aims the involvement of the communicative-relational education in the programs. But surely the great number of communication sciences graduates could present a solid starting point to choose the problem within a few years. So, there are no real operational problems for the insertion of the communicative-social education in schools: if there is any obstacle, it is in the shallow sensibility of some corresponding sectors, of the political world, of that economic and scientific.

What should we do then? What can we do to start a process of cognition and insertion of the communicative-relational abilities in school programs? The options are diverse and the most sensible thing would be the advancement at the same time in some orientations.

The first should be the initiative to raise awareness by organizing events like: conferences, debates, press conferences, publications etc, not separated from the table-arrangement, like it happens with competent authorities. To have any chance for success this requires as many alliances as possible among all those scientific, cultural, institutional and voluntarism forces that are or may

be interested for various reasons in a project like this.

A second orientation could be to perform pilot projects in some localities, schools or institutions, using borders even though they are restricted to the autonomies they have, perhaps with the help of local authorities like regions, municipalities, provinces.

A third orientation could be the creation of courses in some universities and the owners more or less specifically related to the needs of coaches emphasized above. This interference should focus on the interpersonal education and the relational communication. But there is another communication field that deserves appropriate recognition in educational curricula: the education of media or as it can be called, education for a more healthy and conscious use of the media. We should emphasize their importance and to explain that these two dimensions, one relational, the other that of the media, can and should continue working on this consciousness process together.

We strongly believe that, for a stable development today, it is just a matter of time and that sooner or later it will be inevitable to insert the communicative-relational education in school programs: the progressing socio-cultural changes will make it more and more necessary, with serious damage pain in different social levels. It will be necessary as a form of the prevention of deviation, alienation and destructive conflicts; it will be necessary as a professional competence; it will be necessary for the civil and democratic maturation of the civilization; it will be necessary as a preparatory means for cohabitation in the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society that is now being profiled and it will definitely be necessary to prepare the public opinion for the management and peaceful settlement of the international conflicts.

That is why, all those that can contribute in this education process, starting from education, sociologists, psychologists, scientists, politicians, anthropologists, professors, philosophers, economists, and so on, should take action so this happens in the right way at the right time.

### 4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This conference will present a starting point for a real scientific and human cooperation between all those that are engaged in their universities and the civil society in favour of the rhythm and the communication between individuals, civilizations and cultures.

Today, the corresponding institutions can take responsibility for the right policies and to ensure appropriate sources for the great actions of sensibility, education, formation and consultation that actively unite schools, university, media, social organizations; the interference that through a real improvement of communication and interpersonal relationships in different levels, old mindsets, cultural schemes of the destructive conflict and of competition, with a more constructive and creative substitutive policy that is translated into a greater individual and social profit for all of us.

So, if we support Howard Gardner's theory about multiple intelligences, there is an aspect we can never forget: these dimensions represent a door to develop the appropriate abilities, to give us the chance to live life in a more competent way, to live happier and in full harmony with ourselves. Intrapersonal intelligence is, undoubtedly, one of the most precious sources we have.

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## EXTRINSIC META-PROGRAMS WITH INFLUENCE ON WORKERS MOTIVATION

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**Abstract:** *The aim of the research within this article was to identify the relationships between NLP metaprograms specific to extrinsic motivation typology and the motivation of employees within a public research institution. Metaprograms have been tested through a questionnaire-based survey applied to a sample of 95 people. The results of the research have highlighted that the predominant metaprograms are integrated regulation (work is a fundamental part of a person), positive introjection (the feelings of pride and of success) and identified regulation (the role of the workplace in achieving personal goals). Based on the results, the following measures have been proposed to increase extrinsic motivation: organizing training, a pleasant and friendly work environment, fascinating and interesting work activities, adapting activities to the level of expertise, providing instructions and procedures, working conditions and non-discriminatory promotion conditions, correlation of personal and professional goals with the organization's development strategy, positive feedback system (constructive observations, recognition), fair wage packages.*

**Keywords:** *NLP; metaprograms; questionnaire-based survey; extrinsic motivation*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In 1959, F. I. Herzberg created the two factor theory of motivation: (1) hygiene factors (extrinsic, context) and (2) motivational factors (intrinsic, content). according to this theory, intrinsic factors certainly lead to job satisfaction, while extrinsic factors do not always have that purpose. In this context, since the 80 (Hise, 1994), most studies have focused on the implementation of questionnaires concerning job satisfaction; these questionnaires have often highlighted that staff is unmotivated in organizations that offer very good working conditions and many material benefits.

Extrinsic motivation is the motivation generated by external elements of the personality of the individual and which can be suggested or imposed by others (benefits, reprimand, punishment, etc.). In other words, extrinsic motivation implies engagement in work due to *other people's rewards, recognition or orders* (Amabile *et al.*, 1994).

It is classified as follows:

- external regulation - the employee's behavior is determined by external factors: getting rewards, avoiding a punishment, etc. (external control);
- regulation by introjection – a part of external regulation is taken over by the individual's interior,

motivation being a direct consequence of self-imposed internal pressures: shame or guilty in case of failure, pride and self-esteem in case of success (inside control);

- regulation by identification - behavior is valued by the individual through the feelings of importance or relevance to one's own person: achieving a task after establishing its value in accordance with one's own thinking;

- regulation by integration - the work done at the workplace becomes an integral part of the person - activities are carried out to achieve results in accordance with their own values but not as pleasure as in the case of intrinsic motivation

### 2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The aim of the research within this article was to identify the predominant metaprograms in evaluating extrinsic motivation. The questionnaire-based survey achieved for this purpose on a sample of 95 persons (within The National Institute for Research and Development in Informatics – ICI Bucharest), was conducted between October 2017 and april 2018 in six departments (D1-D6). The affirmations for quantification of extrinsic motivation have resulted in 21 metaprogram parameters centralized in 5 categories: external regulation, identified regulation,

integrated regulation, (positive) introjection, (negative) introjection.

Table 1. Extrinsic motivation - metaprograms

Affirmation	Metaprogram	Metaprogram category
I want to succeed in my work activities: because the others provide me with a better job security if I make enough effort	Safety	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: because the others will reward me financially only if I make enough effort	financial reward	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: because I risk losing my job	Safety	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: to avoid being criticized by others	Criticism	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: to have the approval of others	approval	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: because the others will respect me more	Respect	External regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: because I want my work to have a positive impact on others	Personal satisfaction	External regulation
I have this job because: of the promotion opportunities it offers	Professional importance	External regulation
I have this job because: it allows me to earn money to support myself	Necessity	External regulation
Analyze the following statements: I execute job duties because I have to	Obligation	External regulation
Analyze the following statements: I want other people to find out how good I am	Personal satisfaction	External regulation
I have this job because: this type of work offers me safety	Safety	External regulation
At work it is important: to have someone set up my	Subordinate	External regulation

work goals		
Analyze the following statements: I execute job duties because my manager wants me to do that	Subordinate	External regulation
I have this job because: of the incomes it guarantees	Pecuniary importance	External regulation
I have this job because: It allows me to reach a certain lifestyle	Pecuniary importance	Identified regulation
I have this job because: It allows me to reach my career goals	Professional importance	Identified regulation
I have this job because: It allows me to achieve important personal goals	Personal importance	Identified regulation
I have this job because: Work has become a fundamental part of my own person	Personal integration	Integrated regulation
I have this job because: This job is an important part of my life.	Lifestyle integration	Integrated regulation
I have this job because: This job defines me	Full integration	Integrated regulation
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because this makes me feel proud of myself	Pride	Introjection (positive)
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because I want to be successful in life like other people	Success	Introjection (positive)
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because otherwise I would feel guilty	Guilt	Introjection (negative)
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because otherwise I would be very disappointed	Disappointment	Introjection (negative)
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because otherwise I would be very ashamed of myself	Shame	Introjection (negative)
I want to succeed in my work activities: Because I have to prove myself that I can	Fear of failure	Introjection (negative)

### 3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

*Extrinsic motivation* is dominated by metaprograms that are specific to integrated regulation (integration of personal life and work) and positive introjection (the feelings of pride and success) (Table 2). Identified regulation (pecuniary and personal benefits) hold the third place, while external factors are on the last position. Thus, the overall average score was 0,789 showing a position between neutrality and agreement on the statements describing extrinsic motivation.

Table 2. Extrinsic motivation – average score per categories of metaprograms and global average score (Sources: own calculation)

	Total	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
<b>External regulation</b>	0.596	0.806	0.860	0.645	0.202	0.468	0.488
<b>Identified regulation</b>	0.760	0.933	1.070	0.789	0.643	0.571	0.190
<b>Integrated regulation</b>	1.038	1.289	1.035	0.825	1.048	1.048	1.000
<b>Introjection (positive)</b>	0.922	0.967	1.158	0.711	1.000	0.738	1.000
<b>Introjection (negative)</b>	0.628	1.000	0.737	0.408	0.339	0.631	0.714
<b>Extrinsic motivation</b>	0.789	0.999	0.972	0.675	0.646	0.691	0.679

If we look at the situation analyzed by departments, we identify the following: people in department D1 demonstrate a high level of identification with the work done, as well as elements of negative introjection (desire for success because of the fear of failure); employees in D2 department have a high opinion of the categories of (positive) introjection, integrated and identified regulation. This implies an agreement with the affirmations about: pride or success gained through the work done, the high importance of job in ensuring career goals, the importance of work in personal life.

The situation is similar in other departments, too, although other employees do not have a very strong opinion.

The analysis of external regulation category points out the following important elements (Table 3): the answers of D2 department employees highlight their involvement in work activities of the need to receive approval or to avoid criticism from other people, focusing on promotional opportunities and the money needed for their support; employees in D2 department are also focused on professional satisfaction, safety and the need to conduct work out of obligation; holding the

second position in terms of external regulation, the employees of D1 Department are focused on promotional opportunities, performing job duties out of obligation and partly for the financial reward, requiring respect from others; the employees from D4 department are least motivated by external regulation, working in general out of obligation or to demonstrate how good they are.

Table 3. External regulation – average score on metaprograms and average score on category (Departments) (Sources: own calculation)

	Total	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
approval	0.323	0.400	0.737	0.368	-0.071	0.095	0.143
Criticism	0.542	0.600	0.842	0.526	0.071	0.381	0.857
Professional importance	0.823	1.267	1.158	1.000	0.286	0.571	0.429
Necessity	0.542	0.800	0.842	0.579	0.286	0.333	0.143
Obligation	1.031	1.133	1.105	1.053	0.643	1.143	1.143
financial reward	0.318	0.633	0.474	0.342	0.000	0.286	0.214
Respect	0.596	0.806	0.860	0.645	0.202	0.468	0.488
Personal satisfaction	0.542	0.367	0.947	0.447	0.607	0.238	0.643
Safety	0.493	0.644	0.754	0.544	0.071	0.413	0.190
Subordinate	-0.344	-0.700	0.026	-0.079	-0.393	-0.524	0.571
External regulation	0.596	0.806	0.860	0.645	0.202	0.468	0.488

As stated before, employees in D2 and D1 Departments are focused on promotion and career advancement; these items are almost unimportant for those in D6 Department.

Table 4. Identified regulation – average score on metaprograms and average score on category (Departments) (Sources: own calculation)

	Total	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Pecuniary importance	0.646	0.667	1.053	0.842	0.202	0.429	0.143
Professional importance	0.792	1.000	1.105	0.684	0.643	0.571	0.286
Personal importance	0.844	1.133	1.053	0.842	1.048	0.714	0.143
Identified regulation	0.760	0.933	1.070	0.675	0.789	0.571	0.190

Most employees profile integrates into the workplace. *Personal motivation* is very high in D6 and D1 and moderate in D2. The employees from D1 and D5 consider that their job is an important part of personal life, while the employees from D2 almost completely agree that their job defines them.

Table 5. Integrated regulation – average score on metaprograms and average score on category (Departments) (Sources: own calculation)

	Total	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Personal integration	1.208	1.467	1.105	1.053	1.286	1.095	1.429

Lifestyle integration	1.125	1.333	0.895	1.000	1.143	1.333	1.000
Full integration	0.781	1.067	1.105	0.421	0.714	0.714	0.571
Integrated regulation	1.038	1.289	1.035	0.825	1.048	1.048	1.000

In terms of introjection, employees are generally governed by the metaprogram of professional pride; only those in D2 also pursue life success.

Table 6. Introjection – average score on metaprograms and average score on category (Departments) (Sources: own calculation)

	Total	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Pride	1.250	1.400	1.316	0.947	1.286	1.190	1.571
Success	0.594	0.533	1.000	0.474	0.714	0.286	0.429
Introjection (positive)	0.922	0.967	1.158	0.711	1.000	0.738	1.000
Guilt	0.427	1.067	0.474	0.158	0.143	0.476	0.429
Disappointment	0.573	1.133	0.632	0.158	0.357	0.571	0.571
Shame	0.563	0.733	0.632	0.526	0.143	0.667	0.571
Fear of failure	0.948	1.067	1.211	0.789	0.714	0.810	1.286
Introjection (negative)	0.628	1.000	0.737	0.408	0.339	0.631	0.714

However, negative introjection is also present, because they are also governed by the fear of failure (the affirmation: *to prove myself that I can*). The employees of D1 Department are also governed by the feelings of guilt or disappointment (*I want to succeed in my work activities: Because otherwise I would be very disappointed/ I would feel guilty*).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The results obtained allow us to conclude that although intrinsic motivation is less important to employees than the extrinsic motivation, not material benefits are important to them, but metaprograms related to the integration of work

with one's own person and those associated with feelings such as pride or success.

The most important categories of metaprograms specific to extrinsic motivation, which were identified, are:

- integrated regulation – personal integration (work is a fundamental part of a person);
- positive introjection – the feelings of pride and success;
- identified regulation – present in half of the departments, it pursues the role of the workplace in achieving personal goals.

The improvement of motivational climate requires:

- to create non-discriminatory promotion conditions, to correlate personal goals with the development strategy of the organization, to ensure a management feedback system that responds to the need for one's work recognition, self-esteem increase, and promotion of constructive criticism of work;
- to ensure the achievement of personal goals and career promotion goals in an impartial manner, to ensure fair wage packages that allow integration into a particular lifestyle;
- to maintain these feelings of workplace integration.

The author take full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper.

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## MODELS USED IN NLP FOR MOTIVATION

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**Abstract:** Organizations adapt and change at a faster pace than ever before, both in terms of structure, as well as the way in which they operate, in order to achieve their goal. Without taking regard to human resources within an organization, management is often blinded by making profit, forgetting or not knowing that profit can only increase if employee motivation and satisfaction grow. The costs of this goal are far too low compared to the loss caused by the dissatisfaction of the employees. Conflicts, sabotage, defensive behaviors are just some of the manifestations of employee dissatisfaction. also, intense fluctuation and permanent layoffs are costly solutions. Prestigious organizations that have learned over time how they can make a force from their human resources are now in the top of economic development, apply entrepreneurial strategies in human resources management and leadership, being - year after year - one of the most successful organizations.

**Keywords:** team; models; motivation; work; NLP

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Many of the *Neuro-linguistic programming* (international acronym: NLP) models are applicable to communication within and outside the organization, in building publicity and advertising strategies, in sales, in organizing and conducting meetings, avoiding conflicts, and negotiations. Generally, NLP models coincide with each other or may include elements from other models within them, and all of them are similar in their main preoccupation: human behavior.

### 2. THE BAGEL MODEL

This model seeks to identify the behavioral keys of a person in order to decode as close as possible to the reality the internal processes of that person (Dilts, 2008:95). The *BaGEL model* of R. Dilts refers to a set of five behavioral cues which should be observed with the aim of identifying, balancing and improving the inner processes and states of an individual, respectively: (1) *Posture* – influences the quantity, quality and speed of the information transmitted by the transmitter, the way of interpreting and decoding the transmitted information and its intensity, (2) *Accessing cues* – non-verbal and auditory signals incorporate voice, pitch and tempo, and can indicate the feelings of a person, (3) *Gestures* – the movements of the body, especially of the head and hands, which express an

idea, a feeling, an intention, (4) *Eye movements* – it is a cue of the representational system and (5) *Verbal expression patterns* – patterns of thinking, concrete mentality, attitudes, habits, way of verbal expression of a person.




Fig. 1. General scheme of use of the BAGEL model  
Source: adaptation after Iosif (2013:103)

All these five elements determine the intensity of the response that the receiver receives. The response given will have more of these characteristics as the transmitted elements have a higher intensity (sound pressure) and better quality.

### 3. THE BELBIN MODEL

One of the most famous models that refer to the problem of personality within a team is *BELBIN model* or *team roles model*. This model, developed in the 1970s by Belbin (researcher and theoretician in the field of team management) proved that balanced teams, consisting of people with different skills have superior performance compared to that of the unbalanced teams, representing a very important tool for staff management. In the book

*Management Teams*, published in 1981, Belbin defined the model as follows: “the tendency of a person to behave, contribute and interrelate with others in a particular way”.

The *BELBIN model* gives us both a new and exciting way to perceive ourselves and perceive those around us, as well as the chance to better know and understand ourselves, to form a concept based on the information about our own behavior and to put into practice the effective model of action and decision. The information about our profile and team roles gives us a wide range of applications not only at the individual level but also at the level of the whole team we belong to. Team spirit is the result of four processes (Nicolescu & Verboncu, 1997:514):

creating trust among the people involved, establishing clear mission and objectives to which these people should adhere, the development of participatory decision-making processes, strong motivation to maximize the contribution of individuals in the fulfilment of common goals.

Teamwork is fundamental in order to achieve organizational performance and fulfil the objectives pursued. Team formation and consolidation is a long chain of processes that require not only a considerable effort, but also a deep understanding of all the stages to be covered and the difficulties that may arise. A good manager can exploit all this information to improve performance and ensure the success of the organization. also, each individual within the team will benefit from a superior understanding of behavioral and interaction factors, and an enrichment of the baggage of knowledge that will entail improved organizational performance. and last but not least, the *BELBIN model* can also be used in the career planning process. In the book *Motivation in Work. From Theory to Practice* published in 2007, Vagu and Stegaroiu show that

the theories of motivation, considered classical - both content and process theories - address the problems of motivation referring to the individual, motivation being implicitly considered as an intra-individual psychological process, not an inter-individual psychological process. However, some recent studies have shown that the individual’s motivation changes by the mere presence of others [Vagu & Stegaroiu, 2007:522.

Table 1. The three elements of team management. Source: adaptation after West (2005:70-85)

Team leadership*	Team management**	Team training***
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Leadership involves / supposes:	Team management means / represents:	Training requires the following essential skills:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>forming a team in every sense of the word, not only for the sake of its name;</b></li> <li>- <b>imposing a precise direction on team activity;</b></li> <li>- <b>modeling or designing the team so as to work efficiently;</b></li> <li>- <b>gaining organizational support that helps the team reach its goal;</b></li> <li>- <b>appropriate planning of interventions for success.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- imposing precise common objectives;</li> <li>- clarifying the roles of team members;</li> <li>- assessing individual contributions;</li> <li>- providing feedback on team activity (team results, team viability, the progress and welfare of team members, mental health of team members, team innovations, team relationships);</li> <li>- revising group processes, strategies and objectives. Also, team management refers to the development of individual roles; the manager must express subjective opinions about the activity of the team and his / her role is to ensure that there is a high degree of double-loop or reflexive learning in the team.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the ability to listen (active listening, open listening, encouraging communication, reflective listening);</li> <li>- recognition and exteriorization of feelings;</li> <li>- giving feedback (being precise and focusing on the behaviors of members and their consequences);</li> <li>- jointly setting goals (the main task of the leader is to permanently ensure that the team knows exactly the common and individual goals, as well as the overall orientation).</li> </ul>

**Explanatory notes:**

- \* generally refers to strategic guidance and involves reflection on issues related to the management of individuals;
- \*\* takes into consideration medium-term planning and clarification of objectives;
- \*\*\* assumes daily direct contact with team members.

Researches on motivation in economic or sports teams have demonstrated that the application of the principles of individual motivation to teams determine them to be more motivated, effective and competitive, and it can be stated that everything that determines the growth or reduction of team performance refers to its motivation, where well-known factors such as

management and leadership, individual competencies and other mechanisms capable of influencing performance are considered motivational factors. The following factors are considered to have influence on team performance (Fenouillet, 2003:93-94): *the structure of the team* (hierarchical structure within the team), *team homogeneity* (team members compatibility), *team cohesion* (the feeling of belonging to a team), *the size of the team* (it is the responsibility of the manager and the leader to identify the optimal size of a team and to create the conditions for its efficient operation), *the characteristics of team activities* (there are numerous aspects both related to tasks and behaviors that decisively contribute and influence team effectiveness), *the organizational and environmental context in which the team operates* (the degree of formalization varies according to the cultural context), *the evaluation of results* (a periodic process aimed at objectively assessing the activities of members), *reverse connection (feedback)*.

In addition to these factors, the level of motivation in the group is influenced by social facility - the performances of an individual, in the presence of other individuals, are superior to those obtained when the individual acts alone and by social laziness or social flânerie – the mere presence of other individuals can have the effect of reducing the individual’s motivation and performance. If, in the case of social facilitation, the performances of the individual separately obtained are compared with the individual’s performances obtained in the group, in the case of social flânerie collective performances are compared with the individual’s separate performance in co-action with others. (Vagu & Stegaroiu, 2007:524).

4. THE DISNEY MODEL

The *DISNEY model* is a method used for planning, creative problem solving and teamwork; is the method by which Disney (director, producer, animator, screenwriter and entrepreneur) has designed and led his projects. This strategy was taken over and studied by Dilts in the two volumes of the paper *Strategies of Genius* and adapted in NLP in order to provide models of thinking of successful people or more precisely, the way in which they use their basic perceptual skills (sight, hearing, kinesthetic) to organize and optimize the environment they live in.

The applicability of the *DISNEY model* is complex, and only the uses that proved to be useful and stood the test of time were reviewed:

creativity in goal planning, self-confidence, creating high-performance teams, efficient brainstorming, conducting meetings, emotion control, stress management and development of creativity.

*Creativity* is a complex capacity of phenomena or actions that make it possible to create real or imaginary "products". Even if the main component of creativity is imagination, a creation of real value also requires motivation.

The *DISNEY model* is based on the following three stages involved in the process of creation that - in order to capitalize their effect - should be explored individually: *the dreamer* (must allow his/her mind to travel freely, cast away any element of the real world, thus favoring visual imagination), *the realist* (it is the stage where the dreamer returns to the real world full of ideas and motivated to put them into practice) and *the critic* (he finds, with a little bit of concentration, the flaws in the plan to put into practice one of the realist’s ideas, thus avoiding the problems that could lead to failure). also, creativity involves the following distinctive features, each of them having its own significance: *fluidity* (the possibility to imagine, for a short period of time, a great number of ideas, situations, visions), *plasticity* (the ease of changing how to approach a problem when a process turns out to be ineffective), *originality* (is the expression of innovation, of novelty, which can be remarked by the rarity of the answer given by a person when he or she is thoroughly tested).

Table 2. Setting metaprograms for the three phases of the DISNEY model. Source: adaptation after Dilts, Lozier (2000:128)

Style	Dreamer	Realistic	Critic
<b>Focus level</b>	What?	How?	Why?
<b>Representative preference</b>	Vision	action	Logic m
<b>Motivation direction</b>	Pleasure	Pleasure	Pain
<b>Temporal reference</b>	Long term	Short term	Long / Short term
<b>Time orientation / reporting</b>	Future	Present	Future / Present
<b>Weight point</b>	Internal (itself)	External (middle)	External (other people)
<b>Relation / Comparison</b>	Granting	Granting	Disagreement

Another way to stimulate creativity is that indicated by Passuello (the author of *Litemind*, one of the biggest personal development blogs on the internet) who, starting from the Disney model, suggests four more roles (Bandler & Grinder, 2008:121): *the explorer* (use your curiosity, find as much interesting information as possible, talk to all different people), *the artist* (follow your dreams, use your imagination, invent different points), *the judge* (be realistic, realize your dreams, set the traps) and *the warrior* (go ahead, overcome obstacles, bravely and find the way to make your dream a reality). As long as all these stages and roles are taken seriously, NLP specialists say the results are unpredictable and not only at individual level, but also within organizations. This strategy offers an opportunity to analyze and a "in *integrum*", and the way to make steps towards the next final step strengths and the setting of risk management methods, providing an overall view on the implementation of that idea.

## 5. THE MILTON MODEL

The Milton model is something but the inverted magic formula model as it, in comparison to the formula model, uses an ambiguous, non-specific language (Ditts, 2007:129). This is the pattern all wise assistants use. The user's perception has a certain time (Andler, 2008:103).

This model uses the modern hypnotic techniques of Erickson (psychiatrist and psychologist) and based on a series of questions which aim to produce an altered state of consciousness – *trance* – and the induction of the process through direct and indirect suggestions (Erickson & Rossi, 1980:430-451): *fixation of attention* (slight rotation and rotation of psychomotor tasks, rotation of stimuli, rotation of tasks, proportionate proportion, proportionate proportion, proportionate proportion and adaptation of sensory-motor, generalization, and affective behavior through mobility of utterances and the dynamics of perception's areas and purposes), *deponentiation of normal habits* (however, the consciousness will not only with the conscious subconsciously), *inserting stimuli of subconscious* (various subliminal messages only through subconsciously and regression) and *stimulating positive reactions* (which stimulate reflection and dialogue).

The *MILTON model* provides a special framework with the unconscious, applying to

reality, that ordinary human reality is very personal, that something is done by the system and general mental patterns. People know more than they think they know, but they lose their trust in themselves and their limits and implement themselves. The involvement of the human nervous system has taught the human being to believe that he/she has limited capabilities, which is why most people get stuck in individual mental patterns, preventing a successful subconsciously. The principles of *MILTON model* are (Andler & Grindler, 1982:129):

- (1) any person has his/her own inner map, (2) any person's label for his/her own things, (3) any person cannot fixate on his own state, (4) any person must be understood through his/her own values about the world, (5) any person's immunity, (6) the mirrorable persons, the as a result of an immunity.

This model is a modern approach that is used by the direct and indirect methods of *modern hypnotherapy*, namely *the indirect suggestion*, which is hard to resist because it is as simple as a suggestion by the unconscious mind, very fitting in the form of a story, a comparison, a metaphor. *Hypnotherapy* is the movement of the real factors of the unconscious mind and the stabilization of a particular situation, which uses a command language, all *direct suggestion*. The language structure of *MILTON model* is based on the hypnotic language models and is a new hypnotic language models. The hypnotic language is characterized by several specific models (Nightingale, 2004:136), namely:

1. stimulus to the unconscious, as well as the unconscious of a person, the hypnosis process, the unconscious barriers and the apparatus of the nervous system's immunity.

The direct approach of a person's hypnosis state, having a well-defined purpose, is a necessary tool for a certain number of visual, auditory and kinesthetic representations, keeping the mandatories to involve themselves mutually and completely.

The *MILTON model* is formed by: *the causal link* (which is an abbreviation of the direct rapport between two events), *ambiguity* (representing the verbal elements of immunity (words, commands) with multiple meanings that are used to distract attention and interrupt involvement in the activity of a subconsciously message; *phonetic ambiguity* targets a certain word that is not a separate form of the rest of the sentence, and

*syntactic ambiguity* targets the partial overlap of two sentences with a common part) and *changing the tone* (by means of which any message can be made more direct). The model developed by Roberts is based on the fast growing and influential models, inspiring short-term strategies, the birth of *guided imagery*, having the greatest influence on NLP. As in G. suggested that Roberts would have provided a very good therapy model study for and for Grand, the synthesis of the model in his book in Phoenix, Washington (Roberts, 2012:395).

6. THE ROLE MODEL

The *ROLE model* (*Representational systems, Orientation, Links, Effect*) is a model that involves the comparison of the role groups of people who play the role which the individuals appear (Holt, 2004:514). The model is based on the behavior, amplification, success or may be motivated / predicted by the role, especially by young persons.

Developed by Dits with NLP, the *ROLE model* involves the presentation of information that the relevant details that are directly associated with the presentation. The model plans the maps of people who are very rare and productive, as well as the maps of the whole very successful in their area. The main elements of the *ROLE model* are involved in strategies / methods strategies for growth modeling. The behavior of the modeling process which is a help with the help of *ROLE model* is identified by the essential elements of thinking and behavior of a particular response (Dits, 2013:101). The model is something but a success in the steps of the flow of the order of the process of results that all the principles and elements of the system are used. The main thing is that established between the steps of something but a condition that verifies whether the solution is found or not and whether the satisfaction of all the parameters is achieved in the problem (Dits, 2013:102).

7. THE SCORE MODEL

The basic function, the *SCORE model* is a minimum amount of information (Dits, 2007:71). The model was developed by Roberts, Dits and ... in 1987 as an effective way of finding personal problems (financial, material, values, ideals, loyalty) and

relating the transformation. The general terms of *SCORE* terms: *Symptoms* (are the surface problem, the individual result, which leads to the determination of the cause that generated), *Causes* (are the elements that produce and, under particular conditions, cause the appearance of the elements that influence the mental state and the behavioral modification), *Objectives* (what is to be accomplished after solving the problem in the desired way and which will replace, more or less, all *symptoms*), *Resources* (include some elements that are positively influence the behavior of goals and ensure the implementation of the *symptoms*) and *Effects* (represent all the changes in the result from a particular cause as a result of behavioral changes in a certain period of time to achieve the desired final state).




Fig.2. The general scheme for using the SCORE model. Source: adapted after Dits (2013:100)

In the NLP context, an individual result problem can be solved by using the following elements: *defining the problem* (the mental state), *setting the goal* (purpose, mission) and *identifying the steps required to achieve the established goal* (solution, value).

The goal is the same, the answer is a behavior that differs. [...] The solutions given for the problem are rather usually multiple, sometimes even simultaneously contradictory (Radulescu, 1999:8).

To fulfill the role, it is necessary that the components of the *SCORE model* provide a minimum amount of information about the mental and mental environment of an organization, the results of the model are not generated by the process of change at the level of the mental state.

8. THE SOAR MODEL

The *SOAR model* (*State, Operator and Result*) is a model of cognitive system architecture (Newell, 1990:-544), built by Newell (researcher in cognitive information and psychology) and his research team, which

allows to find the main steps in a change process, thus allowing you to reach the desired state.

define the hang s that urrd (M ldn, 2008:135).

Through this model, the terms "sensation", "perception", "memory" and "representation" are established, the knowledge being organized in production systems. The activation of the knowledge is done in parallel, and selection is based on the purpose of the structure in the working memory (M l a, 1999:331). Working memory contains a hierarchical structure of goals, a set of preferences for what is to be accomplished at a given time and what order, practical intentions and metarules (M l a, 1999:320). When a person is facing a problem, the data of the respective problems are put in response with a production system. The behavior of the person is seen as a virtual movement in the problem space until a path is found between the initial state and the final state, movement guided by the goal structure in the working memory and the production systems. Thus, the final state is something but a success in the final state through which a number of specific behaviors have been achieved. A number of goals with their organization and a number of hang s in terms of behavior in the final state, and the desired state, with the help of the processes of transformation within the problem space; in this way the individual adjusts according to the previous person's similar activities, their / her personality, age, availability and level. Transition from the initial state to the final state is made with the help of operators (M l a, 1999:320).




Fig. 3. The general scheme of using the SOAR model. Source: adapted after D lts (2007:48)

The SOAR model assumes that symbols represent information, and use systems to produce a way of representing and storing information and acquiring new knowledge. Also, working memory is seen as an activated part of the long-term memory.

### 9. THE TOTE MODEL

This model, suggested by Miller, Gallanter and Abrahamson in the book *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*, published in 1960, is essentially

a success in activities in the representation systems that have no data and a functional behavior until the point that the subject, typically, will be through the success (D lts et al., 2014:54)

and plans how, by using the rule of *feedback* and *reward*, the individual acts and reacts to fulfill his / her behavior, to attain all his / her goals. The model represents an improvement in the classical *St mulus R sp ns* relationship because it introduces the notion of *feedback* and result (D lts, 2007:67).

The general notion is: *st* (standard amount used to get a representation of the status of the problem), *pr* (to return in any way), *st* (activities that must be met before the response) (Miller et al., 1960:24), the test-practice feedback loop being represented by the terms *st* and *pr* (evaluation). The order of sequences is not reversed, it is unlikely that the practice result is reached. The starting point of the model is the action model *St mulus R sp ns* from the psychological theory known as *behaviorism*, a new perspective in the subject of Psychology following the publication of the article *Psychology as the behaviorist views it* by Watson (psychologist) in the *Psychology Journal* in 1913. He considered behavior as "the set of responses adjusted to the stimulus that trigger it" (Zlat, 1994:71) and, therefore, Psychology would be reduced to the study of the *St mulus R sp ns* loop. The psychological theory argues that only the stimulus and the response between which there is a direct relationship are important and are studied by behaviorists, and everything not related to behavior in the stimulus and the response must be eliminated.




Figure 4. The general scheme for using the TOTE model. Source: adapted after D lts, 2007:65

The model was taken over in NLP and developed by D lts, being the basis of the model of

strateg th nk ng ( r a 2008:36), wh h assum s that b hav ral ffi n y d p nds n th st n f a g al fr th futur , f s m s ns ry and b hav ral v d n n th attanm nt f th g al and f a s t f p rat ns, pr dur s r alt rnat v s w th wh h th g al w ll b a h v d. Th s m d l a ms t apply r s ur s t th pr s nt stat n rd r t a h v a d s r d r sult. Th nd v dual a ts t r du th d ff r n b tw n a pr s nt stat and a d s r d stat ( ' nn r, 2012:392) and nt nu s t a t unt l th s d ff r n d sapp ars. Th d s r d stat s a h v d thr ugh r p at d t st ng f th pr s nt stat mpar d t th d s r d r sults, by a ss ng and apply ng th r s ur s unt l th tw stat s r a h th sam l v l ( f, 2013:98). Th b t v s, strat g s and dr t ns f a t n ar th way n wh h th nd v dual rgan z s h s/h r th ughts and b hav r wh n ngag ng n a task f any k nd. Th y d fin *patt rns* n b hav ral and mmun at n strat g s, but als n th th nk ng styl s f an nd v dual. Th y always r sp nd t a p s t v g al and an b nflu n d by b l fs. Th y ar th r sult f a s r s f p rat ns that ur bra ns p rf rm d m st ft n b y nd th thr sh ld f ns us n ss ( r a, 2008:38).

Strat g s ns st f s qu n s f pr ss s wh h th nd v dual us s t m t vat r d pr ss, d d r a t. Th ava lab l ty f ff t v strat g s s th n ssary fa t r f r p r s nal ffi n y, wh h s why th y ar mp rtant mp n nts f th stru tur f sub t v pr n . a strat gy assum s th st n f th f ll w ng mp n nts: *a tr gg r fa t r* (an v nt, a ns us r un ns us st mulus), *nt rnal stat s* (th ught pr ss s mad up f m t ns and s nsat ns, mag s and s unds, nn r d al gu s), *nt rnal stag s* ( a mb nat n f b th what w s , h ar and f l m ng fr m uts d , and th a t ns und r t a n wh h ar part f th strat gy), *f dba k* ( f th b t v s n t r a h d, t all ws us t tak a unt f th r sult t n t d th sam th ng aga n) and *t* (wh n th ut m d s n t rr sp nd nt r ly t th b t v , th strat gy must b hang d). Th ma n t l us d s *mpar s n* (t hghl ghts th urr nt stat and th d s r d stat , and has thr asp ts: p s t v , mparat v and sup rlat v ); w th ts h lp *m d l* as ns t st ng and mpr v m nt f th nt rnal, phys l g al pr ss s g n rat d by a rta n st mulus. Th *m d l* s st ll us d as a k y strat gy n NLP b aus t s a *ybrn t m d l* – th r sults f an a t n ar r ntr du d nt th syst m and us d as th bas s f r th f ll w ng appr a h. ll r als ntr du d th d a that w an nly pr ss s v n nf rmat nal t ms w th a  $7 \pm 2$  var ab l ty at any

g v n t m . Th th ngs w pay att nt n and th way n wh h w rd r ur pr n nflu n h w mu h w kn w and h w many th ngs w r m mb r ( ' nn r, 2012:392). als , th *m d l* s fr qu ntly us d n d s pl n s wh r t rat v m th ds ar appl d, su h as ng n r ng and art fi al nt ll g n .

## 10. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Th sp fi t hn qu s f NLP m t th manag rs, l ad rs and nsultants halfway s that th y an b tt r und rstand th way n wh h mpl y qual t s and m th ds f *m t vat n*, f b st ng m ral w ll b ap tal z d f r ngag ng p pl n a h v ng g als. M st f th NLP advan d appl at ns us d n th bus n ss fi ld usually r f r t advan d l ngu st m d ls and sup r r bs r vat n t ls that hav th p t nt al t pl r d pr nt th human sub ns us, ntr but ng t th pr gramm ng pr ss by r at ng n w nv t ns and b l fs wh h w ll subs qu ntly harm n z th nd v dual w th th nt rnal nv r nm nt f th rgan zat n. all th s appl at ns pr v d num r us m ans t p w th n ns ns and r al pr bl ms f urr nt manag m nt, w th ut wh h t w uld b v ry d ffi ult, f n t mp ss bl , t st a manag m nt apabl f nsur ng an ffi nt ndu t f a t v t s and an pt mal l v l f pr f ss nal sat sfa t n.

Th auth r tak full r sp ns b l ty f r th nt nts and s nt fi rr tn ss f th pap r.

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## GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT “SYSTEMS FOR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY”

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**Abstract:** *The current paper aims at providing a general overview of the project “Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security” (SASS), designed under the auspices of the Erasmus+ Program and carried out by “Henri Coanda” Air Force Academy in collaboration with Polish and Bulgarian partners. The project proposed the initiation of uniform competences to be developed in employees of aviation, respectively, the design of a common curriculum/plan of study for pilots, air traffic controllers and air surveillance operators. The implementation of this curriculum was possible through the introduction of an on-line teaching/learning system based on an e-Learning platform. In order for the project to be achieved successfully, an assessment plan and a thorough analysis of results obtained after various stages were drawn. The analysis was done based on the feedback obtained from the main target groups of the project and was possible following two staff and students’ mobility stages that were completed with satisfaction questionnaires.*

**Keywords:** *Erasmus+ project; mobility; strategic partnership; communication*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Whether we refer to national security, education or the economic environment, Eastern European countries have had to adapt their public policies and gradually reach the demands of the various international organizations. And all of the above mentioned situations have occurred under their desire to be part of different alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Accordingly, each of these countries has passed through and is still undergoing transformations that affect their own military structures. Armed forces have been restructured and have migrated toward professional armies. The next step, modernization of existing technical systems within military structures, was a constructive and desirable target for a better cooperation with the NATO.

Therefore, in order for all these aspirations to fulfill, it was, it is and will be necessary to:

- obtain new professional skills through new methods of personal development to use the new equipments and technologies in defense systems;
- apply teaching/ learning methods in the context of international cooperation between military academies and civilian universities;

– develop an appropriate psychological and moral behavior by accepting multiculturalism in the context of participation in different multinational and international missions.

Moreover, military education institutions have to assume the role of trainers of future military personnel in charge with maintaining peace and security.

Thus, the organization of military education institutions has to consider upgrading the concept of education and aligning it with the standards existent in the civilian education institutions. This is a painstaking process, which, at “Henri Coanda” Air Force Academy has started by designing a strategy for upgrading the educational endeavor. In the context of the AFAHC education’s opening to various European programs (EU 1288/2013; EC 2017), AFAHC has proposed a project aiming to develop a specific curriculum (plan of study) in cooperation with the War Studies University from Poland and “Vasil Levski” National Military University from Bulgaria, under the aegis of one of the European programs (Erasmus+).

In order to achieve the purpose of the project, the consortium of the 3 universities, united under the leadership of the (1) AFAHC, took into account the competences of each university: (2) War Study

University (WSU), through its professors, has a great experience in the field of safety and security at European level and experience in training civilian students to obtain specific skills, as future employees of various defense systems; and (3) “Vasil Levski” National Military University (VLNMU) develops curricula in the same areas of interest as the AFAHC in the field of aviation, traffic control and air space security.

Apart from these, the experience of MNU and WSU in training graduates both for military and civilian employers and labor markets, in these particular areas of expertise, can add value to this project.

## 2. SASS OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS

**2.1 Overview of SASS Project.** From the point of view of the military universities the labor market is divided into: (1) The civilian labor market; (2) The military labor market, which undergoes continuous restructuring. Consideration needs to be paid to the fact that the military field and civilian life imply distinct activities and rules, more or less different air laws, subjected to military or civilian requirements.

The project started from the idea of standardizing the competences of military students (future pilots, ATCs, Radar and Air Defense officers) with the competences of the graduates of the civil universities in the same field of activity, namely, civilian aerospace schools for pilots and air traffic controllers. This aim took into account the specific regulations to each environment in which activities take place, either civilian or military.

Other aspects which were considered included: the amount of information and the speed of change of equipments and technology in any field of activity and eventually, the need for professional reconversion.

The activities were carried out over two years and focused on two main directions:

- designing a curriculum appropriate to the purpose of the project
- project evaluation through the mobility of staff and students. The periods of experience exchange were an integral part of the project.

The design of the curriculum (and the syllabus for each discipline) began by establishing the competences necessary for aviation, security and air defense specialists. The fact that the field of aviation, airspace management and security comprises many related specializations was taken into account in order to establish the necessary competences.

The project was designed to establish and to standardize the competences which the specialists in existing services on all airports need. These specializations are: ATC, radar and meteorology next to with the “pilot specialization.

The first phase of the project corresponded to its first objective: the members of the project team have developed a plan of study covering 6 disciplines and the teaching/learning materials to be designed under them were distributed to the three partner universities. Subsequently, the second phase of the project consisted of achieving a modern higher education teaching/learning system, namely, an e-Learning platform and a video-conference system.

Each of these two objectives was developed at two distinct levels, one destined to its accomplishment and the other one destined to its self-assessment.

Within the project, the work tasks were shared among the 3 universities. The task for each university, depending on the field of expertise, was to write/develop materials for 2 disciplines.




Fig. 1. Number of working days for each university




Fig. 2. Number of working days/ activity/ university

The graph in Figure 1 shows the total number of days allocated to achieving the final goal of the project, in each university. The graph in Figure 2 indicates the distribution of the days worked within the project, in each university for each activity. It is noticed that the calculation of the total number of days worked in each university leads to the conclusion that the work done was equitably divided, the three partners made an equal contribution to the project.

### 2.2 Assessment of the project’s outcomes.

The completion of the curriculum, the lessons related to each discipline in the plan allowed the transition to the qualitative evaluation stage of the achieved steps. The evaluation was done through mobilities of professors and students from the three universities. There have been 2 such internships. The first mobility took place in Poland and it was focused on the interaction between professors and students, throughout an interval of two weeks. Both professors and students assessed quantitatively and qualitatively the teaching materials of the first stage of the project, enriched with experiments/ simulations/ practical applications meant to help understand theory.

A special contribution to this internship has been made through the involvement of the final beneficiaries of this plan of study, labor market players. They offered the possibility of organizing a working day at a location specific to this area, one of the air bases, as well as the interaction between professionals belonging to various positions of their careers, each of whom had a personal perspective with regard to personal development.

The benefits obtained after the first mobility include, among others:

- the development of interpersonal and inter-social relationships among the participants to the accomplishment of the project;
- the creation of a data base enriched with suggestions and ideas for the further stage of the project;
- cultural exchange among the participant to the project, resulting from socializing activities.
- feedback from the final beneficiaries, employers in the field of aviation.

The feedback was achieved based on satisfaction questionnaires (based on Burgess design, 2001). The sample on which the satisfaction questionnaires were applied was formed by a number of about 100 people, the students participating in the first stage of exchange of experience and the guests invited to an event of dissemination of the intermediate results.

A higher percentage of respondents believe that the carrying out of such a curriculum can positively influence their career development.



Fig. 3. Participants’ opinion regarding the design of a plan of study

As an intermediate conclusion: the purpose of the project, the accomplishment of a plan of study meant to offer a set of skills and abilities to the aviation employees is a favorable one. The opinion that such a plan may lead to an increased interaction among participants is shown in Figure 4.




Fig. 4. Participants’ opinion regarding the objectives of the project

The second stage of the project consisted of developing an on-line learning system. It is mainly based on the e-Learning platform, which is broadly used in civilian universities. The implementation of this stage was followed by a new self-assessment that was carried out at the end of a “blended mobility” interval. There were two weeks for the mobility and another two weeks destined to on-line courses via the e-Learning platform. The satisfaction questionnaires were filled out at the end of the on-line courses and they indicated surprising results from the perspective of the platform use.

The students’ opinion with regard to the use of the on-line learning systems differed from the

professors' perspective. The former stated their opinion clearly that it is preferable for them to use the classical classroom teaching/ learning system. Its advantage would be that of the interaction with peers and professors.

Figure 5 (students) and Figure 6 (professors) show these opinions in order to be compared. The satisfaction questionnaire included the question "How easy is it to use the e-Learning platform of the SASS project?" and it offered five possible answers, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (totally agree) .




Fig. 5. Students' opinion



Fig. 6. Professors' opinion

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

Although the use of e-Learning platforms is not absolute novelty, it has been observed that military university education is rather reluctant to using it. The specificity of the three universities can be the cause of this phenomenon. Students prefer direct interaction as they stated it in their answers to the questions included in the satisfaction questionnaires.

The project managed to pave the way for common plans of study; it provided participants with the opportunity to work in teams, both in case of professors and students and it enhanced the cultural exchange due to the project team members belonging to three universities of three different countries.

### 3. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The present paper is an overview of the strategic partnership project carried out on European funds, under the auspices of the Erasmus+ Program.

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## LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

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**Abstract:** *The People's Advocate Institution is an independent and autonomous public authority vis-à-vis any other public authority and aims to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals in relation to public authorities. Being a controlling institution without the possibility to dispose of ordinary coercive measures, the question arises as to how the People's Advocate manages to develop relations with local authorities and how he succeeds in mediating the conflict between them and the citizens who consider themselves injured in their rights.*

**Keywords:** *People's Advocate; local authorities; community; cooperation*

### 1. BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE INSTITUTION

The People's Advocate Institution is an independent and autonomous public authority regarding any other public authority and aims to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals in relation to public authorities.

The main tasks of the People's Advocate Institution are:

1. the activity of solving petitions;
2. Work on constitutional litigation:
  - a. formulates points of view at the request of the Constitutional Court;
  - b. may refer the Constitutional Court to the unconstitutionality of the laws before promulgation thereof;
  - c. may directly refer the Constitutional Court to the unconstitutionality of laws and ordinances;
3. the activity regarding the administrative contentious: may file the administrative contentious instance, according to the law of the administrative contentious;
4. to promote the appeal in the interest of the law before the High Court of Cassation and Justice on the issues of law which have been solved differently by the courts through irrevocable court rulings;
5. present to the two Chambers of Parliament reports, annually or at their request; the reports may contain recommendations on changes to legislation

or measures of a different nature to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens;

6. Presents reports to the presidents of the two chambers of the Parliament or, as the case may be, to the Prime Minister, in cases where it finds, on the occasion of the investigations undertaken, gaps in the legislation or serious cases of corruption or non-observance of the laws of the country;

7. The People's Advocate can be consulted by the initiators of the draft laws and ordinances, which, through the content of the regulations, concern the rights and freedoms of citizens provided by the Romanian Constitution, by the covenants and other international treaties on fundamental human rights to which Romania is a party.

### 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE INSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In the doctrine it was mentioned that, unlike the American model, characterized mainly by the existence of Ombudsman, also appointed responsible to the executive, the Romanian constitutional system opted like the majority of European states in favor of an Ombudsman accountable to the legislator for could be impartial in relation to officials and administrative bodies, more likely to mistaken or be the target of criticism (Tofan, 2011:21).

The Ombudsman's institution is in line with this idea, its main attribution as it protects the rights of

citizens faced with public administration (Scutelnicu, 2000:130).

Compared to the three classical public powers: legislative, executive and judiciary, the People's Advocate has no decision-making power, being a hearing based on mediation, which differentiates this authority from the usual ones. His real power is based on his moral authority, the latter being a fundamental characteristic of the institution. The experience of the Scandinavian countries has shown that the Ombudsman can be effective if he has enough personality and moral authority. The main function of the People's Advocate is to formally establish the correctness or incorrectness of the administrative actions (Scutelnicu, 2000:131).

In fact, through the People's Advocate Institution and its report with the public administration authorities, as judiciously emphasized in the specialized doctrine, we are witnessing a parliamentary control exercised by the People's Advocate at the level of the local public administration. Antonie Iorgovan (1993:148, *apud* Scutelnicu, 2000:134) speaks of

a modern parliamentary control over the Government and the other bodies of the public administration through authorities that depend on Parliament without being subordinated to it: the People's Advocate and the Court of Accounts.

The People's Advocate Institution does not have a sanctioning role in the application of fines, like other control authorities, this aspect representing the specificity and uniqueness of this institution as a mediator, all the actions undertaken being free of charge. Representatives of the public administration authorities must show their gratitude and openness to collaboration and communication with the People's Advocate Institution, which, both at central level and through its territorial structures, aims to resolve petitions addressed in view of possible harm to the rights of a natural person, the reparation of the alleged damage and the rectification of the unlawful act, if such an act is found, following the investigations carried out<sup>1</sup>.

In the following, we will exemplify certain case scenarios from the work of the People's Advocate - Braşov Territorial Office in relation to the City Hall of Braşov City, which have been solved favorably.

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<sup>1</sup> At European level, the homologous institution, entitled the European Ombudsman, with similar powers and attributions functions in the People's Advocate (for details, see Ioan Muraru, 2004:24-25).

### 3. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE – BRA OV TERRITORIAL OFFICE, IN RELATION TO THE CITY HALL OF BRA OV

The Territorial Office of Braşov, established at the end of 2004, provides protection to any person irrespective of race, nationality, ethnic and social origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth in relation to the activity of civil servants or central authorities ministries, departments, government agencies); the local administration (prefectures, town halls, county, municipal, town and communal councils); the public institutions (for example, labor and social protection departments, territorial pension houses), autonomous regies, as well as specialized committees, such as local and county commissions for land, or commissions for the assessment of persons with disabilities .

#### 3.1 The right to a decent living standard and the protection of children and young people<sup>2</sup>.

The People's Advocate launched an investigation at the City Hall of Braşov, in the event of a citizen's eviction and social housing shortage at the city level. The investigation concerns the possible violation of art. 47 and art. 49 of the Romanian Constitution, regarding the standard of living and protection of children and young people, as well as of Law no. 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of the rights of the child. The People's Advocate was notified on 18 April 2016 by a petitioner stating that she is the sole supporter of two minor children and lives in a real estate under the administration of SC RIAL SRL Braşov (a trading company operating within the limits of the decisions of the Local Council of The City of Braşov and the provisions of the Mayor).

The petitioner reported that he had been sued in court to recognizal of the termination of the last rental agreement concluded on 23 June 2014 and their eviction from space<sup>3</sup>.

Following the demarches made by the People's Advocate on April 23, 2016, SC RIAL SRL Braşov announced that she was also summoned to hand over the space in which the petitioner lives, a space that is owned by private individuals. The imminent danger

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<sup>2</sup> [http://avp.ro/comunicate-de-presă/comunicat\\_18octombrie2016.pdf](http://avp.ro/comunicate-de-presă/comunicat_18octombrie2016.pdf), accessed on 11 June, 2019;

<sup>3</sup> For details regarding the fact that improper execution of obligations is assimilated with the non execution of the contract, see C.Dinu, D.G.Iona (2017:157).

of evacuation of the patent stems also from the fact that on 13 July 2016 it sent a new petition informing it that the tabular owner had been informed by the tabular owner to leave the premises within 7 days. Considering the difficult situation of the petitioner, considering especially the fact that it is a single-parent family, with two dependent children, the Brasov Territorial Office continued the efforts at the City Hall of Bra ov, requesting it to analyze the situation, respectively to communicate the necessary information regarding the projects started in order to reduce the deficit of social housing, with which Brasov has faced for a long time.

By written procedures, information was requested on how to handle the situation of the petitioner, but also on the measures taken in the field of social housing at the city of Bra ov, the City Hall of Brasov communicating a response in this respect.

The People's Advocate states that, in accordance with Article 48 paragraph (2) of the Law no.272 / 2004 on the protection and promotion of the rights of the child, republished, if the parents or persons who, according to the law, have the obligation to support the child can not ensure, for reasons beyond their control, the satisfaction of the minimum needs for housing, food, clothing and education of the child, the State, through the competent public authorities, is obliged to provide them with adequate support, in the form of financial benefits, benefits in kind, as well as in the form of services, according to the law.

Subsequently, the People's Advocate Institution, through its representatives at the territorial level, carried out an investigation at the City Hall of Brasov City Hall, which consisted of a meeting aimed at presenting the complained situation and identifying its favorable resolution.

As a result of the collaboration between the representatives of the two authorities, the City Hall of Brasov ordered the allocation of a social housing in favor of this petitioner and stated that it envisages a series of investments for the construction of new such buildings. The settlement of the complainant's housing situation, as well as the City Hall's commitment to improving the social housing situation at the city of Bra ov, are the result of the actions taken by the People's Advocate, alongside the local authorities of Brasov<sup>4</sup>.

Regarding the situation of social housing at the level of Brasov Municipality, the People's Advocate was informed that two buildings are currently in use: one located on Zizinului Street and the other on Lani

Street, all social housing being already assigned. Besides these, there are also spaces administered by S.C.RIAL S.R.L. which were attributed to certain categories of people (evicted from nationalized buildings, employees in the budgetary sector, social cases). In order to make investments in the field, Bra ov City Hall also identified a building on 126 Zizinului street, suitable for social housing, so the feasibility study was carried out, and the Investment Service would prepare the necessary documentation for the technical project execution and transformation of the Homeless Home Center into social housing. The center will be relocated to another building, formerly the Transylvania School - Astra group, where the public procurement procedure has already begun.

**3.2. Identity documents for a child, issued by local authorities following an investigation by the People's Advocate Institution and a successful collaboration<sup>5</sup>.** The petitioner, without identity papers, informed the Territorial Office of Brasov that she is 22 years old, she is the mother of two minor children - a child of 2 years and one of 10 months and has a stable relationship with the father of the children, otherwise, live together. Neither the petitioner nor his children had identity papers (birth certificates, identity cards). In order to regulate the legal situation of his children, but also to be able to marry, the petitioner addressed the Brasov Court and, following her action, obtained a civil sentence, according to which it was ordered to register the birth of the petitioner, born in 1991, May , day 20, in Bra ov, Bra ov County, female sex, Romanian citizenship, Romanian nationality ... ". On the basis of the civil sentence, the petitioner made several attempts at the local Public Service of Population Records in Bra ov (SPCLEP Bra ov), but she was informed that her mother needed to be present for identity papers. The petitioner states that his father is deceased and that his mother, although the holder of an expired ID card, refuses to appear at SPCLEP Bra ov headquarters so that she is unable to regulate his situation and obtain the desired documents. Only after the mother's birth certificate has been granted, she would be able to take legal action to obtain the birth certificate for the 2-year-old minor. Also, for the minor of only 10 months, it is possible to obtain the birth certificate by administrative means until it reaches the age of one year, so it is necessary to settle the situation of the petitioner with a view to obtaining his birth registration.

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<sup>4</sup> [http://avp.ro/comunicate-de-pres/comunicate2017/comunicat\\_17februarie2017\\_2.pdf](http://avp.ro/comunicate-de-pres/comunicate2017/comunicat_17februarie2017_2.pdf), accessed on 11 June, 2019.

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<sup>5</sup> Newsletter of the People's Advocate Institution no.4/2015, [http://avp.ro/Buletine-informative/buletin4\\_2015.pdf](http://avp.ro/Buletine-informative/buletin4_2015.pdf), accessed on 11 June, 2019.

Representatives of the Territorial Office in Bra ov conducted an investigation at SPCLEP Bra ov. From the discussions, the following occurred: The petitioner must certify, in the presence of another person, that he is so called T.N. SPCLEP therefore recommends the petitioner to appear at the headquarters of SPCLEP Bra ov with a relative who preferably bears the same name or another major person with a valid identity card certifying its identity. After obtaining the birth certificate and identity card, the petitioner will be able to present at the headquarters of SPCLEP Bra ov with the minor up to 1 year old with the following documents: the medical certificate from the maternity in the original, the mother's identity document (copy + original). It will also be necessary to have the father of the child with his / her identity card (original + copy), and he / she will sign a declaration of paternity recognition. Following the investigation, the petitioner was informed by telephone on the legal means by which she can obtain the birth registration. According to the SPCLEP Bra ov executive director, she immediately presented herself with a major person with a valid identity card to the SPCLEP Bra ov Civil Service, where she received the dossier, and on the same day the birth certificate was issued by SPCLEP Brasov.

**3.3. Social assistance for a person with disabilities.** By the petition registered by telephone, through the Dispatcher service, registered with the People's Advocate Institution at Bra ov Territorial Office, Mr. ZA, with domicile in Bra ov municipality, we were informed of a possible violation of art.50 of the Romanian Constitution regarding the protection people with disabilities. We mention that, since the applicant was unable to move because of a physical disorder and the fact that he was at that time hospitalized, the representatives of the People's Advocate Institution have the opportunity to record the issues notified by phone by the person which is considered injured.

Thus, from the content of the petition addressed, it appears that the petitioner is 65 years of age, is invalid, with a medium handicap, undetectable, needs oxygen mask, has no caregivers, is alone. The petitioner underwent a hip orthopedic surgery on October 30, 2018. Currently he is hospitalized at the Mârzescu Hospital in Bra ov. On February 8, 2019, the petitioner was notified of a new disability-grade decision, changing his grade from "accentuated" to "environment" as a result of his reassessment by the Complex Assessment Service of the Adult Person with disability in the County Council of Brasov.

Mr. Z. is dissatisfied with the average grade of disability and wants to file an appeal at the Brasov Tribunal, according to the legal procedure, but does not have the physical possibility to submit the necessary steps, needing guidance on the formulation of this appeal. The petitioner states that he has no help, his only possibility being to contact the authorities. In this respect, Mr Z. claims that he has appealed to several authorities with powers in the field of social assistance, without being able to nominate a certain authority, but it has been stated that there are not enough people to go to the field.

Following the written procedures of the People's Advocate Institution of Bra ov Territorial Office, drafted in a timely manner given the urgent situation of the petitioner, the Social Assistance Department of Bra ov Municipality informed us that on March 1, 2019, an interdisciplinary team from within the same direction went to the 1st Department of Internal Affairs Mârzescu at the County Emergency Clinical Hospital Bra ov, where the petitioner was interned at that time. During the discussion, the petitioner was advised on the challenge to the court of the disability certificate issued on 08.02.2019 by the Disability Assessment Panel. The petitioner was also advised on the procedure to be followed in order to benefit from social services, so that in the near future a team of the Social Services Division will travel to his home in this regard.

As the petitioner was reinstated in the shield, we directed him to contact the Social Services Department after his release so that his representatives could come to his home.

We also informed the petitioner that during the internship he is entitled to apply for social assistance from the Brasov County Emergency Hospital, and that a social worker from this unit should go to the place of admission.

#### **4. EX OFFICIO REFERRALS OF THE PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE INSTITUTION TO LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES**

According to Article 59 of the Constitution of Romania and Article 16 paragraph (1) of the Law no. 35/1997 on the organization and functioning of the People's Advocate Institution, republished, the Ombudsman exercises his / her duties ex officio or at the request of persons injured in the rights and freedoms so that, both under constitutional and legal provisions, the People's Advocate can self-challenge in matters within his competence (Constantinescu *et al.*, 2004:117).

The provisions of art. 4 of the Law no. 35/1997 on the organization and functioning of the People's

Advocate Institution, republished, regulate that the public authorities are obliged to communicate or, as the case may be, provide the People's Advocate, according to the law, their acts in connection with petitions addressed to the People's Advocate, as well as those related to the *ex officio* notifications and the announced or unexpected visits it carries out for the fulfillment of the specific tasks of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture in the Places of Detention, giving him support for the exercise of his duties.

It should be noted that, according to Article 25 of the same law, the scope of exercise of the specific competence of the People's Advocate Institution as regards the conduct of investigations is extended, applying to the public administration authorities, to the public institutions, as well as to any public services under the authority public administration authorities. In this respect, both the head of the institution - the People's Advocate, his deputies, as well as the specialized personnel of the People's Advocate Institution have the right to ask the authorities of the public administration for any information or documents necessary for the investigation, to hear and to make statements from the heads of the public administration authorities; from any official who can give the information necessary to resolve the petition, under the terms of this law.

It should be noted that, according to Article 25 of the same law, the scope of exercise of the specific competence of the People's Advocate Institution as regards the conduct of investigations is extended, applying to the public administration authorities, to the public institutions, as well as to any public services under the authority public administration authorities. In this respect, both the head of the institution - the People's Advocate, his deputies, as well as the specialized personnel of the People's Advocate Institution have the right to ask the authorities of the public administration for any

information or documents necessary for the investigation, to hear and to make statements from the heads of the public administration authorities; from any official who can give the information necessary to resolve the petition, under the terms of this law (see Annual Report of the People's Advocate Institution 2018, [http://avp.ro/rapoarte-anuale/raport\\_2018\\_avp.pdf](http://avp.ro/rapoarte-anuale/raport_2018_avp.pdf), ).

By means of the aforementioned notifications, the People's Advocate Institution of Brasov Territorial Office took steps to verify the issues reported in the press.

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