

## THE NEW PARTNER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Ivaylo ANGELOV

National Military University „Vasil Levski“, Veliko Tarnovo, Republic of Bulgaria  
(ivailoaa@abv.bg)

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***Abstract:** Existing global threats to the security of modern societies such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental and climate change, provoking a search for global responses and responses to ensure peace, peace and stability. Against the backdrop of these priorities in the public agenda, the issue of the role of the European security architecture in the international relations system is particularly relevant as the latest security-related EU documents make a clear call for the EU to adopt as a global a security actor.*

***Keywords:** "Brexit", security, defence*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

By analyzing the EU's defense scenarios, it should be noted that the two-speed military homogenization in the EU, with permanently structured cooperation between member states, remains the integration scenario with the highest probability. It is important to note that this scenario is the one that responds closely to the wishes of the old member states, as this arrangement does not require a change of the existing contracts and is feasible within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty toolbox. The scenario that comes close to federal logic for a single European army, according to expert analysis, is likely to happen either after 10 years (28%) or never (27%).

### 2. EUROPEAN UNION - THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

After the leaving of Britain, the scenario for a single European army was more acceptable in comparison to the time preceding the referendum (before June 23, 2016). The withdrawal of UK may be an opportunity for greater integration, given the United Kingdom's firm opposition to closer integration and the transformation of the EU into a super state. This would mean much greater autonomy in the area of foreign policy, security and defense. However, this opportunity should be the result of sound and timely political decisions, at European level. If European leaders are disposed to think soberly and rationally and are able to bring the interests of the Union to the fore and not their personal ones, the main loser of the so-called "Brexit," would be Britain. The UK debate on leaving the European Union has ignored the potential implications for security, foreign policy and transatlantic relations in Europe.

According to leading military commanders, Britain's exit will limit the UK's ability to overcome international challenges and dangers such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the rise of Russian nationalism. Watching the world today, they see that Britain will be safer and stronger within the Union [1].

The British Security and Defense Strategic Review of 2015 shows that the UK government and security agencies are concerned about the transnational nature of threats to the United Kingdom - the fight against terrorism, extremism, cyber attacks, organized crime, threats to key infrastructure, requiring a coordinated approach with the EU and other partners [2]. With Britain retreating, it is expected that Germany will begin to play a key role in the EU's common foreign and security policy, given its leading position in European diplomacy over Russia.

Concerning the military industry and in the context of the declared European Army, France will have a key role to play in convincing Germany, which after World War II is restricted on the number of army personnel and avoids being perceived as a leading military power, to consider the army only within the NATO structure. If the United Kingdom decides to prioritize its cooperation with the United States and not to continue the joint defense initiatives with France, it will have an impact on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) [3].

The two referendums in the Netherlands [4] and the UK are a typical example of how attempts to accumulate electoral support and take part of the voices from the ultra-formations, the pro-European parties, either change their rhetoric with a critical tone towards the EU or become passive when have to talk about it.

This has its current political logic but, in the long run will lead to evisceration of the political actors, to their unification in a direction that is not constructive for the Member States and for Europe as a whole. The weakness of Eurosceptic is in the lack of vision, but the power is in their "anti-speaking". The strength of the European parties is the EU's achievements and the potential for its development, but the weakness of the pro-European parties is in the fear of making the right decisions, and they are very likely to pay a high political price in the future.

In the EU, at best, we have figures that run governments, but there are no leaders to lead the nations [5], and now Europe desperately needs exactly this. What happens on the world stage puts the international relations in a new context and represents a test for the preservation and consistent application of generally accepted international rules and principles. In this respect, the innovative approach to complex and integrated knowledge, value added innovation and / or value added improvements with calculated risk will be of utmost importance to the upcoming discussions on the future scenarios for the European Union. European and national leaders and policymakers should not allow themselves to live in the past. This implies making responsible decisions here, which is the basis for the impending future.

It should be noted that Britain's exit after 44 years of membership in the European Union, the arrival of the new US administration of Donald Trump and his position about the Union and NATO, the EU, and US relations with Russia and Turkey, the migration and refugee crisis, have led to the mobilization of political will and the emergence of:

- New Global Strategy for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union - Common vision, common actions; stronger Europe;

- Single Security and Defense Package. On November 30, 2016, The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy - F. Mogerini, announced the framework consisting of the following three key elements - 1 / a plan to implement the European Global Strategy; 2 / Implementation Plan of the NATO-EU Joint Declaration of the Warsaw Meeting in July, and 3 / Action Plan for the European Defense Industry to be strong, smart and innovative and related to the launching of an European Defense Fund , providing € 25 million in the European budget for 2017, providing funds for joint investment projects for research and technology development in the defense sector.

By 2020 this fund is planned to reach € 90 million, and in the debate on the next Multiannual Financial Framework post-2020, the European Commission envisages setting up a 500 million annual defense research program [6]. This will be, on the one hand, a test for the unity of the institutions and the Lisbon Treaty, and on the other hand it will show the key role of the Member States' governments, and their national parliaments in the decision-making process.

- White Paper on the Future of Europe, with a focus on security and defense in the five scenarios for EU development by 2025, highlighting as well the need for significant efforts to consolidate European leaders around preserving Europe's unity and forming a common strategic vision;

- The Rome Declaration [7] signed by the 27 EU leaders on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, focuses on the need for more secure and stronger Europe. It is related to the creation of an integrated and competitive defense industry; as well as strengthening the Common Security and Defense protocol in cooperative complementation to NATO.

The European Security and Defense Policy was the focal point in the Security Conference report in Munich [8]. Despite the assurance the Europeans received from US Vice President Mike Pens for strong US NATO support and a "steadfast" commitment to their transatlantic allies, European countries were previously invoked by President Trump to dedicate more resources to defense. In this regard, European leaders need to realize the necessity for more independent and firm approach to accentuate the strength of its unity [9].

### **3. THE GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Despite the slow process of strategic reconsideration of the security environment, the emergence of new strategic documents in the EU security and foreign policy area is a positive step, as the situation in the Middle East, North Africa and Ukraine demands increasingly and intensely a strategic vision that would take into account both the current dynamics and the new realities along with the security and defense challenges in Europe. The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy is an important step in the process of defining the level of ambition of the Union, its strategic objectives and its military capabilities. It shows: [10]

- What type of player the EU wants to be - global. The document proclaims the Union's aspirations for strategic independence, its ambition to exert global authority, not only in terms of its geographic dimension but also of the instruments and policies at its disposal. It notes the EU's willingness and readiness to be engaged in operations and missions outside Europe;

- What type of power the EU wants to use - a combination of soft and firm power. The document recognizes that while the Union is best at using soft power, this is not enough in the context of the new challenges in a world of "foreseeable unpredictability." This highlights the need to strengthen the EU's credibility in the field of security and defense;

- what budget should be earmarked for defense; - there is an attempt to allocate sufficient defense spending, use resources as efficiently as possible, and meet the collective commitment to spend 20% of the defense budget on equipment, research and technologies. The document launches the idea of an EU-wide coordinated process for Member States' military spending plans, which could lead to closer alignment of defense planning and capacity development. This should be done in full uniformity with NATO's defense planning process.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) should play a key role by strengthening the Capability Development Plan acting as a mediator between the Member States and the Commission, assisting the Member States to develop the capabilities arising from the objectives outlined in the Strategy;

- What is the EU's ambition for new technologies and investments in the field of the European defense industry; - the pursuit of creating a solid European defense industry and developing capabilities with the ultimate degree of interoperability and harmonization. It is envisaged that the EU funding in the next budget cycle will be of crucial importance for the development of the defense capabilities that Europe needs.

- How its synergy with NATO to be enhanced: – to deepen the transatlantic link and intensifying the EU's partnership with NATO. The strategy paper reinforces the EU's contribution to Europe's collective security by working closely with its partners, with NATO on the first place.

The EU Global Strategy marks out that: "while NATO exists to defend its members, most of which- European countries, from outside attacks, Europeans need to be better prepared, trained and organized, to be able to contribute decisively to these collective efforts, and act independently if and when it is needed. For Europe to promote peace and to guarantee security on its territory and beyond is of extreme importance to have the necessary ambition and certain level of strategic autonomy[11]. "

In the official conclusion of NATO Communiqué following the Warsaw Summit, the European Union has been highlighted as a unique and key partner of the Alliance, especially in the context of the occurrences at the South and East borders of the two organizations. The independent legal personality of the EU as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, and the NATO-EU meeting in Warsaw, which resulted in the signing of a declaration for cooperation by the Secretary-General of the Alliance - J. Stoltenberg, the President of the European Council - D. Tusk and the President of the European Commission - JK Juncker, has increasingly identified the European Union as a strategic actor on the international scene.

NATO welcomes the emergence of a Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy, paying particular attention to:

- Strategic cooperation with the Union in response to common challenges with emphasis on cyber-security, migration and hybrid threats;

- A strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency and complementarity, with the agreement of the two organizations to respect their autonomy in the decision-making process and their institutional integrity [12].

The new strategic context outlines the opportunity for the EU to be considered as an autonomous global strategic player, active in the field of security and defense, acting in close cooperation with NATO and conducting a meaningful Euro-Atlantic dialogue with Russia.

Key steps in this direction are related to:

- the development of the EU's Global Strategy for Common Foreign and Security Policy into a smart strategy that responds to the new realities and challenges in the security environment;

- to prevent, on the side of the European leaders, the UK exit of the European Union to lead to the domino effect and to deepen the problems in the EU, to take advantage of the opportunities for greater integration of the Union in sensitive areas such as security and defense;

- Reflecting on the idea of changing the direction and sequence of the integration stages, namely post-Soviet republics, first to join the EU and then NATO, applying the method of negotiating.

- Improving the interaction between the EU and NATO in the modern security environment. In the context of the EU's position as a global actor and its ability to respond quickly to new geostrategic realities and challenges, a close cooperation with NATO is needed, focusing on a common vision of threats, a higher degree of integration, interoperability and augmentation among the Allies.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The EU should be defined as an intelligent force, which means applying a combination of hard and soft power in effective strategies in different situations, being pro-active rather than merely reactive to the changes in the modern security environment. Only then a common vision and action for a stronger Europe can be taken. Thus, the EU's Global Strategy, besides epitomizing the transformation and / or adaptation of the EU in response to the changes in the security environment, together with the accompanying documentation will be the basis for modeling the environment through strategic vision and prevention from future risks and threats.

Whether this will happen, the future will show. Due to the great dynamics in the security environment and the forthcoming debate on the future of Europe and related to a series of expected documents, which will definitely give food for thought including the European defense perspective and the proposal for a European Defense Fund, the question remains to be answered.

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